Delhi District Court
Nakul Chand vs State Of Delhi And Ors on 15 May, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-000148-2022
Criminal Revision No.: 19/2022
SHRI. NAKUL CHAND,
S/o. Shri. Bibhuti Prasad,
R/o. 91, Opp. D-896,
New Friends Colony,
New Delhi. ... REVISIONIST
VERSUS
1. STATE (GNCT OF DELHI)
2. SHRI. PANKAJ BAJAJ,
S/o. Shri. Shridhar Bajaj,
R/o. A-118, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi.
3. SMT. RASHMI BAJAJ,
W/o. Shri. Shridhar Bajaj,
R/o. A-118, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi. ... RESPONDENTS
Date of filing : 04.01.2022
Date of institution : 05.01.2022
Date when judgment was reserved : 25.02.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 15.05.2025
AND;
CNR No.: DLCT01-007673-2022
Criminal Revision No.: 261/2022
SHRI. PANKAJ BAJAJ,
S/o. Shri. S.D. Bajaj,
R/o. A-118, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi. ... REVISIONIST
VERSUS
STATE (GNCT OF DELHI) ... RESPONDENT
Date of filing : 12.05.2022
Date of institution : 13.05.2022
Date when judgment was reserved : 25.02.2025
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 1 of 58
ABHISHEK Digitally signed by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:47:30 +0530
Date when judgment is pronounced : 15.05.2025
AND;
CNR No.: DLCT01-007671-2022
Criminal Revision No.: 262/2022
SMT. RASHMI BAJAJ,
W/o. Shri. S.D. Bajaj,
R/o. A-118, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi. ... REVISIONIST
VERSUS
STATE (GNCT OF DELHI) ... RESPONDENT
Date of filing : 12.05.2022
Date of institution : 13.05.2022
Date when judgment was reserved : 25.02.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 15.05.2025
AND;
CNR No.: DLCT01-014069-2022
Criminal Revision No.: 544/2022
SMT. MEENAKSHI SHARMA,
D/o. Lt. Shri. R.D. Sharma,
R/o. 2344, 2nd Floor, Hudson Lane,
Delhi-110009. ... REVISIONIST
VERSUS
1. STATE (GNCT OF DELHI).
2. SHRI. PANKAJ BAJAJ,
S/o. Shri. Shridhar Bajaj,
R/o. A-118, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi-110025.
3. SMT. RASHMI BAJAJ,
W/o. Shri. S.D. Bajaj,
R/o. A-118, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi-110025.
4. SHRI. NAKUL CHAND,
S/o. Shri. Bibhuti Prasad,
R/o. 91, Opp. D-896,
New Friends Colony,
New Delhi-110025.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 2 of 58
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:47:35 +0530
5. SHRI. M.L. JAGGI,
(Since deceased and proceedings abated)
R/o. A-283, New Friends Colony,
Delhi-110025. ... RESPONDENTS
Date of filing : 07.10.2022
Date of institution : 10.10.2022
Date when judgment was reserved : 25.02.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 15.05.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present common judgment shall determine the
aforenoted criminal revision petitions, preferred in terms of the
provisions under Section(s) 397/399 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C./Code’),
bearing; Cr. Rev. No. 19/2022, Cr. Rev. No. 261/2022, Cr. Rev.
No. 262/2022 and Cr. Rev. 544/2022. Pertinently, Cr. Rev. No.
19/2022, Cr. Rev. No. 261/2022, and Cr. Rev. No. 262/2022 have
been preferred by accused namely, Nakul Chand ( hereinafter
referred to as ‘Nakul Chand’); accused, namely, Pankaj Bajaj
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Pankaj Bajaj’) and accused, namely,
Rashmi Bajaj (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rashmi Bajaj’;
hereinafter the said accused persons are collectively referred to as
the ‘accused persons’), respectively. In contrast, Cr. Rev.
544/2022 has been preferred by Meenakshi Sharma ( hereinafter
referred to as the ‘complainant’). Appositely, the said revision
petitions emanate/impugn a common order dated 06.12.2021
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘impugned order’), passed by learned
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate-01/Ld. ACMM-01,
Central, Tis Hazari Court ( hereinafter referred to as the ‘Ld.
ACMM/Ld. Trial Court’), in case bearing, ‘State v. Pankaj Bajaj
& Ors., Case No. 298098/2016″, arising out of FIR No. 234/2011,
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 3 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:47:39 +0530
PS. Crime Branch, under Sections 420/467/468/471/120B of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC‘).
Pertinently, by virtue of the impugned order the Ld. Trial Court
directed framing of charges under Section 120B and Sections
199/200/465 read with Section 120B IPC against the accused
persons. Notably, the charges were subsequently framed against
the accused, namely, Nakul Chand, Pankaj Bajaj and Rashmi Bajaj
on 07.12.2021. Needless to mention that while the accused persons
have sought setting aside of the impugned order of charge dated
06.12.2021 and the consequent framing of such charges on
07.12.2021, however, the complainant has sought for framing of
additional charges under Sections 420/467/468/471 IPC against
the accused persons.
2. Succinctly, the case of the prosecution is premised on
the complaint of the complainant, wherein she inter alia averred
that she had made a complaint on 25.05.2011 at Crime Branch,
seeking inquiry. As per the complainant, her father, Late Sh. R.D.
Sharma was a member of the New Friends Cooperative House
Building Society Limited (hereinafter referred to as the ‘society’)
vide Membership No. 1532, whereupon plot No. A-20, New
Friends Colony, New Delhi (435 sq. yds., hereinafter referred to as
the ‘plot/premise’) was allotted to him by virtue of a sub-lease
dated 16.06.1982 and possession was also handed over to him. As
per the complainant, Delhi Development Authority ( hereinafter
referred to as ‘DDA’) cancelled the sub-lease of the said plot vide
order dated 09.02.2001 for the reason of alleged of violation of
certain clauses of lease deed. Thereupon, the complainant is
asserted to have made a representation before DDA for restoration
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 4 of 58
ABHISHEK Digitally signed by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:47:43
+0530
of lease and mutation in her and upon complainant’s
representation, sub-lease of the plot was restored in the name of the
complainant, and she was asked to deposit the restoration charges
vide letter dated 14.05.2009. However, it is further asserted by the
complainant in her complaint when she visited her plot on
18.05.2009, she found that accused Pankaj Bajaj was conducting
construction activity, in connivance with one M. L. Jaggi,
Secretary of the Society (since deceased). Consequently, the
complainant is proclaimed to have made a complaint to DDA.
However, in support of his claim, accused Pankaj Bajaj relied on
sale deed dated 26.03.2007, asserted to have been executed in his
favour by Sh. M. L. Jaggi. Thereupon, the Deputy Director,
Cooperative Society Cell, DDA, is asserted to have written a letter
dated 22.01.2009 to M. L. Jaggi, avowing that the society sold the
plot illegally to accused Pankaj Bajaj, violating the clause XVI of
the Lease-Agreement dated 13.02.1963 executed between the
DDA and the society. Ergo, under such circumstances, the
complainant moved an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.,
whereupon the instant FIR No. 234/11 under Sections
420/467/468/471/120B IPC came to be registered at P.S. Crime
Branch, and the investigation ensued.
2.1. Relevantly, during the investigation, the concerned
police official(s)/IO is asserted to have recorded the statement as
well as collected relevant reports/documents from the complainant
as well as various authorities. Correspondingly, it is recorded
under the chargesheet that the consequent investigation unearthed
that a land measuring 828 bighas and 15 biswas, situated in the
areas of village Kilokari and Khizrabad, including the premise/plot
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 5 of 58
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:47:47 +0530
in question, was allotted to the society through its President, Sh.
Ram Lal Jaggi (father of co-accused M.L. Jaggi) and its Secretary,
namely, Bal Mukund Vig on 13.02.1963 against an agreement.
Subsequently, in the year 1971, Sh. Bishambar Dayal, filed a WP
(C) No. 764/71 against DDA and society before the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi, against the acquirement of his land, i.e., khasra No.
60/3, Village Khizrabad, New Delhi and a stay was granted by the
Hon’ble High Court against the dispossession of Sh. Bishambhar
Dayal. However, the society had already developed the whole land
and carved out 1116 plots including four plots bearing number
A-13, A-14, A-19 and A-20 which were carved out of khasra No.
60/3. Markedly, as aforenoted the plot was allotted in favour of
complainant’s father vide sub-lease on 16.08.1982 by DDA and a
letter of possession was correspondingly handed over to him by the
society on 20.06.1988, followed by execution of a supplementary
lease-deed on 19.09.1988. Relevantly, the allottees of plots
bearing A-13, A-14 and A-19 are asserted to have settled and
compromised their matters with Sh. Bishambhar Dayal, out of the
court, however, dispute of the plot/premise preserved.
Significantly, in 1992, Sh. R.D. Sharma/complainant’s father sole
the premise/plot to Jaju and Sethi family, in violation of the terms
and conditions of the lease-agreement, leading to eventual
cancellation of the lease in favour of Sh. RD Sharma on
22.01.2001. However, subsequently, the complainant is asserted to
have settled her matter/dispute with Jaju and Sethi family on
05.02.2003 and the breaches were removed. Thereafter, the
complainant submitted her representation and the DDA vide letter
dated 14.05.2009 restored the sub-lease in respect of plot in favour
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 6 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:47:51 +0530
of the complainant, against the payment of restoration charges, as
aforementioned. The chargesheet further chronicles that in the
meanwhile, M.L. Jaggi approached Bhishamber Dayal and
amicably compromised the matter pertaining to WP(C) No.
764/71, out of the court on 19.04.2005, in the absence of other
respondents of WP(C) No. 764/71. The matter was consequently
disposed off by the Hon’ble High Court and Sh. Bishambhar Dayal
acknowledged that the society had already taken possession of the
plot and paid a consideration amount of Rs. 48,00,000/- (Rupees
Forty Eight Lakhs only) to him as well as his heirs against such
settlement.
2.2. The chargesheet further records that pursuant to the
investigation, it was determined that on 07.06.2004, Lt. Col. D. R.
Thukral (membership No. 1500) withdrew his membership with
the society and M. L. Jaggi inducted accused, Rashmi Bajaj in
place of Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral, without taking necessary approval
of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. As per the prosecution,
the minute book of the society was also manipulated by Mr. M.L.
Jaggi with the help of accused, Nakul Chand, Office Supt. of the
society. It is noted under the chargesheet that Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral
never mentioned in his application or affidavit that his
membership may be transferred to any other person.
