Nandyala Jaya Rami Reddy vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 1 April, 2025

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Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati

Nandyala Jaya Rami Reddy vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 1 April, 2025

       THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI
                RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD
     W.P.Nos. 7807, 7954, 7794, 8004, 8006, 8096 & 8103 of 2025



The Court made the following COMMON ORDER:

      Heard   Sri   Venkateswarlu   Posani,   Ld.   Senior   Counsel
appearing on behalf of Sri Ancha Panduranga Rao, Ld. Counsel for
the Writ Petitioner in (W.P. No.7794 of 2025), Sri V. Roopesh Kumar
Reddy, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner in (W.P.No.8004 of 2025),
Ms. Mahathi Saaveri, Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of Writ
Petitioner in (W.P.No.8006 of 2025), Sri K.Srinivas, Ld. Counsel for
the Writ Petitioner in (W.P.No.8096 of 2025), Sri Javvaji Sarath
Chandra, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner in (W.P.No.8103 of
2025), Sri V.V.Satish, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner in
(W.P.No.7807 of 2025), Ms. Abigna, Ld. Counsel appearing on
behalf of Sri P. Badrinath, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner in
(W.P.No.7954 of 2025), Sri Mattegunta Sudhir, Ld. Standing Counsel
for ZPPs and MPPs and Sri S. Vivek Chandra Sekhar, Ld. Standing
Counsel for the State Election Commission.

2.    Common issues arise in all these Writ Petitions. All the Writ
Petitioners have challenged the Notification issued by the Andhra
Pradesh State Election Commission for conducting of elections to
the office of the President and the Vice President of the Mandal
Praja Parishads and the Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson of
the Zilla Praja Parishads. For the present, the Writ Petitioners are
seeking stay of the proceedings of Andhra Pradesh State Election
Commission with regard to conduct of elections to the President and
Vice President of Mandal Praja Parishads and Chairperson and Vice
Chairperson of the Zilla Praja Parishads
                                    2


Submissions on behalf of Writ Petitioners

3.    The Writ Petitioners are questioning the Notification issued by
the Andhra Pradesh State Election Commission for the elections to
the above mentioned posts on the ground that the said posts (the
President and the Vice President of the Mandal Praja Parishads and
the Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson of the Zilla Praja
Parishads) are sought to be conducted without filling-up of the
casual vacancies of the members.          The Writ Petitioners would
contend that they are the prospective contestants for the said posts,
but they are not yet elected as members in the casual vacancies that
have arisen in various Mandal Praja Parishads and Zilla Praja
Parishads.

4.    It is the contention of the Ld. Senior Counsel and the Counsel
for the Writ Petitioners that the Writ Petitioners are deprived of an
opportunity of contesting for the said posts.      It is submitted that
without conducting the elections for the casual vacancies of the
members, the Election Commission ought not to have issued the
Election Notification for the conduct of elections for the posts of the
President and the Vice President of the Mandal Praja Parishads and
the Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson of the Zilla Praja
Parishads. Sri Javvaji Sarath Chandra, Ld, Counsel would submit
that the Election Notification is contrary to the statute and the Rules.
It is submitted that the casual vacancies ought to be filled up within a
period of eight (08) weeks from the date of the occurrence of such
vacancy, whereas the election for the posts of the President and the
Vice President of the Mandal Praja Parishads and the Chairperson
and the Vice Chairperson of the Zilla Praja Parishads are to be
conducted within six (06) months from the date of occurrence of the
vacancies. It is submitted that the underlying logic for maintaining
disparity of time for conduct of the elections for filling-up of casual
                                    3


vacancies and the vacancies of the President and the Vice President
of the Mandal Praja Parishads and the Chairperson and the Vice
Chairperson of the Zilla Praja Parishads is with a view to firstly
conduct election for the casual vacancies and only then conduct
elections for the posts of the President and the Vice President of the
Mandal Praja Parishads and the Chairperson and the Vice
Chairperson of the Zilla Praja Parishads. The Writ Petitioners are
now pressing for an interim relief of staying the process of election of
the President and the Vice President of the Mandal Praja Parishads
and the Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson of the Zilla Praja
Parishads, till such time the casual vacancies are filled up.

5.    Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, Ld. Senior Counsel has drawn the
attention of this Court to the relevant provisions of the statute and
the Rules. He has drawn the attention of this Court to Sub-section
(4) of the Section 2 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1992
that defines the 'casual vacancy' as a vacancy occurring otherwise
than by efflux of time and casual election means an election held to
fill a 'casual vacancy'. He has also drawn the attention of this Court
to the definition of 'ordinary vacancy' for the purpose of drawing a
distinction between both i.e., between 'casual vacancy' and 'ordinary
vacancy'.

