Delhi District Court
Nawab Saifi vs Sidharth Chandola on 24 May, 2025
DLST020132822017
IN THE COURT OF SH. AAKASH MOHAN SINGH, JMFC-05,
N.I. ACT, SOUTH DISTRICT, SAKET, NEW DELHI
CC No. : 7489/2017
U/s : 138 NI Act
PS : Neb Sarai
Nawab Saifi vs. Sidharth Chandola
JUDGMENT
1. CC No. : 7489
2. Date of institution of the case : 05.07.2017
3. Name of complainant : Nawab Saifi
Sh. Manuwa
R/o L-1182/24, Sangam Vihar,
New Delhi.
4. Name of accused, parentage
and address : Sidharth Chandola
S/o Satish Chandra Chandola
R/o D-10, Tower Apart.
IRECO, Victory Valley,
Sec-67, Gurgaon.
5. Offence complained of : 138 N. I. Act
6. Plea of accused : Accused pleaded not guilty
7. Final order : ACQUITTAL
8. Date on which order was : 24.05.2025
reserved
9. Date of pronouncement : 24.05.2025
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Nawab Saifi vs. Sidharth CHandola Page no 1 of 17 JMFC-05 (NI Act)/South
DLST020132822017
FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
1. Vide this judgment, this Court shall dispose off the present complaint
case instituted by the Complainant invoking the provisions of Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881(as in after referred to as NI Act).
2. The facts giving rise to the instant complaint case, as per the
complainant, may be summarized as hereafter: That complainant is engaged in the
business of air conditioning sales, services and providing AMC for domestic &
commercial applications from last several years and accused is engaged in the
business of interior and decor and provides related services to his client through
various sub contractors. That accused approached the complainant for HVAC job
works i.e. modify/renovate the old duct of his client Logix Cyber Park at their
address i.e. 8th Floor, Tower-A, Logix Cyber Park, Sec-62, Noida, UP. On the
request of accused, complainant had started the work under the supervision of Mr.
Rehman and Mr. Rakesh at site and after satisfaction, accused released the
payments on adhoc basis from time to time. That after satisfactory completion of
work, the complainant raised his final bill of Rs. 14,29,425.70/- without taxes
towards the work executed by him. However accused delayed the payment and
asked the complainant to provide a letter duly endorsed by PMC Engineer as well
as his client M/s Logix Cyber Park. That on 17.11.2016 complainant got the said
letter alongwith endorsement from site engineer and handed over a copy to accused
whereof accused reconciled the accounts from his end and arbitrarily deducted the
legitimate payment of the complainant. That in discharge of his legal liability
towards the balance part payment, the accused a cheque bearing no. 248599 dt.
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15.04.2017 for Rs. 77,434/- drawn on Union Bank of India, Kailash Colony
Branch, (hereinafter referred as cheque in question) in favour of the complainant.
That when complainant presented the abovesaid cheques in question for
encashment, same were returned unpaid with remarks “payment stopped by
drawer”. Thereafter, complainant issued a legal demand notice dated 18.05.2017
calling upon the accused to pay the amount of the aforesaid cheque within the
stipulated period but the accused did not make the payment within the statutory
period.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE COURT
3. The complainant tendered his evidence by way of affidavit and relied
upon following evidences:-
a) Copy of letter dt. 17.11.2016 Ex. CW1/1 b) Cheque in question Ex. CW1/2 c) Return memo Ex. CW1/3 d) Legal demand notice dt. 22.07.2017 Ex. CW1/4 e) Postal receipt Ex. CW1/5 f) Courier receipts Ex. CW1/6 g) Reply to legal demand notice Ex. CW1/7 h) Evidence affidavit Ex. CW1/A i) Service Tax Invoice Bill Ex. CW1/X1 j) Copy of cheques Ex. CW1/X2 CC No. 7489/2017 (Aakash Mohan Singh) Nawab Saifi vs. Sidharth CHandola Page no 3 of 17 JMFC-05 (NI Act)/South DLST020132822017
4. Upon appreciation of pre-summoning evidence, accused was
summoned for an offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act and notice under
Section 251, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (herein after referred to as Cr.P.C.)
was served upon accused on 26.08.2017 to which he pleaded not guilty and
claimed trial. The accused took the defence that he had given a contract to the
complainant and was asked to visit the site. He further deposed that complainant
visited the site and has given his quotations accordingly, in which he had assured
that there was no issue in drawings and working would be completed on time. He
further deposed that complainant was not ready to give the bills and complaints
were being received telephonically from clients against the complainant but
complainant told him that his engineers were attending the complaint and work is
getting resolved as per requirements of clients. He further deposed that he asked t
he complainant to issue the certificate of guarantee for one year for HVAC work
and on verbal communication of complainant, he issued cheque in question to the
complainant and complainant denied to issue certificate of guarantee and also
refused to complete the work. He further deposed that he regularly making
communications with the complainant through email to complete the work and to
issue certificate of guarantee otherwise payment of the cheque in question shall be
stopped. He further deposed that complainant to do the needful, therefore, he
stopped the payment of cheque in question. He further deposed that he has no legal
liability to pay the cheque amount.
