Telangana High Court
N. Suresh, vs The State Of Telangana on 21 April, 2025
Author: K. Lakshman
Bench: K. Lakshman
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN
WRIT PETITION Nos.1591 AND 2884 OF 2025, 35951, 36532
AND 36554 OF 2024
COMMON ORDER:
Heard Mr. M.A.K. Mukheed, Mr. T.V.Ramana Rao, Mr. Ramu
Nallamothu, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr.Aniketh
Reddy, learned Asst. Govt. Pleader for Home, appearing for State.
2. These writ petitions are filed to declare the action of the
respondent Nos.3 to 6 in registering FIR Nos. 154 and 155 of 2024 of
P.S. Bomraspet pertaining to the same incident which is the subject
matter of FIR No.153 of 2024 and consequently quash the
proceedings in Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024.
3. In the light of the same, it is apt to refer the relevant
particulars of the writ petitions, petitioners, FIRs, date, time and place
of the incident and offences registered, against the petitioners in all the
aforesaid crimes and the same are extracted below:-
`
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batchWP Petitioner/s Name of the Place, date &
No. ranking in complainant time of the Offences
Cr.Nos. & incident
Designation
1591/ A.35 in 153/24, N.Srinivasa Anjaneya under
2025 A.18 in 154/24 Reddy, Temple, Sections 61
and A.3 in Sub Lagcherla (2) 191(2),
155/24 of Divisional 11.11.2024 191(3)
P.S.Bomraspet Police 12.20 PM 132,109,
Officer, 121(1),
Vikarabad in 126(2), 324
FIR No.153, (4) read
with 190
BNS,
Section 3 of
PDPPA
2884/23 P.1 is A.38 in Karra Kishan, Hanuman under
FIR No.153, MRO, Temple, Sections
A.21 in FIR Dudyal in Lagcherla 191(2),
No.154 & A.15 FIR No.154 191(3)
in FIR No.155 of 11.11.2024 132,109,
2024, Time not 121(1),
specifically 126(2), 324
P.2 is A.47 in mentioned (4) read
FIR No.153, with 190
A.10 in FIR BNS,
No.154 & A.11 Section 3 of
in FIR No.155 of PDPPA
2024, under
P.3 is A.10 in D. Janaiah, Cherllapuram Sections
FIR No.153, A.5 DCRB,DSP Venkataiah’s 191(2),
in FIR No.154 & Vikarabad, in residence, 191(3)
A.7 in FIR FIR No.155 Lagcherla 132,109,
No.155 of 2024, of 2024, 121(1),
126(2), 324
P.4 is A.47 in (4) read
FIR No.153, with 190
A.10 in FIR BNS,
No.154 & A. Section 3 of
No.11 in FIR PDPPA
No.155 of 2024,
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KL,J
W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batchP.5 is A.36 in
FIR No.153,
A.19 in FIR
No.154 & A.13
in FIR No 155 of
2024,P.6 is A.42 in
FIR No.153,
A.16 in FIR
No.154 and spet
and as such I am
well acquainted
with the facts of
the case.
35951/ P.1 is A. No. 11
24 in FIR No. 153,
A.6 in FIR No.
154 & A.No.9 in
FIR No. 155 of
2024.
P.2 is A.2 in FIR
No. 153, A.6 in
FIR No. 154 &
A.No.8 in FIR
No. 155 of 2024.
P.3 is A. 13 in
FIR No. 153, A.7
in FIR No. 154
& A.9 in FIR No.
155 of 2024.
`
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
36532/ P.1 is A.4 in FIR
24 No. 153, A.12 in
FIR No. 154 &
A.1 in FIR No.
155 of 2024.
P.2 is A.5in FIR
No. 153, A.8 in
FIR No. 154 &
A.No.5 in FIR
No. 155 of 2024.
P.3 is A.8 in FIR
No. 153, A.15 in
FIR No. 154 &
A.4 in FIR No.
155 of 2024.
