Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
P. Munikrishnaiah Gopi, Chittoor … vs The Chairman Cum Presiding Officer, … on 9 January, 2025
APHC010286972006
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3504]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY, NINTH OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY-FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM
WRIT PETITION NO: 21411/2006
Between:
Grindwell Norton Limited A Company Incorporated Under ...PETITIONER
Comp A
AND
The Chairman-cum-presiding Officer 2 Others and ...RESPONDENT(S)
Others
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. G V S GANESH
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR LABOUR
2. HANUMANTHA RAO BACHINA
WRIT PETITION NO: 25556/2006
Between:
P. Munikrishnaiah @ Gopi, Chittoor ,district, …PETITIONER
AND
The Chairman Cum Presiding Officer Anantapur Dist …RESPONDENT(S)
Another and Others
2WP_21411_25556_2006
MRK, JCounsel for the Petitioner:
1. HANUMANTHA RAO BACHINA
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR LABOUR
2. G V S GANESH
The Court made the following COMMON ORDER:
The writ petition No.21411 of 2006 is filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, seeking the following prayer:-
“……a) call for the records pertaining to the impugned
Award dated June 30, 2006 in I.D.No.135 of 2003 passed by the
Respondent No.1 viz. the Chairman-cum-Presiding Officer
Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Anantapur and Published by
the Deputy Secretary to Government Labour Employment Training
Factories (Lab.I) Department G.O.Rt.No.1839 dated August 29,
2006 on 25th September 2006 and b) quash the same by the
issuance of a Writ more particularly, in the nature of Writ of
Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ order or direction declaring
the same as wholly without jurisdiction., and pass such other
further orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
facts and circumstances of the case while awarding costs of these
proceedings to the petitioner and render justice….”
2. The writ petition No.25556 of 2006 is instituted under Art. 226 of
the Constitution of India, praying the relief as under :-
“……to issue a writ more particularly one in the nature of
writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ calling upon records
pertaining to I.D No.135 of 2003 dated 30.6.2006 which was
published in G.O.Rt.No.1839, Labour Employment Training
Factories (Lab.I) Department dated 29.8.2006 and to set aside the
3WP_21411_25556_2006
MRK, Jsame as arbitrary, illegal and against principles of natural justice
and consequently direct the 2nd respondent to reinstate the
petitioner into service with continuity of service and with all other
attendant benefits and to pass such other order or orders ….”
3. The petitioner-Company in the writ petition No.21411 of 2006, had
challenged the award dated 30.11.2006 in I.D No.135 of 2003 passed by
the 1st respondent by invoking Section 2-A(2) of Industrial Dispute Act,
1947 (hereinafter referred as the ‘Act’). Dissatisfied with the very same
award, the respondent No.2-Workman, had also filed W.P No.25556 of
2006 and sought his reinstatement with continuity of service, attendant
benefits and back wages.
4. Since, these are cross-writ petitions, the petitioner in W.P
No.21411 of 2006 and respondent No.2 in W.P No.25556 of 2006; and
petitioner in W.P No.25556 of 2006 and respondent No.2 in W.P
No.21411 of 2006, are referred by their nomenclature as arrayed before
the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Ananthapur (hereafter referred
to as ‘Tribunal’) for the sake of convenience i.e.,’Management’ and
‘Workman’ respectively.
Case of the Workman:-
5. The Workman filed I.D No.130 of 2003 by invoking Section 2-A(2)
of ‘Act’ before the Tribunal to pass an award holding that
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discharge/termination order dated 10.03.2003, passed against him by the
Management as illegal.
6. The Workman was appointed in the year 1979 and his services
were confirmed in the year 1980. Thereafter, in view of time to time
promotions in the Company, the Workman was promoted to Charge Hand
way back in 1990. Further escalated to the Senior Charge Hand and
discharging his duties from 01.07.1995 by drawing the salary of
Rs.9,043/- p.m.
7. In a nutshell, the Workman continued in the Management Company
as Senior Charge Hand and he was also active in workers union
activities. Upon disturbances between the Workman and the
Management affairs, a criminal case was registered against the workman
in the concerned Police Station. Finally, the termination/discharge orders
dated 10.03.2003 were issued to the Workman by the Management. The
said termination orders were assailed by the Workman under Section 2-A
of the Act., before the Tribunal.
Case of the Management:-
8. The Management specifically filed its rejoinder by touching various
aspects primarily contending that, the workman does not come under the
definition of Section 2(s) of the Act. Even as per the assertions of the
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Workman, he is discharging his duties as Senior Charge Hand in the
Management and drawing a salary of Rs.9,043/- p.m.
