Delhi District Court
Mukesh Arora vs The State on 24 January, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-008142-2020
Criminal Revision No.: 283/2020
MUKESH ARORA,
S/o. Late Sh. R.C. Arora,
R/o. 3545, Jai Mata Market,
Bazar Sita Ram,
Delhi-110006. ... REVISIONIST/
PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. STATE (GNCT OF DELHI)
2. SHRI. T.S. GAMBHIR,
S/o. Shri. Satnam Singh,
R/o. R-846, New Rajender Nagar,
New Delhi-110060. ... RESPONDENT
Date of Institution : 12.11.2020
Date when judgment was reserved : 11.11.2024
Date when judgment is pronounced : 24.01.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been filed under
Sections 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter, referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’), seeking setting aside of the
order dated 15.09.20201 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘impugned
order’), passed by Ld. ACMM-02, Central, Tis Hazari Courts,
Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Ld. ACMM/Ld. Trial
1
It is noted that the proceedings in the instant case pertain to the period when the restrictions due to
Covid-19 restrictions were persisting and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Re: Cognizance for Extension of
Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Pet. (C) No. 3/2020, dated 10.01.2022 inter alia, directed, “*** I. The order
dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and
23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the
purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or
quasi judicial proceedings. ***III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period
between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all
persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of
limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply…”
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24
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Court’), in case bearing, “State v. Ram Kumar Sharma, etc., CIS
No. 302036/2016″, arising out of FIR No. 50/2013, PS Hauz
Qazi, under Sections 419/420/467/468/471/506 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC‘). Pertinently,
by virtue of the impugned order the Ld. Trial Court directed
framing of charges under Sections 506(part II) IPC and Section
120B IPC read with Section 467/468/471 IPC against the
revisionist/petitioner herein. Notably, the charges were
subsequently framed against the revisionist on 21.10.2020.
2. Succinctly, the case of the prosecution is premised
on the complaint of the complainant/respondent no. 2, namely,
Sh. Tarjit Singh Gambhir/Sh. T.S. Gambhir (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘complainant/respondent no. 2’) inter alia averring that
the property bearing nos. 3375-3378, freehold plot of 79.43 sq.
mts., with building standing thereon, situated in Ward No. VI,
Hauz Qazi, Delhi-110006 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘premise/property in question’) was purchased by one Sh. Dayal
Singh, S/o. Sh. Ladha Singh, vide Certificate of Sale, issued on
05.05.1962, duly registered with the office of Sub-Registrar,
Delhi as Document No. 330, in Additional Book No. 1, Vol. No.
179, page 179 on 18.05.1962. As per the complainant. Sh. Dayal
Singh left for heavenly abode on 19.11.1969 and post, demise of
Sh. Dayal Singh, the premise/property in question devolved upon
his heirs, i.e., (i) Shamsher Singh, son; (ii) Rachpal Singh, son;
(iii) Sampuran Singh, son; (iv) Avtar Singh, son; (v) Harbans
Kaur, daughter; (vi) Pyar Kaur, daughter; (vii) Vidyawanti Kaur,
daughter; (viii) Shanti Devi, daughter; and (ix) Beant Kaur,
daughter; as well as Smt. Pritam Kaur, wife of the said deceased,
left for heavenly abode on 27.03.1958. Under the complaint, it
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Date:
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was further proclaimed that Sh. Dayal Singh never executed any
will in respect of the premise/property in question and the said
property was got mutated by the legal heirs in their names.
Markedly, at the time of lodging of the instant complaint,
respondent no. 2 while proclaiming himself as one of the co-
owners of the premise/property in question, asserted that the
same was under occupation of several tenants at that point in
time. Further, as per the complainant/respondent no. 2, when he
visited the premise/property in question in September 2012, he
was informed by the tenants that one Ram Kanwar Sharma was
claiming himself as the owner of the said premise. It is further
the case of the prosecution/complainant/respondent no. 2 that
upon enquiry it was determined that said Ram Kanwar Sharma
got forged and fabricated sale deed executed in his favour by one
Balbir, dated 27.07.2012, duly registered with Sub-Registrar-III
vide registration no. 7090, Book No. 1, Vol. No. 14797 from
pages 118 to 130 on 27.08.2012. Correspondingly, it is asserted
that it was revealed upon investigation that Balbir Singh claimed
himself as the owner of the premise/property in question,
wrongly averring to be the only son of Seth Dayal Singh. Under
his complaint, the complainant/respondent no. 2 further alleged
that Balbir Singh, neither had any claim to the premise/property
in question nor was he related to Seth Dayal Singh in any manner
and created false documents in form of sale deed, while acting in
collusion/conspiracy with Ram Kanwar Sharma.
Correspondingly, as per the complainant/respondent no. 2, the
revisionist while acting in collusion/conspiracy with Balbir and
Ram Kanwar Sharma contacted him/the complainant for
negotiation of the premise/property in question, offering to settle
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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dispute with him by payment of sum of Rs. 1.2 Crores. As per
the complainant/respondent no. 2, the revisionist even threatened
him that in case he did not settle with him/the revisionist,
he/revisionist would further sell the premise/property in question
to some Muslim gundas.
2.1. Markedly, on the basis of the instant complaint, the
instant FIR was registered, and investigation ensued. Notably,
during the course of investigation, the statements of witnesses
were recorded as well as the documents of the premise/property
in question, pertaining to the alleged sale thereof by Balbir Singh
to Ram Kumar Sharma was carried out. Correspondingly, during
the investigation, it is avowed that the police official(s) came to
know that no person in the name of Balbir Singh S/o. Sh. Dayal
Singh ever resides at Village Sisai Bolan, Hansi Hissar as per the
voters’ list of the relevant/said village. Concomitantly, it was
determined that Balbir Singh S/o. Beeru Ram, got a death
certificate issued on 14.06.2012 claiming that Dayal Singh died
on 23.10.1995 by misrepresenting facts and filing false
documents with the office of SDO, Hansi Civil Hissar, Haryana.
