Naresh Nishad vs Bharat Coking Coal Limited Through Its … on 14 July, 2025

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Jharkhand High Court

Naresh Nishad vs Bharat Coking Coal Limited Through Its … on 14 July, 2025

Author: Deepak Roshan

Bench: Deepak Roshan

                                                      2025:JHHC:19356




IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                    WP(S) 3192 of 2019
                    -------

NARESH NISHAD, aged about 45 years, Son of Shri Prakash
Mallah, Resident of Kusum Vihar, Koyla Nagar, P.O Koyla Nagar
P.S. Saraidhella District Dhanbad. … … Petitioner
Versus

1. Bharat Coking Coal Limited through its Chairman-cum-Managing
Director, having its office at Koyala Nagar, P.O. and P.S. Saraidhela,
District Dhanbad (Jharkhand).

2. The General Manager, Lodna Area, Bharat Coking Coal Limited,
Lodna, P.O. Bhaga, P.S. Jharia, District Dhanbad(Jharkhand)
… … Respondents
With
WP(S) 587 of 2015

——-

Keshar Singh Yadav, son of late Bikram Singh Yadav, resident of
Quarter NO. LNH-278, New Colony, Baniahar, P.O. and P.S. Jharia,
District Dhanbad (Jharkhand) … … Petitioner
Versus

1. Bharat Coking Coal Limited through its Chairman cum Managing
Director, having its office at Koyala Bhawan, P.O. and P.S.
Saraidhela, District Dhanbad (Jharkhand)

2. The General Manager, Lodna Area, Bharat Coking Coal Limited,
Lodna, P.O. Bhaga, P.S. Jharia (Jharkhand) District-Dhanbad
… … Respondents
With
WP(S) 595 of 2015

——-

Arun Kumar Singh, son of late Sohan Singh, resident of Baniahar, –
10 near D.A.V. School, P.O. Bhaga, P.S. Dhanbad (Jharkhand)
Jharia, District … … Petitioner
Versus

1. Bharat Coking Coal Limited through its Chairman cum Managing
Director, having its office at Koyala Bhawan, P.O. and P.S.
Saraidhela, District Dhanbad (Jharkhand)

2. The General Manager, Lodna Area, Bharat Coking Coal Limited,
Lodna, P.O. Bhaga, P.S. Jharia District-Dhanbad

3. The Project Officer, Jeenagora Project, Bharat Coking Coal
Limited, Lodna, P.O. Bhaga, P.S. Jharia District- Dhanbad
(Jharkhand) … … Respondents
With
WP(S) 2944 of 2019

——-

Sanjay Nishad, Aged about 40 years, Son of Late Harimullah,
resident of Block No.24, Qr. No.278, Murlinagar, P.S. Saraidhela,
P.O. B.C.C.L. Township, Koyla Nagar, District-Dhanbad.

                                         ...   ...             Petitioner
                            Versus


                            1
                                                                 2025:JHHC:19356




1. Bharat Coking Coal Limited through its Chairman cum Managing
Director, having its office at Koyla Bhawan, P.O. and P.S.
Saraidhela, District-Dhanbad.

2. General Manager, Bharat Coking Coal Limited, Bastacolla Area-
IX, P.O. and P.S. Dhansar, District-Dhanbad.

3. The Project Officer, Bharat coking coal Limited, Dobari Colliery,
Bastacolla Area-IX, P.O. and P.S. Dhansar, District-Dhanbad.

… … Respondents
With
WP(S) 1989 of 2021

——-

BHUTESHWAR PRASAD SHAW, aged about 33 years, son of
Late Mahabir Shaw, resident of village Kasiatand, P.O. Kalyanpur
P.S. Barbadda, District Dhanbad (Jharkhand)… … Petitioner
Versus

1. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd through its Chairman-cum-Managing
Director, having its office at Koyala Bhawan, P.O. and P.S.
Saraidhela, District Dhanbad.

2. The General Manager (P & IR), Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, having
its office at Koyala Bhawan, P.O. and P.S. Saraidhela, District
Dhanbad.

3. The General Manager (P & IR), Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, East
Basuria Colliery. Kusunda Area, P.O. and P.S. Kusunda, District
Dhanbad.

4. The Disciplinary Authority-cum-Project Officer. East Basuria
Colliery, Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, Kusunda Area, P.O. and P.S.
Kusunda, District Dhanbad. … … Respondents

——-

CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN

——-

For the Petitioner : Mr. Rajendra Krishna, Adv.

: Mr. Pratyush Shounikya, Adv.

: Mr. Shubham Mayank, Adv.

: Mr. Manish Kumar, Adv.

For the Res. BCCL : Mr. S.B.Upadhyay, Sr. Adv.

: Mr. Anoop Kumar, Adv.

: Mr. Parijat Kishore, Adv.

: Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha, Adv.

——-

CAV on:- 08/07/2025 Pronounced on:- 14/07/2025
Since all these writ applications involve common

question of law, as such all were heard together and being disposed of

by this common order.

