Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Narottam Majumder vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 25 July, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay
WPA 3679 of 2024
Narottam Majumder
-vs-
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
With
WPA 2252 of 2024
(CAN 1/2024, CAN 2/2025)
Atanu Ghosh
-vs-
State of West Bengal & Ors.
With
WPA 2280 of 2024
Sk Ali Naser
-vs-
State of West Bengal & Ors.
With
WPA 2285 of 2024
Sk. Amir Ali
-vs-
State of West Bengal & Ors.
With
WPA 23830 of 2024
Sk. Jahiruddin & Ors.
-vs-
State of West Bengal & Ors.
With
Page 2 of 22
WPA 3274 of 2024
Mahadeb Ghosh
-vs-
State of West Bengal & Ors.
With
WPA 3278 of 2024
Rakesh Panja
-vs-
State of West Bengal & Ors.
With
WPA 3283 of 2024
Pradip Banerjee
-vs-
State of West Bengal & Ors.
With
WPA 3720 of 2024
Akshay Kr. Rana
-vs-
State of West Bengal & Ors.
With
WPA 4146 of 2024
Uttam Ash
-vs-
State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Sanat Kr. Roy
: Mr. Baidurya Ghosal
(In WPA 2252/2024,
WPA 2280/2024,
WPA 2285/2024,
WPA 23830/2024,
WPA 3720/2024 &
WPA 4146/2024)
Page 3 of 22
: Mr. Dilip Kumar Samanta
: Mr. Biswapriya Samanta
: Mr. S. Palit
: Mr. Akash Kr. Chakrabarty
(In WPA
3274/2024, WPA
3278/2024, WPA
3283/2024)
For the added party respondent : Mr. Arabinda Chatterjee
: Ms. Kakali Dutta
For the State : Mr. Amal Kr. Sen, Ld. A.G.P.
: Mr. Lal Mohan Basu
(In WPA
2252/2024,
WPA
23830/2024 &
WPA 3283/2024
: Mr. Ayan Banerjee
: Mr. Sanjay Mukherjee
(In WPA
4146/2024)
Heard on : 07/07/2025
Judgment on : 25/07/2025
Rai Chattopadhyay, J. :-
(1) The petitioners in this bunch of writ petitions are the stage carriage
operators, who have been issued permit by the Regional Transport
Authority, Burdwan and ply their vehicles within the district,
Page 4 of 22including the route spreading through the Burdwan Town. A
notification issued by the District Magistrate Burdwan is pertinent
in this case. The same is dated June 6, 2014. The said notification
speaks of decision of a meeting held on June 2, 2014, in presence
of the Minister-in-Charge and the Chairperson BDA, the Chairman
Burdwan Municipality and all bus-owner’s associations. The
unanimous decision was that on and from June 15, 2014, no buses
will ply through old Grand Trank Road, inside the Burdwan town,
except the ‘Town Service’ and the ‘School Buses’. Hence, in
exercise of power conferred under section 96(2)(xxii) of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988, read with Rule 182 of the West Bengal Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1989, the District Magistrate directs in the said
notification dated June 6, 2014, „that all buses plying through the
Burdwan Town, shall in stead of their present movement status,
hence forth operate from Nawabhat and Alisha bus stand
respectively‟. All previous orders were superseded and directions
in the said notification dated June 6, 2014 have been made
effective from June 15, 2014.
(2) The petitioner’s case specifically rests on the provisions made and
mentioned in the 9th paragraph of the said notification, which
provides that „These buses shall henceforth utilize the stands at
Nawabhat and Alisha, depending on their route permits, Long
Route buses with permits issued by the State Transport Authority,
West Bengal and Regional Transport Authorities (other than
Burdwan) including SBSTC buses shall also come under the
purview of this notification. ………‟ . According to the petitioners
Page 5 of 22there has been an exception curved out from the general provisions
of the notification that Nawabhat and Alisha bus stands have been
provided for all, other than the transport, permit for which has been
issued by the Regional Transport Authority, Burdwan. They claim
that they fall within the said exception clause as their respective
permits have been issued by the Regional Transport Authority,
Burdwan.