Notably, the said death certificate is stated to have been used by
Balbir Singh with the office of Sub-Registrar-III for the
registration of the sale deed. Remarkably, on conclusion of the
investigation, chargesheet was filed by the concerned police
officials before the Ld. Trial Court, whereupon cognizance of
offence was taken by the Ld. Trial Court on 05.07.2014.
Subsequently, on the compliance of the provisions under Section
207 Cr.P.C. and upon the Ld. Counsel for the accused’s as well
as Ld. Addl. PP for the State’s addressing their respective
arguments on charge, as aforementioned, charges were directed
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GOYAL
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to be framed by the Ld. Trial Court inter alia against the
revisionist vide order dated 15.09.2020, the impugned order
herein. Apposite at this stage, to reproduce the relevant extract(s)
from the order dated 15.09.2020 of the Ld. Trial Court/impugned
order, as under;
“…7. Heard. Record perused.
8. It is to be noted that voter list of the Village
Sisai Bolan is on record as per which name of father
of accused Balbir Singh is Biru Ram who is resident
of H.No. 232. The said Balbir Singh is having wife
Smt. Dhanno and sons namely Sh. Dinesh, Mahender
etc. Thus, as per voter list it is clear that name of
father of accused Balbir Singh whose photo was also
available on voter list is “Biru Ram” despite that in
the year, 2012 accused Balbir Singh, S/o Sh. Biru
Ram applied and got issued a death certificate of his
father showing name of his father as Dayal Singh. An
affidavit for preparing all these documents was
executed by him on 26.07.2012 which shows that
immediately prior to execution of sale deed in
question he got death certificate of his father by
changing his name from “Biru Ram” to “Dayal
Singh”. He also got a Ration Card issued in his name
showing name of his father as Dayal Singh.
Apparently, accused Balbir Singh, S/o Sh. Biru Ram,
or Dayal Singh, R/o H.No. 232, Village Sisai Bola,
Tehsil Hansi, District Hissar, Haryana, executed a
document i.e. sale deed in question claiming himself
to be Balbir Singh, S/o Sh. Dayal Singh, S/o Ladha
Singh, as owner of property in question i.e. 3375-
3378, Ward No. VI, Hauz Qazi, Delhi-110006. This
document would squarely fall within ambit of false
documents as though father’s name of accused Balbir
Singh was shown as Dayal Singh, however he was
not son of Dayal Singh, S/o Ladha Singh. Thus, it is
proved that sale deed in question is forged document,
as he signed the sale deed not in his own capacity.
but as Balbir Singh, S/o Sh. Dayal Singh, S/o Sh.
Ladha Singh.
9. Accused Ram Kumar purchased the property
in question in cash. No payment was made through
cheques, thus there is no proof that any money
transfer has taken place between accused Balbir
Singh and accused Ram Kumar Sharma which shows
that accused Ram Kumar Sharma was involved in
criminal conspiracy to forge document qua property
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
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in question and on the basis of such forge document
he claimed to be owner of the property and has
applied for mutation of property in his name.
10. Accused Mukesh Arora started construction
in the property in question. He also contacted the
complainant and gave offer to him and also
threatened him that he would further sell the property
to Muslim gundas. All these acts on the part of
accused Mukesh Arora clearly shows that he was
also involved in criminal conspiracy. Consequent to
which forged sale deed was executed and efforts
were made to take possession of the property in
question.
*** *** ***
12. It is further to be noted that no offence of
fraud has been committed in the present matter as
there was no inducement of any one, however there
are sufficient material on record to frame charges for
commission of offence of criminal conspiracy for
forging sale deed of property bearing no.3375-3378,
Ward No. VI, Hauz Qazi, Delhi-110006 against
accused persons namely Ram Kumar Sharma, Balbir
Singh and Mukesh Arora.
*** *** ***
15. Charge for commission of offence U/s 506
(Part-II) IPC be also framed against accused Mukesh
Arora as he threatened the complainant that he would
sell the property in question to muslim gundas. There
are sufficient material on record to frame charges
against accused Mukesh Arora for commission of
offence punishable U/s 120-B IPC r/w Section
467/468/471 IPC as well, as his threat to the
complainant shows his involvement with the other
accused persons…”
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Learned Counsel for the revisionist submitted that
the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere
conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled
cannons of law, deserving to be set aside at the outset, as
suffering with gross illegality. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further
submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial
Court on mere assumptions and that no sound and/or cogent
reasons have been delineated under the said order. Ld. Counsel
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further submitted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld.
Trial Court further failed to appreciate that the entire story of the
complainant is concocted, false and nor reliable. As per the ld.
Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court passed the impugned order by
totally misinterpreting the law and material on record, as well as
wrongly framed the charges against the revisionist. Ld. Counsel
further submitted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld.
Trial Court further failed to appreciate that from the material
placed on record, even the basic ingredients of the
provisions/offences under Sections 506 (part-II) IPC and Section
120B IPC read with Sections 467/468/471 IPC are not even
prima facie established against the revisionist. In this regard, Ld.
Counsel further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court totally ignored
the fact that the revisionist was not involved in any criminal
conspiracy and that there was no material on the record of the Ld.
Trial Court, demonstrating/making out even a prima facie case of
criminal conspiracy and forgery against the revisionist. It was
further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that
the revisionist started his repair work at the instance of Ram
Kumar Sharma, who alleged himself to be the owner of the
premise/property in question and that the revisionist stopped the
construction work, when the same was objected by respondent
no. 2, becoming aware that there was title dispute between the
said parties. In this regard, it was further submitted that the Ld.
