Nana vs State (2025:Rj-Jd:37748-Db) on 22 August, 2025

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Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

Nana vs State (2025:Rj-Jd:37748-Db) on 22 August, 2025

Author: Manoj Kumar Garg

Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg

     [2025:RJ-JD:37748-DB]

           HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                            JODHPUR
                       D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 652/2002

      Nana S/o Natha Manat Meena, R/o Gamadi Deval Pal Phala Mali,
      PS Sadar Dungarpur, District Dungarpur.
                                      (Presently lodged in Central Jail, Udaipur)
                                                                             ----Appellant
                                            Versus
      State of Rajasthan
                                                                           ----Respondent


     For Appellant(s)             :     Mr. Shambhoo Singh, Adv. assisted by
                                        Mr. Hitendra Singh
     For Respondent(s)            :     Mr. Vikram Singh Rajpurohit, PP



               HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG
                   HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI CHIRANIA

                                         Judgment

REPORTABLE
    22/08/2025

     BY THE COURT : (PER HON'BLE MR. MANOJ KUMAR GARG,J)

Instant criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant

against the judgment dated 11.06.2002 passed by learned

Sessions Judge, Dungarpur, in Sessions Case No.44/2001 by

which the learned Trial Court convicted the appellant for offence

under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him for life imprisonment

along with a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine to

further undergo six months RI.

Brief facts necessary to be noted for deciding the controversy

are that 24.04.2001, complainant- Ratni provided an oral

information at Police Station- Dungarpur to the effect that an

altercation had occurred between her mother-in-law, Phulki, and

her brother-in-law (Jeth), identified as the accused-appellant,

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Nana. During the altercation, the accused-appellant Nana

allegedly inflicted a blow with a stone on the head and leg of the

deceased, Phulki. Subsequently, he purportedly pushed her from a

height of ten feet, resulting in her falling to the ground, where she

sustained fatal injuries and died at the scene.

On the said oral report, Police registered the FIR against the

accused-appellant and started investigation. On completion of

investigation, police filed challan against the accused-appellant for

offence under Section 302 IPC.

Thereafter, learned Trial Court framed, read over and

explained the charges for the offence under Section 302 IPC. He

denied the charge and sought trial.

During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many

as twelve witnesses and also got exhibited relevant documents in

support of its case.

The accused appellant was examined under Section 313

Cr.P.C. In defence, five documents Ex-D/1 to Ex-D/5 were

exhibited.

Learned trial Court, after hearing the arguments from both

the sides, taking into consideration and appreciating the

documentary evidence and the statements of witnesses, vide

judgment dated 11.06.2002 convicted and sentenced the accused-

appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC. Hence, this

criminal appeal.

Mr. Shambhoo Singh, counsel for the accused-appellant, has

contended that there was neither intention nor motive on the part

of the accused-appellant to cause the death of the deceased-

Phulki. He submits that, even if the entire prosecution case is

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accepted, the injury inflicted with a stone on the deceased’s head

was found to be of a simple nature. The deceased ultimately

succumbed due to injuries sustained from a fall from a height,

which resulted in grievous rib fractures on her chest. These

injuries are cited as the cause of her death. This version is

corroborated by the testimonies of eye witnesses PW-2 Ratni (the

complainant), PW-3 Hurma, and PW-5 Kurki. Therefore, the

conviction recorded by the trial court under Section 302 of the

Indian Penal Code is alleged to be legally unsustainable. It is

contended that the impugned judgment of conviction warrants

quashing and setting aside, and that the accused-appellant should

be acquitted of the said offence. Counsel has relied upon the

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mathai Vs.

State of Kerala reported in 2005 (3) SCC 260.

Per-contra, the learned Public Prosecutor has vehemently

opposed the prayer made by the counsel for the accused-appellant

and submitted that specific averment has been made that the

accused-appellant inflicted stone injury on the head of the

deceased and later on he pushed the deceased from the height of

ten feet and due to falling from such a great height, deceased

sustained ribs injuries and died on the spot. Thus, the learned trial

court has rightly convicted the accused-appellant for the offence

under Section 302 IPC. Learned Public Prosecutor thus craves

dismissal of the appeal.

We have considered the submissions of the counsel for the

parties made at bar and perused the impugned judgment as well

as record of the case.