(3) It is also pertinent here to mention the new scheme of movement of
buses and the arrangement of stands, as provided in the said
notification, which is extracted bellow:
“In the new scheme of movement of buses, the arrangement stands as
follows :-
a) All buses entering into and leaving from Burdwan, from various
routes like Durgapur, Asansol, Guskara etc. shall henceforth use
Nawabhat bus stand (by no mean they will enter Burdwan Town
through old G.T. Road);
b) All buses entering into and leaving from Burdwan, from various
routes like Katwa, Kalna, Nabadwip, Krishnanagar etc, shall henceforth
use Nawabhat bus stand via-Rly. Bridge, Mehedibagan but shall not
enter into Burdwan Town area (left turn strictly prohibited at the end of
Railway flyover during entry);
c) All buses entering into and leaving from Burdwan from various routes
like Memari, Barsul, Shaktigarh, Jamalpur, Tarakeswar, Kolkata etc.
shall henceforth use Alisha bus stand;
d) All buses entering into and leaving from Burdwan, from the Dakshin
Damadar Section, various routes like Arambagh, Khandaghosh, Raina,
Bankura etc. shall henceforth use the Alisha bus stand vial Telepukur
More, NH-2 but shall not enter into Burdwan Town area;”
(4) The further and ultimate direction as provided in the said
notification dated June 6, 2014 is that „only for dedicated town
service buses whose routes are confined into Burdwan Town area
Page 6 of 22
and School buses shall ply through old G. T. Road into Burdwan
Town area with effect from 15-6-2014.‟
(5) The constitutionality and validity of this notification was
challenged before this Court. Several writ petitions were filed
which were decided by the Hon’ble Single Judge vide the
judgment and order dated September 2, 2022, thereby upholding
the validity of the said notification dated June 6, 2014. Appeals
followed before the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court,
challenging the said verdict of the Single Bench. The Division
Bench has disposed of those vide a single judgment and order
dated July 26, 2023. The Hon’ble Division Bench did not interfere
and upheld the verdict of the Single Bench. The Hon’ble Division
Bench has specifically mentioned that :
“22. Mr. Samanta has asked this Court to indicate that the text of
the notification in the paragraph 9 indicates that it does not apply
to Burdwan Town. Mr. Chatterjee appearing for the private
respondent submits that the notification does not indicate as such.
This Court does not venture to clarify the notification in question.
The notification shall speak for itself.”
(6) A challenge as to the said verdict of the Hon’ble Division Bench
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court had also failed. The Supreme
Court, vide order dated September 25, 2023, had dismissed the
Special Leave Petition challenging the Hon’ble Division Bench’s
order dated July 26, 2023. Therefore, the said notification dated
June 6, 2014, stands as valid and legal.
Page 7 of 22
(7) In such circumstances the District Magistrate, Purba Burdwan
(after bifurcation of the district) has considered the petitioner’s
grievance further, vide this Court’s order dated September 29,
2023 and issued his order dated December 20, 2023. The said
order dated December 20, 2023 passed by the District Magistrate,
Purba Burdwan, is under challenge in this writ petition.
(8) Mr. Roy learned advocate has represented some of the petitioners
whereas Mr. Samanta learned advocate has represented the others,
in this bunch of writ petitions. Mr. Sen learned AGP has
represented the State whereas, Mr. Chatterjee learned senior
counsel has appeared for the added respondents, who are the
existing operators of the dedicated town service buses, within
Burdwan town. Argument on behalf of the parties may be
summarized as herein bellow:
(9) Argument on behalf of the writ petitioners:
The writ petitioners are covered by the exception clause
contained in the 9th paragraph of the said notification dated
June 6, 2014; that the operators who have been granted
permit for providing service within the local limits of
Burdwan town by the Regional Transport Authority,
Burdwan, has been exempted from being covered under the
other provisions of the said notification; that the writ
petitioners fall exactly within the said category and hence,
should be treated as exempted from the operation of the said
notification.
Page 8 of 22
Respective permits of the writ petitioners have been issued
much prior than the date from which the said notification
has come into effect (June 15, 2014) and stand valid till
date;
Giving effect to the said notification in case of the
petitioners would amount to change of their permit
conditions without following the due procedure under the
law; that changing permit conditions without following the
due procedure under the law would not be sustainable in the
eye of law.
That in view of the route alignment and time table granted to
the writ petitioners, they are substantially the local service
providers though not specifically designated as the town
service providers, as mentioned in the said notification.
That there are several similar other operators who have been
permitted to operate within the Burdwan town, though not
specifically designated as the town service providers; hence,
the petitioners have been subjected to unreasonable
discrimination.
That by issuance and operation of a notification conditions
of permit/route alignment/termini point of the writ
petitioners cannot be altered or else the same shall be de-
hors the law; that when the statute prescribes a particular
mode of performance of the State instrumentality, it has to
Page 9 of 22be performed only in the said prescribed mode by the same
and all other modes are necessarily forbidden [by referring
to the judgment in Nazir Ahmed vs King Emperor reported
in AIR 1936 PC 253; also in Bhavnagar University Vs.
Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. reported in (2003) 2 SCC 111
and Ram Deen Maurya (Dr.) Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
reported in (2009) 6 SCC 735].
That the impugned notification is not applicable in case of
the writ petitioners and they are legally entitled and
authorized to operate by following the alignment of the route
mentioned in the permit and the time-table approved by the
authority.
That the impugned notification dated June 6, 2014 has been
made effective from June 15, 2014 and has no operation or
effect retrospectively. Since the petitioners’ permits date
back much prior to the date when the said notification has
been published or made effective and are scheduled to
expire long after, the writ petitioners cannot be considered to
be covered under the same.
That upon due scrutiny of the route alignment and the time
table of the petitioners it would appear that in effect they are
the local service providers, operating similarly as the
dedicated town service buses; hence, they should be treated
similarly with the dedicated town service buses and
dissimilar treatment would amount to discrimination; that
Page 10 of 22classification if at all needs to be based on intelligible
differentia based on a rational relation with the object sought
to be achieved by the legislation [by referring to the
judgment in Ranesh Chandra Sharma vs the State of Uttar
Pradesh reported in (2024) 5 SCC 217].
(10) Argument by the State respondent:
The petitioners have stage carriage permits on route
‘Manikhati to Nawabhat’ via Bajesalepur, Barsul,
Shaktigarh, G.T.Road; they are not the ‘dedicated town
service operators’ and thus does not come within the
exception category of ‘dedicated town service operators’, as
provided under the notification dated June 6, 2014.
That the said notification dated June 6, 2014 has provided
that all buses previously plying through the Old G.T.Road,
except the ‘town service buses’ and the ‘school buses’,
should utilize ‘Alisha’ and ‘Nawabhat’ bus stands,
according to their alignment of routes, since erstwhile
‘Tinkonia’ bus stand would not be functional any more.
Validity of the said notification dated June 6, 2014, in the
context of various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 and the rules framed thereunder, has been upheld by
the Court; that being so and in accordance with the plain
language of the said notification, the prayer of the
Page 11 of 22petitioners to allow them to enter into Burdwan town on the
plea that the petitioners are covered under the exception
clause of the said notification, would not be maintainable ;
hence, there would not be any illegality or infirmity as
regards the order challenged in these writ petitions, that is
dated December 20, 2023 passed by the District Magistrate,
Purba Burdwan/Chairman RTA, Purba Burdwan.
That the present writ petitions are only a drastic effort by the
petitioners to reagitate the issue, already decided the
Hon’ble Coordinate Bench of this Court, being affirmed by
the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court and the Supreme
Court; whereas the settled legal principle is that the decision
of the earlier Bench of coordinate jurisdiction shall have
binding effect on the later Bench; that only two courses are
available, either to follow the decision of the previous Bench
of coordinate jurisdiction or to refer for examination by the
Larger Bench; that, validity of the notification dated June 6,
2014 has not only been upheld by the Hon’ble Coordinate
Bench but the decision of the Single Bench has been upheld
both by the Division Bench and the Supreme Court;
therefore, implementation thereof cannot be restrained in the
guise of whatever plea; in support of argument advanced
regarding binding nature of the decision of the earlier Bench
of coordinate jurisdiction, a Larger Bench judgment of the
Supreme Court has been relied on in National Insurance
Company Limited vs Pranay Sethi and Others [reported in
Page 12 of 22(2017) 16 SCC 680]; that in the present bunch of cases the
petitioners are motivated to procure such relief indirectly,
which have been denied to them directly; hence, the writ
petitions are not maintainable being abuse of the process of
law [as per judgment in Vaijinath s/o Yeshwanta Jadhav
deceased by Legal Representatives and Others vs Afsar
Begum (2020) 15 SCC 128].
The instant writ petitions are only attempted change in the
form of the petition on the grounds therein whereas the issue
required to be determined is substantially the same, as has
been decided in the earlier rounds of litigations challenging
the notification dated June 6, 2014; hence, the instant cases
are barred by the principles of res judicata and/or
constructive res judicata; it has been submitted that in the
earlier rounds of litigation, the parties were same who
fought in the court regarding the validity of the said
notifications; in the instant case the same parties are at
loggerheads to challenge and defend respectively the
essential fallout of implementation of the said notification; it
is only incidental and essentially connected with the subject
matter of the earlier litigations; hence, prohibited under
barred due to exercise of principles of res judicata. In this
respect the judgments in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering
Officers‟ Association vs State of Maharashtra & Others
[reported in (1990) 2 SCC 715] and P.Bandopadhyay &
Page 13 of 22
Others vs Union of India & Others [reported in (2019) 13
SCC 42], have been referred to.
