Delhi High Court
Myna Homes Private Limited vs Preeti Bansal And Ors on 11 August, 2025
Author: Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
Bench: Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
+ CS(COMM) 691/2025 and I.A. 16163/2025, I.A. 16164/2025, I.A.
16165/2025, I.A. 16167/2025, I.A. 17064/2025
MYNA HOMES PRIVATE LIMITED
THROUGH AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY
HAVING REGISTERED ADDRESS AT:
C-9, MEZZANINE FLOOR MAIN MARKET,
VAS ANT VIHAR, NEW DELHI - 110006 ...PLAINTIFF
(Through: Mr. Ankur Mahindroo, Mr. Mohit Dagar and Mr. Rohan
Taneja, Advs.)
versus
PREETI BANSAL
WIFE OF MR. VINOD BANSAL
RESIDENT OF:
J-2 / 14 DLF PHASE-2
SECTOR 25 GURUGRAM,
HARYANA - 122002 ...DEFENDANT NO.1
MR. VINOD BANSAL
RESIDENT OF:
J-2/14 DLF PHASE-2
SECTOR 25 GURUGRAM
HARYANA- 122002 ...DEFENDANT NO. 2
MR. SUBHI BANSAL
SON OF MR. VINOD BANSAL
RESIDENT OF: J-2/14, DLF PHASE-2,
SECTOR 25, GURUGRAM,
HARYANA - 122002 ...DEFENDANT NO.3
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Signing Date:13.08.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
11:17:53 1 KUMAR KAURAV
MR. VINAY KUMAR MITTAL
SON OF SHRI SURESH PAUL MITTAL
RESIDENCE OF:
H. NO. 102/2, MALL ROAD,
MAJOR GURDIYAL SINGH ROAD,
LUDHIANA, PUNJAB-141001 ...DEFENDANT NO.4
MR. VIPIN GUPTA
SON OF SHRI RAM MEHAR GUPTA,
RESIDENCE NOT KNOWN ...DEFENDANT NO.5
UNION BANK OF INDIA
THROUGH AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY
HAVING BRANCH OFFICE AT:
10184, ARYA SAMAJ ROAD,
KAROL BAGH, NEW DELHI - 110005
HAVING ASSET RECOVERY BRANCH' AT:
26/28-D, CONNAUGHT PLACE,
NEW DELHI - ·110001
ALSO AT: M-35, FIRST FLOOR,
OUTER CIRCLE, CONNAUGHT PLACE,
NEW DELHI - 110001. ...DEFENDANT NO.6
(Through: Mr. Siddharth Yadav, Sr. Adv with Mr. Anuj Chauhan,
Mr. Pradeep Yadav and Mr. Sunil Yadav, Advs for D-1, 2 and 3.)
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% Reserved on: 22.07.2025
Pronounced on: 11.08.2025
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JUDGMENT
I.A. 16164/2025 (BY THE PLAINTIFF- FOR EXEMPTION FROM
PRE-INSTITUTION MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 12A CCA,
2015)
The instant application has been filed by the Plaintiff seeking
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exemption from pre-institution mediation envisaged under Section 12 A of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the ‗Act’).
2. The instant civil suit is for various reliefs, inter alia, seeking specific
performance of a collaboration agreement dated 03.06.2015 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‗agreement’).
Brief facts
3. In May 2015, the Plaintiff is stated to have been approached by
defendant Nos. 1 and 2 with a proposal to reconstruct a property situated at
U-29, Green Park Main, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the ‗suit
property’). As per a mutual understanding, the Plaintiff was to demolish and
reconstruct the entire property, post which the Ground Floor and First Floor
would be owned by the Plaintiff, while the Second and Third Floors would
belong to Defendant No. 1.
4. Subsequently, the agreement was executed between the Plaintiff and
Defendant No. 1, formalizing the terms of the proposed redevelopment.
Along with the agreement, Defendant No. 1 executed various supporting
documents, including General Power of Attorney, Special Power of
Attorney, Affidavit, and Will in favour of the Plaintiff to enable necessary
approvals and permissions from the concerned authorities. In furtherance
thereto, the Plaintiff paid a sum of INR 1.2 Crores and took possession of
the property.
5. However, as per the Plaintiff’s case, it later came to light that
Defendant No. 1 had also agreed the Second Floor of the same property to
one Mrs. Kusum Srivastava. Further complications arose when Defendant
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No. 6 i.e., Union Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‗Bank’) issued
a legal notice alleging that the suit property was mortgaged with it and that
the bank was in possession of the original title documents. The Plaintiff
responded, asserting its bona fide possession and development of the
property based on the agreement.
6. The Plaintiff subsequently filed police complaints against Defendants
No. 1 and 2, alleging offences related to cheating and conspiracy. In
connection with the same issues, FIR No. 0125/2016 was registered at
Safdarjung Enclave Police Station under Sections 406 and 420 of Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‗IPC‘). Meanwhile, the Bank
initiated proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
(hereinafter referred to as ‗SARFAESI Act‘) against Defendant Nos. 1 to 3,
issuing notices under Sections 13(2) and 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act and
seeking possession of the suit property. It was only upon the visit of the
Bank’s officials to the property that the Plaintiff came to know about the
aforenoted notices.
7. In response, the Plaintiff addressed a letter to the Bank asserting its
lawful possession arising out of the collaboration agreement and later filed
an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the Debt
Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the ‗DRT’). The said
application was dismissed, and the Plaintiff preferred an appeal under
Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act before the Debt Recovery Appellate
Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the ‗DRAT’). The Plaintiff issued notices
to Defendants No. 1 to 3 and the Bank.