36554/ Sole petitioner, 24 A.6 in FIR No. 153, A.13 in FIR No. 154
4. In all the writ petitions, the petitioners are residents of Bala
Naik Thanda, Roti Banda Thanda, Pulicherla kunta Thanda and
Lagcherla Village, Bomraspet Mandal, Vikarabad District. They are
accused in the aforesaid three crimes. On the complaints lodged by the
aforesaid complainants, the Police Bomraspet registered the aforesaid
three crimes.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the
date of incident, place of incident etc., are same. Basing on the same
incident, the police cannot register the aforesaid three crimes against
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
the petitioners herein. The allegations leveled against the petitioners
herein are same. Therefore, registration of subsequent Crime Nos.154
and 155 of 2024 by Bomraspet Police, are liable to be quashed.
6. The allegations leveled against the petitioners in all three
Crimes are one and the same and therefore, registration of the other
two crimes i.e. Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024 is impermissible and
liable to be quashed. He has also placed reliance on the principle laid
down in Smt. K.Mathamma vs. State of Telangana 1 and
Akbaruddin Owaisi vs. State of A.P. represented by its Principal
Secretary, Home Department 2. With the said submissions, he sought
to quash the Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024.
7. Whereas, learned Asst.Govt.Pleader for Home, would
contend that the allegations leveled against the petitioners in the
aforesaid three crimes are different. Place of incident is different.
Victims and accused are different. Even the offences are also
different. There is no political motive. The allegations leveled against
the petitioners herein are serious. At the instance of A.1, the
petitioners herein attacked the District Collector, Special Officer,
1
2022 (1)ALT (Crl) 12 (T.S.)
2
2013 (6) ALT 101 (SB)
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
KADA and other officials, who went to the spot for the purpose of
conducting public hearing. They have formed into unlawful assembly
and attacked the said Special Officer, KADA with deadly weapons.
Investigation is at the threshold. Quashing of the three crimes at the
threshold is impermissible as per the principle laid down by the Apex
Court and this Court in Crl.P.Nos.1232 of 2022 and batch vide order
dated 29.04.2022. He has placed reliance on the principle laid down in
TT Antony vs. State of Kerala 3 and Jacob John vs. State of
Manipur 4 in common order dated 29.04.2022 in Crl.P.No.1232 of
2022.
8. Perusal of the aforesaid complaints in Cr.Nos.153, 154 and
155 of 2024 pending on the file of Bomraspet Police Station, would
reveal that the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA and other
officials went to the outskirts of Lagcherla Village for the purpose of
conducting public hearing with regard to establishment of Pharma
Company. Villagers and other stakeholders were not found to
participate in the public hearing. A.2 informed the District Collector
and other officials stating that nobody will come to the said place of
3
(2001) 6 SCC 181
4
(2020) Supreme (Manipur) 176
`
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
meeting and they have to conduct public hearing at Lagcherla village.
They can hold gramsabha in the village. Thereafter, the District
Collector and other officials believed his version bonafidely and went
to Lagcherla village in his car bearing No.TS 07 EV 2929. Other
officials including defacto-complainants in all the said crimes
followed them to the village.
9. It is further alleged that in Lagcherla village, the people of
Lagchrela, Bala Naik Thanda, Roti Banda Thanda and Pulicherla
kunta Thanda formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with
stones, sticks and Chili powder. At about 12.20 hours, when all the
officials including the Collector reached Lagcherla village, accused
and others raised slogans against the District Collector saying that ‘go
back Pharma’. They have also obstructed the Collector’s vehicle and
also Special Officer, KADA. They have attacked the Collector. They
have also attacked the defacto-complainant in all the aforesaid crimes
with stones, sticks and chilli powder. They have also damaged
Collector’s vehicle. When Special Officer, KADA tried to convince
the accused and other people, they have attacked him. In the said
attack, he received injuries on the left hand and back side of his neck
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
and right leg etc. He has saved himself, otherwise they would have
killed him. Thus, all the accused formed into unlawful assembly, tried
to kill the Collector, Special Officer, KADA and other officials for
conducting public hearing.
10. In all the aforesaid three crimes, the names of the some of
the petitioners are not there. There is no allegation against the
petitioners herein in the aforesaid three complaints that the petitioners
conspired with other accused and attacked the District Collector,
Special Officer, KADA and other officials who came to Lagcherla
village for conducting public hearing. In the remand report, there are
certain allegations against the petitioners herein. In all the aforesaid
three complaints, the date of incident is 11.11.2024 and time of
incident is around 12.20 P.M.
