Kerala High Court
P.N.Unnikrishnan vs K.X.John Victor on 23 August, 2025
Author: A.Muhamed Mustaque
Bench: A.Muhamed Mustaque
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HARISANKAR V. MENON
SATURDAY, THE 23RD DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 1ST BHADRA, 1947
RCREV. NO. 109 OF 2025
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 11.04.2025 IN RCA NO.34 OF 2024 OF
DISTRICT COURT & SESSIONS COURT/RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY, ERNAKULAM
ARISING OUT OF THE ORDER DATED 10.06.2024 IN RCP NO.134 OF 2021 OF III
ADDITIONAL MUNSIFF COURT, ERNAKULAM (RENT CONTROL)
REVISION PETITIONER/S:
P.N.UNNIKRISHNAN
AGED 48 YEARS
S/O. P.C.NARAYANA MARAR, NANDANAM HOUSE, S.L.PURAM P.O.,
KANJIKUZHY VILLAGE, CHERTHALA TALUK, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT.,
PIN - 688582
BY ADVS.
SRI.DINESH R.SHENOY
SMT.SHANTHIPRIYA D. SHENOY
RESPONDENT/S:
1 K.X.JOHN VICTOR
AGED 74 YEARS
S/O. LATE XAVIER, RESIDING AT ANUGRAHA, THYKOODAM -
VYTTILABYEPASS,VYTTILA ESOM, POONITHURA VILLAGE,KANAYANNUR
TALUK, KOCHI., PIN - 682019
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2 ANNA VICTOR
AGED 72 YEARS
W/O. K.X.JOHN VICTOR, RESIDING AT ANUGRAHA, THYKOODAM -
VYTTILABYEPASS, VYTTILA DESOM, POONITHURA VILLAGE,
KANAYANNUR TALUK, KOCHI., PIN - 682019
3 SOMU VICTOR
AGED 41 YEARS
S/O.K.X.JOHN VICTOR,RESIDING AT ANUGRAHA, THYKOODAM -
VYTTILA BYEPASS,VYTTILA DESOM, POONITHURA VILLAGE,KANAYANNUR
TALUK, KOCHI , REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER AND POWER OF
ATTORNEY HOLDER K.X.JOHN VICTOR, AGED 74 YEARS, S/O. LATE
XAVIER, RESIDING AT ANUGRAHA,THYKOODAM - VYTTILA BYEPASS,
VYTTILA DESOM, POONITHURA VILLAGE, KANAYANNUR TALUK, KOCHI.,
PIN - 682019
BY ADVS.
SHRI.M.P.RAMNATH
SHRI.P.RAJESH (KOTTAKKAL)
SRI.K.J.SEBASTIAN
SEI.M.VARGHESE VARGHESE
SMT.UMA R.KAMATH
SMT.S.SANDHYA
SHRI.BEPIN PAUL
SRI.SHALU VARGHESE
SRI.ANTONY THARIAN
SMT.SHANTHI JOHN
SMT.ASHA T.K.
THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 14.08.2025,
THE COURT ON 23.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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A. MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & HARISANKAR V. MENON, JJ.
------------------------------------------------------------
R.C.R. No.109 of 2025 "C.R"
---------------------------------------------------------
Dated this the 23rd day of August, 2025
ORDER
A.Muhamed Mustaque, J.
In this revision filed under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings
(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Act”) by the tenant, we are called upon to decide the legality of an
order passed under Section 12(3) of the Act.
2. In R.C.P. No. 134/2021, the landlord sought eviction of the
tenant on the grounds of arrears of rent, bona fide requirement, and
cessation of occupation. During the pendency of the proceedings, the
landlord filed I.A. No.3/2021 before the Rent Control Court,
Ernakulam, seeking a direction to the tenant to deposit arrears of
rent up to 05/10/2021, along with the arrears towards TDS. The said
application, filed on 25/10/2021, was resisted by the tenant. The
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tenant contended that he was unable to clear the arrears due to the
adverse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and, further, owing to acts
of interference on the part of the landlord. It was specifically alleged
that the landlord had locked the premises, disconnected the
electricity supply, and cut off the water connection, thereby rendering
it impossible for the tenant to run his business.