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8. During the pendency of the appeal, as per the Plaintiff’s case,
unknown persons approached the Plaintiff with a letter purportedly
evidencing that a One-Time Settlement between Defendants No. 1 to 3 and
the Bank. The Plaintiff continued to prosecute its appeal and also issued
notices to prevent third-party interests in the suit property. A public notice
was issued on behalf of Defendants No. 4 and 5 expressing interest in
purchasing the suit property, to which the Plaintiff raised objections.
Subsequently, the Plaintiff received intimation from the Sub-Registrar that
Defendant No. 1 had attempted to execute a sale deed in favour of
Defendant No. 4.
9. It is under the aforenoted circumstances, the Plaintiff has approached
this Court by way of the instant suit.
10. This matter was earlier called out on 11.07.2025. The Court directed
for issuance of notice to the Defendants on applications bearing no. I.A.
16163/2025 (for ex-parte ad interim injunction) and I.A. 16164/2025 ( for
exemption from pre-institution mediation under section 12A CCA, 2015).
11. The pleadings are completed with respect to the aforenoted
applications qua the Defendant nos. 1, 2, and 3. Arguments were advanced
on the said applications.
Submissions
12. Mr. Ankur Mahindro, learned counsel for the Plaintiff, submitted that
Defendant No.1 has acknowledged the execution of the agreement before
various authorities. He contended that the said agreement has neither been
rescinded nor cancelled. According to him, the Plaintiff has consistently
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demonstrated readiness and willingness to execute the sale deed in his
favour and continues to do so. He pointed out that by the time the
superstructure was completed, Defendant No.6 had already started objecting
to the title documents pertaining to the suit property.
13. He further submits that the initial objection was raised as early as on
19.08.2015, casting doubts on the bona fides of Defendant No.1. He argues
that Defendant No.1 failed to disclose in the agreement that the title
documents were under mortgage with the Bank. He stated that on
26.09.2016, the Bank took possession of the suit property, which, as per his
knowledge, remains with the Bank to date.
14. Learned counsel also drew the Court’s attention to a sequence of dates
and events post-2015 to show that the Plaintiff has been actively pursuing
remedies before the DRT and DRAT.
15. He asserted that due to the fraudulent acts of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2,
the Plaintiff was compelled to initiate criminal proceedings. An FIR bearing
No. 0126/16 was registered under Sections 406 and 420 of IPC against the
said Defendants.
16. He further submitted that paragraph 50 of the plaint clarifies that the
cause of action arose on 29.05.2025 when a public notice was issued by the
counsel for Defendant Nos. 4 and 5, expressing their intent to purchase the
suit property. In response, it is contended, the Plaintiff promptly objected
and notified the concerned party about the existing collaboration agreement
between the Plaintiff and Defendant No.1. He also stated that a legal notice
was issued to Defendant Nos. 1 to 3, asserting the Plaintiff’s rights and
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objecting to any third-party transfer.
17. Learned counsel also submitted that a notice was sent to the
concerned Sub-Registrar’s office, requesting that no document be registered
contrary to the terms of the agreement. Furthermore, Mr. Mahindro
additionally referred to the balance sheets placed on record, which reflect
that despite the completion of the superstructure, the Plaintiff maintained a
balance exceeding INR. 7 crores, indicating the financial capability of the
Plaintiff to proceed with the construction and execution of the sale deed. He
highlighted that the agreement does not stipulate a specific date for
execution of the sale deed, and that the delay was due to various legal
impediments, all attributable to the Defendants. He relied upon the decision
of this Court in Grovy India v. Balbir Singh1, specifically referring to
paragraphs 5, 6, 14, 21, and 73 of the judgment. He argues that the factual
matrix of the present case closely resembles that of Grovy India.
18. Learned counsel also defended the challenge to the maintainability of
the suit despite the absence of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A
of the Act, by asserting that urgent interim relief sought herein is essential to
avoid frustration of the entire cause of action.
19. He emphasized that a sale deed has already been executed behind the
Plaintiff’s back and has been presented for registration. Should the said sale
deed be registered, he averred, it would entirely defeat the purpose of filing
the civil suit. He relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Patil
1
2021 SCC Online Del 4783
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Automation v. Rakheja Engineers2, Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D.3, and M/s
Dhanbad Fuels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr.4, arguing that the
Supreme Court has held that a suit is undoubtedly maintainable where
urgent relief is genuinely sought.
20. He further contended that in the present case, urgent interim relief has
been sought on the basis of substantial material, and therefore, the suit
should not be dismissed merely for non-compliance of Section 12A of the
Act.
21. Per contra, Mr. Siddharth Yadav, learned senior counsel for
Defendant Nos. 1, 2, and 3, submitted that the Plaintiff has taken
inconsistent positions in the plaint. He argued that although the Plaintiff
claims to have completed construction of the entire building, the
photographs on record show that only the superstructure was constructed.
He further asserted that for over a decade, from 2015 to 2025, the Plaintiff
has failed to demonstrate readiness and willingness to execute the sale deed.
22. Mr. Yadav highlighted a material non-disclosure by the Plaintiff,
specifically, the fact that the matter had reached the Supreme Court and the
SLP against the DRAT order was dismissed on 29.03.2019. He contended
that any surviving cause of action should have been pursued at that time.
23. He further questioned as to what refrained the Plaintiff from filing a
civil suit immediately after failing to secure relief from the DRT, DRAT,
2
(2022) 10 SCC 1
3
(2024) 5 SCC 815
4
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1129
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and Supreme Court. He also referred to the applications filed before the
DRAT, where similar reliefs were sought, arguing that having been failed
there, the Plaintiff is attempting to re-agitate the same issues through this
civil suit.