11. In all the three complaints in the aforesaid three crimes
specifically alleged about forming of unlawful assembly by the
accused, attacking the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA and
other officials who came to Lagcherla village for the purpose of
conducting public hearing. They have also raised slogans ‘go back
Pharma’. They are opposing establishment of Pharma Company in the
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
said village and also opposing the public hearing. They have attacked
the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA and damaged their
vehicles. Special Officer, KADA received injuries.
12. As discussed supra, learned counsel for the petitioners would
contend that the allegations in all the aforesaid complaints are one and
the same. Therefore, the Police, Bomraspet Police Station cannot
register crimes vide Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024 on the very same
allegations. It is contrary to the procedure laid down in Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘BNSS’) and also principle
laid down by the Apex Court and this Court in catena of decisions.
13. In the light of the said submission, it is relevant to note that
in TT Antony (supra), the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with
the registration of multiple F.I.Rs. In paragraph No.24, the Apex
Court held that there can be no second FIR and consequently there
could be no fresh investigation in receipt of every subsequent
information in respect of the same cognizable offence or some
occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences.
It was further held that only the information about the commission of
cognizable offence(s), which is first entered in the Station House
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
Diary by the Officer In-Charge of the Police Station, can be regarded
as First Information Report under Section 154 of Cr.P.C; on
subsequent information, the same offence will be covered by Section
162 of Cr.P.C.
14. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment is extracted
below:-
A just balance between the fundamental rights of the
citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the
expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence
has to be struck by the Court. There cannot be any controversy that
sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. empowers the police to
make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and
documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the
Magistrate. In Narangs’ case (supra) it was, however, observed that
it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the
permission of the Court. However, the sweeping power of
investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to
fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident,
giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon
filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final
report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. It would clearly be beyond the
purview of Sections 154 and 156 Cr.P.C. nay, a case of abuse of
the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a
case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs,
not being a counter case, filed in connection with the same or
connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batchthe course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant
to the first FIR either investigation is underway or final report
under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be
a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under
Article 226/227 of the Constitution.
15. Relying on the said judgment, in Akbaruddin Owaisi
(supra), this Court held that the sweeping power of investigation
does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to a fresh investigation
by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or
more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive, FIRs,
whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2)
Cr.P.C. the Court, observed that case of fresh investigation based on
the consequent or successive FIRs not being counter-case, filed in
connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to
have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in
respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under
way or final report under Section 173 (2) of Cr.P.C. has been
forwarded to the Magistrate, may be fit case for exercise of power
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India.
`
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
16. In Upkar Singh (supra), the Apex Court clarifying the
principle laid down by it in TT Antony (supra), held that any further
complaint by the same complainant or others against the same
accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under
the Code because an investigation in this regard would have already
started and further complaint against the same accused will amount to
an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint,
hence will be prohibited under Section 162 of the Code.
17. In Babu Bai vs. State of Gujarat5, in paragraph No.21, the
Apex Court held as follows:-
“21. In such a case the court has to examine the facts and
circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of
sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs
relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence
or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts
of the same transaction. If the answer is in the affirmative, the
second FIR is liable to be quashed. However, in case the
contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is
different and they are in respect of the two different
incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In case in
respect of the same incident the accused in the first FIR5
(2010) 12 SCC 254
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batchcomes forward with a different version or counterclaim,
investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted.”
This Court held that the relevant enquiry is whether two or
more FIRs relate to the same incident or relate to incidents
which form part of the same transactions. If the Court were to
conclude in the affirmative, the subsequent FIRs are liable to
be quashed. However, where the subsequent FIR relates to
different incidents or crimes or is in the form of a counter-
claim, investigation may proceed. [See also in this
context ChirraShivraj v. State of A.P. [ChirraShivraj v. State
of A.P., (2010) 14 SCC 444 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 757]
and Chirag M. Pathak v. Dollyben Kantilal Patel [Chirag M.