Concomitantly, Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral further denied having
transferred his membership to any other person, since he had
already withdrawn his membership and taken back his deposit and
there is no question of transfer of his share to any other as he took
back his deposit. However, Mr. Pradeep Mohan, son-in-law of Lt.
Col. D.R. Thukral, who is stated to have signed the share transfer
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 7 of 58
Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:47:55 +0530
certificate as a witness, stated that Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral had
signed the said certificate in his presence when they went to collect
the cheque from the society. Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral could not be
examined in this regard as he was settled in San Francisco, USA,
and reportedly expired on 19.08.2012. Consequently, since there
was contradiction in the versions, therefore, admitted signatures of
Late Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral were collected from the society and
Central Bank of India and the same were sent to FSL Rohini, along
with the said certificate for expert opinion. However, the report of
FSL, Rohini, New Delhi, corroborated the version of Mr. Pradeep
Mohan that the signature of Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral (Q11) on the
share transfer certificate was found genuine when it was matched
with his admitted signatures (A8 to A14).
2.3. The chargesheet further records that, though, accused
Rashmi Bajaj had applied for membership on 09.12.2004,
however, she was granted membership on 27.11.2004, prior to the
date of application, by resolution No. 6 of the society. Further, the
membership no. 1500 was again transferred to accused Pankaj
Bajaj vide resolution No. 3 of the society dated 25.02.2005, while
accused Pankaj Bajaj had applied for membership only on
30.03.2005. Concomitantly, consequent to the ensuing
investigation, it was determined that the assertion of M. L. Jaggi
that he wrote letters on 10.02.2005 to 90 (ninety) waiting list
members regarding offer of allotment of the plot was determined
to be uncorroborated as out of 88 (eighty eight) letters sent to the
waiting list members, 50 (fifty) letters were returned undelivered
and only 20 (twenty) waiting list members responded, who
categorically denied regarding the receipt of any such letter/offer
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 8 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:47:59 +0530
by them, except the two members. Subsequently, co-accused M.L.
Jaggi is proclaimed to have also written a letter to DDA and
Registrar Cooperative Societies for draw of the plot, however,
from the letter, it is asserted that the plot had already been allotted
to Pankaj Bajaj as there is no mention of any such draw, as per the
society’s record. On the contrary, it was determined that M.L.
Jaggi already handed over the possession of the said plot to
accused Pankaj Bajaj and gave two possession letters dated
03.06.2005 and 13.06.2005. Correspondingly, it was determined
that the sale deed was executed on 26.03.2007 in favour of Pankaj
Bajaj, on a stamp papers purchased on 01.07.2005, after a gap of
about two years. As per the chargesheet, no plot was allotted to Lt.
Col. D.R. Thukral who had been a member of the society for
around 30 (thirty) years, leading to him withdrawing his
membership of the. However, soon after the withdrawal of Lt. Col.
D.R. Thukral’s membership, the plot was illegally transferred to
accused Pankaj Bajaj, immediately on his induction in the society
in the year 2005. Relevantly, as per the chargesheet, the
consideration amount of Rs. 48,00,000/- (Rupees Forty Eight
Lakhs only) was also taken from accused Pankaj Bajaj in 2005, to
settle the accounts/matter with the Sh. Bishambar Dayal and his
family members.
2.4. Markedly, DDA vide its letter dated 22.01.2009 held
that the sale of plot in favour of accused Pankaj Bajaj was void-ab-
initio and thereafter vide letter dated 15.04.2009, it was intimated
to M.L. Jaggi that the society was not entitled to sell any plots.
Concomitantly, as aforenoted, the lease of the plot was restored in
the name of the complainant, whereupon in the facts and
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 9 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:48:05 +0530
circumstances noted herein, the complainant, initiated proceedings
against the accused persons, determining illegal occupation of the
premise/plot in question by accused Pankaj Bajaj. Further, upon
ensuing investigation, it is stated to have been further determined
by the IO that under the minutes of meeting of managing
committee of the society related to the premise/plot, several
manipulations, deletions, amendment by application of white
fluid, etc., were noted and the same are asserted to have been
determined from FSL report to have been carried out by accused
Nakul Chand, while acting in connivance with other accused
persons, in particular, on the directions/instructions/criminal
conspiracy with M.L. Jaggi.
2.5. Remarkably, on conclusion of the investigation,
chargesheet was filed by the concerned police official(s) before the
Ld. Trial Court, whereupon cognizance of offence was taken by
the Ld. Trial Court on 07.08.2013. Relevantly, during the course of
proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court, co-accused, namely,
Maqsudan Lal Jaggi @ M.L. Jaggi left for heavenly abode and the
proceedings qua the said accused were abated by the Ld. Trial
Court vide order dated 28.05.2014, upon receipt of death
verification report of accused, Maqsudan Lal Jaggi @ M.L. Jaggi.
Subsequently, on the compliance of the provisions under Section
207 Cr.P.C. and upon arguments on charge having been addressed
by the Ld. Counsel for the accused persons, Ld. Counsel for the
complainant as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for the State, as
aforementioned, charges were directed to be framed by the Ld.
Trial Court against the accused persons vide order dated
06.12.2021, the impugned order herein. Apposite at this stage, to
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 10 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.05.15 16:48:09 +0530
reproduce the relevant extract(s) from the order dated 06.12.2021
of the Ld. Trial Court/impugned order, as under;
“…I have heard Ld. APP for the state assisted by
Counsel for the complainant and respective counsels
for the accused persons.
Accused no. 1 Pankaj Bajaj is son of accused no. 2
Rashmi Bajaj and alleged to have got alloted plot
bearing no. A-20, New Friends Colony, New Delhi in
their favour, illegally in conspiracy with accused no. 3
M.L. Jaggi (now deceased), who was the President of
New Friends Colony Cooperative House Building
Society, by filing false affidavits, getting the same
alloted even prior to becoming the member of the
society, manipulating and overwriting the resolution
of the society in connivance with accused no. 4 Nakul
Chand who was working as a superintendent in the
society during the relevant time.
As per the record, the allotment of plot in question
in favour of complainant/her Predecessor in interest
was cancelled in the year 2001 and only restored in
2009. However, it does not give right to any person to
take advantage of the same and bypass the rules and
regulations of allotment of the plots of a cooperative
society or jump the queue. No doubt the temptation
was there after the allotment was cancelled but same
can not be a ground to justify illegal acts or acquire the
same by illegal means. In the present case, there is a
clear evidence that both accused Rashmi Bajaj and
Pankaj Bajaj were granted the membership of the
society even prior to the date of application. IO has
also seized the affidavit of Rashmi Bajaj, wherein she
has stated that “I do no own, either in full or in part, on
lease hold or free hold basis, any plot of land or a
house in Delhi / New Delhi / Delhi Cantt, nor does my
husband or any of my dependent relations including
unmarried children, own either in full or in part, on
lease hold or free hold basis, any plot of land or a
house in Delhi/New Delhi / Delhi Cantt.” While her
husband Sh. S.D. Bajaj was the owner of the Flat No.
A/18, NFC, New Delhi and H.No. 200, Sukhdev
Vihar, New Delhi. Further the record reveals that
Rashmi Bajaj transferred her membership further to
her son accused Pankaj Bajaj on 25.02.2005 within a
period of three months again in violation of Clause
9(1) of by-laws.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 11 of 58
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:48:13 +0530
Moving further prima facie there is also evidence
that accused Nakul Chand had manipulated with the
minutes of our meeting. IO has seized the same which
is in register form. The minutes of meeting of
Managing Committee dated 27.11.2004 on Page 40-
43. Resolution No.1 pertaining to Plot No.820 is in
comparatively in small font and resolution No.6 has
been amended after applying white fluid. As per the
IO it clearly suggest that same has been inserted later
and therefore charge of forgery is made out against
accused Nakul Chand. The FSL report confirms the
same in the handwriting of accused Nakul Chand. An
accused cannot seek discharge merely by claiming
that same was done under coercion or as per the
directions of other co-accused.
To conclude prima facie it is established that all
the accused persons conspired to illegally grab plot
No.820 New Friends Colony by resorting to criminal
conspiracy and forgery and thereby induction of Smt.
Rashmi Bajaj against membership No.1500 by
manipulating records and in contravention to
prescribe rules and regulations. Accused Rashmi
Bajaj also gave false affidavit on 09.12.2004 to get the
membership of the society, further transfer of
membership No.1500 also done in contravention of
the by-laws of the society. Hence, prima facie a case
U/s 120 B, 465, 199 and 200 IPC, is made out against
accused- Rashmi Bajaj, Pankaj Bajaj and Nakul
Chand. Accused M.L. Jaggi has ready expired.
However, this court is in agreement with the
submission of counsel for the accused that when the
entire transactions took place complainant was not in
picture i.e. her allotment was cancelled therefore,
there was no aducement, deception or dishonest and
fraudulent intention directed against the complainant
and therefore, no charge of cheating is made out.
Ld APP for the state and counsel for the
complainant has also pressed for the charges U/s
118(5) and 118 (7) of Delhi Co-operative Societies
Act, 2003 against the accused persons for tampering
with the record of Co-operative Society and also
getting allotment of the plot in contravention with the
provisions of above act. However, Section 121 of
Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 2003 clearly states
that no prosecution shall be instituted under this act
without the previous sanction of a Registrar and such
sanction shall not be given unless the person
concerned has been provided a reasonable opportunity
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 12 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:48:17 +0530
to represent in a case. In the present case this court has
failed to find any such previous sanction of the
Registrar and Ld APP for the state assisted by counsel
for the complainant have also failed bring to the notice
of this court any such document wherein any such
sanction has been granted. Accordingly, no charge
under any of the provisions of Delhi Co-operative
Societies Act, 2003 can be made out…”
(Emphasis supplied)
2.6. Apposite at this stage to further reproduce the
consequent charges that were framed against the accused persons
on 07.12.2021, pursuant to the aforesaid order/impugned order, as
under;
“I, ***, ACMM-01 (Central), Delhi do hereby
charge you accused person (1) Pankaj Bajaj (2)
Rashmi Bajaj and (3) Nakul Chand follows:
That at unknown time and place, you all entered
into a conspiracy of which accused M.L Jaggi was
also part (now deceased) to illegally grab plot bearing
no. A-20 situated in New Friends Cooperative
Housing building society. NFC New Delhi or to grab
it by illegal means and you accused Rashmi Bajaj and
Pankaj Bajaj in furtherance of the same became
members of the above society even prior to you
applications for membership and further by bypassing
the waiting list and you all thereby committed offence
punishable u/s 120-B IPC.