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The First Information Report lodged by the complainant-

Ratni (PW-2), contains a detailed and specific account of the

incident that a heated altercation occurred between the accused-

appellant and the deceased- Phulki. During this altercation, the

accused-appellant purportedly inflicted a stone blow on the

deceased’s head. Subsequently, the accused-appellant allegedly

pushed the deceased from a height of approximately ten feet,

resulting in her fall and immediate death at the scene. The

consistency between the FIR account and eyewitness testimonies

namely, those of Ratni (PW-2), Hurma (PW-3), and Kurki (PW-5)

establishes a coherent narrative of the incident. The medical

examination of the deceased shows that deceased- Phulki received

fracture of ribs. The medical expert, Dr. B.P. Verma (PW-9),

examined the injuries and clarified that Injury No.1, located on the

head, was classified as a simple injury and Phulki sustained

fractures of the ribs, specifically, ribs Nos. 2 to 8 on the left side

and rib No. 9 on the right side. However, the injuries to the ribs

particularly Injury No.2 were deemed grievous in nature. He

further opined that the injuries sustained, especially the rib

fractures and the injury to the lungs, were sufficient to cause

death. He explained that the deceased’s fatal injuries likely

resulted from a fall from a height of approximately 6-7 feet.

Therefore, it can be said to have been proved beyond reasonable

doubt that the appellant had caused the death of deceased- Phulki

and thus committed culpable homicide. The evidence on record

clearly shows that the appellant had caused the death by inflicting

a blow with a stone on the head and leg of the deceased- Phulki.

Subsequently, he pushed her from a height of ten feet, resulting in

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her falling to the ground, where she sustained fatal injuries and

died at the scene.

The crucial question however is, whether he had the

intention to cause death of deceased- Phulki or had the intention

to cause such bodily injury which was likely to cause death or

whether he had the conscious knowledge that it was imminently

dangerous that in all probability, it would cause death, or such

bodily injury as is likely to cause death and committed the act

without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such

injury?

At the outset, it would apposite to deal with the relevant

legal provisions, which reads as under:-

“300. Murder–.Except in the case hereinafter excepted, culpable
homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is
done with the intention of causing death, or–

Secondly–If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily
injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the
person to whom the harm is caused, or–

Thirdly–If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to
any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or–
Fourthly–If the person committing the act knows that it is so
imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death
or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such
act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or
such injury as aforesaid.

Exception 1.–When culpable homicide is not murder.– Culpable
homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the
power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes
the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the
death of any other person by mistake or accident.
……x…..xx…..xx….. x……….

……x…..xx…..xx….. x……….

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……x…..xx…..xx….. x……….

Exception 4–Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed
without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion
upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken
undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation–It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the
provocation or commits the first assault.

……….

304, Part II. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder – Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to
murder shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to ten years or with fine or with
both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to
cause death; but without any intention to cause death or to cause
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.”

The ingredients constituting an offence under Section 304

Part II IPC are as follows:

(i) he must commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder;

(ii) the act must be done with the knowledge that it is likely to

cause death;

(iii) but such act is done without any intention to cause death or

to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

Therefore, under the provisions of Section 304 Part II of the

IPC, an individual may be held liable for culpable homicide not

amounting to murder when the act is committed with the

knowledge that it is likely to result in death, yet without any

intention to cause death or to inflict such bodily injury as is likely

to cause death. The essential criterion for establishing an offence

under this section is thus twofold: firstly, the presence of

knowledge on the part of the accused that their conduct is likely to

cause death or such bodily injury as could lead to death; and

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secondly, the absence of any intention to cause death. Thus, core

element of Section 304 Part II IPC is the mental state of the

accused, specifically, the conscious awareness of the potential

consequences of their act, without the accompanying intent to

bring about death.

The reasoning underlying this legal framework is rooted in

the principle of moral culpability and the recognition that an

individual can be deemed criminally liable even if they did not aim

to kill, but nonetheless engaged in conduct that foreseeably

endangers life. Such an approach ensures that individuals cannot

escape liability merely because they lacked the intent to kill,

especially when their actions, by their very nature, posed a

substantial risk of resulting in death. It emphasizes accountability

for reckless or negligent conduct that, while not intended to cause

death, nonetheless leads to fatal outcomes, thereby upholding the

principles of justice and societal protection.