9. It is also firmly asserted by the Management in its rejoinder that,
the Senior Charge Hand post involves supervisory as well as
administrative duties in the Company and controlling sub-ordinates, etc.
In fact, the Workman was tasked to monitor seven sub-ordinate workers,
who were working under his supervision and he had the authority to grant
them leave. Thus, the main ground of attack of the Management is that,
the very institution of an I.D under Section 2(s) of the Act by the Workman
is not maintainable, as he is not a Workman who comes under the
definition of Section 2(s) of the Act. Hence, the very institution of
proceedings before the Tribunal is per-se not maintainable. Hence, the
Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the case.
10. During the course of the proceedings in I.D No.135 of 2003, the
Management filed I.A No.154 of 2005 before the Tribunal, requesting to
frame an issue in respect of the very maintainability of the industrial
dispute by specifically asserting that Workman is discharging the
supervisory functions and not treated as a Workman. The said I.A was
resisted by the Workman stating that, he comes under the purview of 2(s)
of Act. At last, the Tribunal was pleased to dismiss the said I.A vide order
dated 20.09.2005.
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11. Assailing the said I.A orders dated 20.09.2005, the Management
filed W.P No.25484 of 2005 before the Erstwhile High Court of Andhra
Pradesh at Hyderabad seeking quashing of the said proceedings and
also direct the Tribunal to frame an issue whether the Workman in the
case comes within the meaning of 2(s) of the Act.
12. The above said writ petition was disposed on merits vide orders
dated 27.12.2005, whereby and whereunder, Unified High Court of A.P
directing the Tribunal to frame an independent issue as to whether the 2 nd
respondent is a Workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act
and answer it independently in the award, by leading evidence of both
parties within a period of 4 months from the date of receipt of the orders
in Writ Petition.
13. For the sake of a comprehensive view, the relevant para in Orders
dt: 27.12. 2005 in W.P No.25484 of 2005 reads as under:-
“….For the foregoing reasons, the Writ Petition is
disposed of, directing that the Labour Court shall frame an
independent issue as to whether the 2nd respondent is a
Workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act and
answer it independently in the Award, through which the I.D. is
disposed of. Further, it shall be open to both the parties to lead
evidence and put forward their respective contentions on this
aspect. The I.D. shall be disposed of within a period of four (4)
months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. There
shall be no order as to costs…..”
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14. Subsequently, the Tribunal initiated the adjudication process. In
the I.D proceedings. Workman got himself examined as W.W.1 and
Exs.W.1 to W.33 were marked. Per contra, the Management examined
its witness as RW.1 to RW.4, and Exs.M.1 to M.12 were marked.
15. The Tribunal finally disposed of the I.D vide its Award dated
30.06.2006. The relevant paras 37 & 38 in the award dated 30.06.2006 is
extracted hereunder:-
“….Under the above circumstances to safeguard the
interest of the Management as well as the interest of the
workers of the management the petitioner herein need not
be allowed again to work in the Management but the order of
discharge can be modified into one of compulsory retirement
from service and thereby entitle him to take of such benefits
under the rules besides awarding payment of compensation
of ten months salary for the reason he worked for about a
period of 24 years in the Management.
In the result, the order of discharge from service
issued by the respondent herein on 10.03.2003 is hereby
modified into one of the compulsory retirement from service
and there by the petitioner shall be entitled for all such
retirement benefits as per rules and also entitled for ten
months last drawn salary by way of compensation and the
same shall be paid to the petitioner within one month from
the date of publication of the award after deduction of the
amounts if any which were already paid to him. The award is
passed accordingly.”
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16. Being aggrieved by the Award dated 30.06.2006, the Management
filed instant W.P No.21411 of 2006, seeking to set-aside the I.D Court
award 30.06.2006, and the workman also filed W.P No.25556 of 2006,
challenging the very same award to the extent of modifying the
punishment as discharge from service to that of compulsory retirement. In
other words, the Management as well as Workman both are before this
Hon’ble Court by filing two separate writ petitions against the very same
I.D award. Thus, the following common orders are being emanated by
this Court as clearly stated in Para Nos.3 & 4 supra.
17. Heard Sri C.R. Sridharan, learned Senior Counsel representing the
learned counsel Sri G.V.S Ganesh for the Management and Sri Bachina
Hanumanth Rao, learned counsel for the Workman as well as learned
Government Pleader too.
