Orissa High Court
P. Laxmi Patra @ Palia Laxmi @ vs State Of Odisha And Others ……. Opp. … on 4 March, 2025
THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No. 3652 of 2024
(In the matter of an application under Sections 528 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023)
P. Laxmi Patra @ Palia Laxmi @ ....... Petitioners
P. Laxmi and another
-Versus-
State of Odisha and others ....... Opp. Parties
For the petitioners : M/s. A.K. Pandey, D.N. Mishra,
N. Acharya, V.V.B. Suryaprakash,
Advocates
For the opp. Parties : Mr. U.R. Jena, A.G.A. (O.P. No.1)
Mr. S.K. Mohanty, Advocate
(For O.P. No.s.2 & 3)
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA
Date of Hearing: 07.12.2024 :: Date of Judgment: 04.03.2025
S.S. Mishra, J. The present petitioners have invoked the inherent
jurisdiction of this court under Sections 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking quashing of criminal proceedings
arising out of Baidyanathpur P.S. Case No. 140 of 2022 corresponding
to G.R. Case No.942 of 2022 registered against the opposite parties no.2
and 3 by the petitioner no.1.
2. The petitioner no.1 is the informant and petitioner no.2 is the
victim of the present case, approached this Court for quashing of the
criminal prosecution initiated by them against the opposite parties no.2
and 3.
The allegations made by the petitioners against the opposite
parties no.2 and 3 are that on 11.05.2022 at 10.30 P.M. the petitioner
no.1 being the complainant/informant lodged a written report before the
police alleging therein that the daughter of her younger sister, P.
Mohalaxmi's (petitioner no.2 herein) has married with one A. Hadu
Patra, elder son of A. Narayan Patra of Radhamatha Sahi Lanjipalli,
Berhampur since last three years as per Hindu custom and ritual. After
the marriage, husband A. Hadu Patra and mother-in-law, A. Mahalaxmi
of the petitioner no.2 subjected her to torture both physically and
mentally. In the meantime the couples have also been blessed with two
children. Though a complaint was filed at Mahila Police Station against
the husband and mother-in-law on 19.02.2022, subsequently the matter
Page 2 of 16
was compromised in presence of IIC, Mahila Police Station. It is alleged
that on 09.05.2022 the husband and mother-in-law of the petitioner no.2
(P. Mahalaxmi), namely, A. Hadu Patra and A. Mahalaxmi assaulted her
and poured kerosene and set her on fire with an intention to kill her. The
petitioner no.2 was shifted to MKCG Medical College and Hospital,
Berhampur for treatment with the help of the complainant and others.
The F.I.R. has been registered on the aforementioned allegation.
3. Opposite party no.2 was in custody till 04.12.2024 and it is
informed to this Court that subsequent thereto, opposite party no.2 has
been enlarged on bail. Opposite party no.3, is the mother-in-law of the
victim-petitioner no.2, who is 87 years old, has already been admitted to
bail in the present case. The trial of this case is in progress. As many as
nine witnesses have already been examined. The petitioner no.1 has been
examined as P.W.2, whereas petitioner no.2 has been examined as
P.W.1. The other vital witnesses of the prosecution have also been
examined. At this stage, the informant and victim have approached this
Court seeking quashing of the entire prosecution initiated by them
against the opposite parties no.2 and 3.
Page 3 of 16
4. Heard Mr. A.K. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioners;
Mr. U.R. Jena, learned Additional Government Advocate for State-
opposite party no.1; and Mr. S.K. Mohanty, learned counsel for opposite
parties no.2 and 3.
5. Mr. A.K. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioners
submitted that owing to the peculiarity of the present case this Court
even at this stage should give indulgence and quash the entire criminal
prosecution because the informant and victim have approached this
Court and have filed the affidavit wriggling out of their statement made
to the police as well as before the Court. He has relied upon the
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of G. Sagar Suri
and another v. State of U.P. and others1 and K. Bharati Devi and
another v. State of Telengana and another2.
In G. Sagar Suri (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
under:
"It was submitted by Mr. Lalit, learned counsel for the second
respondent that the appellants have already filed an application
in the Court of Additional Judicial Magistrate for their
discharge and that this Court should not interfere in the
1
(2000) 2 SCC 636
2
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2695
Page 4 of 16
criminal proceedings which are at the threshold. We do not
think that on filing of any application for discharge, the High
Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Code. In this connection, reference may be made to two
decisions of this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial
Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400]
and Ashok Chaturvedi v. Shitul H. Chanchani [(1998) 7 SCC
698 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1704] wherein it has been specifically
held that though the Magistrate trying a case has jurisdiction to
discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers
the charge to be groundless but that does not mean that the
accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of
the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the
proceeding quashed against them when no offence has been
made out against them and still why must they undergo the
agony of a criminal trial.”
Similarly, in K. Bharati Devi and another (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held as under:-
“The reference was answered by the learned three-Judge
Bench of this Court in Gian Singh [Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013)
1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988] . Speaking for the
Bench, R.M. Lodha, J. (as his Lordship then was), observed thus
: (SCC pp. 340-43, paras 57-61)“57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the
ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not
the same thing as compounding of offence. They are
different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the
power of compounding of offences given to a court under
Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of
criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power
of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions
contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely
and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the
formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing aPage 5 of 16
criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal
complaint is guided by the material on record as to
whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of
power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal
or dismissal of indictment.
