Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Mukesh Kumar vs State Of Rajasthan (2025:Rj-Jd:27201) on 16 June, 2025
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2025:RJ-JD:27201]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 18/2025
Mukesh Kumar S/o Shri Chhagan Lal, Aged About 29 Years, R/o
Village Khara, P.s. Karda, Dist Sanchore Presently R/o H.no. 219-
A, Ashapurna Nano Avenue, Sikargarh, P.s. Banar, Dist Jodhpur.
(Presently Lodged At Central Jail , Jodhpur)
----Petitioner
Versus
State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Jai Kishan Haniya
For Respondent(s) : Mr. C.S. Ojha, Pp
Mr. Mohit Kumar
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
16/06/2025
1. The jurisdiction of this court has been invoked by way of
filing an application under Section 483 BNSS at the instance
of accused-petitioner. The requisite details of the matter are
tabulated herein below:
S.No. Particulars of the Case 1. FIR Number 0568/2024 2. Concerned Police Station Mahamandir 3. District Jodhpur 4. Offences alleged in the FIR 406,420 of IPC 5. Offences added, if any 6. Date of passing of impugned 19.12.2024 order
2. The concise facts of the case as alleged in the FIR are that
the complainant, Bela Prasad, wife of late Ganga Prasad,
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resident of Hathiyon Ki Bawdi, Rasala Road, Jodhpur, states
that she rented the upper portion of her house to Mukesh
Kumar (S/o Chhaganlal Khara, Village Sanchore) from 2011
to 2021. Over time, close and familial relations developed. In
2017, Mukesh borrowed ₹30,000 for his father’s medical
treatment, which he repaid, thereby further strengthening
her trust. In 2019, Mukesh, an employee of the State Bank
of India (SBI), requested that she take a loan in her name
for his personal and family needs (medical and property-
related), assuring her that he would repay the EMIs.
Accordingly, a loan of ₹2,94,000 was sanctioned through her
SBI account (originally at Raika Bagh branch), which Mukesh
had transferred without her written consent to SBI Pali
Industrial Area branch. He paid only a few instalments, and
the complainant had to bear the remaining repayment
burden. Later, upon obtaining her bank statement, she
discovered that another loan of ₹3,31,000 was fraudulently
sanctioned on 28.04.2023 in her name, without her presence
or consent, and ₹3,05,000 was unlawfully transferred to
Mukesh’s account through forged documents in collusion with
SBI officials. When confronted, Mukesh pleaded for
forgiveness and promised to repay the money with interest.
In October 2024, Mukesh issued a cheque of ₹3,91,100
dated 28.10.2024, which was dishonoured. Subsequently, he
gave a written undertaking on plain paper on 09.11.2024 to
repay ₹9,00,000 by 14.11.2024, but failed to do so. On
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16.11.2024, while checking her bank account at SBI Piyush
Bhawan branch (Account No. 32780131731), she discovered
only ₹1640 in her account. Upon inquiry, she learned that
large sums had been fraudulently withdrawn by Mukesh
using forged signatures and fake documents in collusion with
bank officials. Despite repeated follow-ups, neither Mukesh
nor his family returned the money. Instead, she was
threatened that if Mukesh committed suicide, they would
initiate legal action against her. It has also come to light that
Mukesh is heavily indebted to several individuals. Hence, the
complainant prays for registration of an FIR and strict legal
action against Mukesh Kumar and the concerned bank
officials involved in the conspiracy, forgery, misappropriation,
and breach of trust.
3. It is contended on behalf of the accused-petitioner that no
case for the alleged offences is made out against him and his
incarceration is not warranted. There are no factors at play
in the case at hand that may work against grant of bail to
the accused-petitioner and he has been made an accused
based on conjectures and surmises.
4. Contrary to the submissions of learned counsel for the
petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor opposes the bail
application and submits that the present case is not fit for
enlargement of accused on bail.
5. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned
Public Prosecutor and perused the entire material available
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on record. On a prima facie consideration, it appears that the
dispute is essentially based on financial transactions arising
from a relationship of trust between the parties. The record
reveals that the trial is yet to commence and the conclusion
of trial may take considerable time. In these circumstances,
and having regard to the nature of allegations, it is deemed
appropriate to consider the petitioner’s prayer for bail.
6. It is not disputed that the accused-petitioner has remained
behind the bars for a period exceeding six months. Despite
this prolonged incarceration, the trial has not yet
commenced, nor is there any clear indication from the record
that it will begin in the near future. Continued detention of
the petitioner, solely on the ground that further investigation
is ongoing against other alleged co-accused persons
(including certain bank officials), cannot be a valid basis to
prolong the pre-trial custody of the present accused. A
person should not be subjected to punitive detention before
conviction unless there exists a clear and compelling reason
for doing so. The liberty of an undertrial cannot be sacrificed
at the altar of a speculative future investigation, especially
when there is no credible apprehension that the petitioner
may tamper with evidence or flee from justice.