24. According to him, the Plaintiff has not produced a single document
from 2015 to 2025 to prove his continuous readiness and willingness to
perform his part of the agreement. He contended that the urgency claimed by
the Plaintiff is contrived and unsustainable. He also argued that specific
performance is not warranted at this stage, and if at all, the Plaintiff is
entitled to any relief, it would be limited to recovery for any damages to be
proven during the course of the trial.
25. Mr. Yadav drew the attention of the Court to the agreement, which
required the Plaintiff to complete construction within 15 months of either the
handover of possession or the sanction of building plans. He stated that
possession was handed over on 03.06.2015, and building plans were
sanctioned on 30.06.2015. According to him, even considering 30.06.2015
as the relevant date, the 15-month period expired on 30.09.2016. He averred
that construction was not completed by the time the Bank took over
possession on 26.09.2018. Thus, according to him, the Plaintiff is making
repeated, unsuccessful attempts to obstruct the legitimate enjoyment of the
property by its rightful owner. He further contended that a proper reading of
the decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by the Plaintiff reinforces the
mandatory nature of Section 12A of the Act and exhibits that Courts should
not entertain suits merely on the basis of illusory urgency.
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26. He particularly referred to paragraphs 11 and 12 of the decision in
Yamini Manohar, arguing that Section 12A (1) of the Act requires the suit
to “contemplate urgent relief‖, meaning thereby that the pleadings and
documents must clearly reflect the need for such relief, something that is
absent in the present case.
27. He also referred to paragraph 62 of the decision in Dhanbad and
additionally relies on the decision in W.P.(C) 2039/2025 dated 19.02.2025
titled Renewflex Recycling v. Facilitation Centre Rohini Courts5.
28. Learned senior counsel also submitted that the sale deed has already
been executed. He states that a categorical statement to that effect has been
made in the order dated 11.07.2025.
29. He also contended that the Plaintiff cannot maintain this suit without
complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 12A of the Act. He also
argued that no relief can be granted under Order XXXIX Rule 1& 2 of CPC,
and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the suit.
30. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the
record.
Legal explication of section 12A of the Act
31. The legal position with respect to the scope of Section 12A is no
longer res integra. The Supreme Court, on various occasions, has considered
the question of whether the statutory pre-litigation mediation envisaged
5
2025 SCC OnLine Del 978
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under Section 12A of the Act is a compulsory provision or not.
32. The Supreme Court in Patil Automation (P) Ltd. has held that Section
12A of the Act cannot be defined as a mere procedural law. It was also held
that the scope of the Act, as amended in 2018, by which Section 12A was
inserted, would make it untenable that legislature intended not to accord the
said provision a mandatory flavour and any other interpretation would not
only be in the teeth of the express language used but would also result
rendering the object of the provision otiose. The relevant extracts of the
decision of the Supreme Court in Patil Automation Private Ltd., read as
under:-
―99.1. The Act did not originally contain Section 12-A. It is by
amendment in the year 2018 that Section 12-A was inserted. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons are explicit that Section 12-A
was contemplated as compulsory. The object of the Act and the
Amending Act of 2018, unerringly point to at least partly foisting
compulsory mediation on a Plaintiff who does not contemplate
urgent interim relief. The provision has been contemplated only
with reference to Plaintiffs who do not contemplate urgent interim
relief. The legislature has taken care to expressly exclude the
period undergone during mediation for reckoning limitation under
the Limitation Act, 1963. The object is clear.
***
113.1. We declare that Section 12-A of the Act is mandatory and
hold that any suit instituted violating the mandate of Section 12-A
must be visited with rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11.
This power can be exercised even suo motu by the Court as
explained earlier in the judgment. We, however, make this
declaration effective from 20-8-2022 so that stakeholders
concerned become sufficiently informed.”(emphasis supplied)
33. While discussing the purview of the exception carved out in Section
12A regarding contemplation of urgent interim relief, the Supreme Court in
Yamini Manohar, has held that the language used in the provision to the
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effect “contemplate any urgent interim relief” stipulates the discretion of the
Court to examine the plaint, cause of action, and documents attached
thereto, to determine whether there arises an urgent relief or not. Paragraph
No.12 of the aforesaid decision reads as under:-
“12. The words ―contemplate any urgent interim relief‖ in Section
12-A(1) of the CC Act, with reference to the suit, should be read as
conferring power on the Court to be satisfied. They suggest that the
suit must ―contemplate‖, which means the plaint, documents and
facts should show and indicate the need for an urgent interim relief.
This is the precise and limited exercise that the commercial courts
will undertake, the contours of which have been explained in the
earlier paragraph(s). This will be sufficient to keep in check and
ensure that the legislative object/intent behind the enactment of
Section 12-A of the CC Act is not defeated.”
34. In Yamini Manohar, the Court emphasized that while the provision
does not require express leave of the Court or an application for exemption,
the pleadings and submissions must objectively demonstrate a genuine
urgency. It was observed that the test is not whether the Court ultimately
grants interim relief, but whether, from the standpoint of the Plaintiff, the
nature of the suit and the cause of action justify an urgent prayer. The
Supreme Court also cautioned against using the interim relief prayer as a
camouflage to bypass mediation and emphasized the limited but essential
gatekeeping role of the Commercial Courts to examine the authenticity of
such pleas. It was also held that the phrase “contemplate any urgent interim
relief” empowers the Court to examine if the relief is bona fide or merely a
thoughtful strategy to evade statutory compliance.