As against the argument of the writ petitioners regarding that
the notification as above has excluded those stage carriages,
which have been granted permit by the RTO Burdwan by
interpreting the clause in the notification that, “Long route
buses with permits issued by the State Transport Authority,
West Bengal and Regional Transport Authorities (other than
Burdwan) including SBSTC buses shall also come under the
purview of this notification.” – it has been submitted that a
document has to be given a meaningful, contextual,
purposive and executable interpretation. An interpretation
which fails to achieve the manifest purpose of the
notification, making the same practically unworkable, has to
be discarded. That the interpretation would be such to
promote the efficacious workability of the policy
promulgated thereby or else the very purpose of it would be
futile. According to the State respondent, the policy decision
is to reduce traffic within town. That advancement thereof
can only be achieved by contextual and purposive
interpretation of the clauses in the notification and not
otherwise. In this regard the judgments in Franklin
Templeton Trustee Services Private Limited & Another vs
Amruta Garg & Another [reported in (2021) 9 SCC 606]
and Sanjay Ramdas Patil vs Sanjay and Others [reported in
(2021) 10 SCC 306], have been relied on.
Page 14 of 22
(11) Argument by the added respondents:-
They have largely adopted the argument of the State
respondent.
That, to combat the traffic congestion within Burdwan town
area and in terms of the city development plan prepared in
consultation with IIT Kharagpur, to well-equipped bus
terminus have been constructed and made ready to use at
Nawabhat and Alisha; that it is only in terms of the city
development plan as mentioned above, those two bus stands
has been made operative, and the other one that is namely
Tinkonia bus stand has been closed down and all buses have
been redirected to the newly constructed two bus stands as
named above; for the purpose as above, the Authority has
published the notification dated June 6, 2014 and has taken
all reasonable steps to inform the operators for due
compliance of the same.
That, validity of the notification as above after being
challenged earlier by the instant writ petitioners, has been
upheld by the Single Bench and Division Bench of this
Court and the Supreme Court.
That in the order dated October 28, 2021, the Regional
Transport Authority Purba Bardhaman has held that the
notification dated June 6, 2014 is to be followed strictly. The
Secretary RTA shall issue a general notice to all permit
Page 15 of 22
holders under his jurisdiction, that is RTA Purba Burdwan to
change/modify their termini from Burdwan to Nawabhat or
Alisha bus stand, by the date November 31, 2021.
That a contextual and purposive reading of the words „(other
than Burdwan)’, in the said notification dated June 6, 2014,
would not mean as the petitioners want to impose on those;
that, mentioning about the permits which have been issued
by the RTOs other than Burdwan, does not necessarily
exclude permits issued by RTO Burdwan.
Also, that the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court has
declined to clarify in any manner the clauses in the
notification dated June 6, 2014, which order is binding on
this Court.
(12) It is relevant to discuss as to whether the respondent
authority does possess power to modify route in the permits and
also whether such modification if permissible under law can be
made through administrative orders.
(13) Under section 72(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, The
original transport Authority has the authority and power to grant
permits either as applied for or with such modifications as it deems
fit, provided the modifications do not involve routes not specified
in the original application. The same principle of law is reinforced
in various judgements to clarify that curtailment or alteration of a
Page 16 of 22
route within the limits of the original application constitutes a
permissible modification, whereas granting a permit for a different
route not specified in the application would violate statutory
provisions. Traffic regulations and diversions introduced to
alleviate congestion, especially within city limits, are generally
regarded as valid exercise of the Authority’s power, provided they
are not arbitrary or unreasonable. Courts have held that minor
deviations within the notified route, especially when undertaken
for traffic management and congestion reduction, do not amount to
a violation of permit conditions or a change of route in the permit.
In case of diversion for congestion management, Courts have
emphasised that such measures are within the scope of the
Authority’s power, especially when they do not alter the
fundamental route or increase the service beyond permitted limits.