2. Prayer

W.P.(S) No3192 of 2019

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Petitioner in this writ petition prayed for following reliefs:

i) For issuance of appropriate writ(s), order(s) and/or direction(s),

particularly a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing/setting

aside the order contained in Memo no. 388 dated 26-27/6/2018 as

contained in Annexure-5 whereby and where under the respondent

no.2 has initiated departmental proceeding against the petitioner for

same set of allegations and facts for which a criminal proceeding is

already pending against the petitioner,

ii) For issuance of further appropriate writ(s), order(s) and/or

direction(s), particularly a writ in the nature of Mandamus

commanding the respondents not to proceed with the departmental

proceeding against the petitioner on the same facts and same

evidence on which a criminal case is pending against the petitioner,

iii) For issuance of further appropriate writ(s), order(s) and/or

direction(s), staying the departmental proceeding initiated against the

petitioner vide charges contained in Memo no. 388 dated 26-

27/6/2018 as contained in Annexure-5:

WP(S) 587 of 2015

Petitioner in this writ petition prayed for following reliefs:

(i) For of Issuance an appropriate writ(s)/order(s) and/or direction(s),

particularly a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order

dated 30.07.2014 as contained in Annexure-3, by which the

respondent no. 2 has initiated departmental proceeding as against the

petitioner;

(ii) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s) /order(s) and/or

direction(s), particularly a writ in the nature of Mandamus

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commanding the respondents not to proceed with the departmental

proceeding against the petitioner on the same facts and same

evidence criminal case is pending;

(iii) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/ order(s) and/or

direction(s), staying the departmental proceeding initiated against the

petitioner vide order dated 30.07.2014 as contained in Annexure-3.

(iv For grant of any other appropriate relief(s) as Your Lordships

may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.

WP(S) 595 of 2015

Petitioner in this writ petition prayed for following reliefs:

(i) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order(s) and/or direction(s),

particularly a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order

dated 1.08.2014 as contained in Annexure-3, by which the

respondent no. 2 has initiated departmental proceeding as against the

petitioner:

(ii) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s) /order(s) and/or

direction(s), particularly a writ in the nature of Mandamus

commanding the respondents not to proceed with the departmental

proceeding against the petitioner on the same facts and same

evidence criminal case is pending

(iii) For an issuance of appropriate writ (s)/ order(s) and/or

direction(s), staying the departmental proceeding initiated against the

petitioner vide order dated 01.08.2014 as contained in Annexure-3.

(iv) For grant of any other appropriate relief(s) as Your Lordships

may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.

WP(S) 2944 of 2019

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Petitioner in this writ petition prayed for following reliefs:

(i) for issuance of an appropriate Writ/Order/Direction or a writ in

the nature of certiorari for quashing of memo No. D/IX/18/87, dated

12.6.18 as contained in Annexure-3 by which the Respondent No.3

has initiated a departmental proceeding against the petitioner;

(ii) for issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction or a writ in the

nature of Mandamus commanding upon the concerned respondents

not to proceed with the departmental proceeding initiated against the

petitioner;

(iii) During the pendency of this writ petition the further proceedings

of Departmental Proceeding may kindly be stayed till the outcome of

the writ petition;

WP(S) 1989 of 2021

Petitioner in this writ petition prayed for following reliefs:

(i) For issuance of appropriate writ(s), order(s), and/or direction,

including a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing of Memo No.

1515 dated 23.02.2021 as contained in Annexure- 7 whereby and

where under the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Project Officer, East

Basuria Colliery has decided initiate departmental enquiry for the

allegations levelled against the petitioner as per Memorandum of

charges dated 4.1.2021;

(ii) For issuance of appropriate writ(s), order(s), and/or direction,

including a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing of letter

under reference no. 236 dated 04.01.2021 as contained in Annexure-

4 whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been served with

Memorandum of charges and statement of imputation against the

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petitioner, and has been further directed to file his show cause to the

said Memorandum of charges within 15 days from the date of receipt

of letter,

(iii) For issuance of appropriate writ(s), order(s), and/or direction,

including a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding upon the

respondents not to proceed with the departmental proceeding in

terms of letter dated 23 March, 2021 as the Memorandum of Charges

and Criminal case are based upon similar facts,

3. Brief facts of the cases:-

W.P.(S) 3192 of 2019

As per the statement made in this application, the

petitioner at present is aged about 51 years and was appointed as

Minor Loader on 24.07.1995 under the Respondents and is at the time

of filing of this application he was working as Asst. Revenue

Inspector, Lodna Area Office, Dhanbad. A criminal case was

instituted against the Petitioner vide FIR no. RC-02(A)/2018-D dt.

05.02.2018 under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

for demand of illegal gratification of Rs. 5,000/- from the complainant

of the FIR for putting up and processing land acquisition plan etc. of

the Complainant namely Sudam Deo.CBI submitted charge-sheet on

26.03.2018.

Subsequently, vide letter contained in Memo no. 388 dt.

26-27.06.2018 memorandum of charge was drawn and served against

the petitioner. Departmental proceeding is still pending.

W.P.(S) 587 of 2015

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As per the statement made in this application, the

petitioner at present is aged about 59 years and 11 months and he was

working as Clerk in Regional Store, Lodna, Area-10, under

Respondent No. 2. A Criminal case was instituted against the

Petitioner vide FIR no. RC-04(A)/2014(D) dt. 02.04.2014 u/s 120B of

IPC and sections 7, 13(2) r/w section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 filed by Complainant stating inter-alia that one

Senior Manager and Petitioner for demand of bribe of Rs. 10,000/-

and other named persons also demanded illegal gratification. CBI

submitted chargesheet on 30.05.2014.

