Karnataka High Court
N Suresh vs Commissioner Of Police, Bengaluru on 25 July, 2025
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 25th DAY OF JULY, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO
WRIT PETITION (HABEAS CORPUS) No.53 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
N. SURESH
SON OF LATE NALAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.177,
NEW BILMANGALA
100 FEET ROAD, INDIRANAGAR,
1ST STAGE,
BENGALURU-560 038.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. ROHAN VEERANNA TIGADI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE,
BENGALURU
NO.1, INFANTRY ROAD,
BANGALORE
KARNATAKA-560 001.
2. STATE OF KARNATAKA
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
SAMPANGI NAGARA,
BENGALURU, KARNATAKA-560 001
(REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY -
LAW AND ORDER)
2
3. SUPERINTENDENT
CENTRAL PRISON,
KALABURGI-585 308.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. B.A.BELLIAPPA, SPP-1 A/W
SRI. P.THEJASH, HCGP)
THIS WP(HC) IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS DECLARING THE DETENTION OF VISHNU, AGED ABOUT 23
YEARS AND SON OF SURESH ILLEGAL AND SET HIM AT LIBERTY
FORTHWITH AFTER QUASHING THE ORDER BEARING REFERENCE
NO.10/CRM(4)/DTN/2025 DATED 02/04/2025 (ANNEXURE "A")
PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT UNDER SECTION 3(1) OF THE
GOONDA ACT, THE ORDER BEARING REFERENCE NUMBER HD 192
SST 2025 DATED 08/04/2025 (ANNEXURE "B") PASSED BY THE 2ND
RESPONDENT UNDER SECTION 3(3) OF THE GOONDA ACT AND
ORDER BEARING REFERENCE NUMBER HD 192 SST 2025 DATED
29/04/2025 (ANNEXURE "C") PASSED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT
UNDER SECTION 13 OF THE GOONDA ACT AND ETC.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 14.07.2025 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, THIS DAY,
DR.K.MANMADHA RAO, J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO
3
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO)
This Writ Petition (Habeas Corpus) is filed by father of
the detenu by name Vishnu S/o N Suresh aged about 23 years
(for short ‘detenu’) challenging the order of detention passed
by the respondents and also prayed to quash them. The
petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:
a. Issue a writ of habeas corpus declaring the
detention of Vishnu, aged about 23 years and son of
Suresh illegal and set him at liberty forthwith after
quashing the order bearing reference dated
No.10/CRM(4)/DTN/2025 02/04/2025 (Annexure “A”)
passed by the 1st Respondent under Section 3(1) of
the Goonda Act, the order bearing reference number
HD 192 SST 2025 dated 08/04/2025 (Annexure “B”)
passed by the 2nd Respondent under Section 3(3) of
the Goonda Act and order bearing reference number
HD 192 SST 2025 dated 29/04/2025 (Annexure “C”)
passed by the 2nd Respondent under Section 13 of
the Goonda Act;
b. Call for the records bearing reference No.
10/CRM(4)/DTN/2025 dated 02/04/2025 (Annexure
“A”) from the Respondents;
2. Brief facts of the case are that the detenu has been in
the habit of indulging in acts which are in violation of public peace
4
since 2018 and has been involved in serious criminal offences
such as attempt to murder, robbery, kidnapping for ransom,
extortion, assault, house-breaking, theft, voluntarily causing hurt
by dangerous weapon, wrongful restraint and criminal
intimidation, among other offences which have instilled fear and
insecurity in the minds of the public and engaging in illegal
activities, violating bail conditions after being released on bail.
Being a nuisance to law and order, despite being prosecuted in
the criminal cases in which he was involved, he continued to
engage in illegal activities, made a habit of committing criminal
acts, and continued to commit criminal acts repeatedly. The order
of detention issued on 02.04.2025 is sought to be confirmed
under Section 3(1) of the Goondas Act. Since, 2018, 01 case in
Pulakeshinagar police station of Bangalore city, 01 case in
Byyappanahalli police station, 01 case in Avalahalli police station,
07 cases in Indiranagar police station, 01 case in Sulibele police
station of Bangalore city, in total 11 cases have been registered.
(i) The Pulakeshinagar Police registered a case in
Crime No: 201/2018 for the offence punishable
under section 392 of IPC in which case came to be
closed.
5
(ii) The Byyappanahalli police registered a case in
Crime No: 213/2018 for the offences punishable
under sections 341, 302, 397, 471, 506(B), 201
r/w. 34 of IPC and Investigation is completed,
Charge Sheet is filed and same is pending before
the Juvenile Justice Board in J.C. No:61/2019.