5. Thereafter, on oral plea of accused, accused was granted opportunity
to cross examine the complainant as well as his witnesses, if any under Section 145
(2) of NI Act on 26.08.2017.
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6. The complainant has examined himself as CW1 and one Ms. Poonam
Nawariya, Asst. Manager, IDBI Bank as CW-2. In the post summoning evidence,
the complainant (CW1) has adopted his pre-summoning evidence. The complainant
and his witness was cross examined by the Ld. Counsel for accused. CE was closed
vide order dated 27.02.2020.
7. Accused was, thereafter, examined U/s 281 r/w Sec 313 Criminal
Procedure code, 1872 on 05.04.2021 wherein entire incriminating evidence was put
to him. The accused took defence that he has no liability towards the cheque in
question.
8. Accused has only examined himself as DW-1 after allowing the
application u/s 315 CrPC.
The defence evidence was closed vide order dt. 26.08.2023 and the
matter was fixed for final arguments.
9. I have considered the rival submissions of the parties and perused the
entire evidence led by the parties and the material available on record.
FINAL ARGUMENTS
10. During the course of final arguments, complainant argued that all the
essential ingredients of section 138 NI Act are fulfilled and there exists enforceable
liability towards the complainant on behalf of the accused as the accused has failed
to rebut the presumption of law raised against him by leading DE. He further
argued that since the accused has admitted the signatures and issuance of cheque in
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question in favour of the complainant and further admitted the claim of the
complainant as to the non-existence of any warranty clause, the accused be
convicted of the offence.
11. Per contra, Ld. Counsel for the accused has argued that the offence is
not made out as the accused has no liability to pay the cheque amount as the
cheque in question was issued upon the promise of the complainant to extend
warranty for a period of one year. He further argued that since the complainant has
failed to provide the same and further rectify the deficiency in service and has
further served a defective notice, therefore the accused be acquitted of the offence.
INGREDIENTS OF OFFENCE AND DISCUSSION
12. Before dwelling into the facts of the present case, it would be apposite
to discuss the legal standards required to be met by both sides. In order to establish
the offence under Section 138 of NI Act, the prosecution must fulfill all the
essential ingredients of the offence. Perusal of the bare provision reveals the
following necessary ingredients of the offence:-
First Ingredient: The cheque was drawn by a person on an
account maintained by him for payment of money and the
same is presented for payment within a period of 3 months
from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its
validity;
Second Ingredient: The cheque was drawn by the drawer for
discharge of any legally enforceable debt or other liability;
Third Ingredient: The cheque was returned unpaid by the
bank due to either insufficiency of funds in the account to
honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged toCC No. 7489/2017 (Aakash Mohan Singh)
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DLST020132822017be paid from that account on an agreement made with that
bank;
Fourth Ingredient: A demand of the said amount has been
made by the payee or holder in due course of the cheque by a
notice in writing given to the drawer within thirty days of the
receipt of information of the dishonour of cheque from the
bank;
Fifth Ingredient: The drawer fails to make payment of the
said amount of money within fifteen days from the date of
receipt of notice.
It is only when all the aforementioned ingredients are satisfied that the
person who had drawn the cheque can be deemed to have committed an offence
under Section 138 of the NI Act
13. The accused can only be held guilty of the offence under Section 138
NI Act if the above-mentioned ingredients are proved by the complainant co-
extensively. Additionally, the conditions stipulated under Section 142 NI Act have
to be fulfilled.
PROVING OF INGREDIENTS
14. Notably, there is no dispute qua the proof of first, third and fifth
ingredient. The complainant had proved the original cheque vide Ex.CW1/2 which
the accused has not disputed as being drawn on the account of the accused. It was
not disputed that the cheque in question was presented within its validity period.
The cheque in question was returned unpaid vide return memo Ex. CW1/3 which
has also not been disputed. Further, the accused has admitted the receipt of legal
demand notice Ex. CW1/4 and has even replied to the same vide Ex. CW1/7.