In pursuance and furtherance of the above
conspiracy you accused Rashmi Bajaj prepared a false
affidavit on 09.12.2004 to get the membership of the
above society wherein you stated that, inter alia, your
husband did not own either in full or in part, on
leasehold or freehold, any plot or land or a house in
Delhi New Delhi / Delhi Cantt. whereas your husband
Sh. S.D Bajaj was owner of flat no. A-118. NFC New
Delhi and house no. 200 in Sukhdev Vihar New Delhi
and you thereby committed offence punishable under
section 199 IPC/120-B IPC.
Further you used the above declaration as true
knowing it to be false and committed offence
punishable under section 200 IPC.
Further also in pursuance of the above conspiracy
and to illegally transfer the above plot in the name of
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 13 of 58
Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:48:21 +0530
Rashmi Bajaj you accused Nakul Chand while
working with New Friends Cooperative Housing
building society tempered the minutes of meetings of
the managing Committee dt. 27.11.2004 on page no.
40 to 43 concerning the resolution related to plot no.
A-20, further amended the resolution no. 6 relating to
the above plot by applying white fluid, further the
minutes of meeting of Managing committee dt.
13.5.2005 on page no. 58 to 60 and minutes and
meeting of managing committee dt. 27.5.2005
relating to the above plot were also amended by
applying fluid and you thereby committed offence of
forgery punishable u/s 465 IPC read with 120-B IPC.
And I hereby direct that you be tried by this court
on the said charge…”
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Learned Counsel for accused persons have submitted
that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere
conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled cannons
of law, deserving to be set aside at the outset, as suffering with
gross illegality. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that
the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere
assumptions and that no sound and/or cogent reasons have been
delineated under the said order. Ld. Counsel further submitted that
while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court further
failed to appreciate that the entire story of the complainant is
concocted, false and unreliable. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld.
Trial Court passed the impugned order by totally misinterpreting
the law and material on record, as well as wrongly framed the
charges against the accused persons. Ld. Counsel further
submitted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial
Court further failed to appreciate that from the material placed on
record, even the basic ingredients of the provisions/offences under
Sections 120B IPC and Sections 465/199/200 IPC read with
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 14 of 58
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:48:25 +0530
Section 120B IPC are not even prima facie established against the
accused persons. In this regard, Ld. Counsel for accused, Nakul
Chand submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that
the said accused was a fourth-class employee at the relevant point
in time, totally dependent on the Society as well as its office
bearers for his livelihood and accommodation. Ld. Counsel further
submitted that no mens rea for commission of any offence against
Nakul Chand is forthcoming from the material placed on record,
besides, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court did not discuss
that whatever was performed by Nakul Chand was performed
under threat/compulsion, in order to save his job.
Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, there is no
consensus/commonality of any action or mens rea between the
accused persons in the instant case. Even otherwise, as per the Ld.
Counsel, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 , the
ingredients of offence under Section 464/465 IPC are not even
prima facie made out in the instant case. Even otherwise, it was
vehemently asserted that under the garb of its criminal complaint,
the complainant has endeavored to give a criminal hue to the entire
proceedings, whereas the dispute, if any, is purely civil in nature.
In this regard, Ld. Counsel fervently argued that the matter
between New Friends Cooperative House Building Society Ltd.
and co-accused, Pankaj Bajaj and Rashmi Bajaj is covered under
the provisions of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act and is purely
civil in nature. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, it is not the
case of the prosecution that the accused Nakul Chand received any
profit or advantage in the present matter, besides the prosecution
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 15 of 58
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ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
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has even failed to attribute any motive or advantage to the said
accused.
3.1. Ld. Counsel for accused Pankaj Bajaj and Rashmi
Bajaj, while supplementing the aforenoted arguments, further
asserted that the Ld. Trial Court acted mechanically and passed the
impugned order, oblivious to the correct facts and circumstances.
As per the Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that the
complainant had earlier filed a complaint before the local police
station and the Economic Offences Wing for registration of FIR,
which were found meritless by the said authorities. However, it is
only after lapse of significant time, the complainant approached
Crime Branch-Daryaganj, Kotwali, notwithstanding the fact that
the property in question, did not lie within the local limits of said
police station/authority, which fact was not considered by the Ld.
Trial Court. Even otherwise, as per the ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial
Court failed to appreciate that the investigating agency miserably
failed to assign any mens rea to the accused persons or to
demonstrate even prima facie that they were a part of any
conspiracy. It was further submitted that the ingredients of offence
under Section 120B IPC are completely missing in the instant case.
Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the ingredients of
offence under Section 199/200 IPC are not even made out in the
instant case. In this regard, it was argued that the Ld. Trial Court
failed to appreciate that there is nothing on record to indicate that
accused Rashmi Bajaj knowingly made a false declaration in her
affidavit. On the contrary, as per the Ld. Counsel, accused Rashmi
Bajaj did not know that her husband was a member of another
society and that she had withdrawn from the membership, as soon
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 16 of 58
Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:48:33 +0530
as it came to her attention. Correspondingly, it was asserted that no
fraud, dishonest or wrongful intention/mens rea can be attributed
to the accused persons for the offences alleged against them.
Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, merely for the factum of
membership of the said accused persons to the Society, no
culpability can be attributed against them. It was further submitted
that the case of the accused persons is no different from any other
members of the society, in the waiting list, who would have come
forward to pay the sum of Rs. 48,00,000/- (Rupees Forty Eight
Lakhs only), to be disbursed to the farmers. Further, as per the Ld.
Counsel, it is not the case of the prosecution that the property in
question was undervalued in any manner. Ld. Counsel further
asserted that the filing of the complaint or getting the plot restored
in her name by the complainant, after a lapse of eight years, creates
a separate right in favour of the complainant and she cannot allege
any conspiracy or any other offence against other members of the
society, who have been lawfully assigned the plot against
consideration. Concomitantly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial
Court failed to appreciate that in the instant case, WP No.
764/1971, filed by the bhoomidars of the land in question, namely,
Sh. Bishamber Dayal and his legal heirs was disposed off by way
of compromise with the society and the money was paid by the
society to the farmers/original owners after taking the same from
the said accused persons. Ld. Counsel further strenuously
contended that the Ld. Trial Court erred in not appreciating that
there was no malafide in the transaction in question at any stage
and the complainant, with a sole endeavor to pressurize the society
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 17 of 58
Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:48:36 +0530
to succumb to her unjust demands, converted civil dispute into
criminal proceedings.
3.2. Ld. Counsel for accused Pankaj Bajaj and Rashmi
Bajaj further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider
that the settlement, which was arrived in WP No. 764/1971 has
since attained finality, besides the same was duly approved by the
division bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi and there was
no challenge to such order either by the complainant or any of her
legal heirs. Correspondingly, it was submitted that there is nothing
on record to attribute any culpability for any offence/charges
alleged against the accused persons, besides even the investigating
authorities failed to point out any motive and/or advantage
received by the accused persons to bring forth charges/allegations
levelled against them in the instant case. Ld. Counsel for the
accused persons further vehemently argued that the Ld. Trial Court
grossly erred in not appreciating that there is no grave suspicion
against the accused persons and the material on record, clearly
demonstrates that the accused persons are innocent and have been
wrongly/falsely implicated in the present case by the complainant
with vindictive and ulterior designs/motives. It was further
submitted that the Ld. Trial Court also failed to give any sound,
cogent or justified reasons for passing the impugned order, which
adversely affects the rights of the accused persons. Consequently,
the Ld. Counsel prayed that the impugned order, being passed in
gross violation of law and settled judicial precedents, deserves to
be set aside, outrightly. In support of the said contentions, reliance
was placed upon the decisions in; Union of India v. Prafulla
Kumar Samal & Anr., (1979) 3 SCC 4; Public Prosecutor v.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 18 of 58
Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
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Gangadharudu, (1956) ALT 678; Wayne S. Marteney v. United
State of America; C. Chenga Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, (1996) 10 SCC 193; Kehar Singh & Ors. v. State (Delhi
Administration), AIR 1988 SC 1883; Ram Narain Popli v. CBI &
Ors., AIR 2003 SC 2748; State v. VC Shukla, AIR 1980 SC 1382;
Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
1980 SC 439;Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 885; Yash Pal Mittal v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 2433; Major E. G. Barsay v. State of
Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1762; and Sharad v. State of Maharashtra,
AIR 1984 SC 1622.
4. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that
the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due
appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the present case and,
as such, deserves no interference by this Court. It was further
submitted that no irregularity, impropriety, or incorrectness can be
attributed to the impugned order, as well as the framing of charges
against the accused persons, which was/were passed by the Ld.
Trial Court, cognizant of the principles of law, as well as wary of
the facts and circumstances brought forth. As per the Ld. Addl. PP
for the State, the arguments contended by/on behalf of the accused
persons are in the nature of their defence, which cannot be
considered by court(s) at the stage of framing of charge. Even
otherwise, sufficiency of the material/evidence placed on record,
is not a fact which can be considered at the stage of framing of
charges.
4.1. Ld. Counsel for the complainant submitted that the
Ld. Trial Court erred in not framing charges/material charges
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 19 of 58
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:48:44 +0530
against the accused persons of the offences under Sections
420/467/468/471 IPC. In this regard, it was submitted that the Ld.
Trial Court failed to appreciate that the accused persons,
dishonestly and fraudulently induced the society and thereby all its
members, including the complainant herein, by using forged,
fabricated and concocted documents in order to cheat it and all its
members including the complainant, who would have otherwise
been entitled to allotment of the subject. It was further submitted
that the Ld. Trial Court erred in considering that wrongful loss has
been caused to DDA ad the society, including the complainant,
with whom the subject property vested and had the accused
persons committed their Illegal acts. As per the Ld. Counsel, the
Ld. Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record in
detail, despite the law being settled that at the stage of framing of
charge only the material placed on record for a limited purpose of
establishing a prima facie case is to be seen and it is not to be
determined at the stage of charge, whether the trial would finally
result in conviction or not. Correspondingly, as per the Ld.