On 30.07.2014, an order contained in Memo No.

BCCL/LA/GM(M)2014-846 issued by respondent No. 2 to hold

departmental proceeding, annexing the memo of charge and

departmental proceeding, which is still pending.

W.P. (S) 2944 of 2019

As per the statement made in this application, the

petitioner at present aged about 46 years and he was appointed as

Minor Loader on 18.08.2000 at Dobari Colliery at Bastacolla area.

Thereafter, he was transferred to Ena Colliery on post of Despatch

Clerk and has been working in said post since then. A Criminal case

was instituted against the Petitioner vide FIR no. RC Case No.

01(A)/2018-D dt. 29.01.18 u/s 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988 alleging therein that the Petitioner had demanded illegal

gratification of Rs. 5,000/- from the Complainant and demanded Rs.

3,000/- as first instalment for furnishing details of contribution to

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Provident Fund etc. to Complainant in respect of his father. CBI

submitted chargesheet on 26.03.2018.

On 12.06.2018, an order contained in Memo Ref. No.

D/IX/18/87 issued to hold departmental proceeding, annexing the

memo of charge and the departmental proceeding is still pending.

W.P. (S) 595/2015

As per the statement made in this application, the

petitioner at present is aged about 65 years 6 months and he was

working as Store Clerk, Jeenagova Store lodna Area 10 under the

respondent no.2. A criminal case was instituted against the petitioner

vide F.I.R no RC-04(A) /2014 (D) dt. 02.04.2014 u/s 120B of Indian

Penal Code and Section 7, 13(2) r/w section13(1)(d) of the Prevention

of Corruption Act, 1988 on the basis of complaint filed by Roshan Lal

Agarwal alleging that Arivind Kumar Sinha, Senior Manager and the

petitioner being the clerk of said Store demanded bribe of Rs 9000/-

The C.B.I submitted the charge sheet on 30/05/2014

On 01.08.2014, an order contained in Memo No.

BCCL/PO/DISC-Case/14-2152 was issued by the Respondent no. 2 to

hold departmental inquiry proceeding against the Petitioner, annexing

the memo of charge. The departmental proceeding is still pending.

W.P. (S) 1989/2021

As per the statement made in this application, the

petitioner at present is aged about 37 years and he was appointed as

General Mazdoor on 02.04.2010 in Basuria Colliery under

Respondent. Thereafter in 2015 he was appointed to the post of Clerk

in Basuria Colliery. The F.I.R dt. 12.05.2020, being CBI/DNB case

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No. RC-3(A)/2020(D) was registered u/s 7 of Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 for the allegation that the Petitioner demanded

Rs. 25,000/- from the Complainant and agreed to accept Rs.10,000/-

as the first installment of the total demand. CBI submitted chargesheet

on 29.06.2020. The Petitioner was served with memo of charge

contained in Ref. no.236 dt. 04.01.2021 and Petitioner was directed to

file reply and Petitioner replied to the same and requested the

respondent to provide him with documents pertaining to Memo of

charge and departmental proceeding. Thereafter, Petitioner served

with letter dt. 29.01.2021 by which he was directed to filed his reply

within 7 days as earlier reply was not satisfactory. Petitioner then

made representation for supply of documents.

On 23.03.2021, Petitioner served with office order

contained in ref. No. 1515 issued by Respondent no. 4 for initiation of

departmental inquiry which is still pending.

4. Mr. Rajendra Krishna, learned counsel representing

the Petitioner submits that the charge-sheet has been issued pursuant

to the criminal case lodged by the CBI under Prevention of Corruption

Act for demand of illegal gratification. The amount of illegal

gratification varies in each and every case. However, admittedly, the

CBI case under Prevention of Corruption Act was preferred and only

pursuant thereto, the disciplinary proceedings has been initiated

giving the charge Memo.

Learned counsel further draws attention of this court

towards the charge sheet submitted by the CBI and also the charge

memo given by the disciplinary authority in respect of respective

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petitioners and submits that the allegations are same and similar.

Moreover, even the witnesses which has been mentioned in the

charge-sheet submitted by the CBI and the witnesses in the

disciplinary proceeding are same and similar.

Therefore, looking to all these aspects, this Court vide its

order dated 17-6-2015, passed in W.P.(S) No.587/2015, has given

liberty to the Respondent authorities to proceed with the disciplinary

proceeding. However, they were prevented from passing the final

order of Punishment.

He further submits that the said interim order was passed

on 17-06-2015. However, till date the criminal proceedings are still

pending.

He strenuously contended that the Petitioners are not at

fault for delay in the criminal proceedings. He further relied upon the

judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M. Paul

Anthony versus Bharat Gold Mines Limited reported in (1999) 3

SCC 679 wherein at Para 22 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that “if

the departmental proceeding and the criminal case are based on

identical and similar set of facts, and the charge in criminal case

against the delinquent employee is of grave nature which involves

complicated question of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the

departmental proceeding till the conclusion of the criminal case.”

