Jharkhand High Court
Nirmala Mishra vs The State Of Jharkhand on 3 March, 2025
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No.907 of 2023
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1. Nirmala Mishra, W/o Late Vijay Kumar Mishra.
2. Priyankar Kumar, S/o Late Vijay Kumar Mishra
3. Prashant Kumar, S/o of Late Vijay Kumar Mishra.
4. Sweta Kumari, D/o Late Vijay Kumar Mishra.
5. Supriya Kumari, D/o Late Vijay Kumar Mishra.
All residents of village Pipra, P.O. & P.S. Pipra,
District Palamau (Jharkhand).
………. Petitioners.
-Versus-
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand, Ranchi.
3. Additional Collector, Palamau.
4. Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Chhattarpur, Palamau.
5. Malti Devi, W/o Binod Prasad Gupta, Village Pipra, P.O. &
P.S. Pipra, District Palamau (Jharkhand).
6. Brahamdutta Mishra, S/o Late Harihar Nath Mishra.
7. Sushil Mishra, S/o Late Harihar Nath Mishra.
8. Binod Mishra, S/o Late Harihar Nath Mishra.
9. Dayamanti Devi, D/o Late Harihar Nath Mishra.
10. Gayatri Devi, D/o Late Harihar Nath Mishra.
11. Kusum Devi, D/o Late Harihar Nath Mishra.
12. Markandeya Mishra, S/o Late Dharamdutta Mishra.
13. Jaikendya Mishra, S/o Late Dharamdutta Mishra.
14. Indu Devi, D/o Late Dharamdutta Mishra.
15. Antima Devi, D/o Late Dharamdutta Mishra.
16. Kamal Kishore Mishra, S/o Late Bishundutta Mishra.
All residents of village Pipra, P.O. & P.S. Pipra,
District Palamau (Jharkhand).
………. Respondents.
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CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
—–
For the Petitioners : Mr. Sandip Verma, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Saurabh Sagar, AC to SC-III
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Order No.06 Date: 03.03.2025
1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order
dated 02.09.2020 passed by the Additional Collector, Palamau-
respondent no.3 in Land Ceiling Appeal Case No.XV/13 of 2017-
18, whereby the appeal filed by the respondent no.5 was allowed,
setting aside the order dated 08.06.2017 passed by the Deputy
Collector Land Reforms, Chhattarpur (Palamau)-respondent
no.4 in Land Ceiling Case No.02 of 2016-17. Further prayer has
been made for quashing the order dated 28.09.2022 passed by
the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand, Ranchi-respondent
no.2 in Revision Case No. 24 of 2020, whereby the revision
petition filed by the petitioners has been dismissed.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent
no. 5 purchased the land measuring an area of 0.02 Acres
appertaining to R.S. Plot No.29 of Khata No.26 situated at Village
Pipra, P.O. and P.S.- Pipra, District Palamau (hereinafter referred
as the said land) by virtue of a registered sale deed no.4791/4698
dated 17.10.2016.
3. It is further submitted that the original preemptor, namely, Vijay
Kumar Mishra filed application under Section 16 (3) of the Bihar
Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus
land) Act, 1961 (in short ‘the Act, 1961’) before the respondent
no. 4 being Land Ceiling Case No.02 of 2016-17 claiming pre-
emption on the ground that he was one of the co-sharers and
adjoining raiyat with respect to the said land. The Respondent
No.5 filed show cause in the said case stating inter alia that the
said land was purchased for residential purpose and as such the
application filed by the said pre-emptor claiming pre-emption was
not maintainable. The respondent no. 4, however, allowed the
said case vide order dated 08.06.2017. Aggrieved thereby, the
respondent no.5 filed Land Ceiling Appeal Case No.XV/13/2017-
18 before the Additional Collector, Palamau against the original
preemptor and after his death, the petitioners were substituted
as respondents. The said appeal was allowed vide order dated
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02.09.2020, setting aside the order dated 08.06.2017 passed by
the respondent no.4. Thereafter, the petitioners filed Revision
Case No. 24 of 2020 against the respondent no.5 before the
Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand which was heard
alongwith Revision Case Nos.25 of 2020 and 26 of 2020. The said
revision petitions were dismissed vide common order dated
28.09.2022.