Trial Court also did not consider that the revisionist was doing
construction and repair work of the property in the area and was
not aware of the fact that respondent no. 2 or any other person
were the owners of the premise/property in question. Even
otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, there are no allegations ofCR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 7 of 33
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conspiracy against the revisionist even under the
documents/chargesheet filed by the concerned police official(s).
As per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned order was not totally
against the material on record, rather, also a misinterpretation of
the facts and material placed before the Ld. Counsel. Ergo, it was
submitted that the impugned order is non-speaking order, passed
without going through the investigation record.
3.1. Learned Counsel for the revisionist further asserted
that the Ld. Trial Court acted mechanically and passed the
impugned order, although, it was clearly mentioned under the
chargesheet that the investigation was still in progress and
additional evidence was to be collected. As per Ld. Counsel, the
impugned order was passed without completion of investigation
and therefore, liable to be set aside as being illegal. It was further
submitted that while passing the impugned order, Ld. Trial Court
did not consider that Balbir Singh and Subhash Garg were
related/based in same village, i.e., Village Sisai Bolan, PS Hansi
Hissar, Haryana. As such, as per the Ld. Counsel, Balbir Singh
was the resident of the said village and Subhash Garg’s in-laws’
house was also based in same village, revealing that both the said
accused persons were acquainted with each other. Ld. Counsel
further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court did not even appreciate
that the revisionist never threatened the complainant/respondent
no. 2 in any manner, whatsoever and stopped the construction
work, at the very first instance when objection was raised by
respondent no. 2, making the impugned order liable to be set
aside on this sole ground. Correspondingly, as per the Ld.
Counsel, the revisionist neither signed any alleged forged
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Section 120B IPC read with Sections 467/468/471 IPC ought to
be framed against the revisionist in the instant case.
3.2. Learned Counsel further vehemently argued that the
Ld. Trial Court grossly erred in not appreciating that there is no
grave suspicion against the revisionist and the material on record,
clearly demonstrates that the revisionist is innocent and has been
wrongly/falsely implicated in the present case by the
complainant/respondent no. 2 to only counter the case registered
against him for his illegal acts and deeds. It was further
submitted that the Ld. Trial Court also failed to give any sound,
cogent or justified reasons for passing the impugned order, which
adversely affects the rights of the revisionist. Consequently, the
Ld. Counsel prayed that the impugned order, being passed in
gross violation of law and settled judicial precedents, deserves to
be set aside, outrightly.
4. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that
the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due
appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the present case
and, as such, deserves no interference by this Court. It was
further submitted that no irregularity, impropriety, or
incorrectness can be attributed to the impugned order, as well as
the framing of charges against the revisionist, which was/were
passed by the Ld. Trial Court, cognizant of the principles of law,
as well as wary of the facts and circumstances brought forth. As
per the Ld. Addl. PP for the State, the arguments contended
by/on behalf of the revisionist are in the nature of revisionist’s
defence, which cannot be considered by the Court at the stage of
framing of charge. Even otherwise, sufficiency of the
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considered at the stage of framing of charges.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist as
well as that of Ld. Addl. PP for the State, heard as well as the
records, including the Ld. Trial Court records as well as the
written submissions and case laws, placed on record have been
thoroughly perused.
6. Before proceeding with the determination of the
merits of the case/issues posed before this Court, it would be
apposite to outrightly make a reference to the relevant provisions
under law, in particular that under Section 397 Cr.P.C., as under;
“397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of
revision – (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge
may call for and examine the record of any
proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate
within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of
satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of
any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may,
when calling for such record, direct that the
execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and
if the accused is in confinement, that he be released
on bail or on his own bond pending the examination
of the record.
Explanation – All Magistrates, whether Executive
or Judicial, and whether exercising original or
appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior
to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-
section and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry,
trial or other proceeding…”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Pertinently, from a perusal of the aforesaid, it is
quite evident that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be
agitated either suo motu or an application of parties, that too in a
case(s) where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the
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provision of law, decision of Trial Court being completely
erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily.
In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9
SCC 460, wherein the Hon’ble Court while explicating the
various contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C.
observed as under:
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction
or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it
may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the
orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of
careful consideration and appear to be in accordance
with law. If one looks into the various judgments of
this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction
can be invoked where the decisions under challenge
are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with
the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based
on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are
merely indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it
should not be against an interim or interlocutory
order. The Court has to keep in mind that the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not
lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing
with the question as to whether the charge has been
framed properly and in accordance with law in a
given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise
of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case
substantially falls within the categories aforestated.
Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in
the proceedings under the CrPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Similarly, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in V.K.
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Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1192, in a similar context
noted as under;
“67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to
test the waters of what might happen in the trial. The
Revisional Court has to consider the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order
and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the
court below. While doing so, the Revisional Court
does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence
of the case, rather it considers the material only to
satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the
findings, sentence and order and refrains from
substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate
consideration of evidence. In the instant case, the
Petitioner has failed to make out a case for exercise
of the revisional jurisdiction since there is no patent
error in the impugned order on the face of record.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted,
the revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an
order of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it
is a settled law2 that trite law that in a case where the order of
subordinate Court does not suffer from any illegality , “merely
because of equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no
jurisdiction to re-consider the matter and pass a different order in
a routine manner.” Reference in this regard is made to the
decision in Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 312,
wherein the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi expounded as under;
“9. The scope of interference in a revision
petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that
Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the
Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter
se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings2
Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine
MP 958.