35. Additionally, in Dhanbad, the Supreme Court, reiterating the decision
in Yamini Manohar, explicitly reaffirmed that the mere use of the phrase
“urgent interim relief” in a plaint, without substantiating material or factual
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urgency, does not by itself entitle a Plaintiff to exemption from the
mandatory pre-institution mediation requirement under Section 12A of the
Act. The Court held that a bald assertion of urgency cannot be permitted to
defeat the statutory mandate intended to reduce litigation through structured
settlement opportunities. Paragraph nos. 42 to 44 are reproduced
hereinbelow: –
―iii. How the expression ―urgent interim relief‖ is to be construed
42. Further, it is also pertinent to note that Section 12A of the 2015
Act does not contemplate leave of the Court for filing a suit which
contemplates an urgent interim relief, as is clear from the language
and words used in the provision. The provision also does not
necessarily require an application seeking exemption if a suit is
being filed without pre-institution mediation. An application
seeking waiver on account of urgent interim relief setting out
grounds and reasons may allay a challenge and assist the court, but
in the absence of any statutory mandate or rules made by the
Central Government, an application per se is not a condition under
Section 12A of the 2015Act. Pleadings on record and oral
submissions would be sufficient in ordinary course.
43. This Court in Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi reported in
(2024)5 SCC 815 while interpreting the import of the expression ―a
suit which does not contemplate any urgent interim relief‖ used in
Section12A of the 2015 Act observed that the word ―contemplate‖
connotes to deliberate and consider. Further, the legal position that
the plaint can be rejected and not entertained reflects application of
mind by the Court as regards the requirement of ―urgent interim
relief‖. The Court further observed that the prayer of urgent
interim relief should not act as a disguise to get over the bar
contemplated under Section 12A. However, at the same time, the
Court observed that the mere non-grant of the interim relief at the
ad-interim stage, when the plaint is up for admission and
examination would not justify the rejection of the plaint under
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, as interim relief is at times also
granted after issuance of notice. Further, even if after the
conclusion of arguments on the aspect of interim relief, the same is
denied on merits, that would not by itself justify the rejection of the
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said decision are reproduced hereinbelow:
―10. We are of the opinion that when a plaint is filed under the
CC Act, with a prayer for an urgent interim relief, the
commercial Courts would examine the nature and the subject-
matter of the suit, the cause of action, and the prayer for
interim relief. The prayer for urgent interim relief should not
be a disguise or mask to wriggle out of and get over Section
12-A of the CC Act. The facts and circumstances of the case
have to be considered holistically from the standpoint of the
Plaintiff. Non-grant of interim relief at the ad interim stage,
when the plaint is taken up for registration/admission and
examination, will not justify dismissal of the commercial suit
under Order 7 Rule 11of the Code; at times, interim relief is
granted after issuance of notice. Nor can the suit be dismissed
under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, because the interim relief,
post the arguments, is denied on merits and on examination of
the three principles, namely : (i) prima facie case, (ii)
irreparable harm and injury, and (iii)balance of convenience.
The fact that the Court issued notice and/or granted interim
stay may indicate that the Court is inclined to entertain the
plaint.
11. Having stated so, it is difficult to agree with the proposition
that the Plaintiff has the absolute choice and right to paralyse
Section 12-A of the CC Act by making a prayer for urgent
interim relief. Camouflage and guise to bypass the statutory
mandate of pre-litigation mediation should be checked when
deception and falsity is apparent or established. The
proposition that the commercial courts do have a role, albeit a
limited one, should be accepted, otherwise it would be up to the
Plaintiff alone to decide whether to resort to the procedure
under Section 12-A of the CC Act. An ―absolute and unfettered
right‖ approach is not justified if the pre-institution mediation
under Section 12-A of the CC Act is mandatory, as held by this
Court in Patil Automation [Patil Automation (P) Ltd. v.
Rakheja Engineers (P) Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1 : (2023) 1
SCC(Civ) 545] .
12. The words ―contemplate any urgent interim relief‖ in
Section 12-A(1) of the CC Act, with reference to the suit,
should be read as conferring power on the Court to be
satisfied. They suggest that the suit must ―contemplate‖, which
means the plaint, documents and facts should show and
indicate the need for an urgent interim relief. This is the
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precise and limited exercise that the commercial courts will
undertake, the contours of which have been explained in the
earlier paragraph(s). This will be sufficient to keep in check
and ensure that the legislative object/intent behind the
enactment of Section 12-A of the CC Act is not
defeated.‖(Emphasis supplied)
44. Thus, it becomes clear from a perusal of the aforesaid
decision that the test under Section 12A is not whether the prayer
for the urgent interim relief actually comes to be allowed or not,
but whether on an examination of the nature and the subject-
matter of the suit and the cause of action, the prayer of urgent
interim relief by the Plaintiff could be said to be contemplable
when the matter is seen from the standpoint of the Plaintiff.
Further, what is also to be kept in mind by the courts is that the
urgent interim relief must not be merely an unfounded excuse by
the Plaintiff to bypass the mandatory requirement of Section 12A
of the 2015 Act.