Counsel, Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the concept of
locus standi is alien to criminal jurisprudence and that any person
can set the criminal machinery into motion. In this Ld. Counsel
further asserted that it is not necessary that the wrongful loss must
have ensued only to the complainant personally as in the instant
case, where the acts/illegality on the part of the accused persons
has caused wrongful loss to the society and all its members,
including the complainant herein, attributing criminality against
the accused persons. It was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel
that the documents forged by the accused persons were valuable
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 20 of 58
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:48:48 +0530
security, as specified under Section 30 IPC, attracting the
provisions under Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC against the accused
persons. Accordingly, Ld. Counsel for the complainant submitted
as well as entreated that the charges under Sections
420/467/468/471 IPC be directed to be framed against the accused
persons herein.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the accused
persons, Ld. Counsel for the complainant as well as that of Ld.
Addl. PP for the State, heard as well as the records, including the
records of the Ld. Trial Court as well as the written
argument/submissions and case laws, relied by the party(ies) have
been thoroughly perused.
6. Before proceeding with the evaluation of the rival
contentions of the Ld. Counsel for the accused persons as well as
by Ld. Counsel for the complainant, this Court deems it pertinent
to outrightly note that while the Cr. Rev. No. 19/2022, preferred by
accused Nakul Chand is within the statutory prescribed period of
limitation of 90 days, as per the provisions under Article 131 of the
Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Limitation Act‘). However, Cr. Rev. No. 261/2022, and Cr. Rev.
No. 262/2022 preferred by accused persons, namely, Pankaj Bajaj
and Rashmi Bajaj, respectively against the impugned order dated
06/07.12.2021 were preferred only on 12.05.2022, when the
statutory prescribed period of 90 (ninety) days had already lapsed.
However, in this regard, this Court deems it apposite to make a
reference to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Re:
Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Pet. (C)
No. 3/2020, dated 10.01.2022. Pertinently, in the said decision, the
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 21 of 58
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
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Hon’ble Supreme Court, whilst being cognizant of the restrictions
and limited operation of courts under the wake of covid-19
pandemic, extended the period of limitation in preferring the
proceedings before the concerned court(s) inter alia, noting as
under;
“…5. Taking into consideration the arguments
advanced by learned counsel and the impact of the
surge of the virus on public health and adversities
faced by litigants in the prevailing conditions, we
deem it appropriate to dispose of the M.A. No. 21 of
2022 with the following directions:
I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in
continuation of the subsequent orders dated
08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed
that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall
stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may
be prescribed under any general or special laws in
respect of all judicial or quasijudicial proceedings.
II. Consequently, the balance period of limitation
remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become
available with effect from 01.03.2022.
III. In cases where the limitation would have
expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till
28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period
of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a
limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the
event the actual balance period of limitation
remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than
90 days, that longer period shall apply.
IV. It is further clarified that the period from
15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded
in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23
(4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws,
which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting
proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or
tribunal can condone delay) and termination of
proceedings…”
(Emphasis supplied)
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 22 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:48:56 +0530
7. Ergo, in light of the foregoing judicial dictates, this
Court unambiguously observes that even the bar of
limitation/statutory period of limitation would not be attracted to
the revision petitions bearing; Cr. Rev. No. 261/2022, and Cr. Rev.
No. 262/2022 preferred by accused persons, namely, Pankaj Bajaj
and Rashmi Bajaj, respectively. However, notwithstanding the
judicial dictate in Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation
(Supra.), it is noted that the Cr. Rev. 544/2022, preferred by
Meenakshi Sharma/complainant has been filed only on 07.10.2022
against the impugned order dated 06.12.2021, with an admitted
delay of 125 (one hundred and twenty five) days only. In this
regard, Ld. Counsel for the complainant asserted that the
complainant is a senior citizen of aged 69 years and suffering with
several ailments, including diabetes, thyroid and high blood
pressure, placing her under the most vulnerable category of
persons vis-à-vis covid-19 pandemic. Correspondingly, Ld.
Counsel submitted that the complainant, at relevant point in time,
resides with her husband, who was also aged around 72 years,
besides the complainant’s elder child is a ‘special needs’ child,
suffering with profound and 100% permanent impairment. As per
the Ld. Counsel, upon passing of the impugned order, the
complainant could not immediately contact her counsel owing to
her fear of contracting covid-19 virus and eventually on receipt of
booster doze of her medicine, the complainant met with her
counsel on 21.02.2022, who informed her that the case ought to be
challenged by State, as the same being a State case. Consequently,
the complainant remained under a misconception was quite some
time, as per the Ld. Counsel, and it was only subsequently when
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 23 of 58
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GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
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the complainant sought an alternate opinion on 20.04.2022, she
was apprised of her right to approach this Court. Thereafter, as per
the Ld. Counsel, negotiations on fee structure, obtainment of the
records of the present case from erstwhile counsel of the
complainant and drafting and preparation of the
pleadings/complainant’s revision petition ensued, which was
eventually filed after considerable effort on the complainant’s end,
however, not without delay having been occasioned in the said
process. Accordingly, it was asserted by the Ld. Counsel for the
complainant that the delay in preferring the complainant’s revision
petition was neither deliberate nor intentional and that in case the
delay in preferring the said revision is not condoned, grave and
irreparable loss would accrue upon the complainant, whist, no
loss/damage would be caused to accused persons, in case the
prayer, as sought for by the complainant is permitted. Needless to
mention, Ld. Counsel for the accused persons vehemently opposed
the said prayer/entreaty for condonation on the ground that
considering the period of delay in filing the complainant’s
revision, no relaxation/indulgence ought/may be granted in favour
of the complainant, besides, as per the Ld. Counsel for the accused
persons, conduct of the complainant is such that disentitles her to
seek any indulgence/leave from this Court.
8. As aforenoted, Limitation Act prescribes a period of
limitation of 90 (ninety) days from the date of order, sought to be
revised, as a period of limitation for filing criminal revision.
However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, inter alia provides for
condonation of delay/extension of prescribed period in certain
cases on demonstration of ‘sufficient cause’, which term(s)/words
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 24 of 58
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have been repeated asserted by superior courts to be elastic and
liberally construed, in the interest of justice. In this regard,
reference is made to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12
SCC 649, wherein the Hon’ble Court, while painstakingly
collating the guidelines governing the exercise of court’s power to
condone delay as well as the meaning of the said words,
enunciated as under;
“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles
that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic,
justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing
with an application for condonation of delay, for the
courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are
obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and
purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms
are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper
perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should not be
given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on
the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to
strict proof should not affect public justice and cause
public mischief because the courts are required to be
vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no
real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between
inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few
days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 25 of 58
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attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted.
That apart, the first one warrants strict approach
whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a
party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant
factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the
fundamental principle is that the courts are required to
weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both
parties and the said principle cannot be given a total
go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted
or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful,
the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other
side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets
away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation
by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of
limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be
carefully scrutinised and the approach should be
based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is
founded on objective reasoning and not on individual
perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given some
acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some
more guidelines taking note of the present day
scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay
should be drafted with careful concern and not in a
haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the
courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of
the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is
seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay
should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the
base of individual philosophy which is basically
subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid
down regard being had to the concept of judicial
discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving
consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory
system should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 26 of 58
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22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive
delay as a non-serious matter and, hence,
lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a
nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course,
within legal parameters…”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Unmistakably, the rules of limitation, which are
premised on the principles enshrined in a Latin maxim, ‘interest
reipublicae up sit finis litium1’, are designed not to destroy the
legal rights of parties, rather, to ensure that the parties do not resort
to dilatory tactics. Ergo, considering the objective of the law and
further being wary of the fact that there is no presumption under
law that the delay in approaching courts was deliberate, courts 2
have repetitively professed for adoption of a pragmatic, justice-
oriented approach, in variance to, technical interpretation, while
determining ‘sufficient case’ in a case. In fact, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Satish Chand Shivhare &
Brothers, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2151, while professing for
adoption of a balanced as well as liberal approach in the
determination of a prayer for limitation/condonation of delay,
reaffirmed as under;
“22. When consideration of an appeal on merits is
pitted against the rejection of a meritorious claim on
the technical ground of the bar of limitation, the
Courts lean towards consideration on merits by
adopting a liberal approach towards ‘sufficient cause’
to condone the delay. The Court considering an
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act may
also look into the prima facie merits of an appeal.
However, in this case, the Petitioners failed to make
out a strong prima facie case for appeal. Furthermore,
a liberal approach, may adopted when some plausible
cause for delay is shown. Liberal approach does not
mean that an appeal should be allowed even if the1
It is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation.
2
J.M. Ramachandra & Sons v. Customs Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, 2001 SCC OnLine Del 1082.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 27 of 58
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cause for delay shown is glimsy. The Court should not
waive limitation for all practical purposes by
condoning inordinate delay caused by a tardy
lackadaisical negligent manner of functioning.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Consequently, in light of the aforenoted judicial
dictates/principles governing limitation, in the facts and
circumstances and brought forth to the notice of this Court, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the prayer for condonation
of delay in filing of the criminal revision petition by the
complainant, i.e., of filing of Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 544/2022 in the
instant case deserves to be allowed. As aforenoted, the reasons for
delay in the present case are stated to have been attributed to a
bona fide mistake/misconception as well as of misinformation of
the erstwhile counsel for the complainant, besides the medical and
personal vulnerability of the complainant in wake of covid-19
pandemic as well as her familial conditions. Needless to mention,
the application for condonation of delay of the complainant
elaborately enlists the reasons for delay, besides the same is
accompanied with necessary/explanatory document. Clearly, the
reasons so stated by the Ld. Counsel for the complainant as well as
specified under the complainant’s application, in the considered
opinion of this Court, cannot be treated as malicious or dilatory in
any manner, especially considering from the record of the Ld. Trial
Court to the effect that the complainant had been diligently
pursuing the matter/its case before the Ld. Court. Needless to
reiterate any omission/misconception/error on the part of the
counsel3 for complainant cannot be attributed to her in the instant
3
Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107; Nrisingha Charan Nandy Choudhury v. Trigunand Jha Khoware, 1938
SCC OnLine Pat 77; Rajesh Chandran v MR Gopalakrishnan Nair, OP(C) No. 281 of 2022, dated 22.07.2022
(Kerala HC); and Arjun Singh v. Board of Revenue, 2000 SCC OnLine Raj 657
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 28 of 58
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case. Correspondingly, this Court unswervingly observes that the
prayer for condonation of delay in the instant case deserves to be
allowed and the period of 125 (one hundred and twenty five) days’
delay in preferring the complainant’s revision/Cr. Rev. No.
