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Punjab-Haryana High Court
Nimrata Shergill And Anr vs Shop Owners Welfare Association on 22 April, 2025
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:052765
CR-1072-2025 (O&M) 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CR-1072-2025 (O&M)
Decided on : 22.04.2025
Nimrata Shergill and another ...... Petitioners
Versus
Shop Owners Welfare Association
...... Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM AGGARWAL
***
Present : Mr. Rajesh Garg, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Varinder Arora, Advocate
for the petitioners.
Mr. Raghav Sharma, Advocate
for the respondent.
***
VIKRAM AGGARWAL, J (ORAL)
The present revision petition, preferred under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, assails the order dated 30.01.2025, passed by the Court of
learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh vide which the application preferred
under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
Limitation Act‘) for exclusion of 147 days in filing the first appeal was dismissed.
2. A summary suit under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(for short ‘CPC‘) was filed by the present petitioners seeking recovery of
Rs.49,66,510/- (Rs.10,11,900/- towards petitioner-plaintiff No.1 and
Rs.39,54,610/- towards petitioner-plaintiff No.2) alongwith interest @ 12% per
annum. An application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for rejection of plaint came to
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be filed by the respondent-defendant which was allowed vide order dated
09.03.2022. Aggrieved by the same, CR No.1218 of 2022 was preferred by the
petitioners which was dismissed vide order dated 19.07.2022 (Annexure P-1).
The petitioners then preferred an appeal against the order dated 09.03.2022 before
the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh. The same was
accompanied by an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act (Annexure
P-2). The said application was opposed by way of a reply (Annexure P-3). Vide
impugned order dated 30.01.2025, the said application was dismissed leading to
the filing of the present revision petition.
3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties.
4. Sh. Rajesh Garg, learned Senior Counsel, who has appeared in
person, has submitted that the impugned order is not sustainable. Referring to the
order passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in CR No.1218 of 2022, it has
been submitted that it was clearly observed by the Coordinate Bench that the
impugned order therein amounted to a decree and there is a remedy of appeal
under Section 96 CPC. The Coordinate Bench observed that in view of the said
position, the Court would not interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India. Learned Senior Counsel submits that under the circumstances, the first
appeal was filed along with an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act
which has erroneously been rejected. Learned Senior Counsel has referred to the
judgments of the Supreme Court of India in the cases of Laxmi Srinivasa R and P
Boiled Rice Mill versus State of Andhra Pradesh and Another 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1790 and Kalpraj Dharamshi and another versus Kotak Investment
Advisors Limited (2021) 10 Supreme Court Cases 401 (Annexure P-4 and P-5)
and has submitted that the impugned order deserves to be set aside and the
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application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act deserves to be allowed.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has opposed the
prayer made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. It has been
submitted that the revision petition preferred earlier had been dismissed and,
therefore, no relief under Section 14 of the Limitation Act could have been
granted. Learned counsel submits that the application under Section 14 of the
Limitation Act was, therefore, rightly dismissed. As regards the judgments in the
cases Laxmi Srinivasa R and P Boiled Rice Mill versus State of Andhra Pradesh
and Another and Kalpraj Dharamshi and another versus Kotak Investment
Advisors Limited (supra), learned counsel submits that the said judgments are not
applicable.
6. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the
parties.
7. The only question to be decided is as to whether the application under
Section 14 of the Limitation Act deserves to be allowed or not. No doubt, initially
a revision petition was preferred against the order of rejection of plaint. The said
revision petition was dismissed vide order dated 19.07.2022;
“The order dated 09.03.2022 amounts to a decree as contemplated
under Section 2 (2) of the Code and the aggrieved party has a
remedy of appeal under Section 96 of the Code. That being the
position, this Court would loathe to interfere in the matter in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India.
As a sequel to the above, no case for interference by this
Court is made out. The revision petition is thus dismissed.”
8. No doubt, the revision petition could have been withdrawn.
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However, even while dismissing the revision petition, the observation was that the
order is appealable. The petitioners, therefore, rightly filed the appeal alongwith
an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of
147 days.