45. In the case at hand indisputably, no urgent interim relief was
prayed for at the time of the institution of the suit by the Union‖
36. In Renewflex Recycling, the petitioner therein challenged the
rejection of its commercial suit by the Registry on the ground of non-
compliance with Section 12A of the Act despite having sent a mediation
request to the respondent, which went unanswered. The Division Bench of
this Court held that a legal notice or self-styled mediation attempt by a
litigant does not satisfy the statutory requirement of pre-institution
mediation under Section 12A, which mandates adherence to the prescribed
legal framework involving authorised authorities. Reiterating the settled
principle that statutory procedures must be followed strictly and exclusively
in the manner prescribed, the Court found the petitioner’s submissions
misconceived and dismissed the writ petition in limine. The relevant extract
of the aforenoted decision reads as under:-
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“11. Just so to dispel any unnecessary conjuring up of similar
submissions, it would be apposite to extract Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act which reads thus:
―12A. Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement–(1) A suit, which does
not contemplate any urgent interim relief under this Act, shall not be
instituted unless the Plaintiff exhausts the remedy of pre institution
mediation in accordance with such manner and procedure as may be
prescribed by rules made by the Central Government.
(2) The Central Government may, by notification, authorise the
Authorities constituted under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
(39of 1987), for the purposes of pre-institution mediation.(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Legal Services
AuthoritiesAct, 1987, the Authority authorised by the Central
Government under sub-section (2) shall complete the process of
mediation within a period of threemonths from the date of application
made by the Plaintiff under sub-section (1): Provided that the period of
mediation may be extended for afurther period of two months with the
consent of the parties: Providedfurther that, the period during which
the parties remained occupied withthe pre-institution mediation, such
period shall not be computed for thepurpose of limitation under the
Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963).
(4) If the parties to the commercial dispute arrive at a settlement, the
same shall be reduced into writing and shall be signed by the parties to
the dispute and the mediator.
(5) The settlement arrived at under this section shall have the same
status and effect as if it is an arbitral award on agreed terms under
sub-section(4) of section 30 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 (26 of1996).]‖Applying the golden principle of interpretation, the provisions maybe
read in its most simple and unambiguous manner. So read, it is
apparent that the legislative intent is not to empower a litigant to
supplant the process envisaged in Section 12A of the Act, by issuance
of a legal notice calling for mediation or even supplement it. The
plain reading does not suggest any such mode or method of initiating
mediation proceedings. Infact, the intent appears to be to initiate the
mediation process within the “statutory framework” so as to ensure
that the commercial litigation is not protracted or prolonged
unnecessarily. The legal framework also envisages the mediation to
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overarching control over the mediation process by the institution. In
this context, it is of great significance to note sub-section (5)of Section
12A of the Act. It envisages and bestows a legal sanctity to
the―settlement‖ arrived at by the parties contemplated under sub-
section (4) ofSection 12A of the Act by deeming the same to be an
―award‖ under sub-W.P.(C) 2039/2025Page 8 of 8section (4) of
Section 30 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, consequently
empowering the ―settlement‖ to be legally enforceable. This legal
statutory framework can neither be supplanted nor even supplemented
in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
12. Ergo, from the above analysis of the provisions, it is apparent that
the submissions of the petitioner are extraneous to the legislative
framework and the intent of the Commercial Courts Act‖
37. The Madras High Court, in a case titled as M/S Micro Labs Limited
v. Mr. A. Santhosh6, while rejecting the suit filed with a delay of four
months, noted that such delay would reflect the absence of contemplation. It
was further held that mere filing of applications for interim prayers does not
save the Plaintiff from the death knell consequence qua infraction of Section
12A, rather it is the prerogative of the Court to decide whether the interim
relief sought for is urgent and a product of ‘contemplation’.
38. A similar view has been taken by the High Court of Jammu and
Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar in the case of M/s Devyani International
Limited v. Airport Authority of India and Others7, reaching a conclusion
that the Plaintiff does not have any absolute choice and unfettered right to
paralyse Section 12A of the Act, by making a prayer for urgent interim relief
without any emergent cause of action and imminent danger.
39. The High Court of Bombay in Future Corporate Resources (P) Ltd.
6
C.S (Comm. Div.) No.185 of 2022 decision dated 14.09.2022
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v. Edelweiss Special Opportunities Fund8, while mentioning that Section
12A was meant to accelerate disposal by providing a disposal mechanism
that did not involve Courts, it does not permit a Plaintiff to bypass its
provisions by merely filing an interim application. As per the said decision,
the words “which does not contemplate” does not mean “in the opinion of
the Plaintiff”. The Court emphasized that a Plaintiff may in a commercial
cause contemplate very many things and may want even more but that is
immaterial.
40. In Indian Explosives (P) Ltd. v. Ideal Detonators (P) Ltd.9, the
Calcutta High Court took a view that the exercise of seeking dispensation
cannot be made solely Plaintiff-centric and the same must withstand judicial
discretion. The Court also cautioned about every Plaintiff having the formal
averments in the plaint that the suit contemplates urgent interim reliefs
simply to overcome the mediation process, as the same would render
nugatory the entire purpose of mediation. The relevant paragraphs of the
said decision read as under:-
―11. There may be urgency in any of the specified transactions
enumerated in section 2(c) of the Act which defines ―commercial dispute‖.
Urgency would vary from case to case. There can be no strait jacket
formulae in such cases. Each case must be decided on its own facts. There
must be pleadings to support the case of urgent interim reliefs. The Court
at the time of presentation of the plaint has to be satisfied that there are
averments which justify a case for urgent interim reliefs and for
dispensation with the requirement of section 12A of the Act in the overall
facts and circumstances. Ordinarily, at the stage of admission of the
plaint, the defendant is not represented. However, a defendant has a right
to question whether dispensation has been appropriately granted or not.
This exercise may require the Court to re-examine the grant of7
CS (OS) No. 01/2025
8
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dispensation. The entire exercise of seeking dispensation under section
12A of the Act must be subject to judicial scrutiny.