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However, the accused has disputed the receipt of legal demand notice within 30
days from the date of dishonour/information received by the complainant.
Accordingly, the fourth ingredient would be considered alongwith the second
ingredient. The fifth ingredient as such the same is deemed to be proved that no
payment has been made after issuance of legal demand notice.
RAISING OF PRESUMPTION
15. The accused has admitted the signatures on the cheque in question in
his notice u/s 251 and examination u/s 313 CrPC.
16. As per the scheme of the NI Act, once the accused admits signature on
the cheques in question, certain presumptions are drawn, which result in shifting of
onus. Section 118(a) of the NI Act lays down the presumption that every negotiable
instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Another presumption is
enumerated in Section 139 of NI Act laying down the presumption that the holder
of the cheque received it for the discharge, in whole or part, of any debt or other
liability.
17. The combined effect of these two provisions is a presumption that the
cheque was drawn for consideration and given by the accused for the discharge of
debt or other liability. Both the sections use the expression “shall”, which makes it
imperative for the court to raise the presumptions, once the foundational facts
required for the same are proved. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, Hiten P. Dalal vs. Bratindranath Banerjee (2001) 6 SCC
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16, Kumar Exports vs. Sharma Carpets (2009) 2 SCC 513 and Bir Singh vs.
Mukesh Kumar (2019) 4 SCC 197.
18. Therefore, in the instant case, since the accused has admitted his
signatures on the cheque in question, the aforementioned statutory presumptions
would be raised in favour of the complainant regarding the fact that the impugned
cheque has been drawn for consideration and issued by the accused in discharge of
legally enforceable debt.
APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE QUA SECOND AND FOURTH
INGREDIENT
19. The presumptions contemplated in the NI Act are rebuttable
presumptions and once the same are raised, it is for the accused to rebut the same
by establishing a probable defence. The principles pertaining to the presumptions
and the onus of proof were recently summarized by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418 as under:
“25.1. Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139
of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for
the discharge of any debt or other liability.
25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable
presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise
probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the
presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.
25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused
to rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely
on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to
raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of
probabilities can be drawn not only from the materialsCC No. 7489/2017 (Aakash Mohan Singh)
Nawab Saifi vs. Sidharth CHandola Page no 9 of 17 JMFC-05 (NI Act)/South
DLST020132822017brought on record by the parties but also by reference to
the circumstances upon which they rely.”
20. In the instant case, the complainant seeks to enforce liability upon the
accused on the ground of having provided HVAC services, the cheque in question
being issued by the accused in discharge of the said liability in favour of the
complainant. Since a presumption as envisaged u/s 118 and 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act is attracted in favour of the Complainant as such, it is now
incumbent upon the accused to rebut the said presumption on the basis of
preponderance of probabilities.
21. In order to rebut the same, the accused has firstly stated that since
the complainant had rendered unsatisfactory and incomplete service, in
consequence to which various complaints were received, the complainant had
promised to offer warranty for a period of one year alongwith furnishing of
tax invoices and upon failure of the complainant to do the same, the accused
had rightly stopped the payment of the cheque in question. However, as per the
own admission of the accused as DW-1, it has been stated “there was no warranty
terms attached with BOQ”. It has been further admitted that BOQ is considered to
be tender in the line of work of the accused. Even otherwise, non-performance of
the condition of warranty would not be a justifiable ground to withhold the
payment of a legitimate consideration amount in pursuance of which cheque in
question has been issued admittedly for “final settlement of the account”.
Therefore, the present defence is unsustainable and misplaced.
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22. The accused has further stated that the complainant has failed to
file invoices to liquidate the cheque amount. However, the accused as DW-1 has
admitted that he had issued 3 PDCs for the stated amount for the purpose of final
settlement of account. Therefore, the said contention also does not appear to be
sound.
23. It has been further argued that the cheque in question amount is Rs.
77,434/- whereas vide legal demand notice Ex. CW1/4, the complainant has made
a consolidated demand of Rs. 1,77,434/- which is in excess to the cheque amount.
24. Reliance is placed upon a judgment of Suman Sethi vs Ajay K,
Churiwal of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, AIR 2000 SC 828 wherein it has
held as under :
There is no ambiguity or doubt in the language of Section 138.
Reading the entire Section as a whole and applying commonsense,
from the words, as stated above, it is clear that the legislature
intended that in notice under clause (b) to the proviso, the demand
has to be made for the cheque amount. According to Dr. Dhawan,
the notice of demand should not contain anything more or less
than what is due under the cheque.
