Delhi High Court
Noor Ahamd & Anr vs Mohd Sadiq on 11 December, 2024
$~103
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 11.12.2024
+ RC.REV. 134/2019, CM APPL. 46543/2022, 34619/2023,
50007/2023, 9028/2024 & 67547/2024
NOOR AHAMD & ANR .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Bahar U. Barqi and Mr. Maroof
Ahmad, Advocates.
versus
MOHD SADIQ .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Pranav Jain, Ms. Srishti Govil,
Mr. Divyanshu Agrawal & Mr.
Tanish Manuja, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU
TARA VITASTA GANJU, J.: (Oral)
1. The present Petition has been filed on behalf of the Petitioners/tenants
impugning the order dated 21.01.2019 [hereinafter referred to as “Impugned
Order”] passed by the learned ARC-1 (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.
By the Impugned Order, the Leave to Defend/Contest Application filed by
the Petitioners/tenants has been dismissed with respect to the premises i.e.,
two rooms, two kitchens, one latrine, one bathroom and one store room on
the Ground Floor of property bearing No.919 (New No.1022), Gali Rajan,
Farash Khana, Delhi-110006 [hereinafter referred to as “subject premises”].
2. The undisputed facts in the present case are below:
(i) The Leave to Defend/Contest Application was filed by the
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Petitioners/tenants before the learned Trial Court and the learned Trial
Court, after examining the same and the contentions raised therein, found
that no triable issues had been raised;
(ii) In view of the fact that the user and occupation charges were not
being paid, as was fixed by this Court in terms of judgment of the Supreme
Court in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd.1, the
stay on the execution of the Eviction Order was vacated by this Court on
01.02.2024;
(iii) Thereafter, the subject premises were restored to the
Respondent/landlord through execution proceedings.
3. This Court, on 20.11.2024, had recorded the contentions of the
Respondent/landlord that the present Petition has become infructuous in
view of the judgment passed by this Court, in Ashok Gupta & Anr v.
Deepak Rao2.
4. The matter was adjourned at the request of the learned Counsel for the
Petitioners/tenants to make his submissions in the matter on merits.
5. Written submissions have been filed on behalf of the
Petitioners/tenants and arguments have been advanced by both the parties.
6. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners/tenants has raised two
contentions.
6.1 In the first instance, on merits, it is submitted that the triable issues
are raised which includes the fact that the ownership of the
1
(2005) 1 SCC 705
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Respondent/landlord is in dispute.
6.2 In the second instance, relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court
in Precision Steel & Engg, Works & Anr. vs. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva
Tayal3, it is submitted that leave to defend/contest should be granted if the
tenant’s affidavit discloses facts which if proved would disentitle the
landlord from recovering possession and at this stage, no proof for such
prime facie satisfaction is required.
6.3 Lastly, it is contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court in NC
Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana4 does not apply to the facts of the
present case.
7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners/tenants also seeks to rely upon
judgment in the cases of Devinder Nath v. Mohd. Asim5, Jor Singh versus
Sanjeev Sharma6, Bishan Swaroop v. Manish Sethi7, Amrit Lal Vadhera
vs. Saroj Suneja8 to contest that the present matter is not infructuous.
8. Learned Counsel for the Respondent/landlord on the other hand
submits that so far as concerns the challenge on the aspect of ownership and
title, the same was raised by the Petitioners/tenants in its Leave to
Defend/Contest Application and was dealt with by the learned Trial Court.
A finding on that aspect was given by the learned Trial Court as well in
paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Impugned Order.
2
2024 SCC OnLine Del 7148
3
(1982) 3 SCC 270
4
(2003) 1 SCC 453
5
204 (2013) DLT 141
6
205 (2013) DLT 117
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8.1 Learned Counsel for the Respondent/landlord further submits that the
Respondent/landlord derives title by virtue of a registered sale deed dated
23.01.1936 executed in favour of his grandfather Mr. Haji Moh. Ismail,
which was placed on record before the learned Trial Court and which has
also been filed before this Court. In this regard, reliance is placed on the
English translation of the sale deed to submit that the Respondent/landlord
before this Court is a lineal descendant and grandson of Mr. Haji Moh.