6.    Ld. Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the
relevant provisions of the Andhra Pradesh conduct of election of
Member (co-opted), President and Vice President of Mandala
Parishad and member co-opted, Chairperson and Vice Chairperson
of the Zilla Praja Parishad Rules, 2006 (vide G.O.Ms.No.173
Panchayat Raj and Rural Development (Election) Department, dated
10.05.2006).   Ld. Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of this
Court to the relevant rules with regard to the filling-up of 'casual
vacancies' of members of Mandal Praja Parishad (Rule-7) and of the
                                     4


members, Zilla Praja Parishad and would submit that the period
prescribed for conduct of election from the date of occurrence of
such vacancy is eight (08) weeks (Rule-18). Ld. Senior Counsel has
also drawn the attention of this Court to the provisions relating to the
filling-up of casual vacancies of President and Vice President of
Mandal Praja Parishad (Rule-13) and for the Election of the
Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of Zilla Praja Parishads to be
done within six months (Rule-24).

7.    Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioners have projected various
kinds of 'casual vacancies' that have occurred. In some instances,
the posts of the President or the Vice President of Mandal Praja
Parishad and the posts of Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of Zilla
Praja Parishad have been reserved and there are casual vacancies
which are also reserved. It is submitted that unless such casual
vacancies are filled up, election for the posts of President and Vice
President of Mandal Praja Parishads and Chairperson and Vice
Chairperson of Zilla Praja Parishads which are reserved ought not to
be conducted.

Submissions on behalf of the Official Respondents

8.    Sri Vivek Chandra Sekhar, Ld. Counsel appearing for the
Andhra Pradesh State Election Commission has drawn the attention
of this Court to a Judgment rendered by the Ld. Single Judge dated
05.02.2025 in W.P.No.2602 of 2025. He would submit that similar
situation relating to the election to the posts of Chairperson in Nagar
Panchayat without filling-up the 'casual vacancies' of the members of
Schedule Caste came to be challenged before the Ld. Single Judge
of this Court and the Ld. Single Judge vide the said Order was
pleased to dismiss the Writ Petition on the ground that, it is legal for
the State Election Commission to conduct election even without
filling-up of the 'casual vacancies' as the case may be.
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9.    Sri Vivek Chandra Sekhar, Ld. Counsel for the State Election
Commission has further submitted that the Judgment rendered by
the Ld. Single Judge in W.P.No.2602 of 2025 dated 05.02.2025 was
carried in an intra Court Appeal in W.A.No.107 of 2025. He would
submit that vide Order dated 06.03.2025, the Division Bench of this
Hon'ble Court, having considered the well reasoned decision of the
Ld. Single Judge, was pleased to dismiss the Writ Appeal filed by the
Writ Petitioners therein.   He would submit that this Order of the
Hon'ble Ld. Single Judge, having been affirmed by the Division
Bench of this Hon'ble Court, had attained finality. He had also drawn
the attention of this Court to Para Nos.58 to 60 in S.K.Pushpalatha
Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (in W.P.Nos.33408, 33607 & 35675 of
2016), rendered by the Ld. Single Judge vide Order dated
09.12.2016. He would submit that the statute and the Rules do not
stipulate any bar on the Election Commission in conducting the
election of the President and the Vice President of the Mandal Praja
Parishad and the Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson of the Zilla
Praja Parishad, without filling-up of the casual vacancies. He would
submit that if the logic as proposed by the Writ Petitioners is to be
implemented, the election to these posts can never be conducted or
gross delay may occur in conducting such elections inasmuch as it is
a matter of natural course that 'casual vacancies' keep arising. He
would submit that it is illogical to state that unless all casual
vacancies are filled up, election for these posts can never be
conducted.

DISCUSSION

10.   Having considered the above submissions of either of the
parties, at the outset, this court is rather reminded of not only the
emphatic caveat sounded by Hon'ble Apex court in a catena of
decisions that the High court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction,
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should be loath in interfering in the election process. It has also
reminded of the provisions of the Constitution, which empathically
laid an embargo on interference of a Writ Court in the elections to
the Parliament as well as the State legislatures.