3. The Rent Controller, however, passed an order on 10/06/2022
in I.A.No.3/2021 in R.C.P. No. 134/2021, directing the tenant to pay
the rent arrears from 01/07/2020 to 01/08/2021, excluding the rent
paid for the months of October 2020 and March 2021, and further
directing them to remit the rent from September 2021 onwards.
There was also a direction to remit the rent subsequently fallen due,
within 15 days from the date of the order till the culmination of the
rent control proceedings. The rate of rent payable was Rs. 1,20,000/-
per month.
4. Under the statutory provision, the tenant will have to
discharge the arrears of rent within four weeks. If no sufficient cause
is shown, an order has to be passed by the Authority stopping all
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further proceedings and issuing an order directing the tenant to put
the building in possession of the landlord.
5. The tenant did not pay the arrears instead filed the I.A.
No. 7/2022 in I.A. No. 3/2021 in R.C.P. No. 134/2021. The tenant
filed I.A. No. 7/2022, stating that he shall be allowed to produce
materials and adduce evidence to establish that he has no liability to
pay rent as claimed under the petition under Section 12(1) of the
Rent Control Act.
6. The Rent Controller finally passed an order on 22/07/2022
under Section 12(3) by dismissing I.A. No. 7/2022 and ordering the
tenant to put the landlord in possession. The Rent Controller noted
that no arrears have been cleared as ordered by the Rent Controller
on 10/06/2022.
7. The tenant appealed against the order in I.A. Nos. 3/2021
and 7/2022 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Ernakulam,
in R.C.A No. 44/2022. By an order dated 21/11/2022, the order in
I.A. No.3/2021 was not set aside by the Appellate Authority, and the
order in I.A. No.7/2022 was set aside, directing the Rent Control
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Court to give an opportunity to the tenant to adduce brief evidence.
8. After the remand, the tenant adduced evidence. Exhibits
A1 to A14 were marked on the side of the landlord. Exts. B1 to B8
were marked on the side of the tenant. The Commission Reports were
also marked as C1 to C3. Oral evidence was also adduced on the side
of the landlord and tenant.
9. Based on the oral evidence and materials produced, the
Rent Controller came to a definite conclusion that the tenant could
not enjoy the building due to the obstruction caused by the landlord
and therefore, sufficient cause has been shown for non-remittance
of rent as per the order on I.A. No. 3/2021.
10. In R.C.A. No. 34/2024 filed by the landlord, the Appellate
Authority, by judgment dated 11/04/2025, set aside the order of the
Rent Controller in I.A.No.7/2022 and ordered that the tenant is liable
to suffer the consequence under Section 12(3), as he failed to show
sufficient cause for the non-deposit of rent arrears. In the finding, it
is specifically noted that in the earlier round of litigation, the
Appellate Authority had not set aside the order under Section 12(1)
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in I.A. No. 3/2021, and therefore, the Rent Controller could not have
passed an order contrary to Section 12(1) order. It is also noted that
in I.A. No. 7/2022, no substantial ground has been demonstrated,
except seeking an opportunity to adduce evidence and produce
materials for non-remittance of the rent arrears. It is also noted that
electricity and water supply were restored pursuant to the direction
of this Court in W.P.(C). No. 26131/2021.
11. We shall now consider the scope of Section 12 of the Act
and the nature of the power vested in the Rent Controller and the
Appellate Authority. Section 12 obliges the tenant to deposit the
admitted arrears of rent as a precondition to contest the proceedings.
The provision is essentially equitable in nature. It encompasses
arrears accrued both before the initiation of the proceedings as well
as those that fall due during the pendency of the litigation. The
enquiry under Section 12 is circumscribed by the pleadings of the
parties. Where a serious dispute is raised as to the tenant’s liability
to pay arrears, the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority is not
empowered to pass an order unless it is satisfied that such contention
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lacks bona fides. This Court, in Gopala Panicker Baiju and
Another v. Mallika [2018 (5) KHC 95], has clarified that a bare
denial by the tenant will not suffice to absolve him from the obligation
to deposit admitted arrears of rent. The Court must ascertain, on a
consideration of the tenant’s objections, whether his denial of liability
is bona fide. There may, however, be circumstances where the Court
is required to defer its decision regarding the deposit of admitted
arrears. Illustratively, this could arise in cases of a bona fide denial
of the landlord’s title, or where a genuine defence is raised invoking
the doctrine of suspension of rent.