12. The decision in Chandra Kishore Chaurasia v. R A Perfumery Works
Private Limited, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3529 cited on behalf of the
Plaintiff is distinguishable and inapposite. In the said decision, the Court
in a suit inter alia for infringement and passing off found the same to be
maintainable in the light of averments in the plaint. It is true that the
Plaintiff is dominus litis. However, the exercise of seeking dispensation
cannot be made solely Plaintiff-centric. This exercise must withstand
judicial discretion. Otherwise, it would lead to every Plaintiff having the
formal averments in the plaint that the suit contemplates urgent interim
reliefs simply to overcome the mediation process. This would render
nugatory the entire purpose of mediation. The ultimate grant or refusal of
the interim relief on merits is not the determining factor. The only question
is whether on the basis of the averments made out in the plaint and the
cause of action pleaded, there is a case for urgent interim reliefs.‖
41. Recently, while considering some of the aforenoted decisions, this
Court in Exclusive Capital Ltd. v. Clover Media Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.10,
reaffirmed that the mandate of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A
of the Act cannot be casually circumvented under the guise of seeking
urgent interim relief. The Court held that the exception carved out in the
proviso to Section 12A(1) must be interpreted narrowly and invoked only in
cases where the Plaintiff demonstrably establishes a bona fide, immediate,
and irreparable threat to its rights, one that cannot await the conclusion of
the mediation process. It further clarified that the mere inclusion of prayers
for interim relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC, or the
mechanical reproduction of urgency-related language, does not ipso facto
entitle a party to exemption. Rather, the pleadings must reflect a specific and
substantiated case of urgency, which must be scrutinized at the threshold.
The Court affirmed that the legislative intent behind Section 12A is to
10
2025 SCC OnLine Del 5221
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reduce litigation and promote early settlement and ensure that this statutory
mechanism is not diluted by illusory or strategic claims of urgency. The
relevant extract reads as under: –
53. Thus, it is imperative that Courts remain vigilant against attempts
by unscrupulous litigants to abuse the exemption under Section 12A by
mechanically appending a plea for urgent interim relief as a façade to
circumvent the statutory mandate of pre-institution mediation. Such
conduct erodes the sanctity of the legislative framework and subverts
the object of reducing the burden on Courts through alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms. The prayer for urgent relief must be
substantiated through specific pleadings and demonstrable facts and
cannot be allowed to serve as a mere procedural ruse to escape
mandatory compliance. Courts must rigorously assess the genuineness
of the asserted urgency and reject suits where the plea for interim relief
is palpably contrived or unsubstantiated.
54. As affirmed by the Supreme Court in Yamini Manohar, the
invocation of urgency must transcend mere perfunctory allusions, and
instead find expression through averments in the pleadings, which,
when subjected to judicial scrutiny, disclose a bona fide and imminent
necessity for protective relief at the threshold stage
55. Stepping back, it is important to remember why this pre-institution
mediation provision exists. It merits mention that mediation, as a
mechanism of alternative dispute resolution, plays a pivotal role in
alleviating the burden of an overburdened judiciary while promoting
efficient, amicable, and cost-effective resolution of disputes. It offers a
collaborative platform where parties can engage in open dialogue with
the assistance of a neutral facilitator, thereby preserving commercial
relationships and fostering solutions that are mutually beneficial.
Particularly, in commercial matters, mediation allows parties to retain
control over the outcome without subjecting themselves to the
adversarial rigour of litigation.
56. The significance of mediation lies not only in its procedural
efficiency but also in its transformative potential to reshape the dispute
resolution landscape. It serves the broader objective of access to justice
by making dispute resolution more accessible and less intimidating,
especially for smaller enterprises that may be discouraged by
protracted Court proceedings.
57. Section 12A of the Act fulfills this requirement by instituting a
mandatory pre-institution mediation mechanism, which serves as a
bypass and fast-track route for resolving disputes without occupying
judicial time at the inception stage. The only exception to this route
balances the right to immediate36judicial intervention in genuinely
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urgent matters which may be proved by pleadings, cause of action etc.
58. To sum up, in determining whether a suit contemplates urgent
interim relief, one pertinent consideration is whether the failure to
grant such relief would render the Plaintiff’s application for
injunction or the suit itself infructuous, or would create an
irreversible or unalterable situation, thereby disabling the Court from
restoring status quo ante at the stage of adjudication of such
application. This is one of the determinative factors, among others,
including: (i) the origin and timeline of the cause of action, (ii) the
timing and manner of the Plaintiff’s approach to the Court, and (iii)
whether adherence to the pre-institution mediation mechanism under
Section 12A would operate to the detriment or prejudice of the
Plaintiff.
59. The foregoing factors are only illustrative, and not exhaustive,
parameters to be considered at the threshold while evaluating the
maintainability of a suit without compliance with Section 12A, on the
ground of urgency.
60. In this contextual backdrop, it becomes imperative upon the
Commercial Court, while dealing with an application for exemption
from pre-institution mediation, to determine whether a mere averment
or prayer for an interim relief, is per se adequate to bypass the
procedural mandate of Section 12A, or whether the expression
‘contemplation of urgent interim relief’ warrants a more elevated
threshold of scrutiny to uphold and give effect to the salutary objectives
underlying Section 12A. The adjudication as to whether the suit
contemplates urgency has to be made under the facts and
circumstances of each and every case.‖
42. Thus, the scheme of the statute mandates pre-institution mediation as
a prerequisite to the institution of a commercial suit, subject only to cases
involving genuine urgency or irretrievable prejudice.