He reiterated that in all these cases, the charge is of

demanding/taking illegal gratification or for its conspiracy; which is

certainly a complicated question of fact, inasmuch as, the demand of

bribe and acceptance of the same by the same officer is certainly

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difficult to prove. Moreover, all the witnesses are police witness

therefore, certainly, if the case is pending since long, it is the

respondents and/or the state, who are responsible for the delay, and as

such, the interim order passed by this court on 17-6-2015 shall be

made absolute.

He further argued that in the criminal proceeding the

respective petitioners may be acquitted; and if after conclusion of the

criminal trial either of the Petitioners will be convicted; the

Respondent would be free to pass the final order. He reiterated that

taking bribe and acceptance of the same and/or conspiracy behind it,

is certainly a complicated question of fact and the respective

petitioners are not responsible for delay of the criminal proceedings.

Mr. Krishna, in support of his contention, has relied upon

the judgment passed in the case of M. Paul Anthony Versus Bharat

Gold Mines Limited and another (1999) 3 SCC 679 relevant

paragraph-22 and the case of StanzenToyotetsu India (P) Ltd. v.

Girish V., reported in (2014) 3, SCC 636, relevant paragraph 8 & 15.

5. Mr. S. B. Upadhyay, Ld. Sr. Counsel assisted by

Mr. Anup Kumar Mehta, learned counsel representing the

Respondents submits that due to the pendency of the criminal case

and the order of restriction from passing the final order in the

Disciplinary proceeding as directed by this Court vide its order dated

17-6-2015, passed in W.P.(S) No.587/2015, the Petitioner of WPS No.

587 of 2015 is going to superannuate in the month of July itself and

after retirement of the employee it would be very difficult to catch

hold the said person.

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He further submits that the respective petitioners are

employees of respondent BCCL and they are governed by certified

standing orders which is applicable for the workmen of the

establishment under BCCL and the entire standing order is silent as to

what will happen when a departmental proceeding started while the

employee is in service, but could not be completed during his service

tenure.

He further contended that since the standing order is

silent about the procedure to be adopted in case of a pending

disciplinary proceedings with respect to an employee after his

superannuation; the Respondents are remedy less because of the

pendency of the criminal trial read with the interim order dated 17-6-

2015, passed in W.P.(S) No.587/2015; whereby the Respondents were

restricted from passing the final order in the Disciplinary proceeding.

Admittedly, after retirement of the Petitioner in WPS No.

587 of 2015, who is going to superannuate in the month of July’25

itself, the Respondent will be remediless due to the interim order. He

further submits that in all these cases, since this court has permitted

the Respondents to proceed with the departmental proceeding; the

same is on the verge of completion but only due to the pendency of

the criminal trial, the Respondent could not pass the final order in

terms interim order passed by this Court vide order dated 17-06-2015

in WPS No. 587 of 2015.

He further submits that since the certified standing order

is silent on the issue as to the procedure in case of departmental

proceeding, if the delinquent superannuates from service; the

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petitioner of WPS 595 of 15 has already superannuated. Thus, if the

departmental proceeding will not be concluded before superannuation

of respective employees, then it will seriously prejudice the

Respondents.

In support of his contention, Ld. Sr. Counsel

representing the Respondent, relied upon the following judgments:-

(i) SBI & others v. P. Zadenga (2023) 10 SCC 675

(ii) Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Rabindra Kumar Bharti
(2022) 12 SCC 390,

(iii) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Rabindranath
Choubey
(2020) 18, SCC 71,

(iv) Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. Punjab National
Bank
(2007) 9, SCC 15, and

(v) Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C.,
(1999) 3, SCC 666,

Relying upon the aforesaid submissions and the

judgments referred by him he submits that it would be in the interest

of justice to vacate the interim order and grant liberty to the

Respondents to pass final order in respect to each of the petitioner.

6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, and after

going through the documents available on the record, it is evident that

the facts are admitted in all these cases, inasmuch as, the departmental

proceeding was initiated pursuant to the criminal case filed by the CBI

with respect to individual petitioners. It is also an admitted fact that

the allegations in all these cases are of demand of bribe and

acceptance of the same and/or conspiracy behind it.

Further, in all these cases even the witnesses and the

documents to be relied upon by the disciplinary authority in

disciplinary proceeding and by the CBI in the criminal case are one

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and the same. In other words the departmental proceeding and the

criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts.

7. Vide order dated 17-06-2015, the coordinate bench of

this Court has granted liberty to the Respondents to continue with the

departmental proceeding against the petitioners, but they were

prevented from passing the final order. For brevity relevant portion of

the order dated 17-06-2015, passed in W.P.(S) No. 587 of 2015, is

extracted herein below:

“Having regard to the aforesaid facts and the submission made, as
requested by learned counsel for the respondent, 3 weeks time is allowed
for them to respond to the averments made in the main writ application
as well as on Interlocutory Application. In the meantime the
departmental proceeding may continue against the petitioners in both the
cases, but no final order be passed against them…”

Similar interim orders were also passed in other cases

and finally, all the cases were directed to be heard together by

different orders and as such, all were heard together and since

common issue is involved in this case, the facts of individual cases are

not discussed in details.