Ismail.
8.2 Learned Counsel for the Respondent/landlord further submits that on
the aspect of bonafide need and alternate suitable accommodation, the
learned Trial Court has found that the Petitioners/tenants were unable to
establish their contentions. The learned Trial Court also found that the
current residence of the Respondent/landlord and his four family members
was one room, and thus, was insufficient accommodation.
8.3 Learned Counsel for the Respondent/landlord submits that the
judgments that have been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the
Petitioners/tenants in paragraph 7 above have no applicability to the facts of
the present case since in each of these judgments, the Leave to
Defend/Contest Application was not filed in time, however, the facts in the
present case are that the Petitioners/tenants were given an opportunity to
contest the Application and it is only thereafter that the Impugned Order was
passed.
9. The contentions that have been raised by the Petitioners/tenants have
7
208 (2014) DLT 481
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also previously been raised and was examined by two different Coordinate
Benches of this Court. A Coordinate Bench of this Court by an order dated
20.12.2022 held that there is no infirmity with the findings of the learned
Trial Court. On 01.02.2024, another Coordinate Bench of this Court has also
deemed fit to vacate the stay on the execution of the Impugned Order
granted to the Petitioners/tenants, in view of the fact that the orders passed
by this Court were not being complied with.
10. On the aspect of challenge to the ownership raised by the
Petitioner/tenant, it is a settled law that all that a landlord has to prove is a
better title than the tenant to seek eviction from the tenanted premises under
Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [hereinafter referred
to as “Act”]. The Supreme Court in the case of Swadesh Ranjan Sinha v.
Haradeb Banerjee9, in the context of ownership in an eviction petition, has
clarified that:
” 9. All that a plaintiff needs to prove is that he has a better title than the
defendant. He has no burden to show that he has the best of all possible
titles. His ownership is good against all the world except the true owner.
The rights of an owner are seldom absolute, and often are in many
respects controlled and regulated by statute. The question, however, is
whether he has a superior right or interest vis-a-vis the person
challenging it….”
[Emphasis supplied]
10.1 This Court while discussing the issue of ownership in a Petition filed
under Section 25-B(8) of the Act in a case titled R.S. Chadha v. Thakur
Dass10 has held that what a landlord has to prove is a better title than the
tenant to seek his eviction for the tenanted premises. The Court relied on the
8
decided on 18.12.2023 RC. Rev. 292 (2018)
9
(1991) 4 SCC 572
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judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shanti Sharma vs. Ved
Prabha11 to hold that the term owner has to be understood in the context of
the background of the law. The relevant extract reads as follows:
“10.1 It is settled law that what a landlord has to prove is a better title
than the tenant to seek his eviction from a tenanted premises under
Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. The Supreme Court in the case of Shanti
Sharma v. Ved Prabha has held as follows:
“14. The word “owner” has not been defined in this Act
and the word ‘owner’ has also not been defined in the
Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned
Counsel for the appellant appears to be that ownership
means absolute ownership in the land as well as of the
structure standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of
ownership may be what is contended by the counsel for the
appellant but in the modern context where it is more or
less admitted that all lands belong to the State, the persons
who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons
holding the land on some term from the government or the
authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the
matter it could not be thought of that the legislature
when it used the term “owner” in the provision of
Section 14(1)(e) it thought of ownership as absolute
ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of
ownership only will be as it is understood at present. It
could not be doubted that the term “owner” has to be
understood in the context of the background of the law
and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This
Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at
the same time it has provided that the landlord under
certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona
fide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of
which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a
tenant. In this context, the phrase “owner” thereof has to
be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is
that where the person builds up his property and lets out
to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use,
he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction
the only thing necessary for him to prove is bona fide
requirement and that he is the owner thereof. In this10
2024 SCC OnLine Del47
11
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context, what appears to be the meaning of the term
“owner” is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be
something more than the tenant. Admittedly in these
cases where the plot of land is taken on lease the structure
is built by the landlord and admittedly he is the owner of
the structure….”