A scrutiny of the facts
43. For the sake of clarity, the contents of the instant application are
reproduced as under: –
―The Plaintiff has filed the accompanying suit seeking a decree of
specific performance of the collaboration agreement dated 03/06/2015
executed between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 with respect to
property admeasuring200 square yards, bearing number U-29, Green
Park (Main), New Delhi – 110016 (hereinafter ―suit property‖). The
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Defendants thereby injuncting them from creating, transferring or
purporting to create any third party rights, interests, lien, charge or
encumbrance over the suit property in any manner whatsoever.
2. The contents of the suit may kindly be read as part and parcel of the
present application as the same have not been repeated herein for the
sake brevity and convenience.3. The Plaintiff has preferred an
application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking ad-interim reliefs in the
form of restraining the Defendants from creating, transferring, or
purporting to create third party rights, interests, lien, charge or
encumbrance over the suit property.
4. The Plaintiff, pursuant to collaboration agreement executed with
Defendant No.1 dated 03/06/2015, is entitled to ownership of ground
and first floors of the suit property, along with proportionate rights in
the stilt parking and land underneath, after constructing the multi-
storied building on the suit property. The Plaintiff has even paid
INR1,20,00,000 /- to the Defendant No. 1 and 2. Further, the Plaintiff
has spent considerable amount in the construction of the suit property,
thereby, constructing it to the point of near completion.
5. The said collaboration agreement is still subsisting and has not been
rescinded by Defendant No. 1. The Plaintiff has11always been willing
and still willing and ready to perform its obligations as per the
agreement i.e., complete construction on the suit property. As a result,
the Defendant No. 1 is obligated to execute sale deed qua the two floors
in favour of the Plaintiff.
6. However, the Defendant No. 1 – 2 in collusion with Defendant No. 4
– 5 are attempting to defeat the rights of the Plaintiff in the suit
property. The Defendant No. 1 is attempting to transfer the rights, title
and interests in the entire suit property in favour of Defendant No. 4 –
5. The same would prejudice the rights of the Plaintiff in the ground
and first floor of the suit property.
7. The aforesaid nefarious plan of the Defendants is evident from the
public notice dated 29.05.2025 issued on behalf of Defendant No. 4 – 5
conveying their intentions to purchase the suit property from Defendant
No. 1. Further, letter dated25.06.2025 of Sub-registrar received by
Plaintiff on 05.07.2025 proves that the said Defendants have already
tried registering a sale deed to that effect.
8. That if pre-institution mediation is directed to be instituted, It shall
defeat the purpose of the suit as the Defendants will create third party
rights in the suit property.
9. Thus, in order to protect the interests of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff
prays that it shall be exempted from complying with the requirements of
Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
10. The present application is being made bona fide and in the interest
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of justice. Grave prejudice shall be caused to the Plaintiff in the even
the present application is not allowed.
PRAYER
In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, it is most
respectfully prayed that this Hon’ ble Court may kindly be pleased to:
-a) Grant exemption to the Plaintiff from instituting pre institution
mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 ; and
b) Pass such other and further order(s) as this Hon ble Court may
deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.‖
44. A perusal of the aforesaid indicates that the Plaintiff’s plea for
exemption is premised on the alleged clandestine execution and registration
of a sale deed concerning the suit property, purportedly in violation of the
agreement. It is contended by the Plaintiff that the purported sale deed was
executed surreptitiously, without the Plaintiff’s knowledge, and in a manner
calculated to defeat the Plaintiff’s vested rights under the agreement. The
Plaintiff asserts that the transaction was carried out with oblique motives and
seeks immediate intervention by the Court.
45. On the contrary, the defendants have categorically denied the
existence of any real or imminent urgency warranting exemption from
mediation.
46. On 21.07.2025, it was specifically brought to the attention of the
Court by Mr. Yadav, learned counsel for the Defendants that the Plaintiff
itself had initiated pre-institution mediation, which has subsequently been
withdrawn.
47. As noted hereinabove, the pleadings and material on record have to be
meticulously examined by the Commercial Court to see if the plaint
contemplates any urgent relief. The cause of action, according to theSignature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
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Plaintiff, arose on 29.05.2025 when the Plaintiff came to know about the
Public notice issued by Defendant Nos 3 & 4. Paragraph 50 of the plaint
reads as under: –
“50. That no date of performance was fixed under the collaboration
agreement -dated 03/06/2015 and there has never been any refusal on
the part of the Defendant No. 1 in respect of the rights of the Plaintiff
under collaboration agreement dated 03/06/2015. In May, 2025 the
Plaintiff was made aware that the Defendant No. 1 in connivance with
the other Defendants, i.e. Defendants No. 2 to 6 is seeking to impinge
upon the rights of the Plaintiff under collaboration agreement dated
03/06/2015 and thus, Plaintiff raised objections vide notices dated
29/05/2025 and 02/06/2025. Accordingly, cause of action arose in
favour of the Plaintiff on 29/05/2025 and 02/06/2025. The cause of
action is continuous, subsisting and recurring and the present suit is
being instituted without delay and within the prescribed limitation
period.‖
48. A perusal of the aforesaid paragraph indicates that the Plaintiff avers
that no specific date for performance was fixed under the Collaboration
Agreement dated 03.06.2015, and further, there has never been any express
or implied refusal on the part of Defendant No.1 concerning the rights of the
Plaintiff under the said agreement, thus justifying the institution of the
instant suit to be within the limitation prescribed for a suit of specific
performance.
49. Furthermore, the Plaintiff asserts that it was only in the year 2025 that
he became aware of the creation of third-party rights in the suit property,
which accordingly gave rise to a cause of action and necessitated the
urgency contemplated in the instant suit seeking specific performance of the
agreement.
