Delhi District Court
Mukesh Arora vs The State on 24 January, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-008141-2020
Criminal Revision No.: 282/2020
MUKESH ARORA,
S/o. Late Sh. R.C. Arora,
R/o. 3545, Jai Mata Market,
Bazar Sita Ram,
Delhi-110006. ... REVISIONIST/
PETITIONER
VERSUS
STATE (GNCT OF DELHI) ... RESPONDENT
Date of Institution : 12.11.2020
Date when judgment was reserved : 11.11.2024
Date when judgment is pronounced : 24.01.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been filed under
Sections 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter, referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’), seeking setting aside of the
order dated 30.06.20201 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘impugned
order’), passed by Ld. ACMM-02, Central, Tis Hazari Courts,
Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Ld. ACMM/Ld. Trial
Court’), in case bearing, “State v. Mukesh Arora, CIS No.
1300/2017″, arising out of FIR No. 341/2015, PS Hauz Qazi,
1
It is noted that the proceedings in the instant case pertain to the period when the restrictions due to
Covid-19 restrictions were persisting and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Re: Cognizance for
Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Pet. (C) No. 3/2020, dated 10.01.2022 inter alia, directed,
“*** I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated
08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022
shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special
laws in respect of all judicial or quasi judicial proceedings. ***III. In cases where the limitation
would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual
balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from
01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from
01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply…”
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under Sections 385/506/509/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC‘). Pertinently, by virtue of the
impugned order the Ld. Trial Court directed framing of charges
under Sections 323, 385, 506(part I), and 509 of IPC against the
revisionist/petitioner herein. Notably, the charges were
subsequently framed against the revisionist on 09.09.2020.
2. Tersely put, the genesis of the proceedings before
the Ld. Trial Court was a complaint filed by the complaint,
namely, Smt. Vijay Kumari Bhargava (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘complainant’), addressed to SHO, PS Hauz Qazi inter alia
averring that the complainant and her family were residents at
House No. 3125, Phatak Kedar Nath, Mohalla Dassan, Hauz
Qazi, Delhi and that the adjacent house to the complainant’s
bearing no. 3126-3128 was purchased by the revisionist, one year
prior to her complaint. As per the complainant, the revisionist
used to work as a builder in the locality, engaged in disputed
properties (वह ज्यादातर झगडे वाली Building में लेन देन करता है।). It
was further proclaimed under the complaint that upon the
revisionist’s purchase of the aforenoted premise, the revisionist
along with his other associates, commenced illegal construction
thereupon, leading to damage to the property of the complainant
as well as of the complainant’s raising her trepidations in this
regard with the concerned authorities from time to time ( मकान न०
3126-3128 को खरीदने के बाद मुके श अरोरा ने दीपक कु मार व अपने अन्य
साथीयो के साथ मिलकर उस पर गैर कानुनी ढंग से निर्माण कार्य शुरू कर दिया जो
इनके गैर कानुनी कार्य से मेरा मकान जो कि बहु त पुराना बना हु आ था बहु त ज्यादा
क्षतिग्रस्त हो गया जिसकी शिकायत मेने आपको बडे अफसरो को व कारपोरे शन मे
भी समय-2 पर की थी।). However, when the said alleged illegal
construction is avowed to have persevered, the complainant
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
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lodged/initiated a suit proceeding before the concerned court. In
the said proceedings, the complainant is further declared to have
entered into a settlement with the revisionist and consequent
withdrawal of the said suit, however, asserted to be unaware of
the illicit designs and intentions of the revisionist and his
associates (श्रीमान जी जो उस समय मे इनकी गन्दी नियत नही समझ पायी
व इनकी बातो में आकर राजीनामा कर लिया यह राजीनामा हमारे बीच लिखित मे
हु आ था राजीनामे की बात कोर्ट में भी आयी थी उपरोक्त राजीनामे के अनुसार
उपरोक्त व्यक्ति के खिलाफ डाला मुकदमा वापस ले लिया). In her complaint,
the complainant further asserted that she was of the impression
that subsequent to settlement, everything would resolve between
her as well as the revisionist, however, the revisionist persisted is
avowed to have kept enmity with the complainant, seeking
occasions for brawl (कोर्ट के राजीनामे के बाद मुझे लगा सब कु छ ठीक हो
जायेगा। लेकिन उस दिन के बाद से उपरोक्त व्यक्तियो ने अपने अन्य साथीयो के
साथ मिलकर मेरा व मेरे परिवार का जीना मुश्किल कर रखा है। किसी न किसी
वजह से ये लोग मुझसे बिना वजह झगडा करने कि फिराक मे रहते है ). As per
the complainant, on 09.04.2015 when, she and her son, Nitesh
Kumar Bhargava, were on their way to market, the revisionist is
asserted to have reached there and started misbehaving with
complainant and her son (आज दिनांक 09.04.2015 को जब मै बाजार से
जा रही थी तो मुके श अरोरा अचानक से रास्ते मे मिल गया जो उसने अपने आप
बातचीत शुरू कर दी बातचीत के दौरान उसने मुझसे बहु त बदतमीजी से पेश आया
तथा अपशब्द बोले ). The revisionist is further proclaimed to have
used vulgar and unconstitutional language against the
complainant as well as, threatened her as well as her son by
uttering that they should either pay him a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/-
(Rupees Fifteen Lakhs only) or be ready for dire consequences.
Correspondingly, as per the complainant, the revisionist was
demanding the said amount on the pretext that he has suffered
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24
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losses due to complaints made by the complainant and further
that the revisionist also threatened the complainant that he would
not allow them to repair an inch of their house as well as serious
repercussions would ensue upon the complainant and her family.
(जब तक मैं व मेरा परिवार 15 लाख रू उसके नुकसान की भरपाई के तौर पर नहीं
दोगे तब तक वह हमे एक इन्च जगह भी अपने घर को ठीक नहीं करने देगा। उसने
यह भी कहा की मेरे व मेरे परिवार की भलाई उसके बात मान लेने मे है। वरना वह
हमारे लिए बहु त कु छ कर सकता है।).