The thin line difference between the offence punishable

under “Section 302” and “Section 304” of IPC has been succinctly

explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of A.P. v.

Rayavarapu Punnayya reported in (1976) 4 SCC 382 in the

following words:

“12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, “culpable homicide”

is genus and “murder” its specie. All “murder” is “culpable
homicide” but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, “culpable
homicide” sans “special characteristics of murder”, is
“culpable homicide not amounting to murder”. For the
purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity
of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three
degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be

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called, “culpable homicide of the first degree”. This is the
greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in
Section 300 as “murder”. The second may be termed as
“culpable homicide of the second degree”. This is punishable
under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is “culpable
homicide of the third degree”. This is the lowest type of
culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is,
also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the
three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable
under the second part of Section 304.”

The difference was further elucidated in Rampal Singh v.

State of U.P., reported in (2012) 8 SCC 289 in the following

words:

“18. This Court in Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State of U.P.
[(2007) 14 SCC 660 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 915] noticed that
academic distinction between “murder” and “culpable
homicide not amounting to murder” had vividly been
brought out by this Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu
Punnayya
[(1976) 4 SCC 382 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 659] where
it was observed as under: (Vineet Kumar case [(2007) 14
SCC 660 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 915], SCC pp. 665-66, para

16) “16. … that the safest way of approach to the
interpretation and application of Sections 299 and 300 IPC
is to keep in focus the key words used in various clauses of
the said sections. Minutely comparing each of the clauses
of Sections 299 and 300 IPC and drawing support from the
decisions of this Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab
[AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri LJ 818] and Rajwant Singh v.

State of Kerala [AIR 1966 SC 1874 : 1966 Cri LJ 1509] ,
speaking for the Court, R.S. Sarkaria, J. neatly brought out
the points of distinction between the two offences, which
have been time and again reiterated. Having done so, the
Court said that wherever the court is confronted with the
question whether the offence is ‘murder’ or ‘culpable

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homicide not amounting to murder’, on the facts of a case,
it [would] be convenient for it to approach the problem in
three stages. The question to be considered at the first
stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by
doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of
such causal connection between the act of the accused and
the death, leads to the second stage for considering
whether that act of the accused amounts to ‘culpable
homicide’ as defined in Section 299. … If the answer to this
question is in the negative the offence would be ‘culpable
homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable under the
First or the Second Part of Section Page 8 of 29 304,
depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third
clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found
in the positive, but the case comes within any of the
Exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would
still be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’,
punishable under the First Part of Section 304 IPC. It was,
however, clarified that these were only broad guidelines to
facilitate the task of the court and not cast-iron imperative.

21. Sections 302 and 304 of the Code are primarily the
punitive provisions. They declare what punishment a
person would be liable to be awarded, if he commits either
of the offences. An analysis of these two sections must be
done having regard to what is common to the offences and
what is special to each one of them. The offence of culpable
homicide is thus an offence which may or may not be
murder. If it is murder, then it is culpable homicide
amounting to murder, for which punishment is prescribed in
Section 302 of the Code. Section 304 deals with cases not
covered by Section 302 and it divides the offence into two
distinct classes, that is, (a) those in which the death is
intentionally caused; and (b) those in which the death is
caused unintentionally but knowingly. In the former case
the sentence of imprisonment is compulsory and the
maximum sentence admissible is imprisonment for life. In

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the latter case, imprisonment is only optional, and the
maximum sentence only extends to imprisonment for 10
years. The first clause of Section 304 includes only those
cases in which offence is really “murder”, but mitigated by
the presence of circumstances recognised in the Exceptions
to Section 300 of the Code, the second clause deals only
with the cases in which the accused has no intention of
injuring anyone in particular. In this regard, we may also
refer to the judgment of this Court in Fatta v. Emperor [AIR
1931 Lah 63] , 1151. C. 476 (Refer: Penal Law of India by
Dr Hari Singh Gour, Vol. 3, 2009.) ”

In Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja vs State Of A.P.

reported in (2006) 11 SCC 444, Hon’ble Apex Court has

observed as under :-

“Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal
question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide
whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304
Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters – plucking of a fruit,
straying of a cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word
or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and
group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like
revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in
such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no pre-
meditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the
other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where
the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by
attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to
cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of
murder punishable under Section 302, are not converted into
offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as
murder punishable under Section 302. The intention to cause
death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or
several of the following, among other, circumstances : (i) nature
of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the
accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow

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is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force
employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the
course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight;

(vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there
was any pre-meditation; (vii) whether there was any prior
enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether
there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the
cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of
passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken
undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner;

(xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows.