(iii) The Avalahalli Police registered a case in
Crime No: 08/2021 for the offences punishable
under sections 150, 120(b), 302, 201, 35, 37 r/w.
34 of IPC and the petitioner was admitted to bail on
15.07.2021 in Criminal Petition No.4311/2021.
Investigation is completed, Charge Sheet is filed
and same is pending before the ACJM Court at
Bengaluru. Subsequently, case committed to PDJ
Session Court Bengaluru in S.C.No.120/2021.
(iv) The Indiranagar Police registered a case in
Crime No: 220/2022 for the offences punishable
under sections 454, 380 of IPC which came to be
acquitted.
(v) The Sulibele Police registered a case in Crime
No: 55/2022 for the offence punishable under
section 379 of IPC and which is under investigation.
(vi) The Indiranagar Police registered a case in
Crime No: 276/2024 for the offences punishable
6
under sections 309(6), 3(5) of BNS Act, 2023 and
Investigation is completed, Charge Sheet is filed
and same is pending before the X ACMM Court in
C.C.No.52311/2025.
(vii) The Indiranagar Police registered case in
Crime No: 27/2025 for the offences punishable
under sections 109, 238 (B), 249(B) of BNS Act
2023, which is under investigation.
(viii) The Indiranagar Police registered case in
Crime No: 28/2025 for the offences punishable
under sections 109, 352, 238(b), 249(b) of BNS
Act, 2023 which is under investigation.
(ix) The Indiranagar Police registered case in
Crime No: 29/2025 for the offences punishable
under sections 109, 352, 238(b), 249(b) of BNS
Act, 2023 which is under investigation.
(x) The Indiranagar Police registered case in
Crime No: 30/2025 for the offences punishable
under sections 309(6), 238(b), 249(b) of BNS Act,
2023 which is under investigation.
(xi) The Indiranagar Police registered case in
Crime No: 31/2025 for the offence punishable
7
under sections 109 of BNS Act, 2023 which is under
investigation.
3. Thus, in the cases registered against the detenu,
the rowdy sheet was opened and monitored and despite being
seized and remanded by the Court, without bringing about any
change in his life style, the detenu being in violation of the bail
conditions and opportunities given to him to lead a better life,
continuously failed to attend valid court hearings, engaging in
criminal activities and continuing to commit criminal acts
tending to destroy the welfare of the society, being harmful to
public order. According to the Hooligan Act, it appears to be
essential to maintain public order and security in the
metropolitan city of Bangalore and it is reasonable to keep the
said detenu in preventive custody.
4. The respondents found that presence of the detenu
was causing disturbances to public order and tranquility and he
was becoming menace to the society. Therefore, the detenu
was detained based on the detention order passed by the
respondent No.1-Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru vide order
dated 02.04.2025, the same was sought for confirmation by
8
respondent No.2 u/s. 3(3) of the Goondas Act on 05.04.2025
i.e., three days after the Order dated 02.04.2025 without
giving adequate time to the detenu for submitting the
representation. The same was confirmed by the respondent
No.2 – the Government vide Confirmation Order dated
08.04.2025. Thereafter, the detenu had submitted a
representation dated 09.04.2025 to the Advisory Board which
was also received by the respondent No.2 on 11.04.2025 for
reviewing the detention order. The Government on considering
the representation, passed order dated 11.04.2025 rejecting
the said representation.
5. The Government after obtaining the opinion from
the Advisory Board and following the procedures under the
Goondas Act, confirmed the order of detention, by its order
dated 08.04.2025 (Annexure – B). The Government vide order
dated 29.04.2025 (Annexure – C) ordered to detain him for a
period of one year from 02.04.2025 (Annexure- C) under the
9
6. We have heard the arguments of learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner and the learned HCGP for
respondents.
7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
would submit that the orders passed by the respondent No.2
as well as confirmed by the Government are illegal, contrary
and ultra vires the Goondas Act. Section 2(g) of the said Act
defines a “goonda” as one who habitually commits or attempts
to commit offences under Chapters 8 (Sections 141 to 160,
IPC), 15 (Sections 295 to 298, IPC), 16 (Sections 299 to 377,
IPC), 17 (Sections 378 to 462, IPC) or 22 (Sections 503 to
510, IPC) now replaced by corresponding provisions in the
BNS Act. The allegations in Crime Nos.27/2025, 28/2025,
29/2025, 30/2025 and 31/2025 pertain only to Sections 238
and 249 of the BNS Act committed by the detenu and his
family, which correspond to Sections 201 and 212 of the IPC–
neither of which fall within the scope of the offences
enumerated under Section 2(g) of the Goondas Act. Therefore,
invocation of the Goondas Act is patently erroneous. Further,
the Detenu was in judicial custody from 11.02.2025 to
10
25.02.2025 and was not present when his brother allegedly
came to the house after commission of the purported offence
dated 08.02.2025 and 09.02.2025, rendering the allegations
factually untenable.
