Chattisgarh High Court
Nehru vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 29 July, 2025
Author: Rajani Dubey
Bench: Rajani Dubey
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2025:CGHC:36948
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 364 of 2007
Nehru son of Shri Dhanssai Dilawar, aged about 27 years, Resident of
Singitarai, Police Station Dabhra, District Janjgir-Champa (CG)
... Appellant
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh through the Police Station Dabhra, Distt. Janjgir-
Champa (CG)
... Respondent
For Appellant : Ms. Anusha Naik, Advocate.
For Respondent : Mr. Afroz Khan, Panel Lawyer
Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J
Judgment On Board
29-07-2025
Challenge in this appeal is to the legality and validity of the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 12.4.2007 passed
by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sakti, Distt. Janjgir-Champa in ST
No.242/2006 whereby the appellant stands convicted under Sections
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285 & 304 Part-II of IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for three months
and RI for four years respectively.
02. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the accused/appellant
was running a fancy shop where he would sell petrol illegally without
following safety measures. On 14.3.2005 at 7.30 pm while he was
giving petrol to Sanjay in a jerrycan, the electricity went off. So the
appellant lit a candle and at that time, as electricity supply restored the
fan started moving, the flame of the candle began to flicker and the
jerrycan containing petrol caught fire. Sanjay ran away from there.
However, as the appellant threw the burning jerrycan out of his shop, it
fell over deceased Lalit Kumar who was standing by the side of the
road. Initially Lalit Kumar was taken to hospital at Kharsiya where after
primary treatment he was sent to Govt. Kirodimal Hospital, Raigarh
and from there referred to Bhilai but during the course of treatment he
died. After completion of usual investigation, charge sheet under
Section 285 and 304 of IPC was filed against the accused/appellant.
Learned trial Court charged the accused/appellant under Sections 285
and 302 of IPC which were abjured by him and he prayed for trial.
03. In order to substantiate its case the prosecution examined 22
witnesses. Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313
of CrPC wherein he denied all the incriminating circumstances
appearing against him in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and
false implication. In defence he examined one Bhagau Ram as DW-1.
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04. After hearing counsel for the respective parties and appreciation
of oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court
convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned above. Hence
this appeal.
05. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned
judgment is per se illegal and contrary to the material available on
record. Learned trial Court ought to have seen that the appellant had
neither intention nor knowledge of causing death of the ceased. Even
otherwise, there are contradiction and omission in the statements of
the witnesses which make the whole prosecution case as against the
appellant doubtful. As the incident took place all of a sudden and the
appellant had no knowledge or intention to commit the alleged offence,
the impugned judgment being illegal is liable to be set aside.
06. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposing the
contention of the appellant submits that the learned trial Court upon
minute appreciation of oral and documentary evidence has rightly
convicted and sentenced by the appellant by the impugned judgment
which calls for no interference by this Court. Therefore, the present
appeal being without any substance is liable to be dismissed.
07. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
available on record.
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08. It is clear from the record of learned trial Court that the appellant
was charged under Sections 285 and 302 of IPC and after appreciation
of oral and documentary evidence, learned trial Court convicted and
sentenced him as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this
judgment.
09. The FIR (Ex.P/3) goes to show that on the date of incident, the
accused/appellant was selling petrol without any safety measures, at
that time the electricity went off, so he lit a candle and as the electricity
restored, the fan which was already on switched on, started moving
and the candle's flame started flickering and accidentally the petrol
jerrycan caught fire. The appellant threw the burning jerrycan out of his
shop which fell on the deceased who was standing there and got
severally burnt and ultimately succumbed to the same during the
course of treatment.
10. PW-1 Ghasiram, brother of the deceased, also states that on the
date of incident while the accused/appellant was giving petrol to
Sanjay, the petrol jerrycan caught fire from the burning candle and the
appellant threw it out of the shop which fell on the deceased as a result
of which he died during treatment. PW-2 Chhotka Ram and PW-3
Gangaram have not supported the prosecution case. The prosecution
after declaring them hostile cross-examined where they denied all the
suggestions of the prosecution.