11(1). This Court is also reminded of Article 329 (b) of the
Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Para Nos. 25 and 37
in   N.P.   Ponnuswami        v.    Returning       Officer,   Namakkal
Constituency; (1952) 1 SCC 94, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held
under:

              25. The conclusions which I have arrived at
              may be summed up briefly as follows:
               (1)   Having   regard    to   the   important
               functions which the legislatures have to
               perform in democratic countries, it has
               always been recognised to be a matter of
               first importance that elections should be
               concluded as early as possible according
               to time schedule and all controversial
               matters and all disputes arising out of
               elections should be postponed till after the
               elections are over, so that the election
               proceedings may not be unduly retarded or
               protracted.
               (2) In conformity with this principle, the
               scheme of the election law in this country
               as well as in England is that no
               significance should be attached to
               anything which does not affect the
               "election"; and if any irregularities are
               committed while it is in progress and they
               belong to the category or class which,
               under the law by which elections are
               governed, would have the effect of
               vitiating the "election" and enable the
               person affected to call it in question, they
                                      7


              should be brought up before a Special
              Tribunal by means of an election petition
              and not be made the subject of a dispute
              before any court while the election is in
              progress.
              37. And now a word as to why negative
              language was used in Article 329(b). It
              seems to me that there is an important
              difference between Article 71(1) and Article
              329(b). Article 71(1) had to be in an
              affirmative form, because it confers special
              jurisdiction on the Supreme Court which
              that Court could not have exercised but for
              this article. Article 329(b), on the other
              hand, was primarily intended to exclude or
              oust the jurisdiction of all courts in regard
              to electoral matters and to lay down the
              only mode in which an election could be
              challenged. The negative form was
              therefore more appropriate, and, that being
              so, it is not surprising that it was decided to
              follow the pre-existing pattern in which also
              the negative language had been adopted.


11(2). The above said principle is reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court subsequently in a catena of decisions by placing reliance of
Ponnuswamy's case. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election
Commissioner, New Delhi & Others; (1978) 1 SCC 405, the Hon'ble
Apex Court had held in Para Nos.21 and 24 as under:

                 21. We have to proceed heuristically
              now. Article 329(b) reads:
                  "Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution--
                 (b) no election to either House of
              Parliament or to the House or either
              House of the legislature of a State shall be
              called in question except by an election
                       8


petition presented to such authority and in
such manner as may be provided for by or
under any law made by the appropriate
legislature."
   Let us break down the prohibitory
provision into its components. The sole
remedy for an aggrieved party, if he wants
to challenge any election, is an election
petition. And this exclusion of all other
remedies includes constitutional remedies
like Article 226 because of the non
obstante clause. If what is impugned is an
election the ban operates provided the
proceeding "calls it in question" or puts it
in issue; not otherwise. What is the high
policy animating this inhibition? Is there
any interpretative alternative which will
obviate irreparable injury and permit legal
contests in between? How does Section
100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act integrate into the
scheme? Let us read Section 100 here:
   "Subject to the provisions of sub-
section (2) if (the High Court) is of
opinion--
                   ***

(d) that the result of the election,
insofar as it concerns a returned
candidate, has been materially affected–

***

(iv) by any non-compliance with the
provisions of the Constitution or of this Act
or of any Rules or orders made under this
Act.

the High Court shall declare the election of
the returned candidate to be void.

The companion provision viz. Section 98
also may be extracted at this stage:

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“At the conclusion of the trial of an
election petition (the High Court) shall
make an order–

(a) dismissing the election petition; or

(b) declaring the election of all or any
of the returned candidates to be void;

or

(c) declaring the election of all or any of
the returned candidates to be void and the
petitioner or any other candidate to have
been duly elected.”

Now arises the need to sketch the scheme
of Section 100 in the setting of Article
329(b).
The troublesome word “non-

compliance” holds in its fold a teleologic
signification which resolves the riddle of
this case in a way.

So we will address ourselves to the
meaning of meanings, the values within
the words and the project unfolded. This
will be taken up one after the other.

24.Ponnuswami is a landmark case in
election laws and deals with the scope,
amplitude, rationale and limitations of
Article 329(b). Its ratio has been
consistently followed by this Court in
several rulings through Durga Shankar
Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh
[AIR
1954 SC 520: (1955) 1 SCR 267: 9 ELR
494] and Hari Vishnu Kamath [Hari Vishu
Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque
, AIR
1955 SC 233: (1955) 1 SCR 1104 : 10
ELR 216] and Khare [Dr N.B. Khare v.

Election Commissioner of India, AIR 1958
SC 139: 1958 SCR 648] down to Indira
Gandhi [Indira Nehru Gandhi v.Raj Narain,
1975 Supp SCC 1 : (1976) 2 SCR 347].