8. The law with regards to continuance/stay of departmental

proceeding till culmination of the criminal case when the

departmental proceeding and the criminal case are based on identical

and similar set of facts; has continued to be a debatable issue and no

straight jacket formula has yet been formulated by the Hon’ble Apex

Court. In the case of M.Paul Anthony (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex

Court has laid down certain guidelines to be adopted in such type of

cases. For brevity, para-22 of the judgment is quoted herein below:-

“22. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this
Court referred to above are:

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(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a
criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being
conducted simultaneously, though separately.

(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case
are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal
case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves
complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the
departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.

(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is
grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in
that case
, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case
launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material
collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-
sheet.

(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be
considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard
has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be
unduly delayed.

(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is
being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were
stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and
proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the
employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is
found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.”

If we critically peruse the aforesaid judgment, sub-para

(i) indicates that there is no bar in their being conducted

simultaneously, though separately. However, sub-para (ii) and (iii)

clearly stipulates that if the departmental proceeding and the criminal

cases are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in

the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature

which involves a complicated question of law and fact, it would be

desirable to stay the departmental proceeding till the conclusion of

criminal case.

It further indicates about the nature of allegation, i.e.

whether it involves a complicated question of fact and law or not.

However, in Clause (V), it has given liberty by indicating that if the

departmental proceedings, even they were stayed on account of

pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so

as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found

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not guilty, his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found

guilty, that administration may get rid of him at the earliest.

9. Thus, in these cases, two issues are necessary to

scrutinize in the backdrop of the allegation being identical as the

departmental proceeding and the criminal case are based on identical

and similar set of facts; as to whether there is any complicated

question of law and fact, and whether there is any huge delay in

conclusion of the criminal trial and as to whether there is any hope of

early disposal of the respective criminal cases.

10. At this stage, it would be desirable to understand what is

the question of fact, what is the question of law, and what is the mixed

question of law and fact, and what are complicated matters.

Questions of Fact:

 These concern what actually happened in a case.
 They involve evidence gathering to establish events, actions,
and circumstances.

 Examples include: Did a party sign a contract? Was someone
speeding? What was the intention behind a specific action?
 Complicated questions of fact might involve conflicting
witness testimonies, complex financial transactions, or
technical details requiring expert analysis.
Questions of Law:

 These involve interpreting and applying legal rules, statutes,
and precedents.

 They determine how the law applies to the established facts.
 Examples include: Is a contract legally enforceable? What is
the correct interpretation of a specific law? What is the
appropriate legal standard to apply?

 Complicated questions of law might involve novel legal issues,
unclear or conflicting legal precedents, or the application of
complex legal doctrines.

Mixed Questions of Law and Fact:

 Many cases involve both intricate factual disputes and
challenging legal interpretations.

 These are known as mixed questions of law and fact.
 The court must first determine the facts and then decide how
the law applies to those facts,

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 For example, in a negligence case, the court must determine if
a party acted carelessly (question of fact) and if that
carelessness constitutes negligence under the law (question of
law).

Complicated Matters:

 When a case involves both intricate factual disputes and
challenging legal interpretations, it is considered to involve
“complicated questions of fact and law”.

 This means the court needs to address both the factual aspects
and the legal aspects in a complex manner.

 Such matters often require extensive evidence, expert
testimony, and detailed legal analysis.

 Examples include cases involving intellectual property
disputes, complex business transactions, or cases with
significant constitutional law implications.
In the light of the above, it is to be seen whether these

cases involve complicated/mixed question of fact and law or not. This

Court is of the view that the charge may be grave, but it is not

complicated and it is not such type of cases where several numbers of

witnesses are to be examined. In all these cases, as aforesaid, the

documents to be relied upon by the prosecution in the criminal case

are also similar what has been relied upon by the disciplinary

authority. As aforesaid, since the Respondents were granted liberty to

proceed in the disciplinary proceeding, they proceeded and only final

order is to be passed as claimed by them. Thus, there seems to be no

prejudice to the respective petitioners

11. Further, when the number of witnesses in the criminal

case is not so huge and all the witnesses of the disciplinary

proceedings are also witness in the criminal case; and the matters does

not require extensive evidence, expert testimony, and/or detailed legal

analysis; the present set of cases cannot be termed to be a one

involving complicated question of law and fact, inasmuch as, in the

present set of cases there can’t be intricate factual disputes which will

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2025:JHHC:19356

require legal interpretations. Thus, this Court is of the firm opinion

that these set of cases cannot be termed as a case involving

complicated question of fact and law.

12. At the cost of repetition, in the disciplinary proceeding

the common wittnesses have been examined or about to be examined,

as the case may be, then as per sub-para (v) of para 22 of Paul

Anthony judgment(supra) the pendency of criminal case is of much

importance. In the present set of cases; in W.P.(S) no. 587/2015 &

W.P.(S) no. 595/2015, even charge sheet by the C.B.I. has been

submitted on 30.05.2014 i.e. more than 11 years ago and there is no

chance of early conclusion of trial

Even in W.P.(S) no. 3192/2019 & W.P.(S) no. 2944/2019

the chargesheet has been submitted by the C.B.I. on 26.03.2018 & in

W.P.(S) no. 1989/2021, it has been submitted on 29.06.20. Thus, even

in the latest case chargesheet has been submitted five years before and

there is no chance of early conclusion of trial.