2.1. Markedly, subsequent to the filing of the aforesaid
complaint, the complainant inter alia moved an application under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Ld. MM-08, Central, Tis
Hazari Court, seeking further investigation, which was disposed
off by the Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 05.12.2015 inter alia
directing as under;
“…ASI Ramesh Chand of PS Hauz Qazi in his
written reply stated that no such incident took place
and proposed accused Mukesh Arora had already
registered a case bearing FIR no. 101/15 U/s.
384/506/34 IPC at PS Hauz Qazi against accused
Vijay Kumar Bhargava and Nitesh Bhargava who are
family member of the complainant. However, Ld.
counsel for complainant submits that said case at the
instance of accused Mukesh Arora relates to another
alleged incident and the allegations of complainant
relates to another incident which happened with her.
Having heard submissions of Ld. counsel for
complainant and gone through her complaint as well
as reply of police, this court is of considered view
that the information given by the complainant
discloses commission of some cognizable offence
and same is required to be investigated by the police.
Furthermore, police cannot come to the conclusion
that no such incident had happened before
conducting proper and thorough investigation into
the allegation of informant. It is also noteworthy that
credibility of information would not be pre-requisite
criteria for registration of FIR as same can only be
determined after investigation and complainant can
also be taken to the task of law, if it was found that
she made false case against the accused. This court is
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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also mindful of observation of Hon’ble Supreme
Court made in leading case of Lalita Kumari Vs.
State of U.P.
Accordingly, SHO concerned is directed to
register FIR on the basis of information given by the
complainant under appropriate provision of law and
get the same investigated properly…”
(Emphasis supplied)
2.2. Relevantly, pursuant to the aforesaid direction the
FIR in question came to be registered, and the investigation
ensued. Pertinently, during the course on investigation, statement
of the complainant and other witnesses were recorded, wherein
the complainant and her son proclaimed that the time of the
incident, the revisionist had also pushed and shoved (धक्का मुक्की)
the complainant and her son. Remarkably, on conclusion of the
investigation, chargesheet was filed by the concerned police
officials before the Ld. Trial Court, whereupon cognizance of
offence was taken by the Ld. Trial Court on 02.02.2017.
Subsequently, on the compliance of the provisions under Section
207 Cr.P.C. and upon the Ld. Counsel for the accused’s as well
as Ld. Addl. PP for the State’s addressing their respective
arguments on charge, as aforementioned, charges were directed
to be framed by the Ld. Trial Court inter alia against the
revisionist vide order dated 30.06.2020, the impugned order
herein. Apposite at this stage, to reproduce the relevant extract(s)
from the order dated 30.06.2020 of the Ld. Trial Court/impugned
order, as under;
“…5. Heard. Record perused.
6. Following are the landmark judgments which
have laid down the principle of law governing the
issue of scope of looking into the evidence at the
time of framing charge:-
(i) It was held in P. Vijayan Vs. State of Kerala
(2010) 2 SCC 398;
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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“…if two views are possible and one of them
gives rise to suspension only, as distinguished
from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be
empowered to discharge the accused and at this
stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end
in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words
“not sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a
mere post office to frame the charge at the
behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his
judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
determine whether a case for trial has been
made out by the prosecution. In assessing this
fact, it is not necessary for the Court to enter
into the pros and cons of the matter or into a
weighing and balancing of evidence and
probabilities which is really the function of the
Court, after the trial starts..”
(ii) It was held in Union of India Vs. Prafulla
Kumar Samal (1979) 3 SCC 39;
1) That the Judge while considering the question
of framing the charges under Section 227 of the
Code has the undoubted power to shift and
weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of
finding out whether or not a prima facie case
against the accused has been made out
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court
disciose grave suspicion against the accused
which has not been properly explained the Court
will be fully justified in framing a charge and
proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case
would naturally depend upon the facts of each
case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of
universal application. By and large however if
two views are equally possible and the Judge is
satisfied that the evidence produced before him
while giving rise to some suspicion but not
grave suspicion against the accused, he will be
fully within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under
Section 227 of Code the Judge which under the
present Code is a senior and experienced Court
cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to
consider the broad probabilities of the caso, the
total effect of the evidence and the documents
produced before the Court, any basic infirmities
appearing in the case and so on. This however
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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does not mean that the Judge should make a
roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the
matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.”
7. The contention of Ld. Counsel for accused that
allegations are false, motivated and as per mobile
location accused was not at the spot are all matter of
trial. Presence of MLC is not must for framing notice
U/s 323 IPC. Though, there is apparent contradiction
in the complaint made by the complainant vis a vis
her statement recorded U/s 164 Cr.P.C., however
these contradictions are matter of trial. At this stage,
there is sufficient evidence on record to frame
charges against accused Mukesh Arora for
commission of offences punishable U/s 323/385/506
part 1/509 IPC.
Put up the matter for framing charge against
accused on 08.09.2020…”
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Learned Counsel for the revisionist submitted that
the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere
conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled
cannons of law, deserving to be set aside at the outset, as
suffering with gross illegality. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further
submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial
Court on mere assumptions and that no sound and/or cogent
reasons have been delineated under the said order. Ld. Counsel
further submitted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld.
Trial Court further failed to appreciate that the entire story of the
complainant is concocted, false and nor reliable. Ld. Counsel
further submitted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld.
Trial Court further failed to appreciate that from the material
placed on record, even the basic ingredients of the
provisions/offences under Section 323, 385, 506 (part I), and 509
IPC are not even prima facie established against the revisionist.
In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Ld. Trial
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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Court, while passing the impugned order ignored the final report
filed by the IO before the Ld. Trial Court, affirming therein that
no evidence was found against the revisionist during
investigation and that the revisionist’s name was specified under
column No. 12 of the chargesheet. Further, as per Ld. Counsel,
Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the records showing the
location of the mobile phones of the complainant and the
revisionist, were not considered by the Ld. Trial Court while
passing the impugned order. In this regard, Ld. Counsel fervently
argued that a perusal of the CAF and CDRs of the complainant,
her son as well as the revisionist clearly shows that the revisionist
was not present at the spot and said record is never challenged or
disputed by the Ld. APP for the State or by Ld. Counsel for the
complainant, which belies the case of the complainant.