7. The argument advanced on behalf of the complainant that he
still wishes to be heard at greater length, has also been duly
taken into consideration. However, this Court is satisfied that
both parties have been afforded full and fair opportunity to
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present their submissions and no useful purpose would be
served by keeping the matter pending merely to prolong the
hearing. Upon balancing the rights of the accused against
the need for fair investigation and societal interest, this
Court finds no cogent ground to deny the relief sought by the
petitioner.
8. Further, the argument of the complainant that in the future
the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
might also be invoked and therefore the matter would no
longer remain triable by a Magistrate, is not only premature
and speculative, but also patently misconceived. At present,
the charge-sheet has been filed under Sections 420 and 406
IPC, which are triable by a Magistrate. The judicial process
cannot operate on hypothetical extensions of investigation or
distant legal possibilities. This Court cannot predicate the
liberty of a person on the basis of imaginative contingencies
which may or may not arise. To detain an accused based on
such speculative reasoning would amount to a gross
miscarriage of justice and an erosion of the presumption of
innocence, which is the cornerstone of criminal
jurisprudence.
9. In support of the petitioner’s contention that the matter is
triable by a Magistrate and hence a liberal approach on the
question of bail ought to be adopted, reference may be made
to the judgment passed by this Court in Dharmendra v.
State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application
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No. 11484/2023, decided on 07.10.2023 . In the said
case, bail was granted in respect of offences under Sections
420, 406, and 120-B IPC–offences similar to the present
matter–on the ground that they are triable by a Magistrate,
and that the core principle of bail jurisprudence is to balance
the liberty of the accused with the necessity of securing their
presence during trial. The Court lucidly enunciated that
denying bail in cases triable by Magistrates, particularly
when there is no allegation of absconding or tampering with
evidence, amounts to premature elongation of sentence and
a judicial appropriation of the sentencing discretion vested in
the Magistracy, thereby undermining the legislative
architecture of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
10. It is further imperative to elaborate that in the present
case, the offences alleged–Sections 420 and 406 IPC–are
non-bailable but bailable by discretion, and are triable by a
Magistrate of First Class. The maximum punishment
prescribed under Section 420 IPC is imprisonment of up to
seven years, and under Section 406 IPC, three years. These
fall well within the sentencing jurisdiction of the Magistracy
under Section 29 Cr.P.C. The assertion of the complainant
that offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act may be
added at a future stage is purely speculative and does not
alter the present prosecutorial framework, which is solely
based on IPC offences. Judicial adjudication must proceed on
the basis of existing legal material and not hypothetical
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legislative outcomes. As held in Dharmendra (supra), the
speculative invocation of additional statutes cannot be made
a ground to deny bail when the current charge-sheet
pertains only to offences triable by a Magistrate. It is
judicially impermissible to detain an accused for offences
that might, but have not yet, been invoked. Courts must
refrain from allowing their processes to be driven by
imaginative apprehensions, lest such practices compromise
the accused’s right to liberty and the presumption of
innocence that animates our criminal justice system.
11. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage prior to
conviction, grant of bail is the norm and refusal must remain
an exception, to be exercised only in circumstances where
denial is imperative to ensure the proper administration of
justice. The fundamental rationale behind pre-trial detention
is to secure the accused’s presence during the trial. In the
present case, there is nothing on record to suggest that the
petitioner has attempted to evade the process of law or that
he poses a flight risk. Absent any such material, his
continued incarceration would serve no tangible purpose.
12. There is high probability that the trial may take long
time to conclude. In light of these facts and circumstances, it
is deemed suitable to grant the benefit of bail to the
petitioner in the present matter.
13. It is nigh well settled law that at a pre-conviction stage;
bail is a rule and denial from the same should be an
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exception. The purpose behind keeping an accused behind
the bars during trial would be to secure his presence on the
day of conviction so that he may receive the sentence as
would be awarded to him. Otherwise, it is the rule of
Crimnal Jurisprudence that he shall be presumed innocent
until the guilt is proved.
14. Accordingly, the instant bail application under Section
483 BNSS. is allowed and it is ordered that the accused-
petitioner as named in the cause title shall be enlarged on
bail provided he/she furnishes a personal bond in the sum of
Rs.50,000/- with two sureties of Rs.25,000/- each to the
satisfaction of the learned trial Judge for his appearance
before the court concerned on all the dates of hearing as and
when called upon to do so.
(FARJAND ALI),J
16-Rakesh/-
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