Pathak v. Dollyben Kantilal Patel, (2018) 1 SCC 330 :
(2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 369]
18. In Anju Chaudhary vs. State of UP6, the Apex Court had
an occasion to deal with the concept of registration of second FIR at
length. In paragraph No.14, the Apex Court held as follows:
14. On the plain construction of the language and scheme of Sections 154,
156 and 190 of the Code, it cannot be construed or suggested that there can
be more than one FIR about an occurrence. However, the opening words of
Section 154 suggest that every information relating to commission of a
cognizable offence shall be reduced to writing by the officer in-charge of a
Police Station. This implies that there has to be the first information report
about an incident which constitutes a cognizable offence. The purpose of
registering of an FIR is to set the machinery of criminal investigation into6
2013 (6) SCC 384
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batchmotion, which culminates with filing of the police report in terms of Section
173(2) of the Code. It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled
principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence.
However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or
even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall
within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR
could be registered. The most important aspect is to examine the inbuilt
safeguards provided by the legislature in the very language of Section 154
of the Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin
to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of
power by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for
the same incident cannot be registered. Of course, the Investigating Agency
has no determinative right. It is only a right to investigate in accordance
with the provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon completion of
investigation, either for cancellation or alleging commission of an offence,
is a matter which once filed before the court of competent jurisdiction
attains a kind of finality as far as police is concerned, may be in a given
case, subject to the right of further investigation but wherever the
investigation has been completed and a person is found to be prima facie
guilty of committing an offence or otherwise, reexamination by the
investigating agency on its own should not be permitted merely by
registering another FIR with regard to the same offence. If such protection is
not given to a suspect, then possibility of abuse of investigating powers by
the Police cannot be ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that such
interpretation should be given to Section 154 of the Code, as it would not
only further the object of law but even that of just and fair
investigation. More so, in the backdrop of the settled canons of criminal
jurisprudence, re-investigation or de novo investigation is beyond the
competence of not only the investigating agency but even that of the learned
Magistrate. The courts have taken this view primarily for the reason that it
`
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
would be opposed to the scheme of the Code and more particularly Section
167(2) of the Code. [Ref. Rita Nag v. State of West Bengal [(2009) 9 SCC
129] and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali @ Deepak & Ors. (SLP (Crl) No.9185-
9186 of 2009 of the same date).
19. In Kari Chowdhary vs. Sita Devi 7, in paragraph No.11, the
Apex Court held as follows:-
“11. Learned counsel adopted an alternative contention that once the
proceedings initiated under FIR No. 135 ended in a final report the police
had no authority to register a second FIR and number it as FIR No. 208. Of
course the legal position is that there cannot be two FIRs against the same
accused in respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in
respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two
different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the
same investigating agency. Even that apart, the report submitted to the court
styling it as FIR No. 208 of 1998 need be considered as an information
submitted to the court regarding the new discovery made by the police
during investigation that persons not named in FIR No. 135 are the real
culprits. To quash the said proceedings merely on the ground that final
report had been laid in FIR No. 135 is, to say the least, too technical. The
ultimate object of every investigation is to find out whether the offences
alleged have been committed and, if so, who have committed it.”
(Emphasis supplied).
20. On consideration of the said principles laid down in the said
judgments, in the State of Rajasthan vs. Surender Singh Rathore8,
7
2002 (1) SCC 714
8
2025 Law Suit (SC) 249
`
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
the Apex Court laid down the following principles with regard to the
permissibility of registration of second FIR:-
9. From the above conspectus of judgments, inter alia, the following
principles emerge regarding the permissibility of the registration of a second
FIR:
9.1 When the second FIR is counter-complaint or presents a rival version
of a set of facts, in reference to which an earlier FIR already stands
registered.
9.2 When the ambit of the two FIRs is different even though they may
arise from the same set of circumstances.
9.3 When investigation and/or other avenues reveal the earlier FIR or set
of facts to be part of a larger conspiracy.
9.4 When investigation and/or persons related to the incident bring to the
light hitherto unknown facts or circumstances.
9.5 Where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different.
21. On examination of the facts of the said case wherein the
first FIR refers to a particular incident, action taken therein was
limited, the second FIR pertains to the larger issue of widespread
corruption in the concerned department and, therefore, is much larger
in its scope than the previous FIR. On consideration of the said facts,
the Apex Court held that two incidents are different and distinct.
Therefore, registration of second FIR is permissible.