4. It is also submitted that the said land is being used for agricultural
purpose and the transferee is neither a co-sharer nor an adjoining
raiyat with respect to the land in question. Thus, both the
appellate as well as the revisional authorities exceeded their
jurisdiction in dismissing the appeal and revision filed by the
petitioners on absolutely irrelevant consideration of the materials
available on record. In fact, neither the said land is homestead
land nor the same is being used for dwelling purpose.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that
there is no infirmity in the appellate order passed by the
respondent no.3 as well as the revisional order passed by the
respondent no. 2 and as such the same need no interference of
this court in exercise of the power conferred under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India. It is further submitted the respondent
nos.2 and 3 have specifically observed in the impugned orders
that the said land has been purchased for residential purpose and
as such section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 is not applicable in the
present case.
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6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
materials available on record.
7. Thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners
is that the said land was agricultural land and the petitioners
being the co-sharers and adjoining raiyats were entitled to
purchase the same in view of section 16(3) of the Act, 1961.
8. Before delving into the merit of the contentions of the petitioners,
it would be appropriate to refer few judgments rendered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with the scope of supervisory
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India.
9. In the case of Mohd. Yunus Vs. Mohd. Mustaqim & Others
reported in (1983) 4 SCC 566, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held as under:-
“7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts
under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited “to seeing that
an inferior court or tribunal functions within the limits of its
authority”, and not to correct an error apparent on the face
of the record, much less an error of law. In this case there
was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error
apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on
the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise
jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural
justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in
consonance with the procedure established by law. In
exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High
Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal. It will
not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the
determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be
based or to correct errors of law in the decision.”
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Venkatlal G. Pittie
& Another Vs. Bright Bros. (P) Ltd., reported in (1987) 3
SCC 558, has held as under: –
“27. Interference by the High Courts under Article 227 of the
Constitution must be within limits. This question has been
considered by this Court from time to time and principles laid
down. This Court in Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu4
W.P.(C) No.907 of 2023
Shinde [(1978) 2 SCC 573] expressed the view that the High
Court commits a gross error in interfering with what was a
just and proper exercise of discretion by the Court of Small
Causes, in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the
Constitution. This was unwarranted. The High Court under
Article 227 has a limited jurisdiction. It was held in that case
that a finding as to whether circumstances justified the
exercise of discretion or not, unless clearly perverse and
patently unreasonable, was, after all a finding of fact and it
could not be interfered with either under Article 226 or 227
of the Constitution. If a proper court has come to the
conclusion on the examination of the nature of the structure,
the nature of the duration of structure, the annexation and
other relevant factors that the structures were permanent in
nature which were violative of Section 13(1)(b) of the Rent
Act as well as Section 108 clause (p) of Transfer of Property
Act and such a finding, is possible, it cannot be considered to
be perverse. In such a situation, the High Court could not
have and should not have interfered.
28. In India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M.A. Baker [(1977)
4 SCC 587] this Court reiterated that the limitation of the
court while exercising power under Article 227 of the
Constitution is well settled. Power under Article 227 is one of
judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset
the conclusions of facts, however erroneous these may be. It
is possible that another court may be able to take a different
view of the matter by appreciating the evidence in a different
manner, if it determinedly chooses to do so. That will not be
justice administered according to law to which courts are
committed notwithstanding dissertation in season and out of
season, about philosophies. In that case, the court found that
the High Court had arrogated to itself the powers of the
appellate court.”
11. In the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani & Another Vs.
Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi Deceased through his
heirs and legal representatives, reported in (1995) 6 SCC
576, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“9. Before parting with this judgment we would like to say
that the High Court was not justified in extending its
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in
the present case. The Act is a special legislation governing
landlord-tenant relationship and disputes. The legislature
has, in its wisdom, not provided second appeal or revision to
the High Court. The object is to give finality to the decision of
the appellate authority. The High Court under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India cannot assume unlimited
prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong
decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction
of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law
or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the
High Court interferes.”
12. The proposition laid down in the aforesaid judgments has also
been reiterated in the subsequent judgements rendered in the
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W.P.(C) No.907 of 2023
cases of State through Special Cell, New Delhi vs. Navjot
Sandhu alias Afshan Guru & Others, reported in (2003) 6
SCC 641, State of W.B. & Others vs. Samar Kumar Sarkar,
reported in (2009) 15 SCC 444 and Gulshera Khanam vs.
Aftab Ahmad, reported in (2016) 9 SCC 414.
13. Thus the law relating to interference with the orders of the courts
or tribunals by the High Court within its jurisdiction in exercise of
the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India may be
summarized as under:-
“1. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts
under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited to see that
court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority
and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record
much less an error of law.
2. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the
High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal. It
will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the
determination of the court or tribunal purports to be based
or to correct errors of law in the decision.
3. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all
species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted
to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of
fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave
injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.
4. Where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers
it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant
interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
since the power of superintendence was not meant to
circumvent statutory law.
5. The jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised
as the cloak of an appeal in disguise.”
14. Now, reverting to the present case. This Court has perused the
order of the respondent no.3 passed in Land Ceiling Appeal Case
No.XV/13/2017-18 wherein it has been observed that the
respondent no. 5 was a landless lady and she had bought two
decimals of land for residential purpose and as such section 16(3)
of the Act, 1961 was not applicable on the said land. It has further
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been observed that though the petitioners had claimed that the
respondent no.5 was not a landless lady and the purchased land
was agricultural, however they had failed to adduce any evidence
in support of their claim.
15. This Court has also perused the order dated 28.09.2022 passed
by the respondent no.2 in Revision Case Nos.24, 25 & 26 of 2020,
from which it transpires that the land in question were not
purchased for agricultural purposes and as such section 16(3) of
the Act, 1961 was not found applicable in the aforesaid cases.
16. Hence, it would also be relevant to go through the provisions of
Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961, which read as under:-
“16. Restriction on future acquisition by transfer etc.
(3) (i) When any transfer of land is made after the
commencement of the Act to any person other than a co-
sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the
transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land
transferred, shall be entitled, within three months of the date
of registration of the document, of transfer, to make an
application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for
the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions
contained in the said deed:
Provided that no such application shall be entertained by the
Collector unless the purchase money together with a sum
equal to ten percent thereof is deposited in the prescribed
manner within the said period.
(ii) On such deposit being made the co-sharer or the raiyat
shall be entitled to be put in possession of the land
irrespective of the fact that the application under clause (i) is
pending for decision:
Provided that where the application is rejected, the co-sharer
or the raiyat, as the case may be, shall be evicted from the
land and possession there of shall be restored to the
transferee and the transferee shall be entitled to be paid a
sum equal to ten per cent of the purchase money out of the
deposit made under clause (i).
(iii) If the application is allowed, the Collector shall by an
order direct the transferee to convey the land in favour of the
applicant by executing and registering a document of
transfer within a period to be specified in the order and, if he
neglects or refuses to comply with the direction, the
procedure prescribed in Order 21, Rule 34 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), shall be, so far as may be,
followed.”
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17. Thus, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat of adjoining
land is entitled to make an application before the Collector within
three months of the date of registration of the sale document for
transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained
in the said deed.
18. The word land has been defined under section 2(f) of the Act,
1961 which reads as under:-
“”land” means land which is used or capable of being used for
agriculture or horticulture and includes land which is an
orchard, Kharhur or pasturage or forest land or also the
land perennially submerged under water or the homestead of
land-holder.
Explanation I. – “Homestead” means a dwelling house for the
purpose of living or for the purpose of letting out on rent
together with any courtyard, compound, attached garden,
orchard and out building and includes any out building for the
purpose connected with agriculture or horticulture and any
tank, library and place of worship appertaining to such
dwelling house.
Explanation II. Land perennially submerged under water
shall not include submerged in the bed of a river.”
19. Thus, section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 is not applicable to a
residential land. The petitioners have failed to adduce cogent
evidence before this court also in support of their claim that the
said land is agricultural land. It is an undisputed fact that in the
registered sale deed of the said land it was written that the same
was purchased by the respondent no. 5 for residential purpose.
It is a well settled principle of law that a registered document is
presumed to be validly executed. Otherwise also, the respondent
no. 5 is a landless lady and in view of the judgment rendered by
learned Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of
Nathuni Singh Yadav and Another Vs. State of Bihar and
Others reported in 1997 SCC OnLine Pat 182, application for
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pre-emption will lie only when all the three parties i.e., the
transferor, the transferee and the pre-emptor are landholders. It
has further been held that if a landless purchaser is not provided
protection against any claim made by a co-sharer or
adjacent Raiyat of the land, then he/she cannot acquire any land
which would put him/her to an unjust and inequitable position.
20. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, there is no reason
to interfere with the appellate as well as the revisional orders
dated 02.09.2020 and 28.09.2022 passed by the respondent no.
3 and 2 respectively whereby the right of pre-emption claimed by
the petitioners has been rejected.
21. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
Sanjay/AFR
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