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The factual setting in that case may throw
some light on the decision itself. The
appellant’s nomination for election to the
Madras Legislative Assembly was rejected
by the Returning Officer and so he hurried
to the High Court praying for a writ of
certiorari to quash the order of rejection,
without waiting for the entire elective
process to run its full course and, at the
end of it, when the results also were
declared, to move the Election Tribunal for
setting aside the result of the election
conducted without his participation. He
thought that if the election proceeded
without him irreparable damage would
have been caused and therefore sought to
intercept the progress of the election by
filing a writ petition. The High Court
dismissed it as unsustainable, thanks to
Article 329(b) and this Court in appeal,
affirmed that holding. Fazl Ali, J. virtually
spoke for the Court and explained the
principle underlying Article 329(b). The
ambit and spirit of the bar imposed by the
article was elucidated with reference to the
principle that “it does not require much
argument to show that in a country with a
democratic Constitution in which the
legislatures have to play a very important
role, it will lead to serious consequences if
the elections are unduly protracted or
obstructed”. In the view of the learned
Judge, immediate individual relief at an
intermediate stage when the process of
election is underway has to be sacrificed
for the paramount public good of
promoting the completion of elections.
Fazl Ali, J. ratiocinated on the ineptness of
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interlocutory legal holdups. He posed the
issue and answered it thus:

“The question now arises whether the law
of elections in this country contemplates
that there should be two attacks on
matters connected with election
proceedings, one while they are going on
by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of
the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution (the ordinary jurisdiction of
the courts having been expressly
excluded), and another after they have
been completed by means of an election
petition. In my opinion, to affirm such a
position would be contrary to the scheme
of Part XV of the Constitution and the
Representation of the People Act
, which,
as I shall point out later, seems to be that
any matter which has the effect of vitiating
an election should be brought up only at
the appropriate stage in an appropriate
manner before a special tribunal and
should not be brought up at an
intermediate stage before any court. It
seems to me that under the election law,
the only significance which the rejection of
a nomination paper has consists in the
fact that it can be used as a ground to call
the election in question. Article 329(b) was
apparently enacted to describe the
manner in which and the stage at which
this ground, and other grounds which may
be raised under the law to call the election
in question, could be urged. I think it
follows by necessary implication from the
language of this provision that those
grounds cannot be urged in any other
manner, at any other stage and before any
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other court. If the grounds on which an
election can be called in question could be
raised at an earlier stage and errors, if any
are rectified, there will be no meaning in
enacting a provision like Article 329(b) and
in setting up a special tribunal. Any other
meaning ascribed to the words used in the
article would lead to anomalies, which the
Constitution could not have contemplated,
one of them being that conflicting views
may be expressed by the High Court at
the pre-polling stage and by the Election
Tribunal, which is to be an independent
body, at the stage when the matter is
brought before it.”

11 (3). Reiterating the said principles, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while
interpreting Article 329 (b) of the Constitution of India had held in
Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar; (2000) 8 SCC 216, the
Hon’ble Apex Court held in para No.32 as under:

32. For convenience sake we would now
generally sum up our conclusions by partly
restating what the two Constitution
Benches have already said and then
adding by clarifying what follows there from
in view of the analysis made by us
hereinabove:

(1) If an election, (the term election
being widely interpreted so as to include all
steps and entire proceedings commencing
from the date of notification of election till
the date of declaration of result) is to be
called in question and which questioning
may have the effect of interrupting,
obstructing or protracting the election
proceedings in any manner, the invoking of
judicial remedy has to be postponed till
after the completing of proceedings in
elections.

(2) Any decision sought and rendered
will not amount to “calling in question an
election” if it subserves the progress of the
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election and facilitates the completion of
the election. Anything done towards
completing or in furtherance of the election
proceedings cannot be described as
questioning the election.

(3) Subject to the above, the action
taken or orders issued by Election
Commission are open to judicial review on
the well-settled parameters which enable
judicial review of decisions of statutory
bodies such as on a case of mala fide or
arbitrary exercise of power being made out
or the statutory body being shown to have
acted in breach of law.

(4) Without interrupting, obstructing or
delaying the progress of the election
proceedings, judicial intervention is
available if assistance of the court has been
sought for merely to correct or smoothen
the progress of the election proceedings, to
remove the obstacles therein, or to preserve
a vital piece of evidence if the same would
be lost or destroyed or rendered
irretrievable by the time the results are
declared and stage is set for invoking the
jurisdiction of the court.