9(i). The Limitation Act, 1963 was enacted with a certain object. Till
1859, there was no definite law of limitation and regulations were passed from
time to time for fixing the period of limitation for institution of action. For the
first time in the year 1859, a law on the subject of limitation was passed by Act
XIV of 1859 which came into operation in 1862. The Act of 1859 was followed
by the Act XIX of 1871 followed by Act XV of 1877. Finally, limitation Act,
1908 was passed which continued in operation for a long period. Ultimately, the
Law Commission made various recommendations in its 3rd report dated
27.07.1956. A limitation Bill was, therefore, introduced in the Lok Sabha on
23.12.1960 but it lapsed on account of dissolution of the Lok Sabha and
accordingly, it was again introduced in the Parliament in 1962. It was then that
Act No.36 of 1963 i.e. the present Act came into force w.e.f. 01.01.1964. The Act
defines period of limitation under Section 2 (j) of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for
short ‘the Act, 1963’);
“period of limitation” means the period of limitation prescribed for
any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and “prescribed
period” means the period of limitation computed in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.”
9(ii). Section 5 of the Act, 1963 provides for extension of the prescribed
period in certain cases and lays down as under:-
5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.–Any appeal or
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any application, other than an application under any of the
provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant
or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for
not preferring the appeal or making the application within such
period.
Explanation.–The fact that the appellant or the applicant was
misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in
ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient
cause within the meaning of this section.
9(iii). Section 14 of the Limitation Act provides for exclusion of time of
proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdition;
14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without
jurisdiction.–(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit
the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due
diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first
instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be
excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue
and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of
jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the
time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due
diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first
instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the
same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted
in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other
cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of
sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on
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permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order, where
such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must
fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other
cause of a like nature.
9(iv). The periods of limitation are provided in the schedule attached to the
Act. The legislature was, therefore, conscious of the fact that certain time periods
and limits need to be fixed for initiation of action. Accordingly, different period of
limitations were provided for different actions.
9(v). Then arose the question as to whether the Courts should be strict or
they should be liberal in condoning the delay in initiating different kinds of action.
9(vi). The basic law is that the Courts should be liberal in condoning the
delay but upto a certain extent. However, the concept of ‘liberal approach, justice
oriented approach, substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the
substantial law of limitation. It was so held by the Supreme Court of India in the
case of Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2011 SC 1199.
Further, though, vide different judgments, the State has been given more leverage
as regards delay that occurred in initiating action and condonation thereof, the Act
does not make any distinction between the State and the citizens. It was held by
the Supreme Court of India in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Subrata
Borah Chowlek, (2010) 12 SCALE 209 : 2010 (262) ELT 3 that adopting a strict
standard of proof in the case of Government which is dependent on the actions of
its officials, who often do not have any personal interest in its transaction may lead
to grave miscarriage of justice and, therefore, certain amount of latitude is
permissible in such cases.
9(vii). As per Section 5 of the Limitation Act, if sufficient cause is shown for
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not preferring an appeal or an application (other than an application under the
provisions of Order XXI CPC) within the prescribed period, the same may be
admitted after the prescribed period as well. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee
versus Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others 2013
(4) RCR (Civil) 785, the Hon’ble Apex Court culled out the principles with regard
to condonation of delay. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as under:-
“From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be
culled out are:
(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented,
non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for
condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to
legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in
their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had
to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be
applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the
technical considerations should not be given undue and
uncalled for emphasis.
(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation
of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or
litigant is to be taken note of.
(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof
should not affect public justice and cause public mischief
because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the
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ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the
conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a
delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine
of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be
attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach
whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to
its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given
a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds
urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be
vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face
such a litigation.
(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with
fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse
to the technicalities of law of limitation.
(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised
and the approach should be based on the paradigm of
judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning
and not on individual perception.
(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a
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collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.”