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of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while
considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a
finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court
does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence
of the case. A court in revision considers the material
only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety
of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from
substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate
consideration of evidence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Notably in the context of the foregoing, it is further
apposite to observe here that it is no longer res integra that the
orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither
interlocutory nor final in nature, rather, intermediate in nature 3,
and are, therefore, not affected by the bar of Section 397(2)
Cr.P.C. However, the scope of interference under Section 397
Cr.P.C. at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also equally
settled4. In this regard, it is pertinent to make a reference to the
decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Manendra Prasad Tiwari
v. Amit Kumar Tiwari, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1057, wherein the
Hon’ble Court enunciated the law in regard the foregoing as
under;
“22. The scope of interference and exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 397 of CrPC has been time
and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope
of interference under Section 397 CrPC at a stage,
when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At
the stage of framing of a charge, the court is
concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather
it has to focus on the material and form an opinion
whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has
committed an offence, which if put to trial, could
prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage,
at which stage the final test of guilt is to be applied.
Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge,
the court should form an opinion that the accused is
certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold
something which is neither permissible nor is in
3
Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of U.P., (2022) 15 SCC 720.
4
State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, (2017) 3 SCC 198.
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consonance with the scheme of Code of Criminal
Procedure.
23. Section 397 CrPC vests the court with the
power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction
or law or the perversity which has crept in the
proceeding.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Germane for the purpose(s) of present discourse to
now consider the principles governing framing of charges. In this
regard, it is relevant to outrightly note the settled law 5 that at the
stage of framing of charges, neither can the truth, veracity and
effect of the prosecution case be meticulously 6 judged, nor can
any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused.
On the contrary, at such a stage, only the sufficiency of ground
for proceeding against the accused, on a general consideration of
materials placed before the Court by the investigating police
officer is relevant. Further, though, sifting of evidence is
permissible7, however, scanning of evidence in detail is not.
Quite understandably, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Reena
v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2020 SCC OnLine Del 630 , iterated the
said principles in unequivocal terms as under;
“12. Thus it is settled position of law that at the
time of framing of charge, the Court is not supposed
to look into the evidence of the case in detail and is
only to consider whether there is a strong suspicion
against the accused on the basis of the material that
comes before it. The court has the power to sift the
evidence for the limited purpose of finding out,
whether or not a prima facie case is made out against
the accused. However, the Court is not supposed to
delve deeply into the merits of the matter and start a
5
State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018
6
Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460.
7
State of Maharashta v. Priya Sharan Maharaj & Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 393.
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roving expedition into the evidence that is brought
forth it, as if conducting a trial. Further there is no
one fixed definition that may be ascribed to the term
prima facie’ nor can the term strong suspicion have a
singular meaning. While coming to the conclusion of
a strong prima facie case or strong suspicion, the
Court shall have to decide each case on the basis of
its own independent facts and circumstances.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Concomitantly, it is settled law 8 that the
inconsistency in the material produced by the prosecution or the
defect in investigation9, cannot be looked into for discharge of an
accused, in the absence of full-fledged trial. In fact, the probative
value10 of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the
material placed on record by the prosecution has to be accepted
as true at that stage. Reference in this regard is made to the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State through Deputy
Superintendent of Police v. R. Soundirarasu and Ors.,
MANU/SC/1103/2022, wherein the Hon’ble Court remarked as
under;
“58. Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh
Ahlawat and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.,
MANU/SC/1011/2012: (2013) 11 SCC 476, it was
observed by this Court that while framing charges
the court is required to evaluate the materials and
documents on record to decide whether the facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value would
disclose existence of ingredients constituting the
alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not
required to go deep into the probative value of the
materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether
there is a ground for presuming that the Accused had
committed the offence and it is not required to
evaluate sufficiency of evidence to convict the
Accused. It was held that the Court at this stage
cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the
allegations and contradictions & inconsistencies in8
Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476.
9
State of Tamil Nadu by Inspector of Police v. N. Suresh Ranjan & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 709.
10
Soma Chakravarty v. State, (2007) 5 SCC 403.
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the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at
the stage of discharge.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Relevant to further note that it is trite law 11, at the
stage of framing of charge, only the police report is required to
be considered and the defence of the accused12 cannot be looked
into. Needless to mention that the superior courts 13 have
persistently deprecated the practice of holding a mini trial at the
time of framing of charge. Relevantly, in this regard, reference is
made to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharat
Parikh v. CBI, (2008) 10 SCC 109, wherein the Hon’ble Court
enunciated the judicial principle(s), as under;
“19. As observed in Debendra Nath Padhi case
[(2005) 1 SCC 568: 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] at the stage
of framing charge roving and fishing inquiry is
impermissible and a mini trial cannot be conducted at
such stage. At the stage of framing of charge the
submissions on behalf of the accused have to be
confined to the material produced by the
investigating agency. The accused will get an
opportunity to prove the documents subsequently
produced by the prosecution on the order of the
Court, but the same cannot be relied upon to reopen
the proceedings once charge has been framed or for
invocation of the High Court’s powers under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Apposite to further emphasize14 that at the stage of
charge, court(s) is/are not even required to record detailed
reasons for framing charge, rather15, a very strong suspicion
founded upon materials placed before it, which leads the court to
11
State Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad & Anr. v. P. Suryaprakasam, (1999) SCC (Crl.) 373 and State
of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, 2005 (1) SCC 568.
12
State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294.
13
Indu Jain v. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 341.
14
Bhawna Bai v. Dhanshyam & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 217
15
Supdt. and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52 and
Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368
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form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of factual
ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the
framing of charges. In fact16, it is only when no case is made out
even after presuming entire prosecution evidence, can an accused
be discharged. Needless to accentuate17, “at the stage of framing
of charge, the sufficiency of materials for the purpose of
conviction is not the requirement and a prayer for discharge can
be allowed only if the court finds that the materials are wholly
insufficient for the purpose of trial.” Notably, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip
Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715, while inter alia
illuminating the principles as well as the scope of enquiry for the
purpose of charge/discharging an accused, observed as under;
“14. …In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough
guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose
of discharging an accused. It provides that “the Judge
shall discharge when he considers that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused”. The “ground” in the context is not a
ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the
accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the
innocence of the accused will be determined and not
at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore,
need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting
and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to
delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has
to consider is whether the evidentiary material on
record if generally accepted, would reasonably
connect the accused with the crime. No more need be
enquired into.”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Germane for the purpose of the present discourse to
further observe at this stage, that the superior courts18 have
16
Manjit Singh Virdi v. Hussain Mohammed Shattaf, (2023) 7 SCC 633
17
Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta & Ors., (2015) 3 SCC 424
18
Baldev Kumar v. State, 1987 SCC OnLine Del 571; N.M. Veeraiyan v. State, 2022 SCC OnLine Mad
103; and Kamta Prasad @ K.P. Jaiswal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Revision No. 1803 of 2022,
dated 26.09.2022 (Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh).