58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding
having regard to the fact that the dispute between the
offender and the victim has been settled although the
offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its
opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an
exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the
dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is
restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate
guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have
harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing
that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of
the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only
because he and the victim have settled the dispute
amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation,
yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law,
with or without the permission of the court. In respect of
serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. or other
offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of
moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention
of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity, the settlement
between the offender and the victim can have no legal
sanction at all. However, certain offences which
overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour
having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial,
financial, partnership or such like transactions or the
offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to
dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is
basically to the victim and the offender and the victim
have settled all disputes between them amicably,
irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been
made compoundable, the High Court may within the
framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal
proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied
that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any
likelihood of the offender being convicted and by notPage 6 of 16
quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be
casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above
list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will
depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can
be prescribed.
59. B.S. Joshi [B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4
SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] , Nikhil Merchant [Nikhil
Merchant v. CBI, (2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
858] , Manoj Sharma [Manoj Sharma v. State, (2008) 16
SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145]
and Shiji [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1
SCC (Cri) 101] do illustrate the principle that the High
Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or
complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section
482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect
the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be
said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S.
Joshi [B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675 :
2003 SCC (Cri) 848] , Nikhil Merchant [Nikhil
Merchant v. CBI, (2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
858] , Manoj Sharma [Manoj Sharma v. State, (2008) 16
SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145]
and Shiji [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1
SCC (Cri) 101] this Court has compounded the non-
compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so.
There does exist the distinction between compounding of
an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal
case by the High Court in exercise of inherent power
under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and
different although the ultimate consequence may be the
same viz. acquittal of the accused or dismissal of
indictment.
60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law
and the decisions of this Court
in Simrikhia [Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee, (1990) 2
SCC 437 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 327],
Dharampal [Dharampal v. Ramshri, (1993) 1 SCC 435 :
1993 SCC (Cri) 333] , Arun Shankar Shukla [Arun
Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., (1999) 6 SCC 146 : 1999Page 7 of 16
SCC (Cri) 1076] , Ishwar Singh [Ishwar Singh v. State of
M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153],
Rumi Dhar [Rumi Dhar v. State of W.B., (2009) 6 SCC
364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] and Ashok
Sadarangani [Ashok Sadarangani v. Union of India,
(2012) 11 SCC 321 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 298 : (2013) 1
SCC (Cri) 638] . The principle propounded
in Simrikhia [Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee, (1990) 2
SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] that the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to
override express bar provided in law is by now well
settled. In Dharampal [Dharampal v. Ramshri, (1993) 1
SCC 435 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 333] the Court observed the
same thing that the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which
are expressly barred by the Code. Similar statement of law
is made in Arun Shankar Shukla [Arun Shankar
Shukla v. State of U.P., (1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC
(Cri) 1076] . In Ishwar Singh [Ishwar Singh v. State of
M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 667: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153] the
accused was alleged to have committed an offence
punishable under Section 307IPC and with reference to
Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence
punishable under Section 307IPC was not compoundable
offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no
offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable
under the Code. In Rumi Dhar [Rumi Dhar v. State of
W.B., (2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074]
although the accused had paid the entire due amount as
per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery
before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was
being proceeded with for the commission of the offences
under Sections 120-B/420/467/468/471IPC along with the
bank officers who were being prosecuted under Section
13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d)of the Prevention of
Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash the charge
against the accused by holding that the Court would not
quash a case involving a crime against the society when a
prima facie case has been made out against the accused
for framing the charge. Ashok Sadarangani [Ashok
Sadarangani v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 321 :
Page 8 of 16
(2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 298 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 638] was
again a case where the accused persons were charged of
having committed the offences under Sections 120-B, 465,
467, 468 and 471IPC and the allegations were that the
accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged
property documents as collaterals and utilised such
facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening
letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods,
without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank
to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign
suppliers and also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The
Court was alive to the reference made in one of the
present matters and also the decisions in B.S. Joshi [B.S.
Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC
(Cri) 848] , Nikhil Merchant [Nikhil Merchant v. CBI,
(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] and Manoj
Sharma [Manoj Sharma v. State, (2008) 16 SCC 1 :
(2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and it was held that B.S.
Joshi [B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675 :
2003 SCC (Cri) 848] and Nikhil Merchant [Nikhil
Merchant v. CBI, (2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
858] dealt with different factual situation as the dispute
involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case
under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani [Ashok
Sadarangani v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 321 :
(2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 298 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 638] was
more on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The
decision in Ashok Sadarangani [Ashok
Sadarangani v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 321 :
(2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 298 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 638]
supports the view that the criminal matters involving
overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing.
61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different
from the power given to a criminal court for compounding
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent
power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but
it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline
Page 9 of 16
engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of
justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or
complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and
the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case and no category can
be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or
victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute.
Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the
victim and the offender in relation to the offences under
special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or
the offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity, etc. cannot provide for any basis for
quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences.