3.1. Learned Counsel for the revisionist further asserted
that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that bare perusal of
the material on record clearly shows that it was the complainant,
who was blackmailing the revisionist and that the instant
complaint was wrongly/falsely made against the revisionist, only
as a counter blast to the case registered by the revisionist against
the complainant, on the basis of which, FIR No. 101/2015, under
Sections 384, 504, 34 IPC, dated 19.03.2015 was registered at PS
Hauz Qazi. It was further strenuously iterated by the Ld. Counsel
that the investigation conducted by the concerned IO/police
officials demonstrate no case against the revisionist and even
otherwise presuming the facts under the chargesheet to be
correct, no prima facie case is even made out against the
revisionist herein. Ergo, as per the Ld. Counsel, the charges were
wrongly/erroneously ordered to be framed against the revisionist,CR. No. 282/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 8 of 34
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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by the Ld. Trial Court, entitling the same to be set aside.
3.2. Learned Counsel further submitted that the Ld. Trial
Court failed to consider that the concerned police official(s)/IO,
had recorded the statements of witnesses, which were not
passers-by, rather, permanent residents and/or shopkeepers
around the alleged site of incident, who did not disclose anything
about the incident in question. As per the Ld. Counsel, such
omission on the part of the Ld. Trial Court, clearly shows not
only non-appreciation of material on record, rather, also non-
application of judicious mind by the Ld. Trial Court, while
passing the impugned order. Ld. Counsel further submitted that
Ld. MM has wrongly relied upon the judgments, which, in no
manner, applicable to the facts of the present case. Further, as per
the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court miserably failed to grasp
that for the application of the said judgments, there must be a
prima facie case against the revisionist. However, in the instant
case, as per the Ld. Counsel, there is no material on record,
which shows any prima facie case against the revisionist. Ergo,
as per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned order was passed by the
Ld. Trial Court, while misinterpreting the judgments of the
superior courts. Ld. Counsel further submitted that Ld. Trial
Court failed to appreciate that as per the charge-sheet, no incident
as alleged by the complainant on 09.04.2015 had occurred and
there are no allegations on the part of the complainant before the
police as well as before the Court and in the FIR that she was
pushed by the revisionist. Ld. Counsel correspondingly averred
that the Ld. Trial Court ignored and discarded the contradictions
in the statements of the complainant made in the complaint and
her subsequent statement, recorded in terms of the provisions
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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under Section 164 Cr.P.C. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial
Court was further oblivious to the fact that even in case when
prosecution would lead the evidence collected during
investigation, no conviction would ensue. Correspondingly, as
per the Ld. Counsel, no fruitful purpose would be served by
continuing a trial on the basis of the material, which clearly
shows that no incident had occurred on 09.04.2015, as otherwise
falsely averred by the complainant. It was further submitted that
the Ld. Trial Court also failed to give any sound, cogent or
justified reasons for passing the impugned order, which adversely
affects the rights of the revisionist. Consequently, the Ld.
Counsel prayed that the impugned order, being passed in gross
violation of law and settled judicial precedents, deserves to be set
aside, outrightly.
4. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that
the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due
appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the present case
and, as such, deserves no interference by this Court. It was
further submitted that no irregularity, impropriety, or
incorrectness can be attributed to the impugned order, as well as
the framing of charges against the revisionist, which was/were
passed by the Ld. Trial Court, cognizant of the principles of law,
as well as wary of the facts and circumstances brought forth. As
per the Ld. Addl. PP for the State, the arguments contended
by/on behalf of the revisionist are in the nature of revisionist’s
defence, which cannot be considered by the Court at the stage of
framing of charge. Even otherwise, sufficiency of the
material/evidence placed on record, is not a fact which can be
considered at the stage of framing of charges.
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4.1. Learned Counsel for the complainant, while
supplementing the arguments of Ld. Addl. PP for the State
submitted that the present revision petition has been preferred by
the revisionist on false and vague grounds. As per the Ld.
Counsel, the revisionist is guilty of concealment of facts, failing
to disclose that after execution of settlement agreement in suit
proceedings, the revisionist commenced harassing the
complainant as well as threatened to extort money from her,
which facts were duly narrated by the complainant, in her
statements recorded on different occasions. Further, as per the
Ld. Counsel, the complainant’s complaint under Section 200
Cr.P.C. is a part of the chargesheet, wherein under paras 17, 18,
20 and 21, specific allegations are made/levelled against the
revisionist. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the investigating
agency was acting in a biased and unfair manner, under the
influence of the revisionist, who apart from being a wealthy man
was engaged in the business of builder and collaborator,
demonstrable from the fact that the complainant’s complaint was
taken heed only once the directions for registration of FIR were
issued by the Ld. MM-08, Central, Tis Hazari Court.
Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the law is settled that
mere defect in investigation cannot form the basis of discharge of
an accused. Accordingly, Ld. Counsel vehemently averred that
the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, cognizant
of the facts as well as law, deserving no interference from this
Court. In support of the said contentions, reliance was placed
upon the decisions in; Hema v. State, AIR 2013 SC 1000; Tarun
Jit Tejpal v. State of Goa & Anr. 2019 X AD (SC) 1; Pawan
Singh v. State & Ors., 219 (2015) Delhi Law Time 13 (DB);
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Rupak Mudgal & Ors. v. State, Crl. M.C. No. 3830 of 2003,
dated 30.09.2005 (DHC); and Ram Phal v. State & Ors. Crl. A.
1415/2012, dated 28.05.2015 (DHC).
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist,
Ld. Counsel for the complainant as well as that of Ld. Addl. PP
for the State, heard as well as the records, including the Ld. Trial
Court records as well as the written submissions and case laws,
placed on record have been thoroughly perused.
6. Before proceeding with the determination of the
merits of the case/issues posed before this Court, it would be
apposite to outrightly make a reference to the relevant provisions
under law, in particular that under Section 397 Cr.P.C., as under;
“397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of
revision – (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge
may call for and examine the record of any
proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate
within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of
satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of
any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may,
when calling for such record, direct that the
execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and
if the accused is in confinement, that he be released
on bail or on his own bond pending the examination
of the record.
Explanation – All Magistrates, whether Executive
or Judicial, and whether exercising original or
appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior
to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-
section and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry,
trial or other proceeding…”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Pertinently, from a perusal of the aforesaid, it is
quite evident that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be
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agitated either suo motu or an application of parties, that too in a
case(s) where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the
provision of law, decision of Trial Court being completely
erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily.