[Emphasis supplied]
11. The plea that is taken by the Petitioners/tenants which was taken
before the learned Trial Court as well was that the Respondent/landlord is
not the owner of the subject premises. It was contended that the
Petitioners/tenant are in possession of the subject premises as tenants,
however they were the tenants of one Mr. Abdul Gaffar and after his demise,
his brother Mr. Abdul Malik became the owner. The submission of the
Petitioners/tenants is without any merit. In the first instance, the
Respondent/landlord has placed on record the sale deed dated 23.01.1936
registered in favour of his grandfather and has contended that the title to the
subject premises devolved upon the Respondent. Undisputably, no
proceedings seeking to challenge the title of the Respondent/landlord have
been filed by the Petitioners/tenants. It is no longer res integra that the
proceedings under Section 25-B(8) of the Act cannot be converted into a
title suit. In addition, since the Petitioners/tenants have contended that they
were inducted as a tenant in the subject premises, there can be no dispute
that the Respondent/landlord has a better title to the Petitioners/tenants.
12. No doubt, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Precision Steel
case states that if the tenant’s affidavit discloses facts, which if proved,
would disentitle the landlord from recovering possession, the Leave to
Defend would be granted to a tenant. However, in the present case,
challenge to the ownership of the Respondent/landlord was examined
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including with respect to the averment of the ownership of the said Mr.
Abdul Gaffar. The Respondent/landlord had placed on record a copy of the
judgment dated 30.10.1978 in Civil Suit No. 141/1969 titled Abdul Malik v.
Union of India & Ors. which held that the acquisition of the subject
premises was bad in law and that Mr. Abdul Malik is not the owner of the
property. Concededly, this judgment has attained finality since it was not
challenged by either party. No averment or document has been placed before
the Court to show otherwise, nor the same has been contended.
13. The Petitioners/tenants have relied upon the judgment passed by the
Coordinate Benches of this Court in Devender Nath case, Amri Lal case and
Jor Singh case, all of which relate to the judgments which have been passed
in the context of a tenant not being served in accordance with the provisions
of the Act. There is no dispute that the Petitioners/tenants in the present case
were served and that a leave to defend application was filed by him. Thus,
the judgment relied upon by the Petitioners/tenants has no applicability to
the present case.
14. The only other plea that has been raised by the Petitioners/tenants
before this Court is that the judgment in the NC Daga case which holds that
once the tenanted premises is restored to the Respondent/landlord in
accordance with law, the Revision Petition becomes infructuous, is not
applicable to the facts of the present case, however the same is without any
merit.
15. The issue of whether a Revision Petition is maintainable when the
tenanted subject premises has been legally restored to the
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Respondent/landlord, either during or before the filing of the Revision
Petition, has been addressed by the Supreme Court as well as by
Coordinate Benches of this Court.
16. The Supreme Court in NC Daga, dealt with a situation while
dismissing a challenge by a tenant to a judgment passed by this Court
upholding an order declining leave to defend passed by the learned Trial
Court. The facts in the case were that, possession of the tenanted premises
had been taken pursuant to an order passed by the Executing Court. The
Supreme Court dealt with the similar arguments raised on behalf of the
Respondent/landlord that the Petition has become infructuous pursuant to
the possession having been taken.
17. After briefly examining the contention of the parties, the Supreme
Court in N.C Daga case held that in view of the admitted position of
possession being taken in execution proceedings, it was not necessary to go
into the further details since such a decision would be a purely an academic
question. The Supreme Court in N.C Daga case held as follows:
“6. In view of the admitted position that pursuant to the order passed
by the Rent Controller, possession has been taken on execution of the
order permitting eviction, and absence of specific stand regarding
implied consent it is, however, not necessary to go into the finer details
and to examine the rival stand in the background of legal position as it
would amount to rendering decision on a purely academic question.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed, without any order as to costs.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
18. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar
Verma v. Manmohan Verma12 where on an averment by the
12
Civil Appeal Nos. 5220-5221 of 2008 order dated 19.08.2008
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Respondent/landlord that possession of the premises has already been taken
over, the Supreme Court held that nothing further survives in the Appeal and
disposed the Appeals as being infructuous. The order being brief is extracted
below:
“Leave granted.