But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing
for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences
arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil,
partnership or such like transactions or the offences
arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the
family disputes where the wrong is basically private or
personal in nature and the parties have resolved their
entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court
may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because
of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the
possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to
great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice
would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case
despite full and complete settlement and compromise with
the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider
whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of
justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount
to abuse of process of law despite settlement and
compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and
Page 10 of 16
whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that
the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the
above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court
shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding.”
Relying upon the aforementioned two judgments, Mr. Pandey, learned
counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the plea of quashing of the
F.I.R. remains maintainable despite substantial examination of the
prosecution witnesses. Therefore, keeping in view the stand taken by the
victim as well as the informant in the present case, this Court may quash
the entire proceeding. He has also submitted that the present proceeding
is arising out of a matrimonial discord; hence there is no legal
impediment to interfere and quash the F.I.R.
6. Mr. S.K. Mohanty, learned counsel for opposite parties
no.2 and 3 has reiterated the stand taken by Mr. Pandey, learned counsel
for the petitioners and submitted that the parties have now settled the
dispute amongst themselves and on the settlement terms the present
petition has been filed. Hence, this Court may give indulgence to the
petitioners and quash the criminal proceeding initiated against his
clients.
Page 11 of 16
7. Mr. U.R. Jena, learned Additional Government Advocate
for State-opposite party no.1 on the contrary submitted that trial in the
present case is at advance stage therefore, at this stage, invocation of
inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the
informant and the victim is forbidden particularly when they themselves
have already deposed before the trial Court against the opposite parties
no.2 and 3. He has also read out the evidence of the witnesses to
substantiate his case.
8. I have gone through the contentions raised by the petitioners
in the present petition and also carefully gone through the evidence
recorded by the prosecution in the trial of the accused opposite parties
no.2 and 3. The present petitioners have been examined as P.W.s 1 and 2
on 25.09.2024 & 10.10.2024 respectively. Both the petitioners in their
examination before the court below being the prosecution witnesses have
in detailed narrated the incident and implicated the opposite parties no.2
and 3 by specifically attributing overt act. They sustained extensive
cross-examination; however the defence counsel could not create any
doubt on the trustworthiness of the witnesses. Similarly, there are other
Page 12 of 16
witnesses have also been examined and all the witnesses have supported
the prosecution case. Therefore, while exercising the extra-ordinary
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court should not abruptly
scuttle the ongoing trial. This Court is also conscious of the facts that the
dispute is arising out of a matrimonial discord. However, the offences for
which the opposite parties no.2 and 3 are being tried are grave offences.
Therefore, this Court is not inclined to entertain this petition at the
instance of the present petitioners because it is well settled principle of
law that when the trial is at advance stage and the offence involving are
heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, the High Court while
exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. shall not interfere
and abruptly cut-short the trial. This principle is well established by the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab3, in which the apex court held thus:
“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different
from the power given to a criminal court for compounding3
(2012) 10 SCC 303Page 13 of 16
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power
is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to
be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such
power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases
power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or
FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim
have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no category can be
prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the
High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity
of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot
be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s
family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such
offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact
on society. ……”
It will be apposite to refer to the Judgment of Narinder Singh v. State of
Punjab4 where similar principles relating to an offence involving
charges under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code are reiterated, where
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are
to be generally treated as crime against the society and not
against the individual alone. However, the High Court
would not rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to4
(2014) 6 SCC 466Page 14 of 16
proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted
on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons
used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by
the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis
of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as
to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the
chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former
case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the
criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be
permissible for the High Court to accept the plea
compounding the offence based on complete settlement
between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be
swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is
going to result in harmony between them which may
improve their future relationship.”
9. In light of the well-settled legal principles propounded in the
judgments of Gian Singh (supra) and Narinder Singh (supra), this
Court has carefully considered all the attending circumstances
surrounding the present case. It is evident that the offences involved are
of a grave and serious nature, which warrants a thorough examination
and judicial scrutiny. While it is acknowledged that the parties have
reached a compromise, it is crucial to recognize that the trial has already
progressed to an advanced stage. Furthermore, the victims-petitioners
have duly recorded their evidence with the learned trial court, which
constitutes an important part of the evidence. It is also apposite to note
Page 15 of 16
that the crime is not merely directed at any individual, but rather at the
State and the society at large. Given these facts, this Court is of the
considered view that despite the compromise, the seriousness of the
offences and the advancement of the trial necessitate that the
proceedings be allowed to continue. The mere fact of a compromise, in
this case, does not outweigh the gravity of the charges, and quashing the
proceedings at this juncture would not be in the interest of justice.
Therefore, in the opinion of this Court the trial proceedings should not be
quashed.
10. However, the observations made in this judgment shall not prevent
the accused(s) from seeking any relief available under the law during or
after the process of trial.
11. Accordingly, the CRLMC is dismissed.
(S.S. Mishra)
Judge
The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.
Dated the 4th March, 2025/Ashok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB MOHAPATRA
Designation: Secretary
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 12-Mar-2025 19:06:42 Page 16 of 16