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persistently avowed that no charge can be framed against an
accused merely on the basis of the confessional statements of the
accused or co-accused(s). Relevantly, the Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi in Santokh Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi, Crl. Rev. P.
691/2009, dated 05.08.2011, in regard the aforesaid inter alia
noted as under;
“5. Indubitably no charge can be framed against
an accused merely on the basis of the confessional
statements of the accused or co-accuseds. However,
in the present case the telephone call details shows
that accused Santokh Singh and Satpal Singh were in
constant touch with each other and Amarjit Singh.
Accused Sampat Singh and Pyare Lal have been
discharged for the reason that no role was assigned to
them and there was no evidence against them.
Though Petitioner has not been named in the FIR
however his name has surfaced during the disclosure
of the co-accused pursuant to which the call details
were verified which shows that the two were
together.”
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Ominously, in order to comprehensively deal with
the issue/questions raised in the instant case, it is also pertinent to
make reference to the provisions under Sections 25 and 26 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Evidence Act‘), which make even (any) voluntary
statement/confessions made to the police officer or by any
person, whilst in custody of a police officer, unless it be made in
the immediate presence of a Magistrate, as inadmissible against
such person. In this regard, reference is made to the decision in
Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16
SCC 547, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, held as under;
“27. Section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872
(hereinafter referred to as “the Evidence Act“, for
short) renders inadmissible a confession made to a
police officer. It declares in fact that no confessionCR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 18 of 33
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made to a police officer shall be proved as against a
person accused of any offence.
*** *** ***
44. Such a person viz. person who is named in
the FIR, and therefore, the accused in the eye of the
law, can indeed be questioned and the statement is
taken by the police officer. A confession, which is
made to a police officer, would be inadmissible
having regard to Section 25 of the Evidence Act. A
confession, which is vitiated under Section 24 of the
Evidence Act would also be inadmissible. A
confession unless it fulfils the test laid down in
Pakala Narayana Swami [Pakala Narayana Swami v.
King Emperor, 1939 SCC OnLine PC 1: (1938-39)
66 IA 66: AIR 1939 PC 47] and as accepted by this
Court, may still be used as an admission under
Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This, however, is
subject to the bar of admissibility of a statement
under Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a
statement contains admission, the statement being
one under Section 161, it would immediately attract
the bar under Section 162 CrPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Reference, at this stage is further made to the
decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Commr. of Police v.
Narender Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 265, wherein the Hon’ble Court,
while distinguishing the provisions under Sections 25 and 26 of
the Evidence as well as clarifying the meaning of word,
‘confession’, remarked as under;
“29. …Section 25 raises an embargo as regards
proof of confession before a police officer. The same
need not be in police custody; whereas Section 26
raises a bar as regards admissibility of such
confession, if made by an accused in the custody of a
police officer although such a confession might have
been made before a person who is not a police
officer.
30. The policy underlying Sections 25 and 26 is
to make it a substantive rule of law that confessions
whenever and wherever made to the police, or while
in the custody of the police to any person
whomsoever unless made in the immediate presence
of a Magistrate, shall be presumed to have been
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Section 24 and, therefore, inadmissible, except so far
as is provided by Section 27 of the Act.
31. A confession would mean incriminating
statement made to the police suggesting inference of
the commission of the crime and it, therefore, is
confined to the evidences to be adduced in a court of
law…”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Ergo, being mindful of the principles hereinunder
noted, this Court would now proceed with the determination of
the arguments raised by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist as well as
by Ld. Addl. PP for the State. Markedly, one of the primary
contentions of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist is that even
from the material placed on record prima facie ingredients of
offence under the allegations levelled/charges framed against the
revisionist are not made out. However, in order to appreciate the
said contention, this Court deems it pertinent to reproduce the
relevant provisions under law/IPC as under;
“120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy-When
two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done-
(1) an illegal act, or
(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means,
such an agreement is designated a criminal
conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement
to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal
conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is
done by one or more parties to such agreement in
pursuance thereof.
Explanation.-It is immaterial whether the illegal
act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is
merely incidental to that object.
*** *** ***
463. Forgery-Whoever makes any false
documents or false electronic record or part of a
document or electronic record with intent to cause
damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to
support any claim or title, or to cause any person to
part with property, or to enter into any express orCR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 20 of 33
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implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or
that fraud may be committed, commits forgery.
*** *** ***
467. Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.-
Whoever forges a document which purports to be a
valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a
son, or which purports to give authority to any
person to make or transfer any valuable security, or
to receive the principal, interest or dividends thereon,
or to receive or deliver any money, movable
property, or valuable security, or any document
purporting to be an acquaintance or receipt
acknowledging the payment of money, or an
acquaintance or receipt for the delivery of any
movable property or valuable security, shall be
punished with imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine.
468. Forgery for purpose of cheating-Whoever
commits forgery, intending that the document or
electronic record forged shall be used for the purpose
of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
*** *** ***
471. Using as genuine a forged document or
electronic record-Whoever fraudulently or
dishonestly uses as genuine any document or
electronic record which he knows or has reason to
believe to be a forged document or electronic record,
shall be punished in the same manner as if he had
forged such document or electronic record.