At the time of hearing of these appeals, the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the landlord-respondent submits, on instructions, that the
possession of the premises in question has already been taken over by
the landlord-respondent. That being the position, these appeals have
now become infructuous, which have been filed against the final
judgment and order dt.25.02.2008 and 28.03.2008 passed by the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in RCR No.49 of 2007 and C.M.No.119 of
2008 (Review) in RCR No.49 of 2007, by which the Revision Petition
filed by the tenant/appellant was dismissed and order of eviction was
affirmed. Since the possession has already been taken over by the
landlord-respondent, in our view nothing survives in these appeals
and accordingly, the appeals are disposed of as infructuous.
Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
There will be no order as to costs.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
19. Various Coordinate Benches of this Court have also similarly held
that the tenant’s Petition have become infructuous in view of possession
being taken. Reliance is placed on Neelam Sharma v. Ekant Rekhan13 and
Bhawani Shankar v Nand Lal and Ors.14.
20. In Om Prakash Ashok Kumar & Sons v. Ajay Khurana15 while
relying on the NC Daga case and several other cases, a Coordinate Bench
held as follows:
“10. This Court in various decisions has followed the decision given by
the Supreme Court in N.C. Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana. The Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in Poonam Bangia v. Harbhagwan Dass13
2019 SCC Online Del 6487
14
2021 SCC OnLine Del 4284
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Chandiramani in RC. REV. no. 16/2021 vide order dated 22.07.2021
after following the law laid down in N.C. Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh
Rana, dismissed the revision petition after observing that the landlord
has received the possession of the tenanted premises through
execution proceedings. Another Coordinate Bench of this Court in
Mange Ram v. Rajesh Narain Goel, in RC. REV. no. 147/2021, decided
on 19.03.2024 after following N.C. Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana
and Vinod Kumar Verma v. Manmohan Verma, in Civil Appeal nos.
5220 -5221/2008 passed by the Supreme Court and in Poonam Bangia
v. Harbhagwan Dass Chandiramani in RC. REV no. 16/2021 passed by
this Court as mentioned hereinabove also dismissed the revision
petition as became infructuous due to the reason that the possession
of the subject premises has been restored to the respondent/landlord.
The same view was also taken by another Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court in Ram Avtar v. Anuradha Shukla in RC. Rev. Bearing no.
104/2021 vide order dated 03.11.2023, the revision petition was
ordered to be dismissed as the possession of the tenanted premises has
already been taken by the respondent/landlord in accordance with law.
xxx
12. In the present case as reflected from the order dated 10.05.2024,
the possession of the tenanted premises has already been restored
back to the respondent/landlord in execution of warrant of possession
in accordance with law. This Court is also of the view that the present
petition is not maintainable. Accordingly, the present petition, along
with pending applications stands dismissed being infructuous.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
21. This Court has in Ashok Gupta & Anr. v. Deepak Rao16 has taken the
following view:
“18. The Eviction Petition was filed by the Respondent/landlord
under Section 141(c) [sic. 14(1)(e)] of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
setting out the requirement to open his law offices. The proceeding was
contested by the Petitioner/tenant and an Eviction Order was passed by
the learned Trial Court. Pursuant thereto, the Respondent/landlord
recovered possession of the demised premises in accordance with law.
As such the Revision Petition has been filed challenging the order of the
learned Trial Court which has now gained fruition and was executed
and has already been implemented through execution proceedings. In16
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these circumstances, the Revision Petition has become infructuous.
19. As stated above, the jurisdiction of this Court exercising
revisionary powers is limited and circumspect. The Petitioner/tenant
did not initiate civil proceedings for recovery of possession, instead the
present Revision Petition was filed. The Petitioner/tenant has not
contended that Section 19 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 has been
violated. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the NC
Daga case and Vinod Kumar Verma case, this Court finds that this
Petition has become infructuous and is accordingly dismissed.”