Thus, it is evident from record that after a lapse of so

many years, the trial is still pending and there is no hope of early

conclusion of trail. As a matter of fact, during pendency of the writ

application, the Petitioner of WPS No. 595 of 2015 has already

superannuated. Therefore, taking a clue from sub-para (v) of para-22

of Paul Anthony judgment, this Court is of the view that even if the

departmental proceeding was stayed on account of pendency of

criminal case, the same requires a logical conclusion.

13. Now coming on to the issue raised by Ld. Sr. Counsel for

the Respondents about the Certified Standing Order which does not

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2025:JHHC:19356

stipulate as to the future course of action if a delinquent superannuates

during pendency of the Departmental proceedings. This Court has

perused the certified standing order and admittedly the same is silent

with regard to the course of action adopted by them in such type of

cases where a delinquent superannuates during pendency of the

Departmental proceedings.

It goes without saying that the provisions like Section 43

of Bihar Pension Rules, which stipulates the procedure to be adopted

by the State for continuance of departmental proceeding in case of

superannuation of a delinquent; is absent in the certified standing

order which is applicable to these petitioners.

14. Having regard to the aforesaid discussions, following

issues are involved to decide present set of writ applications:-

(i) What prejudice will be caused to either of the
parties ?

(ii) Balance of loss between the parties.

(iii) Whether the charge is complicated question of
fact and law ?

15. So far as issue number three is concerned, the same has

been discussed herein above and this court after going through the

entire charge memo of the departmental proceeding and the charge-

sheet comes to the conclusion that the same is not a

complicated/mixed question of fact and law for the reasons stated in

the preceding paragraphs.

16. Now coming to the second issue, with regard to what

prejudice will be caused to either of the parties; in this regard,

certainly in view of the standing order, since the same is silent on the

course of action by the management, if the delinquent retires from

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2025:JHHC:19356

service; then it would be very difficult for the Respondent-Company

to conclude the proceeding and in that case, certainly it will prejudice

the Company.

On the other side, if the delinquent is punished in the

departmental proceeding and subsequently he is acquitted in the

Criminal Case, then this Court relying upon several judgments has

held that if the petitioner is acquitted from the criminal trial and

before its conclusion he is punished in the departmental proceeding,

then certainly he can approach the concerned respondent and his

acquittal in the criminal case will certainly change the final verdict of

the department (Refer Para-6 to 8 of W.P.(S) No. 6339 of 2023).

17. It is also a fact that since these workmen are not the

permanent resident of Bokaro, after superannuation they will certainly

proceed to their native place and for the Respondent-Company it

would be next to impossible to trace them out if the interim order

restricting the Respondents to pass a final order in the department

proceeding continues and finally the petitioners will be convicted in

future.

As such, this Court holds that the interim order restricting

the Respondents to pass a final order in the department proceeding in

respective cases will prejudice the Company more; in comparison to

the respective Petitioner and accordingly the balance of loss is more to

the Company; rather than to the respective petitioners.

18. At this stage, it is profitable to refer the judgment passed

by the Hon’ble Apex Court, which is on similar facts and has been

decided against the delinquent. For brevity, para-13 to 17 of the

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2025:JHHC:19356

judgment rendered in the case of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Rabindra

Kumar Bharti reported in (2022) 12, SCC 390, are quoted here in

below.

“13. We would notice that this is a case where there is a
criminal case against the respondent. The appellant(s) as employer
also launched disciplinary proceedings. It is undoubtedly true that
this Court has taken the view that when the charges are identical
and give rise to complicated issues of fact and law and evidence is
the same, it may not be appropriate to proceed simultaneously in
disciplinary proceedings, along with the criminal case. The
rationale behind the principle largely is that the employee who is
facing the disciplinary proceeding would necessarily have to take
a stand. This in turn would amount to revealing his defence and
therefore prejudice the employee in the criminal proceedings. No
doubt, this Court has laid down that it is not an absolute embargo
and the principle is one to be applied based on the facts of each
case.

14. Even applying the principles as such to the facts, that is,
examining its impact on the destiny of this case, we find as follows:

When the respondent was faced with the disciplinary proceeding,
he approached the High Court. Apparently, he sought stay of the
proceedings. The High Court did not deem it appropriate to grant
stay of the disciplinary proceeding. Instead, as noticed by us by
order dated 29-6-2017, the proceedings were allowed to be
continued. According to the appellant(s) proper enquiry was held
and the respondent participated. As to whether the enquiry was
held properly or not is not a matter on which we do express our
opinion. However, at the end of the enquiry as held by the
appellant in view of the order [Rabindra Kumar Bharti v. Eastern
Coalfields Ltd.
, 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 3460] passed by the High
Court the appellant sought permission to pass the final order, or
the appropriate order of penalty. This led to the disposal of the
writ petition itself by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single
Judge in the judgment noticed that this is a case where the
respondent had already revealed his defence by participating in
the proceedings. It is further found that order dated 29-6-2017,
which permitted the enquiry to be continued was not challenged.
The learned Single Judge accordingly permitted the disciplinary
proceedings to attain finality at the hands of the disciplinary
authority. The disciplinary authority accordingly passed an order
dismissing the respondent from service. No doubt this is during the
pendency of the appeal.