(5) The court must be very circumspect
and act with caution while entertaining any
election dispute though not hit by the bar of
Article 329(b) but brought to it during the
pendency of election proceedings. The
court must guard against any attempt at
retarding, interrupting, protracting or stalling
of the election proceedings. Care has to be
taken to see that there is no attempt to
utilise the court’s indulgence by filing a
petition outwardly innocuous but essentially
a subterfuge or pretext for achieving an
ulterior or hidden end. Needless to say that
in the very nature of the things the court
would act with reluctance and shall not act,
except on a clear and strong case for its
intervention having been made out by
raising the pleas with particulars and
precision and supporting the same by
necessary material.”

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11(4). In Shaji K. Joseph v. V. Viswanath; (2016) 4 SCC 429, the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Para No.16, as held as under:

16. This Court, in N.P. Ponnuswami v.

Returning Officer, (1952) 1 SCC 94 : AIR
1952 SC 64] has held that once the
election process starts, it would not be
proper for the courts to interfere with the
election process. Similar view was taken
by this Court in Shri Sant Sadguru
Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj)
Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v.

State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 509.

12. Article 329 (b) of the Constitution of India is usefully extracted
hereunder:

329. Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters:-

“Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution.

(a) * * *

(b) no election to either House of
Parliament or to the House or either House
of the Legislature of a State shall be called
in question except by an election petition
presented to such authority and in such
manner as may be provided for by or under
any law made by the appropriate
Legislature.”

13. The constitutional provisions relating to the Elections of
various local bodies are dealt with under Part-IX of the Constitution
of India. The Article 243-O laid express bar on interference by
Courts in electoral matters relating to Panchayats. Article 243-O is
usefully extracted hereunder:

243-O. Bar to interference by courts in
electoral matters. – Notwithstanding
anything in this Constitution-

(a) the validity of any law relating to the
delimitation of constituencies or the
allotment of seals to such constituencies
made or purporting to be made under
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article 243-K, shall not be called in
question in any court;

(b) no election to any Panchayat shall be
called in question except by an election
petition presented to such authority and in
such manner as is provided for by or under
any law made by the Legislature of a
State.

14. Insofar as the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj, 1994 (Act
No.13 of 1994) is concerned, Chapter-I of Part-V of the Andhra
Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994
deals with Constitution of Election
Commission and Conduct of Elections for the Local Bodies, which
includes Conduct of Elections to Mandal Praja Parishads and Zilla
Praja Parishads. Section 204 of the said Act stipulates that
injunction shall not be granted in election proceeding. The said
provision is usefully extracted hereunder:

Section 204. Injunctions not to be
granted in election proceedings –
Notwithstanding anything in the Code of
Civil Procedure
, 1908 (Central Act 5 of
1908), or in any other law for the time being
in force, no court shall grant any permanent
or temporary injunction or make any interim
order restraining any proceeding which is
being or about to be taken under this Act for
the preparation or publication of any
electoral roll or for the conduct of any
election.”

15. Having regard to the above discussion, this Court does not
agree with the submissions made on behalf of the Writ Petitioners
that unless casual vacancies are filled up the election to the posts of
the President, the Vice President of Mandal Praja Parishads and the
Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson of the Zilla Praja Parishads
cannot be conducted. In this view of the matter, this Court is not
inclined to grant any interim order for the time being in view of the
above discussion.

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16. However, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioners have brought it
to the notice of this Court that in some of the cases, the casual
vacancies have arisen even in the year 2021 and that there is
inaction on the part of the Election Commission, which had not
initiated any steps for filling-up such casual vacancies within the
statutory period that is prescribed. The statutory period, as
indicated above, has prescribed eight (08) weeks time for filling-up
of the casual vacancies. The responsibility of filling-up these ‘casual
vacancies’ is vested with the Andhra Pradesh State Election
Commission. Insofar as this inaction is concerned in conducting the
elections for filling-up of ‘casual vacancies’, this Court is of the view
that the Election Commission is answerable for the same.

17. In this view of the matter, let Counter-Affidavit be filed by the
Andhra Pradesh State Election Commission, in respect of each of
the Writ Petitions, where casual vacancies have not been filled up
within the time stipulated, and to explain as to why such casual
vacancies have not been filled up.

18. Let Counter-Affidavit be filed within two weeks. List this batch
of matters on 16.04.2025.

______________________________________
GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD, J

Dt: 01.04.2025
Mnr/JKS



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