The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive
and there may be several other special circumstances with
reference to individual cases which may throw light on the
question of intention.”

From the above extracts, it becomes evident that a key

criterion in distinguishing whether a particular act constitutes

“murder” or “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”

punishable under Sections 302 and 304 IPC, respectively is the

presence or absence of the offender’s intent. Specifically, if the

offender possesses the intention to cause death or to inflict such

bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or alternatively, if they are

consciously aware of the perilous nature of their conduct

recognizing that their actions are so inherently dangerous that

they will, in all likelihood, result in death or such injury the act is

more appropriately classified as “murder” under Section 300 of

the IPC. In such cases, the corresponding penal provision of

Section 302 IPC, which prescribes the punishment for murder,

would be applicable. Conversely, if the intention to cause death or

such grievous bodily injury is not clearly established the act should

be categorized under the lesser offense of “culpable homicide not

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amounting to murder,” punishable under Section 304 IPC. This

classification recognizes the gravity of the act but acknowledges

the absence of the requisite mens rea (guilty mind) for murder.

The reasoning behind this distinction is rooted in the principles of

criminal law, which aim to attribute liability proportionate to the

mental state and culpability of the offender. Intention and

knowledge are fundamental elements that differentiate between

degrees of criminal liability. When the offender intentionally

commits an act with full awareness of its dangerous potential, it

signifies a higher degree of moral culpability, warranting the

harsher penalty prescribed for murder. Conversely, in cases where

the offender’s conduct lacks such deliberate intent or conscious

knowledge, the law considers the act less blameworthy, thereby

justifying a comparatively lenient punishment under Section 304

IPC. This nuanced approach ensures that the legal response is

both fair and proportionate to the offender’s mental state and the

circumstances of the act.

Upon examination of the injuries sustained by the deceased

and the postmortem report Ex.P/9 indicates that injury No.2 was

identified as the fatal and the primary cause of death.

Furthermore, the circumstances under which the assault

occurred, including the motivations behind causing the injuries,

there is no evidence to suggest that the assault was premeditated

or carried out with a deliberate plan to kill the deceased. The

absence of evidence indicating premeditation is a significant factor.

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Considering the absence of proof of premeditation, including the

lack of undue advantage or cruelty on the part of the appellant as

well as the fact that the assault was the result of a sudden

altercation between the parties, the act can be characterized as

culpable homicide not amounting to murder, aligning with the

provisions of Section 304 Part II of the IPC. This court is of the

opinion that the actions of the accused demonstrated a reckless

disregard for human life rather than an outright intention to

murder. The nature and extent of the injuries, coupled with the

circumstances of the incident, support this conclusion.

In view of the aforesaid aspects and upon assessment of

evidence, we are of the considered opinion that the finding of guilt

recorded by learned trial Court under Section 302 IPC is not

sustainable in the eyes of law because there is a clear absence of

pre-meditation or motive to kill deceased Phulki and it is a case of

culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Therefore, we are

inclined to alter the conviction of the accused-appellant from

Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II, IPC.

Resultantly, the conviction and sentences passed against the

accused appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC is

quashed and set aside and the same is hereby altered to the

offence punishable under Section 304 Part II, IPC.

However, considering the facts that the accused-appellant

was arrested on 30.04.2001 and his sentence was suspended on

01.09.2005, but due to weak economic condition, he could not

furnish the bail bonds and subsequently, he was released on bail

only on 16.03.2009 and accordingly, he has undergone the

incarnation for more than eight years & six months, we think it

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proper to reduce the sentence of the accused-appellant to the

period already undergone by him.

Thus, while maintaining conviction of the appellant offence

under Section 304 Part II IPC, his sentence for the said offence is

hereby reduced to the period already undergone by him. The fine

amount, if not deposited, is hereby waived. The accused-appellant

is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds are cancelled.

Accordingly, the criminal appeal is partly allowed.

The record of the trial court be sent back forthwith.

                                   (RAVI CHIRANIA),J                                   (MANOJ KUMAR GARG),J


                                    81-MS/-




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