8. It is further submitted that the respondent
authorities have relied upon criminal cases that are either
closed or irrelevant to the invocation of preventive detention
under the Goondas Act. Crime No.201/2018 stands closed, and
in Crime No.220/2022 the Detenu was acquitted by a
Competent Criminal Court. Out of 11 cases cited by the
respondents, 7 cases do not relate to offences listed under
Section 2(g) of the Goondas Act and hence, reliance on the
same is legally impermissible. The subjective satisfaction
arrived at by the detaining authority is therefore, vitiated due
to reliance on extraneous and irrelevant material. That the
remaining 4 cases, even if assumed to be active, pertain
merely to maintenance of law and order and not to public
order, which is a necessary precondition for invoking Section 3
of the Goondas Act. Preventive detention under the Goondas
Act requires a proximate and substantial threat to public order.
11
The alleged involvement of the Detenu in these 4 cases viewed
in isolation or collectively, does not cross that threshold.
Therefore, the Goondas Act cannot be invoked for detaining
the detenu. Hence, Detentions Orders are ultra vires the
9. It is submitted that except for Crime No.276/2024,
all other antecedents invoked in support of the Detention
Order are over three years old. Furthermore, one of the cases
has been closed by the Juvenile Justice Board, and another
resulted in acquittal. The absence of any proximate or
continuous pattern of habitual criminal conduct renders the
Detention Order invalid for lack of a live and proximate link
between past conduct and the need for preventive detention.
It is a settled principle of law that stale incidents cannot form
the basis for invoking preventive detention.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner would also
submit that the respondents have failed to consider relevant
and material facts, including the detenu’s bail orders and
applications, despite his liberty at the time of passing the
Detention Order. Judicial precedents require the detaining
12
authority to consider the effect of bail on the likelihood of the
detenu committing further acts prejudicial to public order. In
the instant case, there is no reference to or analysis of the
detenu’s bail status. Besides, the Detention Order relies on
extraneous considerations by referring to criminal antecedents
of the Detenu’s father and brother, which is manifestly
arbitrary and in contravention of constitutional protections
under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11. It is also submitted that the constitutional right of
the detenu to make an effective representation under Article
22(5) of the Constitution of India has been rendered illusory.
The detention order dated 02.04.2025 was forwarded for
confirmation by the State Government on 05.04.2025, i.e.,
within 3 days, leaving no real opportunity for the Detenu to
submit his representation to the first respondent as mandated
by the judgment in the case of Suresh B. Shetty v. State of
Karnataka reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 4234, wherein
this Court directed that a period of 7 days be given to detenu
to submit their representations to the Commissioner of
Police/District Magistrate passing the Order prior to them
13
being sent to respondent No.2 for confirmation u/s.3(3) of the
Goondas Act.
12. It is submitted that the Detention Order fails to
mention the timelines within which the detenu ought to have
preferred his representation to the Commissioner of Police,
State Government and the Advisory Board. violating
procedural safeguards under the Goondas Act. Unlike statutes
such as COFEPOSA or PIT NDPS Act, 1988, wherein the powers
of the officers and State are co-extensive but under the
Goonda Act, such powers are limited and distinct. As per
Section 3(1) of the Goonda Act, the detention order ceases to
operate if not confirmed by the State Government within 12
days. Therefore, the Commissioner of Police could have
considered revocation of the detention only within this limited
timeframe. In this context, it was imperative for the detention
order to disclose the timeline for making representation to the
Commissioner.
13. It is also submitted that the Advisory Board has not
communicated its decision on the representation submitted by
the Detenu dated 09.04.2025, thereby violating Article 22(5)
14
of the Constitution of India. The Detention Order also suffers
from non-compliance with the judgment in the case of
Jayamma v. Commissioner of Police reported in ILR 2019
Kar 1543, where it was mandated to annex documents relied
upon under each ground. In light of these multiple procedural,
legal, and constitutional violations, the Detention Order is
liable to be quashed.
14. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has
placed reliance on the following judgments:-
• Jayamma v. Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru
reported in ILR 2019 Kar 1543;
49. xxx
(7) If any representation is submitted by the detue
before the Detaining Authority, addressing the same to
the Detaining Authority, government, or to Advisory
Board, irrespective of the fact that, to whom it is
addressed, the same shall be as early as possible
considered by the appropriate Government, before
sending the papers to the Advisory Board. If the
appropriate Government revokes the detention order
and directs release of the detenu, there arises no
question of sending the case papers to the Advisory
Board.
xxx
15
• Smt. Gracy v. State of Kerala and another reported
in (1991) 2 SCC 1;
8. xxx
The question, therefore, is: Whether one of the
requirements of consideration by government is
dispensed with when the detenu’s representation
instead of being addressed to the government or also
to the government is addressed only to the Advisory
Board and submitted to the Advisory Board instead of
the government? On principle, we find it difficult to
uphold the learned Solicitor General’s contention which
would reduce the duty of the detaining authority from
one of substance to mere form. The nature of duty
imposed on the detaining authority under Article 22(5)
in the context of the extraordinary power of preventive
detention is sufficient to indicate that strict compliance
is necessary to justify interference with personal
liberty. It is more so since the liberty involved is of a
person in detention and not of a free agent. Article
22(5) casts an important duty on the detaining
authority to communicate the grounds of detention to
the detenu at the earliest to afford him the earliest
opportunity of making a representation against the
detention order which implies the duty to consider and
decide the representation when made, as soon as
possible. Article 22(5) speaks of the detenu’s
‘representation against the order’, and imposes the
obligation on the detaining authority. Thus, any
representation of the detenu against the order of his
detention has to be considered and decided by the
detaining authority, the requirement of its separate
consideration by the Advisory Board being an additional
requirement implied by reading together clauses (4)
16
and (5) of Article 22, even though express mention in
Article 22(5) is only of the detaining authority.
Moreover, the order of detention is by the detaining
authority and so also the order of its revocation if the
representation is accepted, the Advisory Board’s role
being merely advisory in nature without the power to
make any order itself. It is not as if there are two
separate and distinct provisions for representation to
two different authorities viz. the detaining authority and
the Advisory Board, both having independent power to
act on its own.
9. It being settled that the aforesaid dual obligation
of consideration of the detenu’s representation by the
Advisory Board and independently by the detaining
authority flows from Article 22(5) when only one
representation is made addressed to the detaining
authority, there is no reason to hold that the detaining
authority is relieved of this obligation merely because
the representation is addressed to the Advisory Board
instead of the detaining authority and submitted to the
Advisory Board during pendency of the reference before
it. It is difficult to spell out such an inference from the
contents of Article 22(5) in support of the contention of
the learned Solicitor General. The contents of Article
22(5) as well as the nature of duty imposed thereby on
the detaining authority support the view that so long as
there is a representation made by the detenu against
the order of detention, the aforesaid dual obligation
under Article 22(5) arises irrespective of the fact
whether the representation is addressed to the
detaining authority or to the Advisory Board or to both.
The mode of address is only a matter of form which
cannot whittle down the requirement of the
17
constitutional mandate in Article 22(5) enacted as one
of the safeguards provided to the detenu in case of
preventive detention.
• Makuko Chukwuka Muolokwo v. State of
Karnataka, rep., by its Secretary and others
reported in ILR 2020 Kar 5447;
10. The law laid down by the Apex Court in the case
of SMT. GRACY, (supra) is to the effect that even if a
representation is made by the detenue to the Advisory
Board, it is the duty of the appropriate Government to
decide the same independently and uninfluenced by the
views/opinion expressed by Advisory Board. Careful
perusal of the principles laid down in paragraph 17 of
the decision of the Apex Court in the case of R.
KESHAVA, (supra) will show that in absence of a
representation addressed to the appropriate
Government or absence of the knowledge of the
representation having been made by the detenue, the
appropriate Government’s failure to decide the same
independently is not unconstitutional or illegal.
However, in the present case, we are dealing with the
case where the State Government had a clear
knowledge of the representation made by the detenue.
Firstly, the representation dated 6th May, 2020 was sent
to the Advisory Board through the Chief Superintendent
of the Central Prison. Secondly, there is an
endorsement appearing on the covering letter of the
Chief Superintendent of the Central Prison, Bengaluru
enclosing therewith a copy of the representation made
by the detenue. The endorsement is admittedly by a
Section Officer of the Government. In the statement of
objections filed by the Detaining Authority, it is
18
admitted that the Advisory Board heard the petitioner
on his representation. In paragraph 30, there is a
specific admission to that effect. The only contention
raised in paragraph 31 is that the representation was
not given before the first meeting of the Advisory
Board. Paragraph 17 of the statement of objections
filed by the State Government, it is admitted that the
petitioner had made a representation on 6th May, 2020.