12. In the present case, the tenant has raised an objection
relying on the doctrine of suspension of rent. However, at this stage,
there is no scope for adducing evidence while deciding the tenant’s
liability under Section 12(1), in the same manner as in proceedings
under Section 11(2), where default in payment of rent is adjudicated
as a ground for eviction. While exercising jurisdiction under Section
12(1), the Court must adopt a cautious approach to ensure that no
prejudice is caused to the tenant by an order which, in effect, would
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deprive him of the opportunity to defend the proceedings on a
genuine triable issue at the final stage. If the Court finds that passing
an order under Section 12(1) would foreclose the tenant’s right to
have such an issue adjudicated, it should refrain from issuing the
order and instead dispose of the application with appropriate
findings.
13. Section 12(1) of the Act contemplates a two-stage process.
At the first stage, upon the filing of an application under Section
12(1), the Court is required to consider whether the tenant is liable
to pay the rent or arrears claimed by the landlord, having regard to
the objections raised by the tenant. In other words, the Rent
Controller or the Appellate Authority must form an opinion, based on
the pleadings, as to whether an order directing the deposit of rent or
arrears can be issued. Once it is found that the tenant is liable to pay
the arrears, and if such amount is not deposited within the statutory
period of four weeks, the proceedings move to the second stage,
contemplated under Section 12(3). At this stage, the tenant is
precluded from re-agitating the issue of liability, which stands
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concluded. The only scope available to the tenant at this juncture is
to show sufficient cause for the failure to deposit the arrears already
determined as payable. Thus, the determination of liability is to be
made at the first stage under Section 12(1), and the second stage
under Section 12(3) is confined to examining whether the tenant has
shown justifiable reasons for the non-compliance with the order of
deposit.
14. The statute does not define or categorise what would
constitute “sufficient cause” for the purposes of Section 12(3).
Consequently, any cause shown by the tenant, if found sufficient,
may justify postponement of the remittance, but cannot absolve the
tenant of the liability itself. Depending on the nature of the sufficient
cause, the Court may, at best, defer the passing of the final order
under Section 12(3). The provision does not contemplate that a
finding of sufficient cause would either extinguish the liability of the
tenant or defeat the landlord’s entitlement to arrears of rent. The
only consequence of a sufficient cause being established is the
deferment of the order, not the denial of liability.
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15. While invoking “sufficient cause” under Section 12(3) of
the Act, the tenant cannot rely upon the very same grounds which
were already canvassed in defence to the application under Section
12(1), unless such grounds have subsequently arisen after the
passing of the order under Section 12(1). To illustrate, in the present
case, the tenant resisted liability under Section 12(1) by invoking the
doctrine of suspension of rent. The same plea cannot be advanced
again at the stage of Section 12(3), unless a fresh set of facts, arising
subsequent to the order under Section 12(1), furnishes a basis for
re-invoking the doctrine.
16. We shall now advert to the legal issue arising in this case.
At the outset, we are of the view that the order passed by the
Appellate Authority in R.C.A No. 44/2022 on 21/11/2022, in the
earlier round of litigation, is perverse and legally unsustainable. By
the said order, the Appellate Authority remanded the matter for fresh
consideration of I.A. No.7/2022. The application in I.A. No.7/2022
was filed by the tenant specifically for the purpose of disputing his
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liability to remit arrears of rent. The issue of liability, however, had
already been concluded in I.A. No.3/2021. Therefore, without setting
aside the order in I.A. No.3/2021, the Appellate Authority could not
have remanded I.A. No.7/2022 for fresh consideration or permitted
the tenant to adduce evidence. It was as a consequence of this
erroneous remand order that I.A. No.7/2022 came to be contested,
resulting in the present legal dilemma. Proceedings under Section
12(3) of the Act do not contemplate the adducing of evidence or a
full-fledged enquiry. Such a course of action is equally impermissible
in an application under Section 12(1). At the stage of challenge to
the order in I.A. No.7/2022, the Appellate Authority ought to have
noted that liability had already been fixed on the tenant, and unless
sufficient cause was shown in terms of Section 12(3), there was no
further scope for enquiry. The very purpose of I.A. No.7/2022 was,
in fact, to reopen the issue of liability already concluded in I.A.