It is well settled principle of law that the notice has to he read as a
whole. In the notice, demand has to be made for the “said
amount” i.e. cheque amount. If no such demand is made the
notice no doubt would fall .short of its legal requirement Where in
addition to “said amount” there is also a claim by way of interest,
cost etc. whether the notice is bad would depend on the language
of the notice. If in a notice while giving the break up of the claim
the cheque amount, interest, damages etc. are separately specified,
other such claims for interest, cost etc. would be superfluous and
these additional claims would he severable- and will not invalidate
the notice. If, however, in the notice an ommbus demand is madeCC No. 7489/2017 (Aakash Mohan Singh)
Nawab Saifi vs. Sidharth CHandola Page no 11 of 17 JMFC-05 (NI Act)/South
DLST020132822017without specifying what was due under the dishonored cheque,
notice might well fail to meet the legal requirement and may be
regarded as bad.
25. Reference is also craved to the judgment of Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi in M/S Alliance Infrastructure Project Pvt Ltd vs Vinay Mittal, Crl.M.C.
No. 2224/2009 wherein it has been held as under:-
8. The question which comes up for consideration is as to what
the expression „amount of money‟ means in a case where the
admitted liability of the drawer of the cheque gets reduced, on
account of part payment made by him, after issuing but before
presentation of cheque in question. No doubt, the expression
“amount of money” would mean the amount of the cheque alone
in case the amount payable by the drawer, on the date of
presentation of the cheque, is more than the amount of the
cheque. But, can it be said the expression “amount of money”
would always mean the amount of the cheque, even if the actual
liability of the drawer of the cheque has got reduced on account
of some payment made by him towards discharge of the debt or
liability in consideration of which cheque in question was issued.
If it is held that the expression “amount of money” would
necessarily mean the amount of cheque in every case, the
drawer of the cheque would be required to make arrangement
for more than the admitted amount payable by him to the payee
of the cheque. In case he is not able to make arrangement for the
whole of the amount of the cheque, he would be guilty of the
offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments
Act. Obviously this could not have been the intention of the
legislature to make a person liable to punishment even if he
has made arrangements necessary for payment of the amount
which is actually payable by him. If the drawer of the cheque is
made to pay more than the amount actually payable by him, the
inevitable result would be that he will have to chase the payee
of the cheque to recover the excess amount paid by him.
Therefore, I find it difficult to take the view that even if the
admitted liability of the drawer of the cheque has got reduced, on
account of certain payments made after issue of cheque, theCC No. 7489/2017 (Aakash Mohan Singh)
Nawab Saifi vs. Sidharth CHandola Page no 12 of 17 JMFC-05 (NI Act)/South
DLST020132822017payee would nevertheless be entitled to present the cheque for the
whole of the amount, to the banker of the drawer, for encashment
and in case such a cheque is dishonoured for wants of funds, he
will be guilty of offence punishable under Section 138 of
Negotiable Instrument Act.
9. I am conscious of the implication that the drawer of a cheque
may make payment of a part of the amount of the cheque only
with a view to circumvent and get out of his liability
under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act. But, this can
easily be avoided, by payee of the cheque, either by taking the
cheque of the reduced amount from the drawer or by making an
endorsement on the cheque acknowledging the part payment
received by him and then presenting the cheque for encashment
of only the balance amount due and payable to him. In
fact, Section 56 of Negotiable Instrument Act specifically
provides for an endorsement on a Negotiable Instrument, in case
of part-payment and the instrument can thereafter be negotiated
for the balance amount. It would, therefore, be open to the payee
of the cheque to present the cheque for payment of only that
much amount which is due to him after giving credit for the part-
payment made after issuance of cheque. The view being taken by
me was also taken by a Division Bench of Kerala High Court in
Joseph Sartho vs. Gopinathan Nair, 2009 (2) Crimes 463
(Kerala). As noted by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Rahul
Builders vs. Arihant Fertilizers & Chemicals And Another,
(2008) 2 SCC 321, Negotiable Instruments Act envisages
application of the penal provisions which needs to be construed
strictly. Therefore, even if two views in the matter are possible,
the Court should lean in favour of the view which is beneficial
to the accused. This is more so, when such a view will also
advance the legislative intent, behind enactment of this
criminal liability.