In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9
SCC 460, wherein the Hon’ble Court while explicating the
various contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C.
observed as under:
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction
or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it
may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the
orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of
careful consideration and appear to be in accordance
with law. If one looks into the various judgments of
this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction
can be invoked where the decisions under challenge
are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with
the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based
on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are
merely indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it
should not be against an interim or interlocutory
order. The Court has to keep in mind that the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not
lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing
with the question as to whether the charge has been
framed properly and in accordance with law in a
given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise
of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case
substantially falls within the categories aforestated.
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Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in
the proceedings under the CrPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Similarly, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in V.K.
Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1192, in a similar context
noted as under;
“67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to
test the waters of what might happen in the trial. The
Revisional Court has to consider the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order
and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the
court below. While doing so, the Revisional Court
does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence
of the case, rather it considers the material only to
satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the
findings, sentence and order and refrains from
substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate
consideration of evidence. In the instant case, the
Petitioner has failed to make out a case for exercise
of the revisional jurisdiction since there is no patent
error in the impugned order on the face of record.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted,
the revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an
order of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it
is a settled law2 that trite law that in a case where the order of
subordinate Court does not suffer from any illegality , “merely
because of equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no
jurisdiction to re-consider the matter and pass a different order in
a routine manner.” Reference in this regard is made to the
decision in Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 312,
wherein the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi expounded as under;
2
Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC
OnLine MP 958.
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“9. The scope of interference in a revision
petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that
Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the
Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter
se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings
of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while
considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a
finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court
does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence
of the case. A court in revision considers the material
only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety
of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from
substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate
consideration of evidence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Notably in the context of the foregoing, it is further
apposite to observe here that it is no longer res integra that the
orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither
interlocutory nor final in nature, rather, intermediate in nature 3,
and are, therefore, not affected by the bar of Section 397(2)
Cr.P.C. However, the scope of interference under Section 397
Cr.P.C. at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also equally
settled4. In this regard, it is pertinent to make a reference to the
decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Manendra Prasad Tiwari
v. Amit Kumar Tiwari, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1057, wherein the
Hon’ble Court enunciated the law in regard the foregoing as
under;
“22. The scope of interference and exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 397 of CrPC has been time
and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope
of interference under Section 397 CrPC at a stage,
when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At
the stage of framing of a charge, the court is
concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather
it has to focus on the material and form an opinion
whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has
committed an offence, which if put to trial, could
3
Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of U.P., (2022) 15 SCC 720.
4
State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, (2017) 3 SCC 198.
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prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage,
at which stage the final test of guilt is to be applied.
Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge,
the court should form an opinion that the accused is
certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold
something which is neither permissible nor is in
consonance with the scheme of Code of Criminal
Procedure.
23. Section 397 CrPC vests the court with the
power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction
or law or the perversity which has crept in the
proceeding.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Germane for the purpose(s) of present discourse to
now consider the principles governing framing of charges. In this
regard, it is relevant to outrightly note the settled law 5 that at the
stage of framing of charges, neither can the truth, veracity and
effect of the prosecution case be meticulously 6 judged, nor can
any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused.
On the contrary, at such a stage, only the sufficiency of ground
for proceeding against the accused, on a general consideration of
materials placed before the Court by the investigating police
officer is relevant. Further, though, sifting of evidence is
permissible7, however, scanning of evidence in detail is not.
Quite understandably, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Reena
v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2020 SCC OnLine Del 630 , iterated the
said principles in unequivocal terms as under;
“12. Thus it is settled position of law that at the
time of framing of charge, the Court is not supposed
to look into the evidence of the case in detail and is
only to consider whether there is a strong suspicion
5
State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018
6
Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460.
7
State of Maharashta v. Priya Sharan Maharaj & Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 393.
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against the accused on the basis of the material that
comes before it. The court has the power to sift the
evidence for the limited purpose of finding out,
whether or not a prima facie case is made out against
the accused. However, the Court is not supposed to
delve deeply into the merits of the matter and start a
roving expedition into the evidence that is brought
forth it, as if conducting a trial. Further there is no
one fixed definition that may be ascribed to the term
prima facie’ nor can the term strong suspicion have a
singular meaning. While coming to the conclusion of
a strong prima facie case or strong suspicion, the
Court shall have to decide each case on the basis of
its own independent facts and circumstances.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Concomitantly, it is settled law 8 that the
inconsistency in the material produced by the prosecution or the
defect in investigation9, cannot be looked into for discharge of an
accused, in the absence of full-fledged trial. In fact, the probative
value10 of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the
material placed on record by the prosecution has to be accepted
as true at that stage. Reference in this regard is made to the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State through Deputy
Superintendent of Police v. R. Soundirarasu and Ors.,
MANU/SC/1103/2022, wherein the Hon’ble Court remarked as
under;
“58. Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh
Ahlawat and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.,
MANU/SC/1011/2012: (2013) 11 SCC 476, it was
observed by this Court that while framing charges
the court is required to evaluate the materials and
documents on record to decide whether the facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value would
disclose existence of ingredients constituting the
alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not
required to go deep into the probative value of the
materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether8
Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476.
9
State of Tamil Nadu by Inspector of Police v. N. Suresh Ranjan & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 709.
10
Soma Chakravarty v. State, (2007) 5 SCC 403.
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there is a ground for presuming that the Accused had
committed the offence and it is not required to
evaluate sufficiency of evidence to convict the
Accused. It was held that the Court at this stage
cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the
allegations and contradictions & inconsistencies in
the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at
the stage of discharge.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Relevant to further note that it is trite law 11, at the
stage of framing of charge, only the police report is required to
be considered and the defence of the accused12 cannot be looked
into. Needless to mention that the superior courts 13 have
persistently deprecated the practice of holding a mini trial at the
time of framing of charge. Relevantly, in this regard, reference is
made to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharat
Parikh v. CBI, (2008) 10 SCC 109, wherein the Hon’ble Court
enunciated the judicial principle(s), as under;
“19. As observed in Debendra Nath Padhi case
[(2005) 1 SCC 568: 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] at the stage
of framing charge roving and fishing inquiry is
impermissible and a mini trial cannot be conducted at
such stage. At the stage of framing of charge the
submissions on behalf of the accused have to be
confined to the material produced by the
investigating agency. The accused will get an
opportunity to prove the documents subsequently
produced by the prosecution on the order of the
Court, but the same cannot be relied upon to reopen
the proceedings once charge has been framed or for
invocation of the High Court’s powers under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Apposite to further emphasize14 that at the stage of
charge, court(s) is/are not even required to record detailed
11
State Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad & Anr. v. P. Suryaprakasam, (1999) SCC (Crl.) 373 and
State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, 2005 (1) SCC 568.