15. In the appeal, the order of the disciplinary authority
dismissing the respondent was not the subject-matter of challenge
by way of an amendment in the writ petition. The Division Bench
has posed the question as to what would happen if the criminal
trial culminates in acquittal and it is thereafter that the High Court
deemed it appropriate also apparently with reference to its power
under Order 41 Rule 33 to pass the order keeping in abeyance the

21
2025:JHHC:19356

order of dismissal and it was to become operative upon the
criminal trial going against the respondent.

16. We would notice that what is most pertinent is the aspect
that in the challenge in the writ petition against the holding of the
disciplinary proceedings, obtaining of an interim order in the
nature of the case was of relevance and importance to the question
at hand. The principle involved being that when parallel
proceedings are held on the basis of identical charges and the
same evidence, the employee should not be allowed to disclose his
defence. This aspect of the matter is to be looked into with
reference to the effect of the order dated 29-6-2017.

17. As a result of the said order passed during the pendency of
the writ petition, the respondent had allegedly participated in the
enquiry and there would be no scope for applying that principle as
such. In such circumstances, we think that the High Court may not
have been justified in passing the impugned order [Rabindra
Kumar Bharti v. Eastern Coalfields Ltd.
, 2021 SCC OnLine Cal
3460] the result of which is that though the appellant(s) conducted
the disciplinary proceeding as permitted by the learned Single
Judge and the respondent allegedly participated in it and all that
remained was passing of an order by the disciplinary authority and
what is more during the pendency of the appeal no doubt the order
of dismissal has been passed, the appellant is forced to retain the
respondent and the order is to remain in suspended animation to
attain finality only if the criminal case is decided in the future and
it ends in the conviction of the respondent. We do not think that the
High Court was justified in passing such an order in the facts of
this case.

Emphasis Supplied

19. At this stage, it is also pertinent to refer the judgment

referred by the Mr. Krishna, learned counsel for the Petitioner in the

case of StanzenToyotetsu India (P) Ltd. Vs. Girish & Ors. (2014) 3

SCC 636. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied upon para 8 and

15 of the said judgment which is quoted herein below:-

8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some
length. The only question that falls for determination in the above
backdrop is whether the courts below were justified in staying the
ongoing disciplinary proceedings pending conclusion of the trial in
the criminal case registered and filed against the respondents. The
answer to that question would primarily depend upon whether
there is any legal bar to the continuance of the disciplinary
proceedings against the employees based on an incident which is
also the subject-matter of criminal case against such employees. It
would also depend upon the nature of the charges in the criminal
case filed against the employees and whether the case involves

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2025:JHHC:19356

complicated questions of law and fact. The possibility of prejudice
to the employees accused in the criminal case on account of the
parallel disciplinary enquiry going ahead is another dimension
which will have to be addressed while permitting or staying such
disciplinary enquiry proceedings. The law on the subject is fairly
well settled for similar issues and has often engaged the attention
of this Court in varied fact situations. Although the
pronouncements of this Court have stopped short of prescribing
any straitjacket formula for application to all cases, the decisions
of this Court have identified the broad approach to be adopted in
such matters leaving it for the courts concerned to take an
appropriate view in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each
case that comes up before them. Suffice it to say that there is no
short-cut solution to the problem. What is, however, fairly well
settled and was not disputed even before us is that there is no legal
bar to the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings and a criminal
trial simultaneously.

15. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in State of
Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena
[(1996) 6 SCC 417 : 1996 SCC (L&S)
1455] , where this Court reiterated that there was no legal bar for
both proceedings to go on simultaneously unless there is a
likelihood of the employee suffering prejudice in the criminal trial.

What is significant is that the likelihood of prejudice itself is
hedged by providing that not only should the charge be grave but
even the case must involve complicated questions of law and fact.
Stay of proceedings at any rate cannot and should not be a matter
of course. The following passage is in this regard apposite: (B.K.
Meena
case [(1996) 6 SCC 417 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1455] , SCC
pp. 422-23, paras 14-15)
“14. … there is no legal bar for both
proceedings to go on simultaneously and then say that in certain
situations, it may not be ‘desirable’, ‘advisable’ or ‘appropriate’
to proceed with the disciplinary enquiry when a criminal case is
pending on identical charges. The staying of disciplinary
proceedings, it is emphasised, is a matter to be determined having
regard to the facts and circumstances of a given case and that no
hard-and-fast rules can be enunciated in that behalf. The only
ground suggested in the above decisions as constituting a valid
ground for staying the disciplinary proceedings is that ‘the defence
of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced’. This
ground has, however, been hedged in by providing further that this
may be done in cases of grave nature involving questions of fact
and law. In our respectful opinion, it means that not only the
charges must be grave but that the case must involve complicated
questions of law and fact. Moreover, ‘advisability’, ‘desirability’
or ‘propriety’, as the case may be, has to be determined in each
case taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of
the case. … While it is not possible to enumerate the various
factors, for and against the stay of disciplinary proceedings, we
found it necessary to emphasise some of the important
considerations in view of the fact that very often the disciplinary
proceedings are being stayed for long periods pending criminal

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2025:JHHC:19356

proceedings. Stay of disciplinary proceedings cannot be, and
should not be, a matter of course. All the relevant factors, for and
against, should be weighed and a decision taken keeping in view
the various principles laid down in the decisions referred to above.