Paragraph 17 of the statement of objections reads as
under:
“17. It is submitted that consequently, the
Advisory Board has fixed the date of hearing on
04.05.2020 through video conference vide Letter
dated 30.04.2020. A copy of the notice 30.04.2020
is produced herewith and marked as ANNEXURE-
R9. It is further submitted that the petitioner had
made a Representation on 05.05.2020 to the
Advisory Board Government and other through the
Superintendent of Central Prison, Bengaluru against
the Detention Order.
11. xxx
12. xxx
13. Thus, this Court is of the considered view that
the facts of the case before the Apex Court in the case
of it KESHAVA, (supra) were entirely different from the
facts of the case in the case of SMT. GRACY, (supra). In
the case of R. KESHAVA, the Government had no
knowledge of the representation. It is in the light of this
factual position that the Apex Court held that the
decision in the case of SMT. GRACY, (supra) had no
19
application to the facts of the case before it. The other
two decisions relied upon by the State are not on the
point involved. It must be noted here that the right
conferred upon the detenue under Clause (5) of Article
22 of the Constitution of India is to ensure that a
representation made by the detenue is considered at
the earliest.
14. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, the
decision of the Apex Court rendered in if. KESHAVA,
(supra) will not apply, inasmuch as, the representation
of the detenue is not yet decided by the State
Government though it has knowledge about the
th
representation from 6 May, 2020 and though it was
received by it. Moreover, in this case, the Detaining
Authority cannot plead ignorance about the
representation. Therefore, this is a case where the
principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case
of. SMT. GRACY, (supra) will squarely apply. Hence,
there is a violation of the rights conferred upon the
petitioner-detenue under Clause (5) of the Article 22 of
tire Constitution of India and, therefore, continuation of
order of detention is rendered illegal.
• Sumaiya v. The Secretary to Government,
Prohibition & Excise Department, Government of
Tamil Nadu, Fort St. George, Chennai-9 & another
reported in 2007 (2) MWN (Cr.) 145 (DB);
5.5. xxx
If delay was caused on account of any indifference or
lapse in considering the representation, such delay will
adversely affect further detention of the prisoner. In
other words, it is for the authority concerned to
explain the delay, if any, in disposing of the
20
representation. It is not enough to say that the delay
was very short. Even longer delay can as well be
explained. So the test is not the duration or range of
delay, but how it is explained by the authority
concerned.
xxx
• Sarabjeet Singh Mokha v. District Magistrate,
Jabalpur and others reported in (2021) 20 SCC 98;
50. Article 22(4), in guaranteeing a right to
make a representation to the detenu, understandably
creates a corresponding duty on the State machinery to
render this right meaningful. In Section D.1 of the
judgment, we have detailed this Court’s settled
precedent on the detenu’s right to make a
representation and for it to be considered expeditiously
— failing which the detention order would be
invalidated. However, this right would ring hollow
without a corollary right of the detenu to receive a
timely communication from the appropriate Government
on the status of its representation — be it an acceptance
or a rejection.
51. This Court, in considering claims of delay in
the appropriate Government’s dealing with the
representation of a detenu, has included delays in
communication of such rejection. A two-Judge Bench of
this Court in State of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh [State of
Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 35 : 1990 SCC
(Cri) 1] had noted that such a delay formed a part of
the infraction on the detenu’s constitutional right under
Article 22(4). K.N. Saikia, J. speaking on behalf of this
Court, had held: (SCC p. 54, para 19)
21
“19. In the instant case we are satisfied that
after receipt of the xerox copy from the Central
Government, the State Government took only 13
days including 4 holidays in disposing of the
representation. Considering the situation prevailing
and the consultation needed in the matter, the
State Government could not have been unmindful of
urgency in the matter. But the facts remain that it
took more than two months from the date of
submission of the representation to the date of
informing the detenu of the result of his
representation. Eight days were taken after disposal
of the representation by the State Government. The
result is that the detenu’s constitutional right to
prompt disposal of his representation was denied
and the legal consequences must follow.”
(emphasis supplied)
• Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India and others
reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 509;
32. Likewise, in the present case, we are not
concerned as to whether the conditions imposed by
the Magistrate would have taken care of the
apprehension expressed by the detaining authority;
of the detenu indulging in further smuggling
activities. We are more concerned with the aspect
that the detaining authority did not consider the
efficacy of the conditions and enter any satisfaction,
however subjective it is, as to the conditions not
being sufficient to restrain the detenu from
indulging in such activities.