No.3/2021. Though the landlord did not challenge the earlier remand
order, we cannot shut our eyes to the very foundation of the present
proceedings. It is that illegal order of remand which has created a
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procedural stumbling block in a matter which, under Section 12, is
intended to be summary in nature. While it is true that the order
dated 21/11/2022 in R.C.A No. 44/2022 has attained finality owing
to the landlord’s failure to challenge it, in exercise of our revisional
jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act, we are not inhibited from
interfering with such orders. Section 20 empowers this Court to call
for the records relating to “any order passed or proceedings taken”
under the Act, though the scope of interference is confined to
examining the legality, regularity, or propriety of the order impugned.
In our considered view, the remand order dated 21/11/2022 was
perverse, being beyond the scope of consideration under Section
12(3) of the Act. We are, therefore, not hesitant to examine the
propriety of that order in the revision before us. It is in this context
that the tenant’s plea based on the doctrine of suspension of rent
requires consideration. We shall now turn to the scope and
application of the said doctrine in rent control proceedings.
17. The general law applicable governing the relationship
between landlord and tenant is given under Chapter V of the Transfer
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of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as “TP Act“). Under
Section 108 of the TP Act, in clauses ‘b’ and ‘c,’ there is an implied
covenant between lessor and lessee for peaceful possession and
enjoyment of leased property by the tenant. The doctrine of
suspension can be invoked by a tenant if his possession and
enjoyment are interrupted by the landlord. In such circumstances,
the Court will have to form an opinion that, on account of the act
attributable to the landlord, the tenant could not enjoy possession of
the leased premises.
18. In India, the doctrine of suspension of rent has undergone
significant evolution within the framework of rent control
jurisprudence. Rooted in common law principles, it has been refined
and applied through a series of judicial pronouncements. The case
law discussed here clearly demonstrates how this doctrine operates
as a protective measure for tenants, enabling them, in appropriate
circumstances, to lawfully withhold or deny payment of rent to the
landlord when they are wholly or substantially deprived of possession
or enjoyment of the leased premises.
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19. We shall advert to a few judgments that elucidate the
doctrine of suspension of rent:
19.1. In Katyayani Debi v. Udoy Kumar Das [AIR 1925 PC
97], the Privy Council referred to doctrine of suspension as:
“The doctrine of suspension of payment of rent, where the tenant has not been
put in possession of part of the subject leased, has been applied where the rent
was a lump rent for the whole land leased treated as an indivisible subject.”
19.2. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Dhunput
Singh v. Mahomed Kazim Ispahain and Ors.[(1896 )ILR 24 Cal
296] has held as follows:
“27. The principles to be gathered from these cases are, first, that where the act
of the landlord is not a mere trespass, but something of a grave character
interfering substantially with the enjoyment by the tenant of the property
demised to him, there is a suspension of rent during such interference, though
there may not be an actual eviction. And, second, that if such interference be in
respect of even a portion of the property, there should be no apportionment of
the rent, the whole rent being equally chargeable upon every part of the land
demised.”
19.3. A learned Single Bench of the Delhi High Court in Anil
Sachdeva v. Two Brothers (P) Ltd.[(1982) 22 DLT 194] has
examined the application of the doctrine of suspension of rent with
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reference to Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as
follows:
“8. For this clause to come into operation the condition precedent is that the
lessee pays the rent reserved by the lease and performs the contract binding on
the lessee. It is only then there is a duty on the lessor not to interrupt in the
peaceful use of the premises by the tenant. But once the prima facie conclusion
has been reached that the lessee has not performed his part of the contract and
was in arrears of rent reserved by the agreement, the tenant cannot take the
benefit of the principles of suspension of rent in the circumstances of the case.
This conclusion again is prima facie.”