`
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
9
22. In Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs Union of India , the Apex
Court, on examination of the facts therein, more particularly,
registration of multiple F.I.Rs against the petitioner therein, based on
TV show aired on a particular day i.e. 21.04.2020, the facts mentioned
in all the F.I.Rs. was the same, and that it was held that no subsequent
FIR can be registered in respect of same, the incident arising out of the
same occurrence or incident.
23. In Krishna Lal Chawla vs. State of UP 10 reiterated the
principle laid down in TT Antony (supra), and Upkar Singh (Supra)
and held as follows:
7. This Court in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash,
(2004) 13 SCC 292 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] has clearly stated
that any further complaint by the same complainant against
the same accused, after the case has already been registered,
will be deemed to be an improvement from the original
complaint. Though Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved
Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] was
rendered in the context of a case involving cognizable
offences, the same principle would also apply where a
person gives information of a non-cognizable offence and9
AIR 2020 SC 2386
10
AIR 2021 SC 1381
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batchsubsequently lodges a private complaint with respect to the
same offence against the same accused person. Even in a
non-cognizable case, the police officer after the order of the
Magistrate, is empowered to investigate the offence in the
same manner as a cognizable case, except the power to arrest
without a warrant. Therefore, the complainant cannot subject
the accused to a double whammy of investigation by the
police and inquiry before the Magistrate.
24. In C. Muniappan (Supra), the Apex Court held that two or
more crimes can be clubbed if the circumstances and facts indicate
that the second crime was connected or was a result of the first crime.
The relevant portion is extracted below:
37. The submission on behalf of the appellants that two
crimes bearing Nos. 188 and 190 of 2000 could not be
clubbed together, has also no merit for the simple reason that
if the cases are considered, keeping in view the totality of the
circumstances and the sequence in which the two incidents
occurred, taking into consideration the evidence of drivers
and conductors/cleaners of the vehicles involved in the first
incident and the evidence of C. Ramasundaram, VAO (PW
87), we reach the inescapable conclusion that the second
occurrence was nothing but a fall out of the first
occurrence. The damage caused to the public transport
vehicles and the consequential burning of the University bus
remained part of one and the same incident. Merely because
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batchtwo separate complaints had been lodged, did not mean that
they could not be clubbed together and one charge-sheet
could not be filed (see T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala [(2001)
6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] ).
25. The decisions in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (Supra) and
Yanob Sheikh (Supra) relied upon by the Petitioners herein also
reiterate that multiple FIRs relating to the same transaction and
between same parties are not maintainable.
. 26. In Akbaruddin Owaisi (supra), this Court held that
multiple FIRs cannot be registered if the offences relate to the same
incident and arise out of same circumstances. The Court therein
discussed the test of sameness to be applied while deciding whether
the subsequent FIRs are maintainable. The Court held as follows:
39. Let us now briefly refer to the tests which should,
ordinarily, be applied to determine whether or not the two
FIRs under consideration relate to the same
incident/transaction. The law recognizes a common trial or a
common FIR being registered for one series of acts so
connected together as to form the same transaction as
contemplated under Section 220 Cr.P.C. The expression
‘same transaction’, from its very nature, is incapable of
exact definition. (Anju Chaudhary, (2013 Cri LJ
776); Mohan Baitha v. State of Bihar57.). The distinction
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batchbetween two FIRs relating to the same incident, and two
FIRs relating to different incidents or occurrences of the
same incident, should be carefully examined. (Babubhai)
: 2010 AIR SCW 5126. The merits of each case must be
considered to determine whether a subsequently registered
FIR is a second FIR relating to the same incident or offence
or is based upon distinct and different facts and whether its
scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. It will not be
appropriate for the Court to lay down one straight jacket
formula uniformly applicable to all cases. This will always be
a mixed question of law and fact depending on the merits of a
given case. (Anju Chaudhary.). The test, to determine
whether two FIRs can be permitted to exist, is whether the
two incidents are identical or not. (Ram Lal Narang, (1979
Cri LJ 1346)).