544/2022 be condoned. Consequently, for the foregoing reasons,
this Court outrightly allows the complainant’s prayer seeking
condonation of delay in preferring complainant’s revision/ Cr.
Rev. No. 544/2022 and the period of 125 (one hundred and twenty
five) days’ delay in filing/preferring the said revision petition is,
hereby, condoned.
11. Germanely, proceeding further, however, before
appreciating the rival contentions of the parties, it would be
apposite to make a reference to the relevant provisions under law,
in particular that under under law/Section 397 Cr.P.C.4, as under;
“397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of
revision – (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge
may call for and examine the record of any proceeding
before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or
his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying
itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded
or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings
of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such
record, direct that the execution of any sentence or
order be suspended, and if the accused is in
confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own
bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation – All Magistrates, whether Executive
or Judicial, and whether exercising original or
appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to4
Pari materia to Section 438 BNSS, which provides; “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision-(1) The
High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior
Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any
proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence
or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending
the examination of the record.***Explanation–All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether
exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of
this sub-section and of Section 439.***(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised
in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding….” (Emphasis supplied).
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 29 of 58
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the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section
and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial
or other proceeding…”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Pertinently, from a perusal of the aforesaid, it is quite
evident that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be agitated
either suo motu or an application of parties, that too in a case(s)
where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the provision of
law, decision of Trial Court being completely erroneous or where
the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily. In this regard, reliance
is placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amit
Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 , wherein the
Hon’ble Court while explicating the various contours of the
provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. observed as under:
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to
the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order
made in a case. The object of this provision is to set
right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law.
There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be
appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders,
which upon the face of it bears a token of careful
consideration and appear to be in accordance with
law. If one looks into the various judgments of this
Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can
be invoked where the decisions under challenge are
grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the
provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no
evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These
are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative.
Each case would have to be determined on its own
merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 30 of 58
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manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should
not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The
Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to
injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the
question as to whether the charge has been framed
properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it
may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially
falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing
of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings
under the CrPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Similarly, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in V.K.
Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1192, in a similar context
noted as under;
“67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to test
the waters of what might happen in the trial. The
Revisional Court has to consider the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order
and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the court
below. While doing so, the Revisional Court does not
dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the
case, rather it considers the material only to satisfy
itself about the legality and propriety of the findings,
sentence and order and refrains from substituting its
own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of
evidence. In the instant case, the Petitioner has failed
to make out a case for exercise of the revisional
jurisdiction since there is no patent error in the
impugned order on the face of record.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted, the
revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an order
of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it is a
settled law5 that trite law that in a case where the order of
5
Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine MP 958.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 31 of 58
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subordinate Court does not suffer from any illegality, “merely
because of equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no
jurisdiction to re-consider the matter and pass a different order in a
routine manner.” Reference in this regard is made to the decision
in Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 312, wherein the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi expounded as under;
“9. The scope of interference in a revision petition
is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397
CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts
jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the
regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is
also well settled that while considering the legality,
propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion,
normally the revising court does not dwell at length
upon the facts and evidence of the case. A court in
revision considers the material only to satisfy itself
about the legality and propriety of the findings,
sentence and order and refrains from substituting its
own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of
evidence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Notably in the context of the foregoing, it is further
apposite to observe here that it is no longer res integra that the
orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither
interlocutory nor final in nature, rather, intermediate in nature 6,
and are, therefore, not affected by the bar of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.
However, the scope of interference under Section 397 Cr.P.C. at a
stage, when charge had been framed, is also equally settled7. In this
regard, it is pertinent to make a reference to the decision of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Manendra Prasad Tiwari v. Amit Kumar
Tiwari, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1057, wherein the Hon’ble Court
enunciated the law in regard the foregoing as under;
6
Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of U.P., (2022) 15 SCC 720.
7
State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, (2017) 3 SCC 198.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 32 of 58
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“22. The scope of interference and exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 397 of CrPC has been time
and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope
of interference under Section 397 CrPC at a stage,
when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At
the stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned
not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to
focus on the material and form an opinion whether
there is strong suspicion that the accused has
committed an offence, which if put to trial, could
prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage, at
which stage the final test of guilt is to be applied.
Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge,
the court should form an opinion that the accused is
certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold
something which is neither permissible nor is in
consonance with the scheme of Code of Criminal
Procedure.
23. Section 397 CrPC vests the court with the
power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to
the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order
made in a case. The object of this provision is to set
right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law
or the perversity which has crept in the proceeding.”
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Germane for the purpose(s) of present discourse to
now consider the principles governing framing of charges. In this
regard, it is relevant to outrightly note the settled law 8 that at the
stage of framing of charges, neither can the truth, veracity and
effect of the prosecution case be meticulously9 judged, nor can any
weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. On
the contrary, at such a stage, only the sufficiency of ground for
proceeding against the accused, on a general consideration of
materials placed before the Court by the investigating police
officer is relevant. Further, though, sifting of evidence is
8
State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018
9
Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 33 of 58
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permissible10, however, scanning of evidence in detail is not. Quite
understandably, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Reena v. State
(NCT of Delhi), 2020 SCC OnLine Del 630 , iterated the said
principles in unequivocal terms as under;
“12. Thus it is settled position of law that at the
time of framing of charge, the Court is not supposed to
look into the evidence of the case in detail and is only
to consider whether there is a strong suspicion against
the accused on the basis of the material that comes
before it. The court has the power to sift the evidence
for the limited purpose of finding out, whether or not a
prima facie case is made out against the accused.
However, the Court is not supposed to delve deeply
into the merits of the matter and start a roving
expedition into the evidence that is brought forth it, as
if conducting a trial. Further there is no one fixed
definition that may be ascribed to the term prima
facie’ nor can the term strong suspicion have a
singular meaning. While coming to the conclusion of
a strong prima facie case or strong suspicion, the
Court shall have to decide each case on the basis of its
own independent facts and circumstances.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Concomitantly, it is settled law11 that the
inconsistency in the material produced by the prosecution or the
defect in investigation12, cannot be looked into for discharge of an
accused, in the absence of full-fledged trial. In fact, the probative
value13 of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the
material placed on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as
true at that stage. Reference in this regard is made to the decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State through Deputy
Superintendent of Police v. R. Soundirarasu and Ors.,
10
State of Maharashta v. Priya Sharan Maharaj & Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 393.
11
Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476.
12
State of Tamil Nadu by Inspector of Police v. N. Suresh Ranjan & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 709.
13
Soma Chakravarty v. State, (2007) 5 SCC 403.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 34 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:49:53 +0530
MANU/SC/1103/2022, wherein the Hon’ble Court remarked as
under;
“58. Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh
Ahlawat and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.,
MANU/SC/1011/2012: (2013) 11 SCC 476, it was
observed by this Court that while framing charges the
court is required to evaluate the materials and
documents on record to decide whether the facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value would
disclose existence of ingredients constituting the
alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required
to go deep into the probative value of the materials on
record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground
for presuming that the Accused had committed the
offence and it is not required to evaluate sufficiency of
evidence to convict the Accused. It was held that the
Court at this stage cannot speculate into the
truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and
contradictions & inconsistencies in the statement of
witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of
discharge.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Relevant to further note that it is trite law 14, at the
stage of framing of charge, only the police report is required to be
considered and the defence of the accused15 cannot be looked into.
Needless to mention that the superior courts 16 have persistently
deprecated the practice of holding a mini trial at the time of
framing of charge. Relevantly, in this regard, reference is made to
the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharat Parikh v.
CBI, (2008) 10 SCC 109, wherein the Hon’ble Court enunciated
the judicial principle(s), as under;
“19. As observed in Debendra Nath Padhi case
[(2005) 1 SCC 568: 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] at the stage
of framing charge roving and fishing inquiry is
impermissible, and a mini trial cannot be conducted at
14
State Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad & Anr. v. P. Suryaprakasam, (1999) SCC (Crl.) 373 and State of Orissa
v. Debendra Nath Padhi, 2005 (1) SCC 568.
15
State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294.
16
Indu Jain v. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 341.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 35 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:49:58 +0530
such stage. At the stage of framing of charge the
submissions on behalf of the accused have to be
confined to the material produced by the investigating
agency. The accused will get an opportunity to prove
the documents subsequently produced by the
prosecution on the order of the Court, but the same
cannot be relied upon to reopen the proceedings once
charge has been framed or for invocation of the High
Court’s powers under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.”
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Apposite to further emphasize17 that at the stage of
charge, court(s) is/are not even required to record detailed reasons
for framing charge, rather18, a very strong suspicion founded upon
materials placed before it, which leads the court to form a
presumptive opinion as to the existence of factual ingredients
constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of
charges. In fact19, it is only when no case is made out even after
presuming entire prosecution evidence, can an accused be
discharged. Needless to accentuate20, “at the stage of framing of
charge, the sufficiency of materials for the purpose of conviction is
not the requirement and a prayer for discharge can be allowed only
if the court finds that the materials are wholly insufficient for the
purpose of trial.” Notably, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Stree
Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1
SCC 715, while inter alia illuminating the principles as well as the
scope of enquiry for the purpose of charge/discharging an accused,
observed as under;
“14. …In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough
guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of
17
Bhawna Bai v. Dhanshyam & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 217
18
Supdt. and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52 and Sajjan
Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368
19
Manjit Singh Virdi v. Hussain Mohammed Shattaf, (2023) 7 SCC 633
20
Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta & Ors., (2015) 3 SCC 424
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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discharging an accused. It provides that “the Judge
shall discharge when he considers that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused”.
The “ground” in the context is not a ground for
conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on
trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the
accused will be determined and not at the time of
framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not
undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and
weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve
deep into various aspects. All that the court has to
consider is whether the evidentiary material on record
if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the
accused with the crime. No more need be enquired
into.”
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Ergo, being mindful of the principles hereinunder
noted, this Court would now proceed with the determination of the
arguments raised by Ld. Counsel for the accused persons, Ld.
Counsel for the complainant as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for the
State. Markedly, one of the primary contentions of the Ld. Counsel
for the accused persons is that even from the material placed on
record prima facie ingredients of offences/allegations
levelled/charges framed against the accused persons are not even
prima facie made out. However, in order to appreciate the said
contentions, this Court deems it pertinent to reproduce the relevant
provisions under law/IPC as under;
“30. “Valuable security”-The words “valuable
security” denote a document which is, or purports to
be, a document whereby any legal right is created,
extended, transferred, restricted, extinguished or
released, or whereby any person acknowledges that he
lies under legal liability, or has not a certain legal
right.