19.4. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Nilkantha
Pati v. Kshitish Chandra Satpati [AIR 1951 Cal 338], while
considering the question of total and partial suspension of rent,
observed as follows:
“27. A contract which is entered into between the landlord and the tenant
should be held to be a sacred one and the Court is required to protect the weak
and the poor from the highhanded, improper and illegal acts on the part of the
rich and influential. It is concurrently found in this case that the landlord had
dispossessed the tenant from a portion of the tenancy only because he wanted
to straighten out his boundary and the tenant was poor and had not the influence
of the former. The mere fact that the area dispossessed is a small one is not of
an over-riding importance so as to dissuade the Court from applying the
principles of justice, equity and good conscience if the Court finds that the act
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19.5. The Apex Court in Surendra Nath Bibra v. Stephen
Court Ltd. [AIR 1966 SC 1361] has observed as follows:
“7. We are unable to agree with Mr Chatterjee that the decision of the Privy
Council in Ram Lal Dutt case [70 IA 18] can be distinguished on the ground
urged by him. It is no doubt true that the Privy Council was concerned with an
agricultural tenancy but the Privy Council decided the appeal on a matter of
principle, the principle being that the doctrine enunciated, in Neale v. Mackenzie
[150 ER 635] should not be regarded as a rule of justice, equity and good
conscience in India in all circumstances. It is interesting to note that the subject-
matter of the lease in Neal v. Mackenzie [150 ER 635] was a dwelling house and
land attached to it, and it was eight acres of the land which was attached to the
house that the tenant had been kept out of possession. Be that as it may, in our
opinion, the doctrine laid down in Neale v. Mackengie [150 ER 635] (2) is too
inflexible and cannot be applied to all cases. As observed by Sir George Rankin,
the doctrine cannot be justified as a dependable rule to be adhered to
notwithstanding hard cases. On the one hand it does not seem equitable that
when a tenant enjoys a substantial portion of the property of the landlord, leased
to him, without much inconvenience, he should not pay any compensation for
the use of the property, in other words, to borrow the language of Sir George
Rankin, that he should enjoy a windfall. On the other hand it is unfair that if a
tenant is not given possession of a substantial portion of the property, he should
be asked to pay any compensation for the use of the property while he is taking
appropriate measures for specific performance of the contract. It seems to us
that it will depend on the circumstances of each case whether a tenant would be
entitled to suspend payment of the rent or whether he should be held liable to
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that the tenant is not entitled to suspend the payment of rent but he must pay
a proportionate part of the rent.
8. We may make it clear that like the Privy Council in Ram Lal Dutt’s case, 70
Ind App 18: (AIR 1948 PC 24), we are not deciding that the doctrine of
suspension of rent should or should not “be applied at all to cases of eviction of
the lessee by the lessor from a part of the land, and if so, whether it is limited
to rents reserved as a lump sum, and whether it is a rigid or discretionary rule –
these questions will call for careful review when they are presented by the facts
of a particular case”.
(emphasis supplied)
19.6. A Single Bench of the Delhi High Court in N.K. Baslas vs.
Krishan Lal [MANU/DE/0278/1972] has elaborated the
situations in which the doctrine of suspension of rent is applicable as
follows:
“(5) … The following three situations are conceivable, namely: –
(1) The tenant is deprived of the whole of the premises;
(2) He is deprived of a part of the premises but the remaining part cannot be used
without the part of which the tenant has been deprived.
(3) The tenant has been deprived of a part of the premises but the rest of the premises
can be used by the tenant without too much difficulty or inconvenience.
It would be just to say that the whole of rent payable by the tenant to the landlord
should be suspended if the tenant is deprived of the whole of the premises. It may also
be that even if the tenant is deprived only of the part of the premises, the rest of the
premises cannot be enjoyed at all by the tenant. Then also the tenant may be entitled
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to suspend the whole of the rent. But when the tenant is deprived only of the part of
premises and the rest of the premises can be enjoyed by the tenant without too much
difficulty or inconvenience, the tenant would be entitled only to reduce the rent
proportionately so that the landlord loses that part of the rent which could be ascribed
to that part of the premises of which be has deprived the tenant.”