40. The concept of “sameness” has been given a restricted
meaning. In order to examine the impact of one or more
FIRs. the Court has to rationalise the facts and
circumstances of each case and then apply the test of
‘sameness’ to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same
incident and to the same occurrence; and whether they are
in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the
same transaction or relate completely to two distinct
occurrences.It is only if the second FIR relates to the same
cause of action, the same incident, there is sameness of
occurrence and an attempt has been made to improvise the
case, would the second FIR be liable to be quashed. In cases
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batchwhere every FIR has a different spectrum, and the allegations
made are distinct and separate, it may be regarded as a
counter complaint, but it cannot be stated that an effort has
been made to improve the allegations that find place in the
first FIR or that the principle of “sameness” is attracted.
(Babubhai, (2010 AIR SCW 5126); Surendra
Kaushik v. State of Uttar Pradesh-2013 CrlLJ 1570).
41. It is not possible to enunciate any formula of universal
application to determine whether two or more acts constitute
the same transaction. They are to be gathered from the
circumstances of a given case indicating proximity of time,
unity or proximity of place, continuity of action, commonality
of purpose or design. For several offences to be part of the
same transaction, the test to be applied is whether they are so
related to one another in point of purpose or of cause and
effect or as principal and subsidiary, so as to result in one
continuous action. Where there is commonality of purpose or
design, where there is a continuity of action, then all those
persons involved can be accused of the same or different
offences “committed in the course of the same transaction”.
Where two incidents are of different times with involvement
of different persons, there is no commonality, the purpose
thereof is different, they emerge from different
circumstances, and would not form part of the same
transaction. (Anju Chaudhary, (2013 Cri LJ 776)).
`
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
27. In Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy vs. The State of
Telangana 11, this Court discussed various decisions held that in
following cases multiple FIRs are maintainable:
20. The sum and substance of the above said judgments is
that there is no embargo for registration of two FIRs on the
following circumstances/grounds:
(a) where the allegations made in both the FIRs are from
different spectrum, where there are different versions from
different persons;
(b) same set of facts may constitute different offences;
(c) where there are two distinct offences having different
ingredients;
(d) where the allegations are different and distinct;
(e) when there are rival versions in respect of same episode,
they would normally take shape of two different FIRs and
investigation can be carried out under both of them by the
same Investigating Agency.
The decision in Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy (Supra) was
subsequently followed by this Court in K. Mathamma (Supra).
28. Relying on the said principles, this Court in Crl.P.No.1232
of 2022 held that registration of multiple FIRs is impermissible, if
they relate to the occurrence of same incident, involve same parties
and arise out of the same cause of action. Registration of multiple
11
2021(2) ALT (Crl) 171 (TS)
`
23
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
FIRs is impermissible even in cases of different incidents if such
incidents form part of the same transaction. In other words, if the
subsequent offence alleged in the subsequent FIR is connected with
the first FIR or is the consequence of the first FIR, such subsequent
FIR is not maintainable. The courts before reaching a conclusion that
the subsequent FIRs are not maintainable, shall see if the alleged
incidents or offences are identical or not and whether any
commonality between the accused and the complainant exists. Further,
registration of subsequent FIRs are impermissible if they are filed only
to improve the case of the prosecution or fill up the lacunae in the
earlier complaint.
29. In Sreekumar vs. State of Kerala 12, the Apex Court held
that where the subsequent FIR was registered on different set of
allegations by a different person, the said FIR is maintainable.
30. In Jakir Hussain Kosangi vs. State of Andhra Pradesh13
Division Bench of this Court discussed various decisions of the
Supreme Court dealing with multiple registration of crimes. The Court
held that where similar offences involving various victims are
12
(2018) 4 SCC 579
13
2017(5) ALT 342
`
24
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
committed, each of such offence involves an independent cause of
action. Further, registration of FIRs by multiple victims cannot be
prohibited simply because the nature of allegations are the same as
each offence arises out of an independent cause of action.
31. In Jacob John (supra), wherein two complaints were
registered against the accused i.e. one in Ukhrul Police Station, and
the other is by Mansarovar Police Station, Jaipur city. The offences
leveled against the petitioner therein are punishable under Sections
370 (5), 376, 34 of IPC and Section 6/2010 of the POCSO, 2012. On
examination of the facts therein, Manipur High Court at Imphal held
that successive FIRs for the same incident are permissible if they
pertain to different incidents/crimes. The seriousness of the offences
and their societal impact, shall also be considered and the accused
must face trial in two different places.