12…….The expression „amount of money‟ used in Section
138(b) of Negotiable Instrument Act, to my mind, in a case of
this nature would mean the amount actually payable by the
drawer of the cheque to the payee of the cheque. Of course, if
the payee of the cheque makes some demands on account of
interest, compensation, incidental expenses etc, that would not
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invalidate the notice so long as the principal amount demanded
by the payee of the cheque is correct and is clearly identified in
the notice. When the principal amount claimed in the notice of
demand is more than the principal amount actually payable to
the payee of the cheque and the notice also does not indicate the
basis for demanding the excess amount, such a notice cannot be
said to be a legal and valid notice envisaged in Section 138(b)of
Negotiable Instrument Act. In such a case, it is not open to the
complainant to take the plea that the drawer of the cheque could
have escaped liability by paying the actual amount due from him
to the payee of the cheque. In order to make the notice legal and
valid, it must necessarily specify the principal amount payable to
the payee of the cheque and the principal amount demanded
from the drawer of the cheque should not be more than the actual
amount payable by him though addition of some other demands
in the notice by itself would not render such a notice illegal or
invalid.
13. In Central Bank of India & Another vs. Saxons Farms &
Others 1999(8) SCC 221, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed
that the object of the notice under Section 138(b) of Negotiable
Instrument Act is to give a chance to the drawer of the cheque
to rectify his omission and also to protect the honest drawer. If
the drawer of the cheque is asked to pay more than the
principal amount due from him and that amount is demanded
as the principal sum payable by him, it is not possible for an
honest drawer of the cheque to meet such a requirement.
26. Similar has been held by the Hon’ble Kerela High Court in Joseph
Sartho v Gopinathan, MANU/KE/0342/2008 and Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat
in Shree Corporation v. Anilbhai Puranbhai Bansal, MANU/GJ/0379/2018.
The view has been endorsed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dashrathbhai
Trikambhai Patel vs. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel and Ors.,
MANU/SC/1294/2022.
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27. In the facts of the present case, although the complainant has specified
the cheque amount vide para no. 6 of the legal demand notice, despite that in view
of non-furtherance of the breakup of the excess amount, the accused has been
called upon to pay a greater sum than the claimed liability. No cogent explanation
has been given as to how the offence would be attracted in view of the differential
in the consolidated demand made and the outstanding liability.
28. Further, accused has argued that the complainant has served a legal
demand notice beyond the statutory period. Complainant submits that the same has
to be computed from the date of knowledge. Perusal of record shows that the
cheque has returned dishonoured on 17.04.2017 whereas legal demand notice has
been posted on 19.05.2017 which is beyond the period of 30 days. Complainant
claims that he had received the same on 21.03.2017. However, during his cross-
examination as CW-1, the complainant has admitted that his mobile number was
linked to his account and he used to received regular intimation through SMS
relating to credit, debit etc. He has further stated to have visited the bank on the
next day of presentation which would be 18.04.2017. However, that could still
expire the limitation on 17.05.2017. Such a delay cannot be condoned. Therefore,
the fourth ingredient also does not stand proved.
29. Therefore, on these two grounds alone, the accused is liable to be
acquitted.
30. It has been argued by the complainant that the accused has admitted
the issuance of cheque in question and the provision of services by the complainant
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and the ground of warranty etc. is not tenable. However, it is a cardinal principle of
the criminal jurisprudence “the prosecution is supposed to stand on its own legs
and it cannot derive any benefits whatsoever from the weakness, if any, in the
defence of the accused.”. It is also a settled position of law that in criminal trials
the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond any shadow of doubt; and the
criminal trial stand on a different pedestal than that of a civil case where any
suspicious circumstance arising will certainly give advantage to the accused.
Reliance is placed upon Veena Rani Chabra vs. Manju Rohida,
MANU/DE/3067/2008.
31. Hence, in the light of discussion and the authorities cited in the
aforegoing para(s), it is apparent that the case of the complainant stands defeated on
technical ground. Consequently, it can be said that no legal liability exists in favour
of the complainant qua the cheque amount, thus, the second ingredient to the
offence under section 138 of NI Act does not stand proved.
CONCLUSION:
32. In the result of the analysis of the present case, the accused Sidharth
Chandola stands ACQUITTED of the offence punishable under Section 138,
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
33. This judgment contains 17 pages. This judgment has been signed and
pronounced by the undersigned in open court.
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34. Let a copy of the judgment be uploaded on the official website of
District Courts, South, Saket forthwith.
Digitally signed
AAKASH by AAKASH
MOHAN SINGH
MOHAN Date:
SINGH 2025.05.24
16:09:23 +0530Announced in the open Court (AAKASH MOHAN SINGH)
on 24.05.2025 JMFC-05 (NI ACT) SOUTH/SAKET
NEW DELHICC No. 7489/2017 (Aakash Mohan Singh)
Nawab Saifi vs. Sidharth CHandola Page no 17 of 17 JMFC-05 (NI Act)/South