33. Ameena Begum [Ameena Begum v. State of
Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri)
22
754] , noticed with approval Vijay Narain
Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay Narain Singh v. State
of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361]
and extracted para 32 from the same (Vijay Narain
Singh [Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984)
3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361] ) : (SCC pp. 35-36)
“32. … It is well settled that the law of
preventive detention is a hard law and therefore
it should be strictly construed. Care should be
taken that the liberty of a person is not
jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within
… not be used merely to clip the wings of an
accused who is involved in a criminal
prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of
keeping a man under detention when under
ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to
resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the
material available is such as would satisfy the
requirements of the legal provisions authorising
such detention. When a person is enlarged on
bail by a competent criminal court, great caution
should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of
an order of preventive detention which is based
on the very same charge which is to be tried by
the criminal court.”
(emphasis supplied)
34. The criminal prosecution launched and the
preventive detention ordered are on the very same
allegations of organised smuggling activities,
through a network set-up, revealed on successive
raids carried on at various locations, on specific
information received, leading to recovery of huge
23
cache of contraband. When bail was granted by the
jurisdictional court, that too on conditions, the
detaining authority ought to have examined
whether they were sufficient to curb the evil of
further indulgence in identical activities; which is
the very basis of the preventive detention ordered.
• Suresh B. Shetty v. State of Karnataka and
others reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 4234;
More specifically pargraphs No.27 and 28
wherein, this Court has observed that as the period
in which the representation needs to be filed has not
been specified in the order of detention made, the
right to file the representation becomes illusory.
• Rashid Kapadia v. Medha Gadgil and others
reported in (2012) 11 SCC 745;
• Rajammal v. State of T.N. and another reported in
(1999) 1 SCC 417;
• Devesh Chourasia v. District Magistrate, Jabalpur
and others reported in (2022) 20 SCC 531;
• Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India and
others reported in (1980) 4 SCC 531;
• Ammena Begum v. State of Telangana and others
reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587;
• Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Malik v. Union of India and
others reported in (1992) 1 SCC 1;
• Alakshit v. State of Maharashtra, through its
Principal Secretary and another reported in 2022
SCC OnLine Bom 7439;
24
• Promod Singla v. Union of India reported in (2023)
2 SCR 793;
• Rajasthan Public Service Commission and another
v. Harish Kumar Purohit reported in (2003) 5 SCC
480;
15. Learned HCGP submitted office file of the detention
proceedings.
The learned HCGP appearing for the respondents would
submit that in order to monitor his criminal activities, a “A”
category Rowdy Sheet was opened in Indiranagar Police
Station on 26.04.2022 vide order No.HSD/RS/03/2022. The
Detaining Authority, after careful consideration, was satisfied
that ordinary penal laws were insufficient to curb the detenu’s
incorrigible criminal conduct. Therefore, exercising powers
under Section 3 of the Goondas Act, the Detention Order dated
02.04.2025 was issued as a preventive measure to ensure
maintenance of public order. Despite repeated warnings and
opportunities granted by the Authorities and the Courts, the
detenu has failed to reform and continued to indulge in
criminal activities, indicating his habitual tendencies even after
lawful intervention. It is emphasized that the persistent
25
involvement of the detenu in criminal activities was deemed a
genuine and immediate threat to the normal rhythm of public
life, thereby necessitating the need for preventive detention.
16. It is contended that there exists no statutory
requirement mandating the detaining authority to provide a
fixed time for submission of representation before the
confirmation of detention. The detenu was clearly informed,
both orally and in writing, about his right to make a
representation. The relevant addresses of the respondents
were also furnished. Despite having a period of 6 days before
the confirmation order dated 08.04.2025, the detenu chose not
to exercise this right. There is no procedural lapse or violation
of rights in this regard. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of
India and Section 8 of the Goondas Act have been scrupulously
followed, and the representation dated 09.04.2025 was duly
considered and rejected on 11.04.2025.
17. It is submitted that the State Government has
discharged its obligation to consider representations even
when the representation was addressed to the Advisory Board.
The detenu’s repeated involvement in criminal acts of grave
26
nature has severely disrupted public peace. The detaining
authority, upon due application of mind and independent
assessment of materials including voluminous documentation
of 363 pages, found the detenu’s conduct to fall squarely
within the ambit of “Goonda” under Section 2(g) of the
Goondas Act. The contention that past acquittals or discharge
from cases should prevent detention is legally flawed;
preventive detention can be invoked independently of
acquittals if there exist preventive grounds.
18. It is further submitted that the detenu had been in
judicial custody until 28.10.2024, and thus, the period of 156
days from his release till the Detention Order is not
unreasonable. A rigid timeline cannot be imported to assess
proximity in preventive detention cases, and a realistic, case-
specific approach must be adopted. The delay in issuance of
the detention order is attributable to the necessity of collecting
data from multiple police stations across the city and handling
additional criminal cases that arose during the material period.