21.1 In addition, in RC. REV. No. 104/2021 captioned as Ram Avtar v.
Anuradha Shukla vide order dated 03.11.2023 this Court has held that once
possession was taken over by the Respondent/landlord in accordance with
law, the Petition becomes infructuous. The relevant extract of the Ram
Avtar case reads as follows:
“4.1 This Court has considered this contention of the learned
Counsel for the Petitioner/tenant. The Revision Petition has been filed
challenging the order of the Trial Court which has now gained
fruition, and has already been implemented through execution
proceedings. In these circumstances, the Revision Petition has
become infructuous.
5. Furthermore, this Court in various judgments held that once
possession has been taken over by the Respondent/landlord in
accordance with law, this petition becomes infructuous and in view
thereof, nothing survives in the petition.”
[Emphasis supplied]
22. The present Petition has been filed impugning the order and judgment
of the learned Trial Court which has directed vacation of the subject
premises in issue. The jurisdiction of this Court is only revisionary in nature
and limited in scope. The Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain
Dua17 while interpreting the intendment of the legislature in removing two
stages of Appeal that were earlier provided in the Delhi Rent Control Act,
17
(2022) 6 SCC 30
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1958 [hereinafter referred to as the “Act”] has held that this is a conscious
omission. It was held that the High Court is not expected to substitute and
supplant its view with that of the learned Trial Court, its only role is to
satisfy itself on the process adopted. Thus, the scope of revisionary
jurisdiction of this Court has been limited to examine if there is an error
apparent on the face of the record or absence of any adjudication by the
learned Trial Court, and it is only then should the High Court interfere. The
Supreme Court has also cautioned from converting the power of
superintendence into that of a regular first Appeal under revisionary
jurisdiction. This has been elucidated at length by Supreme Court in Abid-
Ul-Islam case in the following manner:
“Scope of revision
22. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit of the
proviso to Section 25-B(8). The proviso creates a distinct and
unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order
passed by the learned Rent Controller over an application filed under
sub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is
to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal.
It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through
a covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.
23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the
High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with
that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role
is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by
the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is
an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean
that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should
not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a
roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to
converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first
appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.
xxx
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25. The aforesaid decision has been recently considered and approved
by this Court in Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal [Mohd.
Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC 327 : (2020) 4 SCC (Civ)
107] : (SCC pp. 340-41, paras 22-23)
“22. This Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co.
Ltd. [Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8
SCC 119] had an occasion to consider the scope of proviso to
Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. This Court
found, that though the word “revision” was not employed in the
said proviso, from the language used therein, the legislative intent
was clear that the power conferred was revisional power. This
Court observed thus : (SCC p. 124, para 11)
’11. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in the
present case has reassessed and reappraised the evidence
afresh to reach a different finding as though it was
exercising appellate jurisdiction. No doubt even while
exercising revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal of evidence
can be made, but that should be for the limited purpose to
ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-
finding court is wholly unreasonable.’
It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that the High Court
while exercising the revisional powers under the Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958 though could not reassess and reappraise the evidence, as if
it was exercising appellate jurisdiction, however, it was empowered to
reappraise the evidence for the limited purpose so as to ascertain
whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly
unreasonable.
23. Again in Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani [Ram Narain
Arora v. Asha Rani, (1999) 1 SCC 141] , this Court had an
occasion to consider the aforesaid powers under the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958. This Court observed thus : (SCC p. 148, para
12)
’12. It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision petition
under Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act
is a very limited one, but even so in examining the legality
or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller,
the High Court could examine the facts available in order
to find out whether he had correctly or on a firm legal basis
approached the matters on record to decide the case. Pure
findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but
(sic if) in a given case, the finding of fact is given on a
wrong premise of law, certainly it would be open to the
Revisional Court to interfere with such a matter.’
It was thus held, that though the scope of revisional powers of the
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legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the
High Court could examine the facts available in order to find out
whether he had correctly or on a firm legal basis approached the
matters on record to decide the case. It has also been held, that pure
findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but in a given
case, if the finding of fact is given on a wrong premise of law, it would
be open to the Revisional Court to interfere with the same.”