12
State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294.
13
Indu Jain v. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 341.
14
Bhawna Bai v. Dhanshyam & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 217
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reasons for framing charge, rather15, a very strong suspicion
founded upon materials placed before it, which leads the court to
form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of factual
ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the
framing of charges. In fact16, it is only when no case is made out
even after presuming entire prosecution evidence, can an accused
be discharged. Needless to accentuate17, “at the stage of framing
of charge, the sufficiency of materials for the purpose of
conviction is not the requirement and a prayer for discharge can
be allowed only if the court finds that the materials are wholly
insufficient for the purpose of trial.” Notably, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip
Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715, while inter alia
illuminating the principles as well as the scope of enquiry for the
purpose of charge/discharging an accused, observed as under;
“14. …In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough
guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose
of discharging an accused. It provides that “the Judge
shall discharge when he considers that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused”. The “ground” in the context is not a
ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the
accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the
innocence of the accused will be determined and not
at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore,
need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting
and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to
delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has
to consider is whether the evidentiary material on
record if generally accepted, would reasonably
connect the accused with the crime. No more need be
enquired into.”
15
Supdt. and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52
and Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368
16
Manjit Singh Virdi v. Hussain Mohammed Shattaf, (2023) 7 SCC 633
17
Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta & Ors., (2015) 3 SCC 424
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15. Ergo, being mindful of the principles hereinunder
noted, this Court would now proceed with the determination of
the arguments raised by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist as well as
by Ld. Addl. PP for the State. Markedly, one of the primary
contentions of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist is that even
from the material placed on record prima facie ingredients of
offence under the allegations levelled/charges framed against the
revisionist are not made out. However, in order to appreciate the
said contention, this Court deems it pertinent to reproduce the
relevant provisions under law/IPC as under;
“319. Hurt-Whoever causes bodily pain, disease
or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt.
*** *** ***
321. Voluntarily causing hurt-Whoever does any
act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any
person, or with the knowledge that he is likely
thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby
cause hurt to any person, is said “voluntarily to cause
hurt”.
323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt-
Whoever, except in the case provided for by section
334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to one year, or with fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
*** *** ***
383. Extortion-Whoever intentionally puts any
person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any
other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so
put in fear to deliver to any person any property or
valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which
may be converted into a valuable security, commits
“extortion”.
*** *** ***
385. Putting person in fear of injury in order to
commit extortion-Whoever, in order to the
committing of extortion, puts any person in fear, or
attempts to put any person in fear, of any injury, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to two years, or with
fine, or with both.
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503. Criminal intimidation-Whoever threatens
another with any injury to his person, reputation or
property, or to the person or reputation of any one in
whom that person is interested, with intent to cause
alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any
act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to
do any act which that person is legally entitled to do,
as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat,
commits criminal intimidation.
*** *** ***
506. Punishment for criminal intimidation-
Whoever commits, the offence of criminal
intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to
two years, or with fine, or with both;…
*** *** ***
509. Word, gesture or act intended to insult the
modesty of a woman-Whoever, intending to insult
the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes
any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object,
intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or
that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such
woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman,
shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a
term which may extend to three years, and also with
fine.”
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Notably, it is observed from a perusal of Section 323
IPC that the essence of the said offence lies in the accused’s
causing hurt to the victim, voluntarily , i.e., intentionally or with
knowledge that in the process, hurt would be caused.
Significantly, the term, hurt, in turn, is defined under Section 319
IPC as causation of any bodily pain, disease or infirmity to a
victim. Quite evidently, disease or infirmity may have external
manifestation, however, bodily pain may not be easily
perceivable from any medical report. Ergo, it is quite
understandable that the superior courts have persistently avowed
that in order for conviction under Section 323 IPC to stand, it is
not essential for production of an injury/medical report.
Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Lakshman
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Singh v. State of Bihar, (2021) 9 SCC 191 , wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in unambiguous terms noted as under;
“11. Now so far as the submission on behalf of
the appellant-accused that all the appellants were
alleged to have been armed with lathis and so far as
PW 8 is concerned, no injury report is forthcoming
and/or brought on record and therefore they cannot
be convicted for the offence under Section 323 IPC is
concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that
PW 8 in his examination-in-chief/deposition has
specifically stated that after he sustained injuries,
treatment was provided at Government Hospital,
Paatan. He has further stated in the cross-
examination on behalf of all the accused persons
except accused Dinanath Singh that he sustained 2-3
blows of truncheons. He has also stated that he does
not exactly remember that how many blows he
suffered. According to him, he first went to Police
Station, Paatan along with the SHO of Police Station,
Paatan, where his statement was recorded and
thereafter the SHO sent him to Paatan Hospital for
treatment. Thus, he was attacked by the accused
persons by lathis/sticks and he sustained injuries and
was treated at Government Hospital, Paatan has been
established and proved. It may be that there might
not be any serious injuries and/or visible injuries, the
hospital might not have issued the injury report.
However, production of an injury report for the
offence under Section 323 IPC is not a sine qua non
for establishing the case for the offence under
Section 323 IPC. Section 323 IPC is a punishable
section for voluntarily causing hurt. “Hurt” is defined
under Section 319 IPC. As per Section 319 IPC,
whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to
any person is said to cause “hurt”. Therefore, even
causing bodily pain can be said to be causing “hurt” .
Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case,
no error has been committed by the courts below for
convicting the accused under Section 323 IPC…”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. In so far as the provision under Section 385 IPC is
concerned, same provides for culpability in the instances where 18
(i) an accused puts or attempts to put any person in fear, of any
injury; and (ii) the accused does so, in order to commit extortion ,
18
Jyoti Tiwary v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., MANU/JH/0955/2023.
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i.e., induce the person so put in fear to deliver to any person
having any property, valuable security, or anything signed or
sealed or which may be converted into valuable security.