19.7. A single Bench of Calcutta High Court in Nirmalendu
Basu and Others v. Nilima Chatterjee [1975 KHC 1627] held as
follows:
“15. In view of the decision above on the question of suspension of rent, it cannot
be held that only in case of dispossession of the tenant from a portion of tenancy
by landlord by physical force, such tenant can get advantage of suspension of
rent. The principle is that in a case where the landlord dispossesses his tenant
from any portion of the leased property by exercising physical force, coercion,
threat or any other trick or means or any fraudulent or mala fide process against
the wish or will or natural inclination of the latter or where the landlord connives
with or assists others directly or indirectly to dispossess the tenant or does
something which is responsible for the dispossession of the tenant from any
portion of the tenancy or by his acts or omission leads the tenant to part with
possession of any portion of the property in lease against his will or consent or
depriving him of the benefit or use of such property, the tenant so dispossessed
shall be entitled to suspension of the entire rent if he so likes so long as he does
not get back the portion from which he is dispossessed…”
19.8. A Single Bench of the Calcutta High Court in P.K. Roy v.
Bimala Mukherjee [(1976) ILR 2 Cal 306] has explained the
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circumstances in which rent can be suspended or waived as follows:
“13. The ratio of the decisions cited above appear to be as follows:
(1) In cases of eviction of the tenant from the demised property, the tenant will
be entitled to suspension or partial abatement of rent.
(2) To constitute such eviction it is not necessary that there must be physical
dispossession of the tenant from the property or any part thereof. Any act or
interference with the tenant’s enjoyment a possession of the property or any
part thereof by any deliberate and tortuous act of the landlord or his agent will
constitute eviction for application of the doctrine of suspension of rent.
(3) Such interference in the tenant’s enjoyment of the property is of a grave and
substantial nature.
(4) It will depend in the circumstances of each case whether there should be a
suspension of rent or partial abatement of rent.
(5) It is open to the tenant to claim suspension or proportionate abatement of
rent in an action against him by the landlord and the remedy is not confined only
to action for damages by the tenant against his landlord.”
19.9. A Single Bench of the Punjab High Court in Hakim Sardar
Bahadur v. Tej Parkash Singh [AIR 1962 Pun. 385] has looked
into the application of the doctrine of suspension in India and opined
that in India, the doctrine has a modified application–generally
accepted in cases of eviction from part of premises, but restricted in
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cases of non-delivery.
19.10. Further, a Single Bench of the Delhi High Court in Ved
Rattan and Bros. Vs. Janak Raj [1979 RLR 170] has observed
as follows:
“(15) What is to happen if the landlord in a high handed manner deprives the
tenant of a part of the premises demised to him ? Ought the tenant to pay rent
or suspend it? If he suspends rent after receipt of notice of demand must he be
held a defaulter? These questions are of some consequence to the tenant. If he
suspends rent and he is held to be in default he can avail of the benefit of Section
14(2) once but not a second time. Section 14(2) gives a valuable right to the
tenant to escape eviction by paying or depositing rent as required by S. 15. It
means so much to the tenant. Therefore, if the land lord has tortuously deprived
the tenant of a part of the demised premises and the tenant suspends payment
of rent if will not be just to condemn him as a defaulter. As the Supreme Court
has said :
“IT would be inequitable to allow the plaintiff to recover the full rent when he
has not delivered possession of the whole of the premises in question”
(Surendera Nath Supra at page 1363).
(16) The landlord cannot get the best of both worlds he cannot get the full rent
as well as oust the tenant from the part of the premises. The landlord cannot
take advantage of his tortuous act. If he deprives the tenant of a part of the
premises leased to him and the tenant does not pay rent the Controller in justice
and equity will not hold him in default. The tenant cannot pay proportionate rent.
The rent is fixed in lump sum and the lease is indivisible. How is the tenant to
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apportion the rent ? I am not denying the Controller’s power to pass an order
under Section 15(1) of the Act. He can make an order taking the conduct of the
landlord and the tenant into account. If the tenant has enjoyed a substantial
portion of the property of the landlord without much inconvenience it does not
stem equitable that he should not pay any compensation for the use of the
property. In other words he should enjoy a windfall to use a phrase of Sir George
Rankin (Ram Lal Supra). Any legal theory which points the tenant a right to
retain and use another’s property without making payment, Therefore, has to
be condemned. The Controller can order the tenant to pay proportionate rent.