32. In the light of the said principle, coming to the facts of the
present case, as discussed supra, the incident is one and the same
which took place on 11.11.2024. Most of the accused are common. On
the complaint lodged by 7th respondent i.e. Sub Divisional Police
Officer, Vikarabad, Bomraspet Police, registered a case in Cr.No.153
`
25
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
of 2024 for the offences under Sections 61 (2), 191(2), 191(3)
132,109, 121(1), 126(2), 324 (4) read with 190 Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita (for short ‘BNS’), Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to
Public Property Act, 1984 ( for short, ‘PDPPA’). The Police,
Bomraspet, received a complaint from 7th respondent at 14.00 hours
on 11.11.2024 and they have registered the aforesaid crime at 14.00
hours. Admittedly, names of some of the petitioners are not there in
the complaint dated 11.11.2024 of 7th respondent.
33. On the complaint lodged by 8th respondent – the MRO, the
very same police, registered a case in Cr.No.154 of 2024 against the
accused for the offences under Section 191(2), 191(3) 132,109,
121(1), 126(2), 324 (4) read with 190 BNS, Section 3 of PDPPA.
Names of some of the petitioners are not there in the said complaint.
The said complaint was received by the Police, Bomraspet Police
Station at 15.00 hours on 11.11.2024 and they have registered the said
crime at 15.00 hours.
34. On the complaint lodged by 9th respondent, the very same
police, registered a case in Cr.No.155 of 2024 at 16.00 hours for the
`
26
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
offences under Section 191(2), 191(3) 132,109, 121(1), 126(2), 324
(4) read with 190 BNS, Section 3 of PDPPA .
35. In Cr.No.153 of 2024, the place of incident is mentioned as
near Anjaneya Swamy temple, Lagcherla village. Time of incident is
12.20 p.m. In the complaint in Cr.No.154 of 2024, place of incident is
mentioned as Anjaneyaswamy temple, Lagcherla village. In the
complaint in Cr.No.155 of 2024, the place of incident is mentioned as
Chellapuram Venkataiah’s residence. As discussed supra, Cr.No.153
of 2024, Cr.No.154 of 2024 and Cr.No.155 of 2024 were registered at
14.00, 15.00 and 16.00 hours. by the Police, Bomraspet Police Station
on the complaints lodged by respondent Nos.7 to 9.
36. It is also relevant to note that the scribe of all the three
complaints is one and the same. Respondent No.7 is Sub Divisional
Officer, Respondent No.8 is Mandal Revenue Officer, respondent
No.9 is also a DCRB, DSP, who are highly educated and responsible
officers. Instead of preparing complaints on their own by mentioning
the incident specifically, they have signed on the written complaint
prepared by Writer of Bomraspet Police Station. The only explanation
offered by learned Asst.Govt.Pleader, with regard to the same is that
`
27
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
there was attack on the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA and
other officials and situation in the village was tense. Therefore,
respondent Nos.7 to 9 were not in a position to prepare complaint on
their own. However, the complaints were prepared by Writer of
Bomrapet Police Station on the instructions of respondent Nos.7 to 9
and after going through the same, they have signed. The said
explanation offered by the learned Asst. Govt. Pleader is not
satisfactory. Respondent Nos.7 to 9 being Sub Divisional Police
Officer, the MRO and Deputy Superintendent of Police, have to
prepare complaints by mentioning the incident specifically. They
cannot sign on the complaints prepared by Writer of the Police Station
and lodge a complaint with police, Bomraspet Police Station at
different timings i.e. at 14.00, 15.00 and 16.00 hours. In the said
complaints, there is no mention that on the instructions of respondent
Nos.7 to 9, Writer of the said Police Station prepared complaints and
on going through the same, they have signed on the same. The said
facts would show the intention of the respondents in implicating the
petitioner in the aforesaid three crimes.
`
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
37. It is trite to note that learned Asst.Govt.Pleader, fairly
admitted that the place of incident in Cr.No.153 of 2024 and 154 of
2024 is one and the same.