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11. PW-4 Laxmi Prasad Bharadwaj, PW-5 Hansram, PW-6
Bhagandas and PW-10 Sanjay Dansena, all have stated that the
accused/appellant was selling petrol illegally in his shop and on the
date of incident while he was giving petrol to Sanjay (PW-10), the
petrol jerrycan caught fire from the burning candle and the appellant
threw it out of the shop which fell on the deceased Lalit as a result of
which he got severely burnt and ultimately died during treatment.
12. PW-7 Dr. VS Baghel conducted postmortem on the body of the
deceased on 21.3.2005 and opined that the cause of death was
hemorrhagic shock due to extensive infected burn, ulcers and burn
injuries. He proved his report Ex.P/7. The other prosecution witnesses
also supported the prosecution case and stated that the deceased died
due to burn injuries.
13. Learned trial Court after appreciation of the evidence on record
while acquitting the accused/appellant of the charge under Section 302
of IPC convicted him under Sections 285 and 304 Part-II of IPC by
observing that though the intention of the appellant was not to cause
death of the deceased but he had the knowledge that if the burning
petrol jerrycan being thrown by him falls on someone may result in his
death and as such, he is guilty under Sections 304 Part-II and 285 of
IPC.
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14. Section 304 of IPC deals with punishment for culpable homicide
not amounting to murder. Section 299 of IPC defines culpable homicide
and Section 300 defines murder whereas Section 304A deal with the
offence of causing death by negligence. So for ready reference, these
sections are reproduced as under:
"299. Culpable Homicide. - Whoever causes death by doing an
act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of
causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the
knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits
the offence of culpable homicide.
300. Murder - Except in the cases hereinafter excepted,
culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is
caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-
Secondly- If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily
injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the
person to whom the harm is caused, or-
Thirdly- If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to
any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or-
Fourthly,- If the person committing the act knows that it is so
imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death
or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits
such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing
death or such injury as aforesaid.
304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder
Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder
shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and
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shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused
is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done
with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without
any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death.
304A. Causing death by negligence
Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or
negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
15. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid sections makes it clear that
the key distinction between offenses under Section 304 Part II and
Section 304A of IPC lies in the degree of mens rea (guilty mind)
involved. Section 304 Part-II deals with culpable homicide not
amounting to murder, requiring the accused to have knowledge that his
act is likely to cause death, even if he didn't intend to cause death.
Section 304A, on the other hand, deals with death caused by a rash
and negligent act, where there is no intention or knowledge of causing
death. Thus, the crucial factor in distinguishing between the two
sections is the presence or absence of "knowledge" that the act is likely
to cause death. If such knowledge exists, even without the intention to
cause death, Section 304 Part-II is applicable and if there is only
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rashness or negligence, without the knowledge element, Section 304A
is the relevant provision.
16. This issue came up for consideration before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Anbazhagan vs State represented by
the Inspector of Police, reported in AIR 2023 SC 3660 wherein
Hon'ble Supreme Court considering what are the essential ingredients
for attracting the provisions of Section 304 of IPC has held in para 60
sub-para 12 as under.
"60. Few important principles of law discernible from the
aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:-
...........
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty
intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury
is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done
without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the
circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or
unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead
to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be
one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.”
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Ramkumar vs.
State Represented by Inspector of Police, reported in AIR 2023 SC
4246 has reiterated the same principle. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Mahadev Prasad Kaushik vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
and another, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 479 has considered the
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comparison between Section 304 of IPC and Section 304-A of the IPC
and has held in paragraph 23, 24 and 26 as under :-
23. Section 304A was inserted by the Indian Penal Code
(Amendment) Act, 1870 (Act XXVII of 1870) and reads thus;
“304A. Causing death by negligence. – Whoever causes the
death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not
amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to two years, or with fine, or with both.