9(viii). Still further, in the case of Basawaraj and another versus Special
Land Acquisition Officer 2013 (14) SCC 81, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
was dealing with a judgment of the High Court of Karnataka wherein the appeals
filed by the appellants had been dismissed on the ground of limitation. In this case
also, the Hon’ble Apex Court examined as to what would amount to a sufficient
cause as defined under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was held that the
expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of
bonafidies cannot be imputed to the party concerned. It was held that whether or
not sufficient cause had been shown, could be decided on the facts of a particular
case and no straitjacket formula was possible. In this case, there was a delay of 5
½ years in filing the appeal and the High Court of Karnataka had dismissed the
appeals on the ground of limitation. The Hon’ble Apex Court, after examining the
facts of the case and law on the subject, declined to interfere in the decision of the
Karnataka High Court and, therefore, rejected the appeals. It was held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court as under:-
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be
blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is
“adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer
the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no
more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and
circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point
of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context,
“sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a
negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in
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view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”.
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford
sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises
discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must
satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause”
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is
furnished, the Court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior
purpose.(See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v.
Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1336 ; Lala
Matadin v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1953 ; Parimal
v. Veena @ Bharti, 2011(2) RCR (Civil) 155 : 2011(1) Recent Apex
Judgments (R.A.J.) 611 and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, AIR 2012 Supreme Court 1629.
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 Supreme Court
993 this Court explained the difference between a “good cause”
and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause”
is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it
can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on
a lesser degree of proof that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so
long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has
been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and
no straitjacket formula is possible.(Vide: Madanlal v. Shyamlal,
2002(2) RCR (Civil) 361; and Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu &
Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., 2002(2) RCR (Civil) 337.
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12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress
resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause
hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has
no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal
maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is
the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently
been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The Statute of Limitation is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to
bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably
and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s
Laws of England, Vol. 24, p. 181:
“330. Policy of Limitation Acts. The courts have expressed at
least three differing reasons supporting the existence of
statutes of limitations namely,(1) that long dormant claims
have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a
defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale
claim, and(3) that persons with good causes of actions should
pursue them with reasonable diligence”.
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or
deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by
long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own
inaction, negligence’ or laches.
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(See: Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff
Assn., 2005(4) RCR (Civil) 334 : (2005) 7 SCC 510 Rajendar Singh
& Ors. v. Santa Singh & Ors., AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2537 and
Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium
Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, 2002(2) RCR
(Criminal) 553 , this Court held that judicially engrafting principles
of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law
laid down by the Constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,
1992(2) RCR (Criminal) 634.”
9(ix) In so far as Section 14 of the Limitation Act is concerned, a Three
Judges Bench examined the issue in the case of Kalpraj Dharamshi and another
versus Kotak Investment Advisors Limited and another (2021) 10 Supreme
Court Cases 401. The Supreme Court of India noticed the conditions/principles
required for pressing into service Section 14 of the Limitation Act;
“(1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil
proceedings prosecuted by the same party;
(2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence
and in good faith;
(3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of
jurisdiction or other cause of like nature;
(4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to
the same matter in issue; and
(5) Both the proceedings are in a court.”
9(x). The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain
the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented it to approach the court within limitation. In case a
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party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on its part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could
be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down
by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient
cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature. As regards Section 14 of the Limitation Act as well,
the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of India have been noticed in the
preceding paragraph.
10. Reverting to the facts of the case, in the considered opinion of this
Court, the First Appellate Court fell into error by rejecting the application. Merely
because the petitioners were advocates would not mean that the filing of the
revision petition was not bonafide or that same was not being prosecuted with due
diligence. The jurisdiction of this Court was invoked and the order rejecting the
plaint was challenged. Though, the said order was appealable, at times, petitions
under Section 227 of the Constitution of India are entertained if the order is found
to be palpably illegal and without jurisdiction. The Coordinate Bench was of the
view that as the remedy of appeal was available, the revision petition was devoid
of merit. Under the circumstances, the petitioners were well within their rights to
prefer an appeal. In the considered opinion of this Court, it was a fit case where
powers under Section 14 of the Limitation Act should have been exercised.
In view of the above, the present petition is allowed. The impugned
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order dated 30.01.2025, passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge,
Chandigarh is set aside and the application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act
is allowed.
Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of accordingly.
(VIKRAM AGGARWAL)
JUDGE
22.04.2025
mamta
Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
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