Contentions of the counsels:-
18. The learned Senior Counsel who is appearing for the Management
while reiterating the averments made in the writ affidavit filed in support of
the writ petition, mainly asserted that the very institution of I.D is perse
illegal, nonest in the eye of Law on two grounds. Firstly, even as per the
case projected by the Workman, he does not come under the purview of
Section 2(s) in view of his nature of work, etc and as the Workman does
not come under the clutches of the Act, the award by the Tribunal/Labour
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Court is without Jurisdiction. Secondly, the orders dated 30.06.2006 are
hit by judicial indiscipline on the ground that in the earlier proceedings
between the very same parties, specific directions were given by the
Hon’ble High Court in W.P No.25484 of 2005, to frame an independent
issue in respect of Section 2(s) of the Act and answer the same
independently. But, the same was not followed at all. Thus, the very
award itself is without jurisdiction and got vitiated.
19. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Workman Sri Bachina
Hanumantha Rao submitted that, though there are no specific issue
framed by the Tribunal in terms of the orders dated 27.12.2005 of Hon’ble
High Court of A.P. However, the Tribunal answered that as the nature of
duties of the workman is supervisory in nature, the workman comes under
the definition of 2(s) of the Act. More so, he sought to allow the I.D in
toto. The learned Government Pleader adopted the Workman side
argument.
Consideration of the Court:-
20. The above facts and circumstances, raise the following issues in
the lis:-
i. Whether the workman comes within the purview of
the definition of 2(s) of the ‘Act’ or not?
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WP_21411_25556_2006
MRK, Jii. Whether the directions in the order dated
27.12.2005 in W.P No.25484 of 2005, are followed
by the Tribunal in its true letter and spirit?
Issue No.1:-
21. In order to determine whether Workman comes within the ambit of
Section 2(s) of the Act, it is useful to refer the factual aspects in the case
on hand. Even as per the assertions in the claim petition before the
Tribunal also, the Workman was initially appointed as General Workman
in 1979, confirmed the same in 1980 in the Company. Further, he was
promoted multiple times. At last, after 24 years of service, he was
designated as Charge-Hand and later on as Senior Charge Hand from
01.17.1995 and was drawing a Salary of Rs.9,043 per month (Act pre-
amendment ceiling was Rs.1,600/- and it was substituted with
Rs.10,000/- p.m. Amendment Act 24/2010 w.e.f 15.09.2010). Admittedly,
the Management issued Termination Orders dated 10.03.2003. The
instant I.D filed way back in the year 2003 and Award was passed on
30.06.2006. Above all dates relates to pre-amendment of the Act, thus,
the ceiling limit of salary is Rs.16,00/- per month only.
22. Admittedly, the Tribunal had not framed any such issue in terms of
the orders dated 27.12.2005 passed by the Erstwhile High Court of A.P.
at Hyderabad.
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23. Apparently, the Tribunal comes under the supervisory jurisdiction of
Erstwhile High Court in all its corners. But for the reasons best known, the
Tribunal has not adhered to the specific direction issued by the
Constitutional Court. The said approach is not legal and valid, why
because, if the Tribunal ought to have framed an independent issue in
terms of the orders passed by the High Court dated 27.12.2005 in W.P
No.25484 of 2005, it would not have lead to multiple years of litigation
without any logical conclusions in the lis.
24. In this context, it is trite to mention that Industrial Dispute Act, 1947
aims to resolve the disputes in between the Employers and Employees by
setting out certain statutory parameters by defining who is Workman in
terms of the Act. To answer the moot point whether the workman comes
within the purview of Section 2(s) of the Act or not?, it is relevant to
extract the definition of 2(s) of the Act:-
“…..’Workman’ means any person (including an
apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual,
unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or
supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of
employment be express or implied and for the purpose of
any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial
dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed,
discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a
consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge
12WP_21411_25556_2006
MRK, Jor retrenchment has, led to that dispute, but does not include
any such person:-
(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of
1950), or the Army Act, 1950(46 of 1950), or the Navy Act,
1957 (62 of 1957); or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an
officer or other employee of a prison; or.
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or
administrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity,
draws wages exceeding ten thousand rupees per mensem
(after amendment) or exercises, either by the nature of
duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers
vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.”
A plain reading of Section 2(s) of the Act would emphasize that the
definition of the Workman in the first portion is inclusive. The later portion
is an excluding in Nature. Thus, to determine Workman, both should be
read conjointly together in order to test the meaning of Workman.