*** *** ***
120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy-When
two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done-
(1) an illegal act, or
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 37 of 58
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(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means,
such an agreement is designated a criminal
conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement
to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal
conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is
done by one or more parties to such agreement in
pursuance thereof.
Explanation-It is immaterial whether the illegal
act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is
merely incidental to that object.
*** *** ***
199. False statement made in declaration which is
by law receivable as evidence- Whoever, in any
declaration made or subscribed by him, which
declaration any Court of Justice, or any public servant
or other person, is bound or authorised by law to
receive as evidence of any fact, makes any statement
which is false, and which he either knows or believes
to be false or does not believe to be true, touching any
point material to the object for which the declaration
is made or used, shall be punished in the same manner
as if he gave false evidence.
200. Using as true such declaration knowing it to
be false- Whoever corruptly uses or attempts to use as
true any such declaration, knowing the same to be
false in any material point, shall be punished in the
same manner as if he gave false evidence.
*** *** ***
415. Cheating-Whoever, by deceiving any person,
fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so
deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to
consent that any person shall retain any property, or
intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or
omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if
he were not so deceived, and which act or omission
causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that
person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to
“cheat”.
Explanation-A dishonest concealment of facts is a
deception within the meaning of this section.
*** *** ***
420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery
of property- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly
induces the person deceived to deliver any property to
any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or
any part of a valuable security, or anything which is
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 38 of 58
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signed or sealed, and which is capable of being
converted into a valuable security, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
*** *** ***
463. Forgery-Whoever makes any false
documents or false electronic record or part of a
document or electronic record with intent to cause
damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to
support any claim or title, or to cause any person to
part with property, or to enter into any express or
implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that
fraud may be committed, commits forgery.
464. Making a false document- A person is said to
make a false document or false electronic record-
First- Who dishonestly or fraudulently-
(a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or
part of a document;
(b) makes or transmits any electronic record or
part of any electronic record;
(c) affixes any electronic signature on any
electronic record;
(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a
document or the authenticity of the electronic
signature, with the intention of causing it to be
believed that such document or part of document,
electronic record or electronic signature was made,
signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or
by the authority of a person by whom or by whose
authority he knows that it was not made, singed,
sealed, executed or affixed; or
Secondly- Who without lawful authority,
dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or
otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in
any material part thereof, after it has been made,
executed or affixed with electronic signature either by
himself or by any other person, whether such person
be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or
Thirdly- Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes
any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or
an electronic record or to affix his electronic signature
on any electronic record knowing that such person by
reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot,
or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he
does not know the contents of the document or
electronic record or the nature of the alteration…
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 39 of 58
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465. Punishment for forgery-Whoever commits
forgery shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years,
or with fine, or with both.
*** *** ***
467. Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.-
Whoever forges a document which purports to be a
valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a
son, or which purports to give authority to any person
to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive
the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or to
receive or deliver any money, movable property, or
valuable security, or any document purporting to be
an acquaintance or receipt acknowledging the
payment of money, or an acquaintance or receipt for
the delivery of any movable property or valuable
security, shall be punished with imprisonment for life,
or with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable
to fine.
468. Forgery for purpose of cheating-Whoever
commits forgery, intending that the document or
electronic record forged shall be used for the purpose
of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
*** *** ***
471. Using as genuine a forged document or
electronic record-Whoever fraudulently or
dishonestly uses as genuine any document or
electronic record which he knows or has reason to
believe to be a forged document or electronic record,
shall be punished in the same manner as if he had
forged such document or electronic record…”
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Notably, it is observed from above that in order to
attract culpability under provisions under Sections 465, 467 and
468 IPC, the prosecution is inter alia required to establish21,
commission of forgery as defined under Section 463 IPC. Notably,
as per the provisions under Section 463 IPC, “Whoever makes any
false documents or false electronic record or part of a document or
21
Dharmala Venkata Subrahmanya Sarma v. The State of A.P., Criminal Petition No. 10174 of 2018, dated
27.03.2024 (Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh).
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 40 of 58
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
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electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the
public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause
any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or
implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may
be committed, commits forgery”. Needless to mention, making of
false document, as per Section 464 IPC inter alia amounts to the
making, signing, sealing or execution of a document or part of a
document or electronic record in the manner specified under the
said provision, “with the intention of causing it to be believed that
such document or part of document, electronic record or electronic
signature was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or
affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose
authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed
or affixed”. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohd Ibrahim v. State of Bihar (2009) 8
SCC 751, wherein the Hon’ble Court, while enunciating the
ingredients of offence of making of false document(s)/Section 464
IPC, noted as under;
“10. An analysis of section 464 of Penal Code
shows that it divides false documents into three
categories:
10.1. The first is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently makes or executes a document with the
intention of causing it to be believed that such
document was made or executed by some other
person, or by the authority of some other person, by
whom or by whose authority he knows it was not
made or executed.
10.2. The second is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a
document in any material part, without lawful
authority, after it has been made or executed by either
himself or any other person.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 41 of 58
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
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10.3. The third is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or
alter a document knowing that such person could not
by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b)
intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him,
know the contents of the document or the nature of the
alteration.
11. In short, a person is said to have made a `false
document’, if (i) he made or executed a document
claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone
else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or (iii)
he obtained a document by practicing deception, or
from a person not in control of his senses.”
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Here, it is further pertinent to refer to the decision of
the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Karan Kohli v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Revision No. 199/2018, dated
11.10.2018, wherein the Hon’ble High Court observed that for
liability under Section 468 IPC to attract, prosecution is not
required to prove that an accused actually commits the offence of
cheating. On the contrary, “what is material is the intention or
purpose of the offender in committing forgery. For proving the
case under Section 468 of the IPC prosecution is required to
establish that the accused had committed forgery and that he did it
with the intention that document forged shall be used for the
purposes of cheating.” Correspondingly, provisions under Section
471 IPC would be attracted22 in a case where an accused,
fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine, any document or
electronic record, which he knows or has reasons to believe to be
forged.
23. Markedly, in so far as the provisions under Section
120B IPC is concerned, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly
22
Deepak Gaba v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 2328 of 2022, dated 02.01.2023 (SC).
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 42 of 58
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note that the superior courts have incessantly clarified 23 that
Section 120B IPC prescribes punishment for criminal conspiracy,
which by itself is an independent offence and punishable
separately from the main offence. Clearly, the objective behind
inducting the offence of criminal conspiracy under the statute book
is to prevent riotous supremacy which an accused may gain by
involvement of several persons. In fact, Section 120A/120B IPC
specifically envisage that a person, singularly, may not be in a
position to commit an offence, however, when he enters into an
agreement with other, the others may give him impetus as well as
support to commit the same. Apposite at this stage to make
reference to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Esher
Singh v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2004 SC 3030: 2004 (11)
SCC 585, wherein the Hon’ble Court while inter alia explicating
the ingredients and scope of provisions under Section 120B, noted
as under;
“…The elements of a criminal conspiracy have
been stated to be: (a) an object to be accomplished, (b)
a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that
object, (c) an agreement or understanding between
two or more of the accused persons whereby, they
become definitely committed to co-operate for the
accomplishment of the object by the means embodied
in the agreement, or by any effectual means, (d) in the
jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act.
The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the unlawful
combination and ordinarily the offence is complete
when the combination is framed. From this, it
necessarily follows that unless the statute so requires,
no overt act need be done in furtherance of the
conspiracy, and that the object of the combination
need not be accomplished, in order to constitute an
indictable offence. Law making conspiracy a crime, is
designed to curb immoderate power to do mischief
which is gained by a combination of the minds. The23
State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan & Anr., AIR 2000 SC 3323: 2000 (8) SCC 203.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 43 of 58
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encouragement and support which co-conspirators
give to one another rendering enterprises possible
which, if left to individual effort, would have been
impossible, furnish the ground for visiting
conspirators and abettors with condign punishment.
The conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as
to encompass all its members wherever and whenever
any member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of
the common design. (See: American Jurisprudence
Vol.II See 23, p. 559). For an offence punishable
under section 120-B, prosecution need not necessarily
prove that the perpetrators expressly agree to do or
cause to be done illegal act; the agreement may be
proved by necessary implication. Offence of criminal
conspiracy has its foundation in an agreement to
commit an offence. A conspiracy consists not merely
in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of
two or more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means.
So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is
not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect,
the very plot is an act in itself, and an act of each of the
parties, promise against promise, actus contra actum,
capable of being enforced, if lawful, punishable if for
a criminal object or for use of criminal means…”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Here, it is further apposite to make a reference to the
decision in Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India, 1993 (3) SCC 609 ,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court explicitly remarked that in
order to attract culpability against an accused/co-conspirator, it is
not necessary of all the participants to be aware of each and every
detail at every stage, rather, there must be consensus/commonality
of mind and action. Relevant extract from the said dictate is
reproduced as under;
“…It is not necessary that each conspirator must
know all the details or the scheme nor be a participant
at every stage. It is necessary that they should agree
for design or object of the conspiracy. Conspiracy is
conceived as having three elements: (1) agreement (2)
between two or more persons by whom the agreement
is effected, and (3) a criminal object, which may be
either the ultimate aim of the agreement, or may
constitute the means, or one of the means by which
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 44 of 58
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that aim is to be accomplished. It is immaterial
whether this is found in the ultimate objects…”
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Germane for the present purpose(s) to note that in
order to attract culpability under the provisions of Section 420
IPC, prosecution is required to prove the commission24 of, “(i)
cheating as defined under Section 415 IPC 25; (ii) dishonest
inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any
valuable security or anything which is sealed or signed or is
capable of being converted into a valuable security, and (iii) mens
rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement.” Here, it
is further pertinent to note that as per Section 415 IPC, cheating
encompasses, fraudulently or dishonestly inducing a ‘person so
deceived’ to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that
any person shall retain any property, or even includes,
intentionally inducing a person so deceived to do or omit to do
anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived.
Quite evidently, in so far as the latter part of Section 415 IPC is
concerned, ‘property’, at no stage, is involved. In fact, it is the
doing of an act or omission to do an act by the person so cheated, as
a result of intentional inducement by the accused, which is
material. However, even in this regard, law is settled that the
damage or harm caused or likely to be caused must be the
necessary consequence of the act done by reason of the deceit
practiced, or must be necessarily likely to follow therefrom, and
24
Binod Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2014 (10) SCC 663 and Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam, (2019) 3
SCALE 563.