It is a settled position of law that such intervening conduct by
the detenu cannot be held against the detaining authority
while considering the issue of proximity. Further, it has been
27
substantiated that the detenu, even while under a bond under
Section 117 of the Cr.P.C., continued to engage in criminal
activities. The Special Executive Magistrate and the Deputy
Commissioner of Police, East Division, ordered his judicial
custody from 11.02.2025 to 25.02.2025 for the breach of said
section, which reinforced the need for preventive detention.
19. It is argued that each ground of the detention must
be assessed independently. Therefore, even if one ground is
found to be sufficient, the Detention Order would stand valid.
The Detaining Authority has also rightly invoked Section 6A of
the Goondas Act, which incorporates the “Doctrine of
Severability”. Even if one or more grounds of detention are
found to be unsustainable, the order of detention shall
nevertheless stand valid if one of the grounds survives legal
scrutiny. The reliance placed on criminal antecedents of the
detenu’s father and brother was merely illustrative and not
determinative of the detention. The Detaining Authority’s
reasoning was found exclusively on the conduct of the detenu
himself.
28
20. Section 6A of the Goondas Act reads as under:
6A. Grounds of detention severable.-
Where a person has been detained in pursuance
of an order of detention under sub-section (1) or
sub-section (2) of section 3, which has been
made on two or more grounds, such order of
detention shall be deemed to have been made
separately on each of such grounds, and
accordingly ,- (a) such order shall not be
deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely
because one or some of the grounds is or are ,-
(i) vague ; (ii) non-existent ; (iii) not-relevant ;
(iv) not connected or not proximately connected
with such person; or (v) invalid for any other
reason whatsoever ; and it is not, therefore,
possible to hold that the Government or the
officer making such order would have been
satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of
section 3 with reference to the remaining ground
or grounds and made the order of detention ;
(b) the Government or the officer making the
order of detention shall be deemed to have
made the order of detention under the said sub-
section (1) or sub-section (2), after being
satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) with
reference to the remaining ground or grounds.
21. To buttress his arguments, the learned HCGP placed
reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of
Priyadarshini v. Commissioner of Police, by order dated
29
03.05.2025, passed in WPHC No.31/2025, wherein, this
Court has arrived at a conclusion as follows:
“So far as non-mentioning of specific time is
concerned, it is not a criterion to hold an order as invalid,
as hyper-technical grounds would not outweigh
considerations of public order and safety.”
As per the above ruling there is no requirement for
affording a fixed period before issuing the Confirmation Order.
The Court held that technicalities should not override the
objective of maintaining public order. Further, the grounds of
detention were furnished within 5 days, as per Section 8 of the
Goonda Act, and the Confirmation Order was passed within the
12-day limit.
22. Section 8 of the Goondas Act, reads as under:-
“When a person is detained in pursuance of a
detention order, the authority making the order shall,
as soon as may be, but not later than five days from
the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds
on which the order has been made and shall afford him
the earliest opportunity of making a representation
against the order to the State Government.”
23. It is also submitted that the bail orders relied upon
by the petitioner has also been duly considered wherever
30
applicable. In several cases, the question of bail does not arise
due to either acquittal or lack of arrest. The record also reveals
that there exists a continuous chain of criminal activity across
multiple years and jurisdictions, showing a clear pattern of
habitual and incorrigible conduct. The Advisory Board has also
opined affirmatively on the necessity of detention. The
detenu’s actions have been rightly assessed as prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order, necessitating preventive
detention to safeguard society from further threats.
24. In support his contentions, the learned HCGP has
placed reliance on the following judgments:-
• Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat,
reported in (1988) 3 SCC 153, Para 10The courts should not merely, on account of delay
in making an order of detention, assume that such
delay, if not satisfactorily explained, must necessarily
give rise to an inference that there was no sufficient
material for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority.
• Malwa Shaw v. State of W.B., reported in (1974) 4
SCC 127, Para 2A period of five months elapsing between the date
of the alleged incident and passing of the detention
order, a period not unreasonably long so as to discredit
the subjective satisfaction of the detaining magistrate.