25. It is apt to refer the facts of the case on hand which reveals that,
Ex.W-3, is a Letter of initial appointment of the Workman, Ex.W-4 is
confirmation letter, Ex.W-5 is the Change of designation letter, Ex.W-6,
Ex.W-7 are letters of further appointment of the Workman, Ex.W-8 is the
change of designation, Ex.W-9, Ex.W-10 is the letters of annual
increments. Ex.W-11 is the Letter of Confirmation as a Charge-Hand.
Ex.W-12, Ex.W-13 & Ex.W-14, reveals the nature of employment as a
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Charge-Hand. Ex.W-15 is a letter of Confirmation as Senior Charge-
Hand. Ex.W-16 to Ex.W-21 are letters of annual increments. Ex.W-22 to
Ex.W-25 and Ex.W-28 are Salary Slips. The entire depositions and
evidence clearly reveals that the Workman was inducted into the
Management Company in the year 1979. Later on, he was promoted to
several designations and at last, on 30.06.1995, his services as Senior
Charge Hand was confirmed.
26. Conversely, by going through the depositions of M.W.1 and M.W.4
and documents on behalf of the Management, more particularly,
Performance Appraisal Form dated 09.09.1998 (Ex.M.1), it is apparent
that the Workman had signed the said form as Appraiser. In the said
form, the superiors of Workman Ch. Gopala Charyulu, Sec. Crushing
Sys.Opr/G.W, Grade 05, had duly assessed his overall job performance
and reviewed his personal details in a supervisory capacity and also
signed on the said form. Thereafter, the Workman also reviewed the
remarks made therein and finally signed the form as superior to them.
Thus, the review made by the Workman under Ex.M1 would clearly
discloses that he had done supervisory duties in the company.
27. Further, Ex.M.2 to Ex.M.5, would go to show that the Workman in a
supervisory and monitory capacity has recorded certain details with
regard to the shifts, status of the plant, granting leaves to his sub-
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ordinates, granting permissions to attend the job and etc. Ex.M.6 is
Appraisal Form of workman herein dated 20.02.2003, wherein, he has
submitted the details of his work/role in the company.
28. Undoubtedly, during the cross examination, Workman as W.W-1
admitted the documents under Ex.M.1 to Ex.M.6. Thus, all the relevant
documents clearly proves that the, Workman herein is working as Senior
Charge Hand in the company and he is holding independent post
performing his duties as supervisory and administrative in nature. Thus,
the Workman was discharging Administrative works and was also
drawing a salary of Rs.9,043/- as on the date of his termination.
29. Apart from supervisory capacity, even coming to the salary drawn
by the Workman, as per Section 2(s)(iv) of the Act, the salary of the
Workman should not exceed Rs.1,600/- per month (before amendment).
However, in the present case, the Workman was drawing a salary of
Rs.9,043/- p.m. till the date of dismissal from the service i.e., 10.03.2003,
which is contrary to the statutory limit. On that point also, a person, who
is drawing a salary exceeding the statutory limit of Section 2(s) of the Act,
would not be qualified as a Workman and he/she is not at all entitled to
raise a dispute before the Tribunal by invoking Section 2-A of the Act and
the Tribunal ought not to have entertained the I.D itself in view of subject
matter of jurisdiction is not amenable under the provisions of the Act.
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30. It is apt to refer to the Dictum in Bharti Airtel Ltd. Vs. A.S
Raghavendra1, wherein, the Apex Court by meticulously going through
the definition of the Workman and its vistas of the Industrial Dispute Act,
1947, and also perceiving the relevant legal position had viewed Ved
Prakash Gupta Vs. Delton Cable India Pvt. Ltd.2 and S.K Maini Vs.
Carona Sahu3, and had clarified that the definition of the Workman that
mere absence of power to appoint, dismiss or hold disciplinary inquiries
against other employees cannot be the sole criteria to determine the
status of an employee as Workman.
31. Further very recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lenin Kumar
Ray Vs. Express Publications (Madurai) Ltd. 4 , while dealing with
Section 2(s) of the Act, held as under:-
“15. The law is well settled that the determinative factor
for “workman” covered under section 2(s) of the I.D. Act, is
the principal duties and functions performed by an employee
in the establishment and not merely the designation of his
post. Further, the onus of proving the nature of employment
rests on the person claiming to be a “workman” within the
definition of section 2(s) of the I.D. Act.”