Apposite for the purpose of present discourse to make a reference
to the decision in Biram Lal & Ors. v. State,
MANU/RH/0559/2006, wherein the Hon’ble High Court of
Rajasthan, while explicating the difference between the
provisions under Section 383 IPC and Section 385 IPC, remarked
as under;
“10. Section 383 IPC defines ‘extortion’ whereas
Section 384 IPC is the penal section for extortion
whereas Section 385 IPC is for attempt to commit
extortion. In order to complete the act of extortion
the person who was put in fear, must have been
induced to deliver the property. If the act of
inducement caused by the wrong doer should bring
forth its result at least by the victim consenting to
deliver property even if actual delivery does not take
place due to any fortuitous circumstances which
would constitute extortion, but if it falls to produce
the requisite effect, the act would remain only at the
stage of attempt to commit extortion. In the instant
case, even if the offence of extortion is held to be not
made out for want of delivery of the property at least,
the offence of attempt to commit extortion is clearly
made out, as has been held in the case of Romesh
Chandra Arora v. The State MANU/SC/0034/1959:
1960CriLJ177.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Correspondingly, for bringing home charges under
Section 506 of IPC, the prosecution is required to prove that the;
(i) accused threatened some person; (ii) such threat must extend
to causing any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to
the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was
interested; and (iii) the accused did so with intent to cause alarm
to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he was
not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally
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entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat.
Pertinently, the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa in Amulya Kumar
Behera v. Nabaghana Behera, 1995 SCC Online Ori 317, while
explicating the meaning of the word, ‘alarm’ used under Section
503/506 IPC, noted as under;
“…The threat must be intended to cause alarm
from which it follows that, ordinarily, it would be
sufficient for that purpose. The degree of such alarm
may very in different cases, but the essential matter is
that it is of a nature and extent to unsettle the mind of
the person on whom it operates and take away from
his acts that element of free voluntary action which
alone constitutes consent. The case where the threat
produces an alarm is comparatively a simple one, for
all that has then to be proved is that threat was given
and that the alarm was due to the threat: but where
the threat has not that effect, it involves a question
whether it was sufficient to overcome a man of
ordinary nerves. The Court may hold it to be an
empty boast, too insignificant to call for penal
visitation of Section 506. “Intimidate” according to
Webstar’s Dictionary means” (1) to make timid,
make afraid, overawe; (2) force or deter with threats
or violence, cow”. Threat referred to in the Section
must be a threat communicated or uttered with
intention of its being communicated to the person
threatened for the purpose of influencing his mind.
Question whether threat amounts to a criminal
intimidation or not does not depend on norms of
individual threatened if it is such a threat as may
overcome ordinary free will of a man of common
firmness. “Threat” is derived from Anglo-sexam
word “threotou to life”, (harass). It is the dicleration
of an intention to inflict punishment, loss or pain on
another. “Injury” is defined in Section 44. It involves
doing of an illegal act. If it is made with intention
mentioned in the section, it is an offence. Whether
threat was given with intention to cause alarm to the
person threatened has to be established by evidence
to be brought on record…”
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Significantly, in the aforenoted dictate, the Hon’ble
Court explicitly observed that the mens rea/ intention envisaged
under Section 503/506 IPC must be to cause alarm to the victim
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and whether or not such a victim is alarmed, is not of any
consequence. Here, it is further apposite to make reference to the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manik Taneja v. State
of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423, wherein the Hon’ble Court,
while dealing with the ingredients of offence under Section(s)
503/506 IPC, inter alia, observed as under;
“11. …A reading of the definition of “criminal
intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act
of threatening to another person, of causing an injury
to the person, reputation, or property of the person
threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened
person is interested and the threat must be with the
intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it
must be to do any act which he is not legally bound
to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled
to do.”
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Pertinent to further note that the essential
ingredients of Section 509 IPC are; (i) intention on the part of an
accused to insult the modesty of a woman; and that the (ii) insult
must be caused by; (a) uttering any words, or making any sound
or gesture, or exhibiting any object intending that such word or
sound shall be heard or that the gesture or object shall be seen by
such woman, or (b) by intruding upon the privacy of such a
woman. Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Varun
Bhatia v. State & Ors., MANU/DE/5747/2023, wherein the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, while explicating the contours of
the provisions under Section 509 IPC, noted as under;
“18. Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code
delineates two pivotal components for establishing an
offence: firstly, the presence of an intention to insult
the modesty of a woman, and secondly, the manner
in which this insult is perpetrated. The cornerstone of
this provision is the requirement of intent, where the
accused must possess a deliberate intention to affront
or insult the modesty of a woman. This intent sets
apart ordinary speech or actions from those that
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amount to an offence under Section 509. The insult
itself can take place through two distinct modes. It
can occur verbally or visually by uttering specific
words, making sounds, or displaying gestures or
objects, with the deliberate intent that these words,
sounds, gestures, or objects are heard or seen by the
woman involved. Alternatively, insult can manifest
as an intrusion upon the woman’s privacy, meaning
thereby encroaching upon her personal space or
violating her sense of privacy intentionally, in a
manner that affronts her modesty. In essence, Section
509 emphasizes that intent is the linchpin of this
offence, necessitating a deliberate affront to a
woman’s modesty for the Section to be invoked.
*** *** ***
21. In essence, both Section 354 and Section 509
of Indian Penal Code addressed the issue of
outraging the modesty of a woman, but they do so in
distinct ways. Section 354 primarily deals with cases
involving physical assault or the use of force against
a woman, wherein her modesty is violated through
actions that involve direct contact or physical harm.
On the other hand, Section 509 concerns instances
where words, gestures, or acts are employed with the
deliberate intent to insult or offend a woman’s
modesty, without necessarily involving physical
force. This distinction in legal provisions reflects the
recognition that outraging a woman’s modesty can
take various forms, both physical and verbal, and the
law seeks to address each of these forms distinctly to
ensure justice and protection for women in different
situations. In the present case, the complainant has
raised allegations solely under Section 509 of the
Indian Penal Code against the accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Here, it is further apposite to note that the superior
courts have persistently avowed that in order for the provisions
under Section 509 IPC to be invoked, merely insulting a woman
is not sufficient, rather, insult to the modesty of a woman is an
essential ingredient of the said provision. In this regard, the
Hon’ble High Court of Kerala in Abhijeet J.K. v. State of Kerala
& Ors., MANU/KE/0617/2020, in unambiguous terms, noted as
under;
CR. No. 282/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 26 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.01.24 17:00:00 +0530
“8. Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code provides
that, whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any
woman, utters any word, makes any sound or
gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such
word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or
object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes
upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished
with simple imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years, and also with fine.