25
Section 415 of IPC provides, “Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person
so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or
intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were
not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind,
reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.”
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 45 of 58
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the law does not take into account remote possibilities that may
flow from the act. In other words, law does not take into account
remote possibilities that may flow from the act. Clearly, such
damage or harm must be proximate and natural result of the act or
omission and does not include vague and contingent injury.
Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon’ble
Calcutta High Court in Harendra Nath Das v. Jyotish Chandra
Datta, AIR 1925 Cal. 100: (1925) ILR 52 Cal. 188 , wherein the
Hon’ble Court, while iterating similar sentimentalities, remarked
as under;
“6. …Under Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code,
the damage or harm caused or likely to be caused must
be the necessary consequence of the act done by
reason of the deceit practiced, or must be necessarily
likely to follow therefrom, and the law does not take
into account remote possibilities that may flow from
the act [Mojey v. Queen-Empress (1890) I. L. R. 17
Calc. 606]. The proximate and natural result only of
the act has to be judged, and not any vague and
contingent injury that may possibly arise [Milton v.
Sherman (1918) 22 C. W. N. 1001]. The prosecution
allege in the present case that the accused used the
name of a bogus or non-existent firm, with the object
of not fulfilling the contract in the event of the market
going up, and as the market did go up he did not
supply the jute with the result that Mr. Pithie suffered
loss. Such remote consequences must, in my opinion,
be ignored for the purposes of Section 415 of the
Indian Penal Code…”
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Markedly, in order for the provisions under
Section 199 IPC to be attracted in a given case, prosecution is
required to prove that an accused indulged in 26; “(i) making of a
declaration which a Court or a public servant is bound or
authorised by law to receive in evidence; (ii) making of a false
26
Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. v. Datar Switchgear Ltd. & Ors., Crl. Appeal No. 1979/2010, dated
08.10.2010 (SC).
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 46 of 58
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statement in such declaration knowing or believing it to be false;
and (iii) such false statement must be touching any point material
to the object for which the declaration is made or used .”
Correspondingly, Section 200 IPC provides that, “whoever
corruptly uses or attempts to use as true any such declaration,
knowing the same to be false in any material point, shall be
punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence.”
Clearly, criminality for the offence under Section 199 IPC lies in
making of declaration which a Court or a public servant is bound
or authorised by law to receive in evidence. As a corollary, where a
document fails to qualify as a declaration which any court or
public servant or other person is bound or authorized by law to
receive as evidence of any fact or the authority does not qualify as
one which has authority under the law to receive any evidence,
provisions under Section 199 IPC would not be attracted.
Reference in this regard is made to the decision of Hon’ble High
Court of Punjab and Haryana in; Anil Kapoor v. Finance-cum-
Health Secretary, Chandigarh, 1974 CrLJ 862, wherein the
Hon’ble Court purged the accused therein of criminality of offence
under Sections 199/200 IPC. Relevantly, in the instant case the
accused had a false affidavit to his application to the Director of
Health Services, seeking admission to M.B.B.S. course against the
reserved quota. However, under such circumstances, it was held
that such declaration was not the one which any court or public
servant or other person was bound or authorised by law to receive
as evidence of a fact so as to attract culpability against the accused
therein for the offence under Sections 199/200 of IPC. Relevant
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 47 of 58
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
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extract from the decision in Anil Kapoor v. Finance-cum-Health
Secretary, Chandigarh (Supr.) is reproduced as under;
“…The first contention of learned Counsel for the
petitioner is that the declaration contained in affidavit
(Exhibit PC/1) is not of the type mentioned
in Sections 199 and 200, Indian Penal Code, i.e., it is
not a declaration which any court or public servant or
other person is bound or authorized by law to receive
as evidence of any fact. I asked Mr. Anand Swaroop to
point out the existence of any such law in relation to
that declaration and he frankly conceded that he could
not point out any and that the petitioner could not be
said to have committed any offence falling
under Section 199 or Section 200 of the Indian Penal
Code even if that declaration was false to the
petitioner’s knowledge. In this view of the matter, I
accept the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner
and hold that the charge framed against the petitioner
under the two sections, just above-mentioned, cannot
be sustained…”
(Emphasis supplied)
27. Consequently, being mindful of the above, when
facts of the present case are conscientiously evaluated, in light of
aforenoted judicial precedents as well as the arguments addressed,
it is outrightly observed that there are specific allegations that the
accused persons, namely, Pankaj Bajaj and Rashmi Bajaj, acted in
connivance and criminal conspiracy with M.L. Jaggi (since
deceased) and accused Nakul Chand, to illegally grab the land of
DDA, i.e., plot/premise in question by engaging in cheating and
conspiracy. There are further allegations that accused Rashmi
Bajaj was inducted as a member of society under membership no.
1500 by M.L. Jaggi, Secretary/President of Society by
manipulating the records of the society, with the help of Nakul
Chand, Officer Superintendent of the Society, in violation of
prescribed rules and regulations. In fact, it is explicitly recorded
under the chargesheet, it was determined during the investigation
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 48 of 58
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that though accused Rashmi Bajaj applied for membership of the
society on 09.12.2004, however, she was granted the membership
on 27.11.2004, i.e., prior to the date of application, by resolution 6
of the society. In this regard, investigations are asserted to have
further unearthed that from the original minute book w.e.f.
12.12.2003 to 28.11.2008 of the society, which is in the register
form was seized and it was determined that in the minutes of
meeting of the managing committee dated 27.11.2004, on page
nos. 40-43 thereof, Resolution no. 1 relates to the plot/premise and
that the same was observed to be in comparatively
smaller/shrunken writing/font. Correspondingly, Resolution no. 6
of the said minutes of meeting relate to the plot/premise, which
was noted to have been amended after application of white fluid.
Apposite to reproduce the relevant extract(s) of resolution 6, with
emphasis on the amended portion, as under;
“6. To consider to Considered and
transfer the share of approved. Lt. Col. Dev
membership no. 1500 Raj Thukral was
which was in the name of enrolled as a member of
Lt. Col. Dev Raj Thukral the society in the year
(Retd.) who has requested 1974. As he has shifted
to transfer his share in the to USA along with his
name of Mrs. Rashmi family, he requested the
Bajaj w/o. Mr. Shiridhar society for the refund of
Bajaj, as he had now his deposit made for the
settled out of India (USA) land. He further
Lt. Col. Thukral became requested that in his
member in 1974 and is on place, membership be
the waiting list, being a transferred in the name
senior most citizen has of Smt. Rashmi Bajaj
also requested to refund w/o. Sh. Shiridhar
the money lying deposited Bajaj. Accordingly, the
with the society. The same is approved and an
Society as per practice, amount of one lakh has
refunded an amount of Rs. been received from
24,840/- against Rs. Smt. Rashmi Bajaj
25,000/- deposited by towards her
him. A cheque of Rs. One membership fee and
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 49 of 58Digitally
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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+0530
lakh on a/c. F membership deposited for the land.
fee and part payment of "Resolved
land has been received accordingly."
from Mrs. Rashmi Bajaj.
(Emphasis supplied)
28. Correspondingly, the said membership, i.e.,
membership bearing no. 1500 was subsequently transferred to
accused Pankaj Bajaj, in place of accused Rashmi Babj vide
resolution no. 3 of the society dated 25.02.2005, while accused
Pankaj Bajaj had applied for membership on 30.03.2005, i.e., prior
to the date of application. Needless to mention that in the
aforementioned original minute book w.e.f. 12.12.2003 to
28.11.2008 of the society, under the minutes of meeting of the
managing committee dated 25.02.2005, on page nos. 51-53
thereof, Resolution no. 1 relates to the plot/premise and that the
same was observed to be in comparatively smaller/shrunken
writing/font. Correspondingly, Resolution no. 3 of the said
minutes of meeting relate to the plot/premise, recording transfer of
membership in favour of accused Pankaj Bajaj in the said minutes
dated 25.02.2005, prior to the said accused’s application only on
30.03.2005. Apposite to reproduce the relevant extract(s) of
resolution 3 of the said minutes of meeting, as under;
"3. To consider request Approved, subject to
of Mrs. Rashmi Bajaj w/o. completion of
Mr. Shiridhar Bajaj for formalities and payment
the transfer of of necessary charges.
membership no. 1500 in "Resolved
the name of her son Mr. accordingly."
Pankaj Bajaj. Mrs.
Rashmi Bajaj is a waiting
member and is without
plot.
(Emphasis supplied)
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 50 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:51:19 +0530
29. Here, it is further pertinent to note that the
investigations in the instant case are proclaimed to have further
revealed that from the aforementioned original minute book w.e.f.
12.12.2003 to 28.11.2008 of the society it is further observed that
under the minutes of meeting of managing committee dated
13.05.2005 on page nos. 58-60, Resolution No. 5 is related to
plot/premise. Correspondingly, minutes of meeting of managing
committee dated 27.05.2005 on page nos. 61-64, Resolution No. 5,
6 and 7 were observed to be related to the plot/premise, where the
Resolution No. 6 was determined to have been amended after
applying white fluid. Relevantly, there are statements of witnesses
on record of the Ld. Trial Court, being the members of the
managing committee of the society, who proclaimed that the said
minutes/resolutions were not made and/or written in front of
them/said members of society. Needless to mention that the said
resolutions were further declared to have been manipulated and
fabricated by M.L. Jaggi at a later stage and that too without the
knowledge of such members of society. Pertinently, the said
amended/fluid marked extracts are stated to have been determined
under forensic investigation to be made by accused Nakul Chand,
who is stated to have manipulated/committed forgery, in the
minute books and other documents of the society on the direction
of co-accused M.L. Jaggi (since deceased). Needless to mention
that such amendments/overwriting/insertion in shrunken fonts, as
per the FSL Report dated 16.05.2013 were inter alia determined
under the handwriting of the accused Nakul Chand. Apposite to
reproduce the relevant extracts from the said report as under;
“…Questioned: Red enclosed writings &
signatures marked Q1 to Q11 on various documents
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 51 of 58Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.05.15
16:51:24
+0530
viz. Minutes Book (New Friend’s Co-operative House
Building Society Ltd.) w.e.f. 12.12.2003 to
28.11.2008, Undertaking and Trasnfer of Share dated
7th June 2004.