1
(2024) 6 SCC 418
2
(1984) 2 SCC 569
3
(1994) 3 SCC 510
4 2024 SCC Online SC 2987
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32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Milkhi Ram Vs.
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board 5 in Civil Appeal No. 1346 of
2010 (Decided on 8-10-2021)., held as under:-
“14. In the present matter, the appellant has clearly
founded his claim in the suit, on the provisions of the ID
Act and the employer therefore is entitled to raise a
jurisdictional objection to the proceedings before the civil
court. The courts below including the executing court
negated the jurisdictional objection. The High Court in
Revision, however has overturned the lower court’s order
and declared that the decree in favour of the plaintiff is
hit by the principle of coram non judice and therefore, the
same is a nullity.”
33. Apparently, the Workman filed documents, which also reveal that
Workman had exercised supervisory duties too. In that backdrop of the
above unequivocal facts and circumstances, it is determined that the
Workman does not come within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act.
Once, he is not a Workman, the very institution of I.D No.135/2003 itself
is per se without jurisdiction. Thus, if any orders passed by the judicial
forums, which do not have jurisdictional powers lead to nullity and also
trip under the realm of ‘Doctrine of Coram non judice’.
5
AIR Online 2021 SC 872
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Issue No.2:-
34. This Court has consciously gone through the material papers
placed on record., whereunder, the Tribunal in its 18 pages award had
not at all framed any issue, much less, an independent issue, so as to,
answer the pivotal point, whether Workman comes within the meaning of
Section 2 (s) of the Act? in terms of specific direction issued by the High
Court in earlier writ petition between the very same parties i.e., vide order
dated 27.12.2005 in W.P No.25484 of 2005.
35. Unfortunately, the Tribunal had not adhered to the Constitutional
Court’s judicial command, by virtue of its vested powers under Article 226
of the Constitution of India. If the Tribunal had adhered to the earlier
directions of the High Court, the lis ought to have reached its logical end
at the earliest, which fulfills the object and intendment of the statutory
framework as well. In fact, it is also beneficial to the respective parties,
so as to, pursue their respective legal rights in accordance with the Law.
36. Evidently, Workman on his own quoted his age at the time of filing
I.D No.135 of 2003 as 43 years. Now, he is aged about 64 years, (who
crossed the age of superannuation) without any benefit from his litigation.
37. In this context, it is the trite to mention the well settled principle of
law that the court which does not have jurisdiction to try the matter would
have no jurisdiction to pass any orders which affect the rights of the
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parties. Hence, deciding the issue with regard to jurisdiction is a
fundamental issue, which goes to root of the matter and decide the fate of
matter either at preliminary stage or on merit. The jurisdiction of the
judicial Forums is categorized into multiple categories. The main wings
are i) Territorial jurisdiction ii) Pecuniary jurisdiction iii) Jurisdiction over
the subject matter. In fact, territorial and pecuniary jurisdictional
objections have to be raised at the threshold stages so as to take steps to
cure the procedural aspects by transferring to the concerned Forum.
Whereas, in the case of jurisdiction over the subject matter is entirely
different and distinct, why because by the limitations prescribed in the
statutory framework come into play. Hence, where judicial fora has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, it cannot take up the
cause in the lis. Even an order passed by such Forum having no
jurisdiction also hit by the ‘Doctrine of Coram non judice’. In this context it
is relevant to note the Apex Court dictum in Kiran Singh Vs. Chaman
Paswan6, which reads as under:-
“6. It is a fundamental principle well-established that a
decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and
that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is
sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of
execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of
jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether it is
in respect of the ‘subject matter’ of the action, strikes at the6
AIR 1954 SC 340
19WP_21411_25556_2006
MRK, Jvery authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a
defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.”
38. The above line of legal position is further followed in the case of
Chief Engineer, Hydal Project Vs. Ravinder Nath7, as under:-
“28. Once the original decree itself has been held to be
without jurisdiction and hit by the doctrine of coram non
judice, there would be no question of upholding the same
merely on the ground that the objection to the jurisdiction
was not taken at the initial, First Appellate or the Second
Appellate stage. It must, therefore, be held that the civil court
in this case had no jurisdiction to deal with the suit and
resultantly the judgments of the Trial Court, First Appellate
Court and the Second Appellate Court are liable to be set
aside for that reason alone and the appeal is liable to be
allowed”.