9. Utterance of any word or making of any sound
or gesture by a person, intending to insult the
modesty of a woman, attracts the offence punishable
under Section 509 I.P.C., if such act was made
intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or
that such gesture shall be seen by such woman.
10. There is distinction between an act of merely
insulting a woman and an act of insulting the
modesty of a woman. In order to attract Section 509
I.P.C., merely insulting a woman is not sufficient.
Insult to the modesty of a woman is an essential
ingredient of an offence punishable under Section
509 I.P.C. The crux of the offence is the intention to
insult the modesty of a woman.
11. Section 509 I.P.C. criminalises a ‘word,
gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a
woman’ and in order to establish this offence it is
necessary to show that the modesty of a particular
woman or a readily identifiable group of women has
been insulted by a spoken word, gesture or physical
act (See Khushboo v. Kanniammal:
MANU/SC/0310/2010 : AIR 2010 SC 3196).”
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Consequently, being mindful of the above, when
facts of the present case are conscientiously evaluated, in light of
aforenoted judicial precedents as well as the arguments
addressed, it is outrightly observed that the complainant has
made/levelled specific allegations against the revisionist
pertaining to the revisionist’s threatening her/the complainant
and her son on 09.04.2015, publicly on a road at Sita Ram Bazar,
Delhi in order to commit extortion. Further, as aforenoted, as per
the complainant, the revisionist demanded the complainant andCR. No. 282/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 27 of 34
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24
17:00:05 +0530
her son to pay a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs
only) or be ready for dire consequences. Correspondingly, as per
the complainant, the revisionist was demanding the said amount
on the pretext that he has suffered losses due to complaints made
by the complainant and further that the revisionist also threatened
the complainant that he would not allow them to repair an inch of
their house. Markedly, the said assertions further find mention
under/corroboration from the statement of the complainant’s son,
namely, Nitesh Bhargava, recorded by the concerned police
officials, wherein he reiterated the complainant’s stand. Needless
to mention, that the factum of the revisionist’s abusing as well as
threatening the complainant and her son, finds mention under the
statement of the complainant, recorded under Section 164
Cr.P.C. Correspondingly, both the complainant as well as her
son, Nitesh Bhargava asserted in their statements before the
police officials as well as the complainant proclaimed in her
statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. that the revisionist pushed
and shoved them (धक्का मुक्की करी) at the relevant point in time.
Accordingly, under such circumstances, this Court is in
concurrence with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that prima
facie case, strong suspicion and sufficient material/ground(s) to
proceed with the charges under Sections 323, 385 and 506 (part-
I) are made out against the revisionist herein. Further, in light of
the aforenoted judicial dictate, this Court is further in agreement
with the Ld. Trial Court that for offence under Section 323 IPC
to stand, there is no requirement of any medical report , i.e.,
production of an injury report for the offence under Section 323
IPC is not a sine qua non.
CR. No. 282/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 28 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24 17:00:08 +0530
23. Nevertheless, it is observed from the material
placed on record that though, the complainant asserted that the
revisionist abused her at that point in time, however, there is
nothing on record to demonstrate in the slightest that there was
any insult from the revisionist, as directed/intended to insult the
modesty of the complainant in the instant case. In fact, nowhere
under her complaint or subsequent statement recorded under
Section 161 of the complainant, except for the general allegation
of abuse [‘बतामीज़ी से पेश आया तथा अपशब्द बोले’ and ‘गाली दी व अपशब्द
बोले’], nothing else is forthcoming to demonstrate that the
revisionist uttered specific words, made sounds, or displayed
gestures or objects, with the deliberate intent that these words,
sounds, gestures, or objects are heard or seen by the complainant
with an intention to insult her modesty. In fact, even in her
subsequent statement, recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the
complainant made general allegation of the complainant abusing
her (‘गंदी गंदी गलियां दी’), without making any allegations as to
insulting her modesty by such conduct. As aforenoted, for a
prosecution under Section 509 IPC there, it is imperative that
there are definite allegations of insult to the modesty of woman
or intrusion into her privacy and that merely insulting a woman is
different from insulting the modesty of woman. Clearly, in the
former case, the allegations would fall short to even make a
prima facie case for the offence under Section 509 IPC.
Reference, in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon’ble
High Court of Kerala in Basheer v. State of Kerala, Crl.MC.No.
837 of 2010, dated 24.03.2016, wherein the Hon’ble Court, while
quashing a proceeding under Section 509 IPC, remarked as
under;
CR. No. 282/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 29 of 34
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24
17:00:12 +0530
“3. The learned Magistrate, and also the learned
Sessions Judge erred in law to find that this
prosecution can proceed under Section 509 IPC.
Mere insult will not attract Section 509 IPC. For a
prosecution under Section 509 IPC there must be a
definite allegation of insult to the modesty of woman
or intrusion into the privacy of woman. Thus the
allegation must involve modesty of woman or
privacy of woman. Mere insult or false allegation
will not attract a prosecution under Section 509 IPC.