[Emphasis supplied]
23. The provisions of the Act provide for a remedy of restoration of
possession to a Petitioners/tenants in one situation, i.e., under Section 19 of
the Act. In cases allowed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, the recovery of
possession by a tenant under Section 19(1) of the Act can be obtained if the
landlord re-let the whole or part of the subject premises within three years
from the date of obtaining possession from the evicted tenant. Sub-section
(2) of Section 19 of the Act further provides that where such premises are
not occupied within two months by landlord or within three years from the
date of possession by the person for whose benefit the premises are held, or
are re-let to a person without permission of the Rent Controller within three
years from the date of possession, the Rent Controller may direct the
landlord to put the tenant in possession or pay him such compensation as is
deemed fit by the Rent Controller. Section 19 of the Act is set out below:
“19. Recovery of possession for occupation and re-entry.–(1) Where
a landlord recovers possession of any premises from the tenant in
pursuance of an order made under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-
section (1) of section 14 [or under sections 14A, 14B, I4C, 14D and 21,
the landlord shall not, except with the permission of the Controller
obtained in the prescribed manner, re-let the whole or any part of the
premises within three years from the date of obtaining such possession,
and in granting such permission, the Controller may direct the landlord
to put such evicted tenant in possession of the premises.
(2) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises as
aforesaid and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or by the
person for whose benefit the premises are held, within two months ofSignature Not Verified
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obtaining such possession, or the premises having been so occupied
are, at any time within three years from the date of obtaining
possession, re-let to any person other than the evicted tenant without
obtaining the permission of the Controller under sub-section (1) or the
possession of such premises is transferred to another person for
reasons which do not appear to the Controller to be bona fide, the
Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by such
evicted tenant within such time as may be prescribed, direct the
landlord to put the tenant in possession of the premises or to pay him
such compensation as the Controller thinks fit.”
23.1 The Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam case has held that Section 19 of
the Act gives a right of re-possession to the dispossessed tenant if landlord
recovers possession under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and thereafter, the
landlord does not use the subject premises for the purpose that it was
intended and set out in such Eviction Petition on which basis, an order for
eviction was obtained by the landlord. The relevant extract is set out below:
“19. Before a presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty-bound to
place prima facie material supported by the adequate averments. It is
only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and the onus shifts on
the tenant. The object of Section 14(1)(e) vis-à-vis Section 25-B has to
be seen in the light of yet another provision contained under Section 19.
Section 19 gives a right to the dispossessed tenant for repossession if
there is a non-compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after
eviction, to put the premises to use for the intended purpose. Such a
right is available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the
application filed by the landlord invoking Section 14(1)(e) being
allowed. Thus, Section 19 inter alia throws more light on the
legislative objective facilitating a speedy possession. The object is also
reflected in the proviso to Section 25-B(8), denying a right of appeal..”
[Emphasis Supplied]
24. In the present case, as discussed above, the Respondent/landlord
recovered possession of the subject premises in accordance with law. As
such the Revision Petition has been filed challenging the order of the learned
Trial Court which has now gained fruition as was executed and has already
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been implemented through execution proceedings.
25. As stated above, the jurisdiction of this Court exercising revisionary
powers is limited and circumspect. Concededly, the Petitioners/tenants have
not initiated appropriate civil proceedings for recovery of possession of the
tenanted premises. The Petitioners/tenants have also not contended that
Section 19 of Act has been violated. Relying on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the NC Daga case and Vinod Kumar Verma case, this
Court finds that this Petition has become infructuous and is accordingly
dismissed. All pending Applications stand closed.
26. However, given the fact that substantial time has been taken up by the
Petitioners/tenants before this Court in spite of multiple orders of Coordinate
Benches of this Court which, have found that the present Petition is without
any merit, this matter has taken up more than 34 hearings on account of
multiple adjournments by the Petitioners/tenants, the Court deems it
apposite to fix costs in the sum of Rs.25,000/- payable directly to “Bar
Council of Delhi-Indigent and Disabled Lawyers Account” by the
Petitioners/tenants within six weeks. Proof of costs shall be filed by the
Petitioners/tenants with the Registry.
TARA VITASTA GANJU, J
DECEMBER 11, 2024/ ha
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