*** *** ***
503. Criminal intimidation-Whoever threatens
another with any injury to his person, reputation or
property, or to the person or reputation of any one in
whom that person is interested, with intent to cause
alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any
act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to
do any act which that person is legally entitled to do,
as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat,
commits criminal intimidation.
*** *** ***
506. Punishment for criminal intimidation-
Whoever commits, the offence of criminal
intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to
two years, or with fine, or with both.
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If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.–
and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or
to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to
cause an offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to seven years, or to impute,
unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, or with line, or with
both.”
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Notably, it is observed from above that in order to
attract culpability under provisions under Sections 467 and 468
IPC, the prosecution is inter alia required to establish19,
commission of forgery as defined under Section 463 IPC.
Notably, as per the provisions under Section 463 IPC, “Whoever
makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a
document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or
injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or
title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into
any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or
that fraud may be committed, commits forgery” . Needless to
mention, making of false document, as per Section 464 IPC inter
alia amounts to the making, signing, sealing or execution of a
document or part of a document or electronic record in the
manner specified under the said provision, “with the intention of
causing it to be believed that such document or part of document,
electronic record or electronic signature was made, signed,
sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of
a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not
made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed”. Reference in this
regard is made to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in
19
Dharmala Venkata Subrahmanya Sarma v. The State of A.P., Criminal Petition No. 10174 of 2018, dated
27.03.2024 (Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh).
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Mohd Ibrahim v. State of Bihar (2009) 8 SCC 751 , wherein the
Hon’ble Court, while enunciating the ingredients of offence of
making of false document(s)/Section 464 IPC, noted as under;
“10. An analysis of section 464 of Penal Code
shows that it divides false documents into three
categories:
10.1. The first is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently makes or executes a document with the
intention of causing it to be believed that such
document was made or executed by some other
person, or by the authority of some other person, by
whom or by whose authority he knows it was not
made or executed.
10.2. The second is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a
document in any material part, without lawful
authority, after it has been made or executed by
either himself or any other person.
10.3. The third is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or
alter a document knowing that such person could not
by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b)
intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him,
know the contents of the document or the nature of
the alteration.
11. In short, a person is said to have made a `false
document’, if (i) he made or executed a document
claiming to be someone else or authorised by
someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a
document; or (iii) he obtained a document by
practicing deception, or from a person not in control
of his senses.”
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Here, it is further pertinent to refer to the decision of
the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Karan Kohli v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Revision No. 199/2018,
dated 11.10.2018, wherein the Hon’ble High Court observed that
for liability under Section 468 IPC to attract, prosecution is not
required to prove that an accused actually commits the offence of
cheating. On the contrary, “what is material is the intention or
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purpose of the offender in committing forgery. For proving the
case under Section 468 of the IPC prosecution is required to
establish that the accused had committed forgery and that he did
it with the intention that document forged shall be used for the
purposes of cheating.” Correspondingly, provisions under
Section 471 IPC would be attracted 20 in a case where an accused,
fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine, any document or
electronic record, which he knows or has reasons to believe to be
forged. Lastly, in so far as the provisions under Section 120B
IPC is concerned, this Court deems it pertinent to make a
reference to the decision in Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India,
1993 (3) SCC 609, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, noted
with approval, as under;
“…It is not necessary that each conspirator must
know all the details or the scheme nor be a
participant at every stage. It is necessary that they
should agree for design or object of the conspiracy.
Conspiracy is conceived as having three elements:
(1) agreement (2) between two or more persons by
whom the agreement is effected, and (3) a criminal
object, which may be either the ultimate aim of the
agreement, or may constitute the means, or one of the
means by which that aim is to be accomplished. It is
immaterial whether this is found in the ultimate
objects…”
(Emphasis supplied)
21. In so far as the provisions under Section 506 of IPC
is concerned, law is settled that in order for the said provision to
be applicable, the prosecution is required to prove that the; (i)
accused threatened some person; (ii) such threat must extend to
causing any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the
person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was
interested; and (iii) the accused did so with intent to cause alarm
20
Deepak Gaba v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 2328 of 2022, dated 02.01.2023 (SC).
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to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he was
not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally
entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat.
Pertinently, the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa in Amulya Kumar
Behera v. Nabaghana Behera, 1995 SCC Online Ori 317, while
explicating the meaning of the word, ‘alarm’ used under Section
503/506 IPC, noted as under;
“…The threat must be intended to cause alarm
from which it follows that, ordinarily, it would be
sufficient for that purpose. The degree of such alarm
may very in different cases, but the essential matter is
that it is of a nature and extent to unsettle the mind of
the person on whom it operates and take away from
his acts that element of free voluntary action which
alone constitutes consent. The case where the threat
produces an alarm is comparatively a simple one, for
all that has then to be proved is that threat was given
and that the alarm was due to the threat: but where
the threat has not that effect, it involves a question
whether it was sufficient to overcome a man of
ordinary nerves. The Court may hold it to be an
empty boast, too insignificant to call for penal
visitation of Section 506. “Intimidate” according to
Webstar’s Dictionary means” (1) to make timid,
make afraid, overawe; (2) force or deter with threats
or violence, cow”. Threat referred to in the Section
must be a threat communicated or uttered with
intention of its being communicated to the person
threatened for the purpose of influencing his mind.