The section deals with homicidal death by rash or negligent act.
It does not create a new offence. It is directed against the
offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300, IPC and
covers those cases where death has been caused without
intention’ or ‘knowledge. The words “not amounting to culpable
homicide in the provision are significant and clearly convey that
the section seeks to embrace those cases where there is neither
intention to cause death, nor knowledge that the act done will in
all probability result into death. It applies to acts which are rash
or negligent and are directly the cause of death of another
person.
24 There is thus distinction between Section 304 and Section
304A, Section 304A carves out cases where death is caused by
doing a rash or negligent act which does not amount to culpable
homicide not amounting to murder within the meaning of Section
299 or culpable homicide amounting to murder under Section
300, IPC. In other words, Section 304A excludes all the
ingredients of Section 299 as also of Section 300. Where
intention or knowledge is the motivating force of the act
complained of, Section 304A will have to make room for the
graver and more serious charge of culpable homicide not
10amounting to murder or amounting to murder as the facts
disclose. The section has application to those cases where there
is neither intention to cause death nor knowledge that the act in
all probability will cause death.
26. Though the term ‘negligence’ has not been defined in the
Code, it may be stated that negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided upon those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs would do, or doing something which a reasonable and
prudent man would not do”.
18. In light of aforesaid judicial pronouncements if the facts and
evidence emerging in the present case are seen, it is quite apparent
that there was no premeditation or intention on the part of the
accused/appellant of causing death of the deceased. Admittedly, the
petrol jerrycan caught fire accidentally from the burning candle. None
of the witnesses has stated that the accused threw the burning jerrycan
on the deceased intentionally, rather the oral and documentary
evidence on record clearly suggests that when the petrol jerrycan
caught fire, the accused in order to save himself and the other persons
present in the shop, threw it out of his shop which accidentally fell on
the deceased who was standing outside the shop and ultimately led to
his death during the course of treatment.
19. While natural human tendencies like impatience or a lack of
focus can contribute to rash or negligent behavior, the law doesn’t
excuse these actions based on inherent human traits. The standard is
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what a reasonable person would do, not what a specific person might
be inclined to do based on their personality. In the present case, in the
totality of facts and circumstances of the case and the overall evidence
on record, though it would not be justifiable to even attribute knowledge
of causing death to the accused/appellant but as he failed to exercise
the level of care that a reasonable person would in the same situation
and acted without proper consideration for potential consequences
leading to unfortunate death of the deceased, he can safely be held
guilty under Section 304A of IPC in place of 304 Part-II. As regards
offence under Section 285 of IPC, from the above discussions, it
stands proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused/appellant
acted in negligent manner while handing a combustible item in his
possession endangering human life and as such, his conviction under
this section cannot be faulted with.
20. As regards quantum of sentence, considering the fact that the
incident occurred in the year 2005, the appeal is also pending since
2007; the appellant was on bail during trial as well as during pendency
of this appeal and did not misuse the liberty; he has remained in jail for
about 1 year & 5 months, this Court is of the opinion that no fruitful
purpose would be served in sending him back to jail at this stage and
the ends of justice would be met if he is sentenced to the period
already undergone by him under Section 304A of IPC.
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21. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. While maintaining
conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 285 of IPC, his
conviction under Section 304 Part-II of IPC is altered to Section 304A
of IPC and he is sentenced thereunder to the period already
undergone by him. The impugned judgment stands modified to the
above extent.
The appellant is reported to be on bail. However, keeping in view
the provisions of Section 481 of BNSS, 2023 the appellant is also
directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- with one
surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be
effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the
event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or
for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereon
shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
The record of the trial Court along with copy of this judgment be
sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and
necessary action.
Sd/
(Rajani Dubey)
Judge
Digitally signed
MOHD by MOHD
AKHTAR KHAN
AKHTAR Date:
2025.07.31
KHAN 16:53:29
+0530
Khan