(14) In case of the writ petitioners, it is the change of termini of
the already approved route for plying their vehicles, is what has
been made effected vide the impugned order and the notification
dated June 6, 2014. The reasons thereof are well spoken in the
notification and the order. Validity of the notification dated June 6,
2014 has already been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The
impugned order dated December 20, 2023 is only in terms of the
said notification. It is pertinent to note that the route alignment for
the writ petitioners remains substantially the same excepting
change of termini and that they should terminate their vehicles at
the outskirts of the city of Burdwan, at the two newly constructed
bus stands instead of crossing through the city. As a matter of fact,
Page 17 of 22
the bus stand which was previously in use has been closed. All this
is result of a policy which has been undertaken by the State
Authorities, to combat the menace of over congestion of traffic
within Burdwan city. It is not that the State Authority would not
have any power to impose modifications as to the route alignment
already allowed in the permit, but such decision has to be based on
reasons and should not mutilate absolutely with the original permit
conditions. The Court finds in the present case, both the said
conditions to have been duly fulfilled by the respondents, while
passing the impugned order.
(15) Hence, no infirmity can be found in modifying the permits
of the writ petitioners including road curtailment which are found
valid under Section 72(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as the
reasons therefor are valid and not arbitrary. In this regard, the
verdict of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of State of
West Bengal Vs. Sk. Nurul Amin reported in (2010) 11 SCC 182
may be mentioned as follows:-
“5. Section 72 of the Act deals with grant of stage carriage
permits. Sub-section (1) thereof which is relevant, is
extracted below:
“72. Grant of stage carriage permits.–(1) Subject to the
provisions of Section 71, a Regional Transport Authority
may, on an application made to it under Section 70, grant a
stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or
with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant
such a permit:
Provided that no such permit shall be granted in respect of
any route or area not specified in the application.”
A careful reading of sub-section (1) of Section 72 makes it
clear that the Authority is not bound to grant a stage
Page 18 of 22
carriage permit as sought. The Authority could either grant
the stage carriage permit in accordance with the application
or refuse to grant such stage carriage permit or grant the
stage carriage permit with such modifications as it deemed
fit. The only restriction on the power of the Authority is that
it could not grant a permit for a route not specified in the
application.
6. In this case, what the Authority has done is to grant the
permanent stage carriage permits in regard to the routes for
which the applications were made, but with a modification,
by curtailing the routes for which the permits were applied,
only up to Barasat. The Authority in effect therefore refused
to grant the permit for the last leg (Barasat to Kolkata) of
the two routes applied. Though the communications from
the Authority to the respondent did not contain the reason
for curtailing the routes, it is stated that the resolutions of
the Authority (which led to the issue of the impugned
communications) assigned the reason for curtailment. The
reason was that in view of the heavy traffic congestion and
vehicular pollution in Kolkata, there was restriction of entry
of new passenger vehicles into Kolkata and, therefore, the
permits were granted only up to Barasat.
7. The Division Bench proceeded on the basis that when one
of the termini is altered by the Authority, then the permit is
not granted in respect of the route applied, and it would
amount to granting a permit in respect of a route not
specified in the application. On a careful consideration, we
are of the view that the interpretation by the High Court is
without basis.
8. What is prohibited by the proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 72 is granting of a permit in respect of any route or
area not specified in the application. The said proviso does
not prohibit curtailment in regard to portion of the route
applied for, for any valid reason. In fact sub-section (1)
specifically authorises the Authority to grant the stage
carriage permit with such modifications as it deems fit.
Curtailment of a route would be a modification as
contemplated under sub-section (1). We may clarify this by
an illustration where the application is made for grant of a
permit in regard to a route A to D through points B and C. If
the grant is made for the route A to C through B, excluding
the last portion C to D, it will be a modification which is
contemplated and provided for under sub-section (1) of
Section 72 of the Act. On the other hand, if the grant is made
in regard to route E to F or in regard to route A to E, the
Page 19 of 22
grant will be in regard to a route not specified in the
application and consequently the permit will be violative of
the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 72 of the Act.”
(16) Thus, one can also find that the Courts have upheld route
modifications made via notifications, if those are founded on
legitimate traffic management considerations and are not arbitrary.