38. It is also relevant to note that in all the aforesaid three FIRs,
the names of some of the petitioners are not there. According to the
respondent Nos.7 to 9, A.1 is the main conspirator, on his instigation
and assistance both financial and moral etc., the petitioners herein
formed into unlawful assembly, attacked the District Collector,
Special Officer, KADA and other officials with an intention to kill
them. Except the said allegation, there is no other allegation against
the petitioners herein that they were present were present physically at
the scene of offence and participated in the said attack. Vide order
dated 29.11.2024 in W.P.No.32798 of 2024, this Court quashed the
proceedings in Cr.No.154 and 155 of the very same police station
against A.1, an Ex-MLA.
39. In the light of the said discussion and the principle laid
down by the Apex Court and this Court, registration of multiple FIRs
against the petitioners is impermissible. If they relates to the
occurrence of same incident and investigation is same, arising out of
`
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
the same cause of action, registration of multiple FIRs is
impermissible even in case of different incidents. This Court has to
see if the alleged incident or offences are identical or not or
commonality between the accused and the complainant exists or not.
Registration of subsequent FIRs are impermissible, if they are filed
only to improve the case of the prosecution or to fill up lacunae in the
earlier complaint.
40. As discussed supra, the incidents, nature of allegations,
most of the accused, damage to vehicles and cause of action in three
crimes, offences registered are one and the same. There is
commonality between the accused and the complainants. Therefore,
registration of multiple FIRs i.e. Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024 of
Bomraspet Police Station with regard to the same incident against the
petitioners is impermissible and are liable to be quashed.
41. The complaints in Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024 and
statements, if any, recorded by the Investigating Officer shall be
treated as statements in Cr.No.153 of 2024 and the statements of the
witnesses recorded under Section 180 of BNSS, may be treated as
statements of witnesses in Cr.No.153 of 2024.
`
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
42. Vide order dated 29.11.2024 in W.P.No.32798 of 2024, this
Court quashed the proceedings in the present Cr.No.154 and 155 of
the very same police station against A.1, an Ex-MLA. This Court held
that the incidents, nature of allegations, most of the accused, damage
to vehicles and cause of action in three crimes, offences registered are
one and the same. There is commonality between the accused and the
complainant. Therefore, registration of multiple FIRs i.e. Cr.No.154
and 155 of 2024 of Bomraspet Police Station with regard to the same
incident against the petitioners is impermissible and are liable to be
quashed. No appeal is preferred against the said order. Therefore, the
said order has become final.
43. In the light of the said submission, it is relevant to extract
paragraph Nos.15 and 16 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Hazi
Iqbal @ Bala through SPOA vs. State of UP 14 and the same are as
follows:-
15. At this stage, we would like to observe something important.
Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the
FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such
proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the
14
Order dated 08.08.2023 in Crl.A.No.2345 of 2023 of the Apex Court.
`
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely.
We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the
accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then
he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the
necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments
made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary
ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just
enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint
alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious
proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending
circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the
averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in
between the lines.
The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the
stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall
circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case
on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in
the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs
assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out
of private or personal grudge as alleged.
16. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC
522, a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials
the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine
distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as
evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that
manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for
quashing an FIR. The Court held:-
“5. …Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any
attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the
court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the
process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice
and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would
be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or
continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of
these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no
offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question
of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to
look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and
whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in
toto.
`
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W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239,
this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power
can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p.869, para
6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the
institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint
taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute
the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal
evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to
prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the
distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is
evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case
where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not
support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry
whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a
reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the
function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an
instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be
circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all
relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process,
lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to
unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the
section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a
prosecution and bring about its sudden death…..” (Emphasis supplied)
44. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, these writ petitions
are allowed. The proceedings in Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024 pending
on the file of Bomraspet Police Station against the petitioners herein
are hereby quashed. The investigating Officer in Cr.No.153 of 2024
pending on the file of Bomraspet Police Station is at liberty to record
`33
KL,J
W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batchstatements of respondent Nos.8 and 9 (complainants in Cr.Nos.154
and 155 of 2024) in Cr.No.153 of 2024. The statements, if any,
recorded by the Investigating Officer in Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024
shall be treated as statements in Cr.No.153 of 2024.
iii) However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no
order as to costs.
As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the
writ petition shall stand closed.
_________________
K. LAKSHMAN, J
Date:21.04.2025
vvr
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