Question whether threat amounts to a criminal
intimidation or not does not depend on norms of
individual threatened if it is such a threat as may
overcome ordinary free will of a man of common
firmness. “Threat” is derived from Anglo-sexam
word “threotou to life”, (harass). It is the dicleration
of an intention to inflict punishment, loss or pain on
another. “Injury” is defined in Section 44. It involves
doing of an illegal act. If it is made with intention
mentioned in the section, it is an offence. Whether
threat was given with intention to cause alarm to the
person threatened has to be established by evidence
to be brought on record…”
(Emphasis supplied)
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22. Significantly, in the aforenoted dictate, the Hon’ble
Court explicitly observed that the mens rea/ intention envisaged
under Section 503/506 IPC must be to cause alarm to the victim
and whether or not such a victim is alarmed, is not of any
consequence. Here, it is further apposite to make reference to the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manik Taneja v. State
of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423, wherein the Hon’ble Court,
while dealing with the ingredients of offence under Section(s)
503/506 IPC, inter alia, observed as under;
“11. …A reading of the definition of “criminal
intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act
of threatening to another person, of causing an injury
to the person, reputation, or property of the person
threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened
person is interested and the threat must be with the
intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it
must be to do any act which he is not legally bound
to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled
to do.”
(Emphasis supplied)
23. Consequently, being mindful of the above, when
facts of the present case are conscientiously evaluated, in light of
aforenoted judicial precedents as well as the arguments
addressed, it is outrightly observed that the
complainant/respondent no. 2 has made/levelled specific
allegations against the revisionist and the co-accused persons,
Balbir Singh and Ram Kanwar Sharma. In particular, it is
asserted against the revisionist, under the complaint of
respondent no. 2, as under;
“10. Mr. Mukesh Arora a known builder is
associates with Sh. Balvir and Sh. Ram Kanwar
Sharma has contacted myself for negotiations of the
said property even knowing wrongful execution of
the sale deed and even offering to settle with Sh.
Balvir, as per the enquires made it has come to my
knowledge that Mr. Balvir and Mr. Ram Kanwar
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Sharma are just hand to mouth status and cannot
dream of such big deals. As such, Mr. Mukesh Arora
fully involved in the conspiracy. Mr. Mukesh Arora
now is contacting me directly and offered me Rs. 1.2
Crore even knowing the of fraudulent execution of
the sale deed of above referred property. Mr. Mukesh
has threatened myself if I don’t settle with him, he
will further sell it to some notoriest Muslim goondas.
I hereby pray that such action be stopped…”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Markedly, it is observed from the
documents/material placed on record of the Ld. Trial Court, in
particular from the sale deed dated 27.07.2012, alleged to be
executed between co-accused Balbir/Balvir and Sh. Ram Kanwar
Sharma, co-accused Balbir/Balvir declared himself as the
son/sole surviving legal heir of Sh. Dayal Singh S/o. Late Sh.
Ladha Singh @ Lakha Ram. In particular, the said agreement,
while declaring Sh. Dayal Singh as the absolute and rightful
owner of built up property bearing nos. 3375-3378, with
roof/terrace rights, built on freehold plot of land admeasuring,
79.43 sq. mts., situated at Ward No. VI, Hauz Qazi,
Delhi-110006 (premise/property in question), further declared
that Sh. Dayal Singh left for heavenly above on 23.10.1995 and
his wife, passed away in the year, 1987, leaving behind Balvir as
his sole legal heir, as aforenoted. However, when the particulars
of said, Balvir, asserted to be resident of H. No. 232, Village
Sisai Bola, Tehsil Hansi, Distt. Hissar, Haryana (as specified
under the said sale deed/sale agreement dated 27.07.2012) are
stated to be verified from the voters’ list of the said village and
the residential address particulars, particulars are determined to
be of that of one Balbir Singh S/o. Biru Ram. Correspondingly,
whilst, the complainant annexed the death certificate of Sh.
Dayal Singh, wherein the date of Sh. Singh’s demise is noted as
CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 27 of 33
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.01.24
16:57:12
+0530
19.11.1969, on the basis of which, mutation of the
premise/property in question is proclaimed to be carried out by
MCD in favour of the legal heirs of Sh. Dayal Singh vide letter
No. Tax/CS/MR/28, dated 12.04.1999, however, it is noted from
the records of the Ld. Trial Court that co-accused Balbir Singh
got a false death certificate prepared of Sh. Dayal Singh by
wrongfully representing Sh. Dayal Singh as his father. Markedly,
under the said certificate the date of demise of Sh. Dayal Singh
was got recorded as 23.10.1995, whilst, under the death
certificate of Sh. Dayal Singh, annexed with the complaint, date
of demise of Sh. Dayal Singh was noted as 19.11.1969. Needless
to reiterate that not only did co-accused Balbir/Balvir Singh
wrongly asserted Sh. Dayal Singh as his father, rather, also
wrongly got the said death certificate issued basis ration card
issued in name of Balbir Singh, depicting his father’s name as
Sh. Dayal Singh as well as on a false affidavit. Further, as
aforementioned that on the basis of said documents it is prima
facie observed that the co-accused Balvir/Balbir Singh and Ram
Kanwar Sharma executed the sale deed dated 27.07.2012 for the
premise/property in question. Consequently, in light of the
foregoing this Court is in concurrence with the finding of the Ld.
Trial Court that the said documents, i.e., death certificate of Sh.
Dayal Singh as well as the sale deed dated 27.07.2012 are false
documents in so far as the said documents were made, signed,
sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of
a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not
made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed. Clearly, sale deed
dated 27.07.2012 is asserted to be executed by co-accused
Balvir/Balbir as S/o. Dayal Singh, which prima facie stands
CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 28 of 33
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24
16:57:17 +0530
belied from the records/documents placed on record, in
particular, voters list of the village where the said co-accused is
avowed to be a resident of. Correspondingly, the death certificate
of Sh. Dayal Singh prima facie appears to be forged/false
document, basis the manipulated records produced by co-accused
Balvir/Balbir Singh, as aforenoted.