In Annexure A2 complaint the 2nd respondent does
not have a case that the petitioners herein had
insulted her modesty as a woman, or that they had
intruded into her privacy in any manner. If at all the
petitioners had spread or published any insulting and
defamatory matters, she can initiate prosecution for
defamation under Section 500 IPC, provided, the
allegations would come under the definition of
defamation under Section 499 IPC. Any way mere
insult or insulting words, or abuse will not attract a
prosecution under Section 509 IPC. In this case there
is absolutely nothing in the complaint preferred by
the 2nd respondent, or in the final report submitted
by the police to indicate that the petitioners had in
any manner insulted her modesty or intruded into her
privacy. Merely insulting a woman is different from
insulting the modesty of woman. The subject of
insult for a prosecution under Section 509 IPC must
be the modesty of woman and not the woman as
such. When there is nothing to make out the essential
elements of the offence under Section 509 IPC, the
prosecution against the petitioners cannot proceed
under the law. I find that the present prosecution is
an abuse of legal and judicial process. If at all the 2 nd
respondent has a grievance or complaint that the
petitioners herein had made or published any
defamatory material against her alleging
misappropriation of amount, she will have to pursue
appropriate remedy, if at all such allegations would
constitute the offence of defamation. The present
prosecution cannot proceed because the complaint
does not contain the essential elements or ingredients
of the offence under Section 509 IPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Here, it is pertinent to deal with the contention of
the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist that there are contradictions in
the statements of the complainant recorded at different points in
CR. No. 282/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 30 of 34
Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24
17:00:17 +0530
time, i.e., in her complaint, statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
and her statement record under Section 164 Cr.P.C. However, as
aforenoted, such contradictions/inconsistencies, in the considered
opinion of this Court, are not sufficient enough for discharge of
an accused, as aforenoted, the superior courts have persistently
avowed that contradictions and inconsistencies in the statement
of witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge. In as
much as the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist
pertaining to the Ld. Trial Court’s not considering the CAF and
CDRs of the complainant, revisionist and the complainant’s son,
not demonstrating their presence at the spot at relevant point in
time, this Court is in concurrence with the finding of the Ld.
Trial Court that the same is a subject matter to be determined at
the stage of trial and cannot be scrupulously evaluated at the
stage of trial. Needless to mention the fact whether or not the said
parties were in possession of their respective mobile
phone/electronic devices at the relevant point in time or the
reasons for such ambiguity, as pointed out by Ld. Counsel for the
revisionist can be determined only after evidence has been led in
the instant case and that the same cannot be determined on mere
assertion of/on behalf of the revisionist, without a trial. Needless
to mention that law is trite19 that CDR data can only be taken as
supporting or corroborative piece of evidence, which in the
instant case has to be analyzed vis-à-vis statements of the
complainant and her son, which can only be done once the
evidence is led before the Ld. Trial Court. Further, this Court is
also not convinced with the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the
revisionist that since the material placed on record is insufficient
19
Azad v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 2 HCC (Del) 435.
CR. No. 282/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 31 of 34
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24
17:00:21 +0530
to convict the revisionist, he ought to be discharged. In fact, in
this regard, it is reiterated that at the stage of framing of charge,
sufficiency of materials for the purpose of conviction is not the
requirement and a prayer for discharge can be allowed only if the
court finds that the materials are wholly insufficient for the
purpose of trial, which is not the case here. Correspondingly, as
aforenoted, mere defect in investigation cannot also be a ground
for discharge. Lastly, this Court is also not convinced with the
contention of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist that charges
ought not to be framed against the revisionist as he was placed
under column no 12 of the chargesheet. In this regard, it is
outrightly submitted that no order of challenge of issuance of
summons to the revisionist on 02.02.2017 has been brought to
the attention of this Court. Even otherwise, this Court is
conscious of the law20 that there is no bar under law that courts
cannot summon and proceed against a suspect/accused, even if
such a suspect is kept in column no.12 of the chargesheet.
25. Consequently, in conspectus of above, further being
wary of the aforenoted judicial principles, in light of the
arguments addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist, Ld.
Counsel for the complainant as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for the
State, this Court observes that from the facts and circumstances
of the case, material and the documents placed on record of the
Ld. Trial Court, including inter alia the contents of the
20
Reference is made to SWIL Ltd. v. State of Delhi & Ors., MANU/SC/0450/2001, wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court, noted; “7. Further, in the present case there is no question of referring to the
provisions of section 319 Cr.P.C. That provision would come into operation in the course of any
inquiry into or trial of an offence. In the present case, neither the Magistrate was holding inquiry as
contemplated under section 2(g) Cr.P.C. not the trial had started. He was exercising his jurisdiction
under section 190 of taking cognizance of an offence and issuing process. There is no bar under
section 190 Cr.P.C. that once the process is issued against some accused, on the next date, the
Magistrate cannot issue process to some other person against whom there is some material on record,
but his name is not included as accused in the charge-sheet.” (Emphasis supplied)
CR. No. 282/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 32 of 34
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24
17:00:25 +0530
chargesheet, statements of witnesses, including that of the
complainant and her son, Nitesh Bhargava, prima facie case
under Section 323/385/506(part-I) IPC stands established against
revisionist in as much as the revisionist on 09.04.2015 at Bazar
Sita Ram, Delhi inter alia voluntarily caused hurt to the
complainant and her son, Nitesh Bhargava by pushing and
shoving (धक्का मुक्की करी); putting the complainant and her said
son in fear of injury in order to commit extortion; as well as
threatening the complainant and her son, Nitesh Bhargava of dire
consequences as well as demanding the said amount on the
pretext that he has suffered losses due to complaints made by the
complainant and further that the revisionist also threatened the
complainant that he would not allow them to repair an inch of
their house. Needless to mention that nowhere from the material
placed on record, any element/allegation of any insult from the
revisionist, as directed/intended to insult the modesty of the
complainant in the instant case, as specified under Section 509
IPC is prima facie made out against the revisionist, entitling the
revisionist for discharge from the said offence.
26. Accordingly, in light of the aforesaid discussion,
this Court unwaveringly records and reiterates that the impugned
order/order dated 30.06.2020, passed by the Ld. ACMM-02,
Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in case bearing, “State v.
Mukesh Arora, CIS No. 1300/2017″, arising out of FIR No.
341/2015, PS Hauz Qazi, under Sections 385/506/509/34 IPC is
upheld in respect of charges under Sections 323/385/506(part-I)
of IPC and set aside in so far as it directs framing of charge
under Section 509 IPC. Needless to reiterate that there is no
infirmity in as far as the impugned order directs framing of
CR. No. 282/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 33 of 34
Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24
17:00:29 +0530
charges under Sections 323/385/506(part-I) of IPC in the instant
case. Ergo, the instant petition/revision petition stands partly
allowed in the aforesaid terms. The petition is consequently
disposed off in the terms specified herein.
27. Trial Court Record along with a copy of this
order/judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court concerned for
information and compliance.
28. Revision file be consigned to record room after due
compliance.
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24
17:00:34
+0530
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 24.01.2025 ASJ-03, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
CR. No. 282/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 34 of 34
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