50. It is pertinent to note that as per the terms of the agreement, the
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Plaintiff undertook to complete the proposed construction within a period of
15 months from the date of receipt of the sanctioned building plan from the
competent authorities, or from the date of delivery of vacant possession of
the suit property to the builder, which ever event occurred later. The relevant
clause of the agreement reads as under:-
― That the Builder undertakes to complete the proposed building within
a period of 15 (Fifteen) months from the date of the receipt of the
sanctioned plan from the authorities concerned or from the date of
vacant possession from the Owner to the Builder, whichever is later,
subject to FORCE MAJEURE and further ifdelay is occasioned for any
reason of any act or legislation orrestriction, prohibition or restrained
imposed by any Statutory Body and or Governmental Authority, no
liability shall attach tothe Builder.‖
51. Further, it is an admitted position that the sanctioned building plan
was obtained on 30.06.2015, and accordingly, the fifteen-month period
would have expired on 30.09.2016. Notably, it is neither the Plaintiff’s case
that the construction was fully completed as on the date of the taking over of
possession by the bank on 26.09.2016, nor is it pleaded that the project
would have reached completion within a span of four days thereafter had
such possession not been taken.
52. It is pertinent to note that essentially the agreement and the cause of
action, stemming from the rights, if any, created by the agreement, date back
to 03.06.2015, and the suit has been instituted nearly nine years thereafter.
Undeniably, time was the essence of the agreement, and the same was not
abided by the parties. On the contrary, the plaint discloses that the Plaintiff
became aware of some third-party alienations and encumbrances in the year
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including the DRT and DRAT. Nothing precluded the Plaintiff from
instituting a suit against the Defendants for specific performance of the
agreement if the conduct of the Defendants was so prejudicial.
53. In terms of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, legal rights crystallize upon
the execution and completion of contractual performance.
54. In these circumstances, the Plaintiff cannot now claim urgency of
such a nature that would justify bypassing the mediation process. Further, it
may also be noted that the facts reveal that the Plaintiff was well aware that
third-party rights were being created by the Defendants long before it
knocked on the doors of this Court.
55. Moreover, it is seen that the rights in the suit property had already
been transferred to Defendant No. 4 even prior to the filing of the present
suit.
56. The purported claim of extraordinary urgency, premised on the
apprehension that the execution of the sale deed would prejudice the
Plaintiff’s rights, does not persuade this Court to exempt the Plaintiff from
the mandatory requirement of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A
of the Act. Thus, upon a comprehensive and careful scrutiny of the
pleadings on record, including the prayer clause of application seeking
exemption from the mandatory requirement of pre-institution mediation
under Section 12A of the Act as well as the detailed reply filed by the
contesting Defendants, this Court finds no sustainable basis to permit such
exemption.
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57. Notably, it is trite law that specific performance is a discretionary
equitable remedy, and the Court, in appropriate cases, may not grant such
relief even if a valid contract exists.
58. It is pertinent to note that specific performance may be refused where
monetary compensation is an adequate remedy. Reference can be made to
the decision of the Supreme Court in Prakash Chandra v. Angadlal11
wherein it was held that the ordinary rule is that specific performance should
be granted, but only when equitable considerations point to its refusal and
the circumstances show that damages would constitute an adequate relief,
denial is necessary.
59. Further, the Court must also be cognizant of the fact that performance
of a contract is not the sole remedy that must necessarily be considered in
such suits. It must also be borne in mind that the apprehension of urgency or
adverse impact on the rights of the parties due to delay in enforcement does
not automatically warrant the grant of any interim relief or an exemption
from procedural mandates such as pre-institution mediation under Section
12A of the Act.
60. In any event, even if specific performance ultimately becomes
untenable due to non-grant of any urgent interim relief, such a situation
would not amount to an irreparable or irreversible injury. The law provides
adequate remedies in the form of compensatory damages, the grant of which
will depend upon the nature and sufficiency of evidence led by the parties
during trial. Therefore, the ultimate relief, whether specific performance of11
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the agreement or an alternative remedy in the form of damages, shall
necessarily be determined based on the evidence adduced and the equitable
considerations prevailing at the time of adjudication.
61. The Court is thus of the considered view that the present exemption
application appears to be an afterthought, stemming not from any emergent
situation, but from the Plaintiff’s longstanding dissatisfaction with the course
of events that transpired nearly a decade ago. The chronology of events
indicates a belated invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction, falling short of
demonstrating the kind of imminent or irreparable harm that would justify
urgent interim intervention.
62. Accordingly, the Court finds that the threshold of urgency envisaged
under Section 12A has not been met. The statutory requirement of pre-
institution mediation not having been lawfully dispensed with, renders the
present suit premature and not maintainable.
63. In view of the foregoing discussion, the application for exemption
from pre-institution mediation is dismissed.
CS(COMM) 691/2025 and I.A. 16163/2025, I.A. 16165/2025, I.A.
16167/2025, I.A. 17064/2025
1. Accordingly, the suit, along with the pending applications, also stands
rejected.
2. Needless to state that nothing said hereinabove shall be treated to be a
finding on the merits of the case of the Plaintiff for succeeding in a suit of
specific performance and damages.
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3. The aforesaid findings, however, shall not preclude the Plaintiff from
instituting a fresh suit in accordance with law, including seeking specific
performance or damages upon following the due procedure laid down in
Section 12A of the Act.
4. The date already fixed i.e., 18.09.2025, before the concerned Joint
Registrar, stands cancelled.
(PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV)
JUDGE
AUGUST 11, 2025
aks
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