25. In so far as the role of the revisionist in the
instant case, alleged to be involved in conspiracy with the
aforenoted co-accused persons is concerned, reference is made to
statements of various witnesses recorded under Section 161
Cr.P.C. as well as that of the complainant/respondent no. 2. In
particular, it is noted from the statements of Sh. K.K. Gupta and
Sh. Raja Ahuja, both asserted that in May, 2012, the revisionist
started demolition work on the first and second floors of the
premise/property in question. In fact, Sh. K.K. Gupta further
proclaimed of receipt of notice of Ram Kumar Sharma in relation
to the said property. However, it is noted that in quite vicinity of
time, sale deed of the premise/property is proclaimed to have
been executed between Sh. Balbir Singh and said Ram Kanwar
Sharma vide sale deed dated 27.07.2012. Further, as aforenoted,
the complainant/respondent no. 2 in his complaint inter alia
asserted that the revisionist approached him/the complainant,
proposing/offering a sum of Rs. 1.2 Crores for settlement in
relation to the premise in question, besides threatening the
complainant that he would sell the property/premise in question
to some gundas in the event the complainant/respondent no. 2
failed to succumb to his/revisionist’s demands. Here, it is further
pertinent to mention that the complainant asserted in his
complaint that Ram Kanwar Sharma, on the basis of the said
CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 29 of 33
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24
16:57:22 +0530
forged sale deed endeavoured to claim entitlement to the property
in question. Consequently, when the entire factual scenario of the
instant case, including the previous and past conduct of the
revisionist, factum of preparation of false documents, i.e., the
death certificate of Sh. Dayal Singh and sale deed dated
27.07.2012, wherein co-accused Balbir Singh proclaimed himself
to be the sole surviving heir of Sh. Dayal Singh and the co-
accused Ram Kanwar Sharma claimed ownership of the
premise/property in question basis such false document, further
accentuated by the statements of Sh. K.K. Gupta and Sh. Raja
Ahuja, as well as the assertions of the complaint, this Court is of
the considered opinion that there is sufficient material/ground(s)
to proceed against the revisionist for the allegations levelled
against him is so far as they pertain to offences against Section
120B IPC read with Sections 467/468/471 IPC. Needless to
mention that there is prima facie case grounds and strong
suspicion, as well as material and witnesses who can depose
against the revisionist for the framing of charges. Apposite to
further mention at this stage that in so far as the offence of
conspiracy is concerned even otherwise, law is settled that direct
evidence is difficult to find for generally 21, “a conspiracy is
hatched in secrecy and it may be difficult to adduce direct
evidence of the same. The prosecution will often rely on
evidence of acts of various parties to infer that they were done in
reference to their common intention. The prosecution will also
more often rely upon circumstantial evidence. The conspiracy
can be undoubtedly proved by such evidence direct or
circumstantial.”
21
Mukesh and Ors. v. State for NCT of Delhi & Ors., MANU/SC/0575/2017.
CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 30 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.01.24 16:57:26 +0530 26. However, in so far as the complainant's/respondent no. 2's own assertion/averment
complaint pertaining to allegation of criminal intimidation are
concerned, it is alleged under the complaint that the revisionist
threatened the complainant/respondent no. 2 that in the event of
the complainant’s not succumbing to his/revisionist’s demands,
he would further sell the premise/property in question to some
notorious goondas. Undoubtedly, there are allegations of injury 22
to the premise/property in question, however, there are no threat
to cause destruction of premise/property by fire, clearing
bringing the conduct of the revisionist under the ambit of
provisions under Section 506 (part-I), instead of Section 506
(part-II) as specified under the impugned order.
27. Consequently, in conspectus of above, further being
wary of the aforenoted judicial principles, in light of the
arguments addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist, Ld.
Counsel for the complainant as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for the
State, this Court observes that from the facts and circumstances
of the case, material and the documents placed on record of the
Ld. Trial Court, including inter alia the contents of the
chargesheet, statements of witnesses, including that of the
complainant and other witnesses, as aforenoted as well as other
material, including the FSL report dated 14.09.2015 placed on
record of the Ld. Trial Court, prima facie case under Section
120B IPC read with Sections 467/468/471 IPC and Section 506
(part-I) stands established against revisionist in as much as the
revisionist, while acting in criminal conspiracy with co-accused
22
Reference is made to Section 44 IPC which provides the meaning of injury as, “The word “injury”
denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property.”
(Emphasis supplied) CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 31 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.01.24 16:57:31 +0530
persons, Balbir/Balvir Singh and Ram Kanwar/Kumar Sharma
prepared false/forged sale deed dated 27.07.2012, registered on
27.08.2012, whereby co-accused Balbir Singh impersonated as
Balbir Singh S/o. Dayal Singh as well as in furtherance of
conspiracy, co-accused Balbir Singh got prepared false
document/foreged death certificate of Dayal Singh by changing
his father’s name from Biru Singh, said sale deed being used by
Ram Kumar Sharma for claiming right of premise/property in
question as well as to get mutated the property in his favour.
Correspondingly, the revisionist prima facie appears to have
threatened the complainant/respondent no. 2 to cause injury to
the property/premise in question.
28. Accordingly, in light of the aforesaid discussion,
this Court unwaveringly records and reiterates that the impugned
order/order dated 15.09.2020, passed by Ld. ACMM-02, Central,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in case bearing, “State v. Ram Kumar
Sharma, etc., CIS No. 302036/2016″, arising out of FIR No.
50/2013, PS Hauz Qazi, under Sections
419/420/467/468/471/506 of IPC is upheld in respect of charges
under Section 120B IPC read with Sections 467/468/471 IPC and
in the considered opinion of this Court, the facts of the case
demonstrate a prima facie case under Section 506 (part-I) IPC,
instead of Section 506 (part-II) IPC. Ergo, the instant
petition/revision petition stands disposed off in the terms
specified herein.
29. Trial Court Record along with a copy of this
order/judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court concerned for
information and compliance and with directions to proceed, as
per law.
CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 32 of 33
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24
16:57:35 +0530
30. Revision file be consigned to record room after due
compliance.
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24
16:57:40
+0530
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 24.01.2025 ASJ-03, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 33 of 33
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