39. It is apt to mention that the Tribunal ought to have followed the
aforesaid order dated 27.12.2005 in W.P No.25484 of 2005 of the
Erstwhile High Court at Hyderabad, which binds on the Tribunal. In fact,
as the Tribunal comes under the supervisory jurisdiction of this High
Court, the primary duty casts upon the Tribunal to follow the
Constitutional Court orders.
40. More so, in the backdrop of Article 215 (High Court is Court on
record), under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Coming to the
instant lis, the Tribunal directly comes under the supervisory jurisdiction of
7
2008 (2) SCC 350
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the Erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Thus, it is the constitutional
duty as well as the judicial discipline to maintain judicial uniformity, the
Tribunal ought to have followed the previous direction of the Hon’ble High
Court dated 27.12.2005 in W.P No.25484 of 2005, in between the very
same parties.
40. But, unfortunately for the reasons best known, Tribunal had not
followed the same. In fact, on the point of the Doctrine of Judicial
discipline also, it is the bounden duty of the Tribunal in its strict sense. If
the Tribunal had adhered to the High Court orders, it would have curtailed
the unnecessary prolonged litigation then and there itself.
41. In the case of Priya Gupta Vs. Ministry of Health & Family
Welfare8 emphasizes the fundamental principle that judicial discipline and
adherence to the law declared by higher courts are integral to the
credibility and effective functioning of the judicial system and observed
that:-
“12. The government departments are no exception to
the consequences of willful disobedience of the orders of the
Court. Violation of the orders of the Court would be its
disobedience and would invite action in accordance with law.
The orders passed by this Court are the law of the land in
terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. No Court or
Tribunal and for that matter any other authority can ignore8
(2013) 11 SCC 404
21WP_21411_25556_2006
MRK, Jthe law stated by this Court. Such obedience would also be
conducive to their smooth working, otherwise there would be
confusion in the administration of law and the respect for law
would irretrievably suffer. There can be no hesitation in
holding that the law declared by the higher court in the State
is binding on authorities and tribunals under its
superintendence and they cannot ignore it. This Court also
expressed the view that it had become necessary to reiterate
that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of
discipline have a grave impact on the credibility of judicial
institution and encourages chance litigation. It must be
remembered that predictability and certainty are important
hallmarks of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country,
as discipline is sine qua non for effective and efficient
functioning of the judicial system. If the Courts command
others to act in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution and to abide by the rule of law, it is not possible
to countenance violation of the constitutional principle by
those who are required to lay down the law.”
42. In the case of Mary Pushpam Vs. Telvi Curusumary & Ors9, the
Apex Court highlighted the importance of ensuring Judicial Discipline and
observed as follows:-
“1. The rule of ‘Judicial Discipline and Propriety’ and
the Doctrine of precedents has a merit of promoting certainty
and consistency in judicial decisions providing assurance to
individuals as to the consequences of their actions. The
Constitution benches of this Court have time and again
reiterated the rules emerging from Judicial Discipline.
Accordingly, when a decision of a coordinate Bench of same9
(2024) 3 SCC 224
22WP_21411_25556_2006
MRK, JHigh court is brought to the notice of the bench, it is to be
respected and is binding subject to right of the bench of such
co-equal quorum to take a different view and refer the
question to a larger bench. It is the only course of action
open to a bench of co-equal strength, when faced with the
previous decision taken by a bench with same strength.
43. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances and also taking into
consideration of well-settled Law that, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is
a welfare legislature, this Court is inclined to direct the Courts, Industrial
Tribunals and Judicial Forums, which come under the domain of judicial
as well as administrative arenas to follow the Higher Court’s directions,
more particularly, the mandates of Constitutional Courts in its true letter
and spirit and further to maintain the judicial discipline too.
Conclusion:-
44. In view of the above foregoing discussion, this Court pass the
following:-
i. The impugned award dated 30.06.2006 passed in I.D
No.135 of 2003 by the Tribunal is hereby set-aside.
ii. Writ Petition No. 21411 of 2006 instituted by the
Management is allowed.
iii. Writ Petition No.25556 of 2006 filed by the Workman is
dismissed.
23
WP_21411_25556_2006
MRK, Jiv. Needless to say, the dismissal of the claim of the
Workman, will not come in the way of Workman to
pursue his legal remedies, in accordance with Law.
No costs. The miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall
stand closed.
___________________________________
JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM
Date: .01.2025
GVK
24
WP_21411_25556_2006
MRK, J
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM
WRIT PETITION Nos.21411 and 25556 of 2006
Date: .01.2025
GVK
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