Standards- Red enclosed standard writings &
signatures marked A1 to A7 of Sh. M.L. Jaggi , A8 to
A14 of Col. D.R. Thukral and S1 to S36 of Sh. Nakul
Chand.
*** *** ***
III. The person who wrote the red enclosed
writings stamped and marked S1 to S36 also wrote the
red enclosed writings similarly stamped and marked
Q2, Q3, Q5, Q7 & Q9 for the following reasons:…”
(Emphasis supplied)
30. Strikingly, it is further recorded under the
chargesheet that accused M. L. Jaggi (since deceased) is asserted
to have written letter on 10.02.2005 to 90 (ninety) waiting list
members regarding offer of allotment of the premise/plot in
question through post. However, during the course of
investigation, IO/Insp. Sajjan Singh Yadav is asserted to have
issued letters vide No. 1443-1530/ACP/SOS, dated 14.11.2011
through courier to all the waiting list members except accused
persons, Pankaj Bajaj and Nakul Chand, whereupon, out of 88
(eighty eight) letters so issued, 50 (fifty) letters were returned
undelivered and only 20 (twenty) waiting list members responded,
who categorically denied regarding the receipt of any such
letter/offer by them from M.L. Jaggi, except the two members.
Further,
31. Concomitantly, from the investigation, it is
asserted to have been determined that accused M.L. Jaggi (since
deceased) executed a sale deed on 26.03.2007 in favour of Pankaj
Bajaj by claiming society’s ownership over the plot/premise,
however, such agreement was executed on stamp paper purchased
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 52 of 58
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:51:28 +0530
on 01.07.2005, besides, in order for accused Rashmi Bajaj to
obtain membership, she is asserted to have tendered a declaration
before the society inter alia asserted as under;
“…1. That neither I nor my husband nor any of my
dependent relations (including unmarried children( is
a member of any other house building cooperative
society, functioning in Delhi/New Delhi/Delhi Cantt.
2. That I do not own, either in full or in part, on
lease hold or free hold basis, any plot of land or a
house in Delhi/New Delhi/Delhi Cantt., nor does my
husband or any of my dependent relations including
unmarried children, own either in full or in part, on
lease hold or free hold basis, any plot of land or a
house in Delhi/New Delhi/Delhi Cantt…”
(Emphasis supplied)
32. As aforenoted, accused, Rashmi Bajaj is
proclaimed to have tendered declaration avowing that neither does
she or her spouse or any of her dependant relations, including
unmarried children, owned, either in full or in part, on lease hold or
free hold basis, any plot of land or a house in Delhi/New
Delhi/Delhi Cantt., either in full or in part, on lease hold or free
hold basis, which was determined to be false as her/Rashmi Bajaj’s
husband, S.D. Bajaj was determined to be the owner of the Flat No.
A-118, NFC, New Delhi and H. No. 200, Sukhdev Vihar, New
Delhi, at the relevant point in time. Ergo, in conspectus of the
foregoing, when the arguments of Ld. Counsel for the parties as
well as the written submissions and case laws relied are considered
in conjunction with the material placed on record, this Court is in
consensus with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the accused
persons, acted in connivance and criminal conspiracy with each
other, whereby, in furtherance to the said conspiracy, accused
Nakul Chand, while working with the society manipulated and/or
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 53 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:51:33 +0530
tempered the minutes of meetings of the managing committee
dated 27.11.2004 on page no. 40 to 43, concerning the resolution
related to plot/premise, besides, also amended the resolution no. 6
relating to the said plot by applying white fluid. Concomitantly,
accused Nakul Chand, in furtherance to said conspiracy also
carried out material alterations in the minutes of meeting of
managing committee dated 13.5.2005 on page no. 58 to 60 and
minutes and meeting of managing committee dated 27.5.2005
relating to the premise/plot, by applying fluid, committing the
offence of forgery under Section 465 IPC read with Section 120B
IPC. However, this Court is not in consensus with the submission
of Ld. Counsel for the complainant that the provisions under
Section 467/468/471 IPC are attracted against the accused persons
for the reason that neither the minutes of said meeting nor the
undertaking tendered by accused Rashmi Bajaj to the society, in
the considered opinion of this Court, be treated to be a valuable
security under Section 30 IPC, as otherwise professed by Ld.
Counsel for the complainant. Needless to mention, Section 30 IPC
defines, valuable security as a document, “which is, or purports to
be, a document whereby any legal right is created, extended,
transferred, restricted, extinguished or released, or where by any
person acknowledges that he lies under legal liability, or has not a
certain legal right…”. Clearly, neither the minutes of meeting or
the said undertaking is a document which creates legal right or
liability in favour of any of the accused persons in the instant case,
bringing the case outside the purview of the provisions under
Section 467/468/471 IPC. In fact, in this regard, reference is made
to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in; Shaikh Noor
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 54 of 58
Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:51:37 +0530
Mohamad Shaikh Fazal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC
297: 1980 Cri. LJ 1345, wherein the Hon’ble Court in a similar
situation, modified the conviction of the accused/convicts therein
from Section 471/467 IPC to Section 471/465 IPC, holding that
certificates deployed by the said accused/convicts for obtaining
admission in college would not fall within the ambit of ‘ valuable
security’ under Section 30 IPC. Relevant extract of the said dictate
is reproduced as under;
“…as regards the offence under Section 471 read
with Section 467, I.P.C. we do not think that the two
certificates the appellant has been found to have
forged to get admission in the Art and Commerce
College affiliated to Poona University could be
described as “valuable security” as the expression is
defined in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code, We,
therefore, alter the conviction under the aforesaid
sections to one under Section 471 read with Section
465 of the Indian Penal Code. However, having regard
to the facts and circumstances of the case we set aside
the sentences passed against the appellant and remit
the matter to the trial court…”
(Emphasis supplied)
33. In so far as the charge under Section 199 IPC is
concerned, this Court is not in consensus with the finding of the
Ld. Trial Court that tendering of false affidavit by Rashmi Bajaj to
the society would bring the accused persons prima facie within the
ambit of the said provision. Needless to reiterate that criminality
for the offence under Section 199 IPC lies in making of declaration
which a Court or a public servant is bound or authorised by law to
receive in evidence. As aforenoted, where a document fails to
qualify as a declaration which any court or public servant or other
person is bound or authorized by law to receive as evidence of any
fact or the authority does not qualify as one which has authority
under the law to receive any evidence, provisions under Section
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 55 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:51:41 +0530
199 IPC would not be attracted. Clearly, in the instant case, in the
considered opinion of this Court, Society does not fall within the
purview of an authority, authorised by law to receive a document,
as an evidence of any fact, bringing the instant case outside the
purview of Section 199/120B IPC, as also observed by the Hon’ble
High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Anil Kapoor v. Finance-
cum-Health Secretary, Chandigarh (Supra.). Nonetheless, in the
instant facts of the present case, provisions under Section
200/120B IPC are squarely applicable against the accused persons.
Needless to mention that there is prima facie material against the
accused persons for the offence under Section 120B IPC, as
demonstrable from the material placed on record and this Court is
not convinced with the submission of Ld. Counsel for the accused
persons that no clear, explicit and cogent evidence is forthcoming
to proceed with the said charge. Needless to reiterate in this regard
that law is trite that for the offence of conspiracy, direct evidence is
difficult to find for generally27, “a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy
and it may be difficult to adduce direct evidence of the same. The
prosecution will often rely on evidence of acts of various parties to
infer that they were done in reference to their common intention.
The prosecution will also more often rely upon circumstantial
evidence. The conspiracy can be undoubtedly proved by such
evidence direct or circumstantial.” Lastly, this Court is not
convinced with the submissions of Ld. Counsel for the
complainant that the offence under Section 415/420 IPC stands
attracted against the accused persons in the absence of even prima
facie material on record to demonstrate, inducement of any kind of
27
Mukesh and Ors. v. State for NCT of Delhi & Ors., MANU/SC/0575/2017.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 56 of 58
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:51:46 +0530
the complainant or any other person, forthcoming on record.
Lastly, this Court reiterates that the submissions of Ld. Counsel for
the accused persons that they have been falsely implicated in the
present case or the investigating officer has active vindictively
against the accused persons or that accused Nakul Chand was
actively in good faith on the instructions of his senior(s) or that the
accused persons had no mens rea or consensus to commit the
offence are all subject matter of trial and the accused persons’
defence, which cannot be considered at the stage of framing of
charge, in light of the aforesaid judicial dictates.
34. Consequently, in conspectus of above, further
being wary of the aforenoted judicial principles, in light of the
arguments addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the accused persons,
Ld. Counsel for the complainant as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for the
State, this Court observes that from the facts and circumstances of
the case, material and the documents placed on record of the Ld.
Trial Court, including inter alia the contents of the chargesheet,
statements of witnesses, as well as other material, including the
FSL report, prima facie case under Section 120B IPC, Sections
465/200IPC read with Section 120B IPC stands established
against accused persons. Needless to mention that there is
sufficient material/ground(s) to proceed against the accused
persons for the said offences, besides there is prima facie
case/grounds and strong suspicion, as well as material and
witnesses who can depose against them. However, it is reiterated
that in the instant case, in the considered opinion of this Court,
society does not fall within the purview of an authority, authorised
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 57 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:51:49 +0530
by law to receive a document, as an evidence of any fact, bringing
the instant case outside the purview of Section 199/120B IPC.
35. Accordingly, in light of the aforesaid discussion, this
Court unwaveringly records and reiterates that the impugned
order/order dated order dated 06.12.2021, passed by Ld.
ACMM-01, Central, Tis Hazari Court in case bearing, ‘State v.
Pankaj Bajaj & Ors., Case No. 298098/2016’ , arising out of FIR
No. 234/2011, PS. Crime Branch, under Sections
420/467/468/471/120B of IPC is upheld in respect of charges
under Section 120B IPC and Sections 465/200 IPC read with
Section 120B IPC and modified/set aside in so far as it relates to
framing of charge under Section 199/120B IPC. Ergo, the
aforenoted petitions/revision petitions bearing; Cr. Rev. No.
19/2022, Cr. Rev. No. 261/2022, Cr. Rev. No. 262/2022 and Cr.
Rev. 544/2022 are disposed off in the above terms. Needless to
mention that the judgments relied would not come to aid of the
parties as facts of the present case are distinguishable.
36. Trial Court Record along with a copy of this
order/judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court concerned for
information and compliance.
37. Revision file be consigned to record room after due
compliance.
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.05.15
16:51:54
+0530
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 15.05.2025 ASJ-03, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 58 of 58