For example, diversion of buses away from congested routes to
alleviate traffic and prevent accidents has been validated when
supported by reasons such as, road safety and congestion control,
hence the Authority acts within its statutory powers and records
reasons adequately. Notifications issued under statutory powers
(for example under Section 71 and 72 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988) for traffic regulation, must be based on adequate factual and
legal considerations like road safety, congestion and public
interest. Therefore, the Court is constrained to accept submission
of the writ petitioners that by modifying the termini of the
permitted route with the petitioners the respondent authority has
actually modified the permit conditions without following the due
procedure under the law. Instead, for the reasons as discussed
above, and the precedence cited, it can be stated that modification
of the route alignment however, a definite purpose and reason
particularly, when such reason is to eradicate congestion and
alleviate traffic within the city limits cannot be considered to be
done beyond the scope of statute by the Authority or by exercise of
power not vested in it. Instead, it is found that a reasoned decision
of the statutory Authority which does not have an effect of
Page 20 of 22
changing the entire composure of the applied route by the writ
petitioner but only might have changed the termini for a definitive
purpose of alleviation of traffic is tenable in the eye of law.
(17) At the cost of reiteration, the Court can say that the
notification dated June 6, 2014 has been upheld by this Court as
well as the Supreme Court. The Division Bench of this Court has
not been pleased to allow any sorts of clarification as to the
notification dated June 6, 2014. In such circumstances, the
petitioners have put forth their grievance, designing the same with
the help of the words different from those used by them at the first
instance while challenging the notification dated June 6, 2014.
This time, they had come before the Court with the contention that
they would be rather excluded by operation of the Clause
mentioned in the said notification dated June 6, 2014. The
impugned order dated December 20, 2023 passed by the District
Magistrate, Purba Burdwan has decided such prayer of the writ
petitioners. The petitioners have taken recourse to the language in
the notification as above, as follows:-
“Long route buses with permits issued by the State
Transport Authority, West Bengal and Regional
Transport Authorities (other than Burdwan) including
SBSTC buses shall also come under the purview of this
notification.”
(18) The District Magistrate, Purba Burdwan has stated:-
“It is a matter of fact that the notification dated
06.06.2014 vide Memo No. 2314/MV clearly prohibits the plying
Page 21 of 22of buses in between the Burdwan Town except the Town Service
Buses who are strictly confined into the Burdwan Town area
and school buses. It is to be mentioned here that in clause (c) of
the said notification, “All buses entering into and leaving from
Burdwan from various routes like Memari, Barsul, Shaktigarh,
Jamalpur, Tarakeswar, Kolkata etc, shall hence forth use the
Alisha Bus Stand”. Hence the ‘Exception claim’ of petitioner’s
advocate does not stand.”
** ** ** **
The representation dated 14.08.2023 can not be allowed in
contradiction to the Notification dated 06.06.2014 vide Memo
No. 2314/MV read with Final Order dated 26.07.2023 passed by
the Hon’ble Division Bench, High Court, Calcutta.”
(19) It is the settled law that a document has to be read in its
entirety and giving meaning to the words thereof in context with
the other portions of the document so that a purposeful and
effective meaning can be read within the words thereof. The Court
meticulously considers the judgments in the case of Franklin
Templeton Trustee Services Private Limited & Another vs Amruta
Garg & Another [reported in (2021) 9 SCC 606] and Sanjay
Ramdas Patil vs Sanjay and Others [reported in (2021) 10 SCC
306] in this regard in which the Courts have upheld the necessity
of contextual and purposive reading of the provisions. The ratio
thereof similarly attracts in case of construction of a notification
too. Such being the law now well-established, the Court is
constrained to hold that the interpretation of the execution Clause
„(other than Burdwan)‟ if taken as argued by the writ petitioners,
would render the entire notification dated June 6, 2014 as
nugatory, whereas its validity has already been upheld by the
Hon’ble Apex Court.
Page 22 of 22
(20) In their argument, the petitioners have suggested that the
wordings in the said notification dated June 6, 2014 makes a
distinction between the vehicles permitted to ply by RTA Burdwan
and those permitted by other Regional Transport Authorities, to
ply within Burdwan Town. However, in case it was so, no
justifiable reason for the same, is apparent. When the ultimate
object is to alleviate traffic by reducing number of vehicles plying,
there must exist intelligible differentia, if class is made within
class, a group is separated from similar other groups. Therefore,
this could not be a plausible interpretation of the said notification.
(21) Considering all above, the Court is of opinion that the
impugned order of the District Magistrate, Purba Burdwan dated
December 20, 2023 can neither be termed as illegal or improper, as
claimed by the writ petitioners. Hence, finding no merit in the
instant writ petitions, the Court is constrained to dismiss the writ
petitions in the batch.
(22) All writ petitions as mentioned in the cause title, are
dismissed. Interim order stands vacated in all the writ petitions as
mentioned above.
(23) Urgent certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite
formalities.
(Rai Chattopadhyay, J.)