31
• Noor Salman Makani v. Union of India, reported in
(1994) 1 SCC 381, Para 4Excluding the intervening holidays, the delay in
disposing of the representation comes to only five days,
which cannot be said to be undue• Madan Lal Anand v. Union of India, reported in
(1990) 1 SCC 81. Para 38While disposing of the representation, time
imperative can never be absolute or obsessive
(reiterated)• Gautam Jain v. Union of India, reported in (2017) 3
SCC 133, Paras 21, 03 & 27The Act provides that where there are a number
of grounds of detention covering various activities of the
detenu spreading over a period or periods, each activity
is a separate ground by itself, and if one of the grounds
is irrelevant, vague or unspecific, then that will not
vitiate the order of detentionWhen there were various grounds which formed
the basis of the detention order, and even if the
documents pertaining to one particular ground were not
furnished, that ground could be ignored applying the
principle of segregation, and on the remaining grounds,
the detention order is still sustainable.
• Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat,
reported in (1988) 3 SCC 153, Para 12
The detention order cannot be said to be vitiated
because of some of the grounds of detention being non-
existent, irrelevant, or too remote in point of time to
furnish a rational nexus for the subjective satisfaction of
32
the detaining authority. It is usually from prior events
showing tendencies or inclinations of a man that an
inference can be drawn whether he is likely, in the
future, to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order. (reiterated)
• Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B., reported in (1975)
3 SCC 198, Para 32
Order of preventive detention may be made either
before or during prosecution. An order of preventive
detention may be made with or without prosecution and
in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal.
• Priyadarshini v. Commissioner of Police, reported in
WPHC No.31 of 2025, Paras 18 & 21
A delay of 164 days would not, in itself, be the
criterion to view the order of detention in a tinted glass.
A mere delay in passing the preventive detention
order will not make an order bad and vitiated.
So far as non-mentioning of specific time is
concerned, it is not a criterion to hold an order as
invalid, as hyper-technical grounds would not outweigh
considerations of public order and safety.
25. We have gone through the entire material placed
before us and considered the contentions of the learned
counsel for the petitioner and learned HCGP, we are of the
opinion that all the procedures prescribed under Goondas Act,
were strictly complied with prior to passing of the Detention
Order. The detenu has been committing the crime against the
33
innocent persons. All the offences committed by the detenu
are serious and series in nature in the following manner:
[[
Sl. Police Station Law suit Section of the Act Current stage
No number
1. Pulakeshinagar PS 201/2018 392 of IPC Case closed
2. Baiyappanahalli 213/2018 341, 302, 397, 471, Pending in Court
PS 506(2), 201 R/w 34
of IPC
3. Avalahalli PS 08/2021 150, 120(b), 302, Pending in Court
201, 35, 37 R/w R/w
34 of IPC
4. Indiranagar P S 220/2022 454 and 380 of IPC Acquitted
5. Sulibele P S 55/2022 379 of IPC Under
investigation
6. Indiranagar PS 276/2024 309(6) and 3(5) of Pending in Court
BNS
7. Indiranagar P S 27/2025 238(a) and 249(c) of Under
BNS investigation
8. Indiranagar P S 28/2025 238(a) and 249(c) of Under
BNS investigation
9. Indiranagar P S 29/2025 U/S 238(a) and 249(c) Under
of BNS investigation
10. Indiranagar P S 30/2025 U/S 238(a) and 249(c) Under
of BNS investigation
11. Indiranagar P S 31/2025 U/S 238(a) and 249(c) Under
of BNS investigation
26. It is observed that the contravention of law always
affects order, but before it can be set to affect public order. It
must affect the community or public at large as a disturbance
34
to public order, the specific activity has an impact on the
broader community or the general public, revoking feelings of
fear, panic or insecurity. Accordingly, the detenu was detained
by an order indulging in serious criminal offences such as,
murder, attempt to murder, robbery, kidnapping for ransom,
extortion, assault, house-breaking, theft, voluntarily casuing
hurt by dangerous weapon, wrongful restraint and criminal
intimidation, other offences that have instilled fear and
insecurity on individuals of locality. The petitioner got
released on bail in the criminal cases registered against him
and committed breach of conditions of bail. The respondents
after subjective satisfaction of the materials placed before
them passed the Detention Order. There is no illegality in the
said Orders.
27. Further, it is observed that the detenu has been
given an opportunity for making a representation, not only has
to be at the earliest, also a reasonable time of seven days has
to be given to the detenu to make representation under
Section 8(1) of the Goondas Act. Accordingly, the detenu has
submitted representation which has been considered.
35
Thereafter, the detaining authority had passed the appropriate
detention order.
28. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the
view that the orders challenged in the writ petition, does not
suffer from any infirmity as such. The detaining authority
passed the impugned order with subjective satisfaction arrived
at on the basis of the materials placed on record.
Accordingly, Writ Petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(DR. K.MANMADHA RAO)
JUDGE
BNV
Ct-adp
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