15. … Indeed, in such cases, it is all the
more in the interest of the charged officer that the proceedings are
expeditiously concluded. Delay in such cases really works against
him.”

(emphasis supplied)
However, In the same judgment, the Hon’ble Apex

Court at Para 18 has held as under :-

18. That apart, the respondents have already disclosed the
defence in the explanation submitted by them before the
commencement of the departmental enquiry in which one witness
has been examined by each of the enquiry officers. The charge-

sheet, it is evident from the record, was filed on 20-8-2011. The
charges were framed on 20-12-2011. The trial court has ever since
then examined only three witnesses so far out of a total of 23
witnesses cited in the charge-sheet. Going by the pace at which the
trial court is examining the witnesses, it would take another five
years before the trial may be concluded. The High Court has in the
judgment under appeal given five months to the trial court to
conclude the trial. More than fifteen months has rolled by ever
since that order, without the trial going anywhere near completion.
The disciplinary proceedings cannot remain stayed for an
indefinitely long period. Such inordinate delay is neither in the
interest of the appellant Company nor the respondents who are
under suspension and surviving on subsistence allowance. The
number of accused implicated in the case is also very large. We
are not suggesting that the incident must be taken to be false only
because such a large number could not participate in the incident.
But there is a general tendency to spread the net wider and even
implicate those who were not concerned with the commission of
the offences or who even though present committed no overt act to
show that they shared the common object of the assembly or be
responsible for the riotous behaviour of other accused persons.
Interest of such accused as may be innocent also cannot be
ignored nor can they be made to suffer indefinitely just because
some others have committed an offence or offences.

Emphasis Supplied

20. Similar issue was also taken into consideration by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v.

Rabindranath Choubey (2020) 18 SCC 71 and it has been observed

by the Hon’ble Apex Court that “in view of various decisions, it is

apparent that under Rule 34.2 of the CDA Rules, inquiry can be held

24
2025:JHHC:19356

in the same manner as if the employee had continued in service and

appropriate major and minor punishment……”

But unfortunately, there is no such rule in the Certified

Standing Order, as stated herein above, which is applicable to these

Petitioners.

21. In the absence of any such provision, the Hon’ble Apex

Court has also held in the case of Bhagirathi Jina versus Board of

Directors, OSFC, (1999) 3, SCC 666, relevant para are 6 & 7 which

is as under:-

6. It will be noticed from the abovesaid regulations that no
specific provision was made for deducting any amount from the
provident fund consequent to any misconduct determined in the
departmental enquiry nor was any provision made for continuance
of the departmental enquiry after superannuation.

7. In view of the absence of such a provision in the abovesaid
regulations, it must be held that the Corporation had no legal
authority to make any reduction in the retiral benefits of the
appellant. There is also no provision for conducting a
disciplinary enquiry after retirement of the appellant and nor any
provision stating that in case misconduct is established, a
deduction could be made from retiral benefits. Once the appellant
had retired from service on 30-6-1995, there was no authority
vested in the Corporation for continuing the departmental enquiry
even for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retiral
benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such an
authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the
appellant was entitled to full retiral benefits on retirement.

Emphasis Supplied

22. It would also be profitable to refer the judgment passed

in the case of Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. Punjab National Bank

(2007) 9 SCC 15 para-13 and 22 as under:-

13. The question as to whether a departmental proceeding can
continue despite the delinquent officer’s reaching the age of
superannuation would depend upon the applicability of the extant
rules. It may be true that the question of imposition of dismissal of
the delinquent officer from service when he has already reached
the age of superannuation would not ordinarily arise. However, as
the consequences of such an order are provided for in the service

25
2025:JHHC:19356

rules, in our opinion, it would not be correct to contend that
imposition of such a punishment would be wholly impermissible in
law.

22. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it was permissible for
the Bank to continue with the disciplinary proceedings relying on
or on the basis of Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Punjab National
Bank (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979.

23. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, this Court

holds that preventing the Respondent from passing the final order in

the backdrop of the delay in Criminal Case is not in the interest of

justice, inasmuch as, in one of the Writ applications being WPS no.

595/2015, the Petitioner has already retired.

As such, the Order dated 17.06.2015 passed in WPS No.

587 of 2015 and all other interim orders whereby the Respondents

were prevented from passing final order, is hereby, vacated and the

Respondents are directed to proceed in the matter.

24. It goes without saying, that the Respondents shall

proceed in the respective departmental proceedings strictly in

accordance with law and following principles of natural justice and

shall not be in hurry to close the proceedings; except in cases where

the delinquent is going to retire soon.

25. With the aforesaid observations and directions, all Writ

applications stand disposed of. Pending I.As., if any, also stands

closed.

(Deepak Roshan, J.)

Fahim/-

AFR/

26

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