But he cannot hold its tenant a defaulter when used for eviction by the landlord,
if the tenant is able to establish that he was dispossessed from a part of the
demised premises. To so hold would “be merely piling unreason upon
technicality” to use another phrase of Shri George Rankin.
(emphasis supplied)
19.11. A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Budge
Budge Company Limited v. Jute Corporation of India Limited
[2001 SCC OnLine Cal 71] held as follows:
“11. …It is equally settled that the principles governing suspension of rent are
based on justice, equity and good conscience and it would depend on facts of
each case whether the tenant is entitled to suspension of the rent and, secondly
it was the duty of the lessor to see that the lessee may hold the property during
the time limited by lease without interruption and, thirdly, where the act of the
landlord is not a mere trespass but something of a grave character interfering
substantially with the enjoyment by the tenant of the property tenanted to him,
there must be suspension of rent during such interference though there may not
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12. From the discussions made hereinabove and in view of the principles laid
down by the various decisions as noted hereinearlier, we are, therefore, of the
view that it cannot be held that only in case of dispossession of a tenant from a
portion of his tenancy by the landlord by physical force, such tenant only can
take advantage of suspension of rent. Therefore, the principle that emerges in
view of the discussions made hereinabove is that in a case where the landlord
dispossesses his tenant from any portion of the tenanted property by exercising
physical force, coercion, threat or any other trick or means or any fraudulent or
mala fide process against the wish or will or natural inclination of the latter or
where the landlord connives with or assist others directly or indirectly to
dispossess the tenant or does something which is responsible for the
dispossession of the tenant from any portion of the tenancy or by his acts or
omission leads the tenant to part with possession or any portion of the property
in lease against his will or consent or deprives him of the benefits or use of such
property, the tenant so dispossessed or deprived shall be entitled to suspension
of the entire rent so long as he does not get back the portion from which he is
dispossessed.
19.12. The Apex Court in Raichurmatham Prabhakar v.
Rawatmal Dugar [(2004) 4 SCC 766] held as follows:
“9. The leases of immovable property and the relationship between landlord and
tenant are governed by Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The
rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee are stated in Section 108 of the TP Act
which apply subject to the contract or local usage to the contrary. Under clauses
(b) and (c) thereof, not only is the lessor bound on the lessee’s request to put
him in possession of the property but there is also an implied covenant for
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2025:KER:64313peaceful possession and enjoyment of the leased property by the tenant. So long
as the lessee pays the rent reserved by the lease and performs the obligations
cast on him by the contract of lease, he is entitled to hold and enjoy the property
without interruption by anyone including the lessor. Under clause (1) the lessee
is bound to pay or tender, at the proper time and place, the premium or rent to
the lessor.
10. There has developed what is known as the doctrine of suspension of rent
based on principles of justice, equity and good conscience. If the lessee is
dispossessed by the lessor from the leased property the obligation of the lessee
to pay rent to the lessor is suspended.”
20. From the above judgments, it is evident that the doctrine
of suspension of rent has to be applied by the Court cautiously,
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is
applied where the landlord unlawfully evicts the tenant from the
premises, either wholly or substantially, the tenant’s obligation to pay
rent is suspended for that period, since rent is payable only in
consideration of possession and enjoyment. It is also applied even
without full eviction, if any part of the property is rendered unfit for
beneficial use such as by demolition undertaken by the landlord,
denial of access, or failure to carry out essential repairs, the tenant
is entitled to suspension or abatement of rent, depending on whether
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the deprivation is total or partial.
21. In the present matter, the core issue for consideration is
whether the tenant can invoke the doctrine of suspension of rent.
The tenant had not raised any claim for abatement of rent. We have
already observed that the revisional jurisdiction conferred under
Section 20 of the Act is wider in its reach, though limited in the nature
of power exercisable. Even if the order passed under Section 12(1)
of the Act in the rent control petition had attained finality by virtue
of the appellate order, it is still open to examination in this revision.
The learned counsel for the landlord contended that since the order
under Section 12(1) had attained finality, the tenant is precluded
from reagitating the issue in revision. We are unable to accept this
contention. As already noted, the revisional power under Section 20
enables this Court to examine the legality, regularity, and propriety
of any order passed in proceedings under the Act, even if such orders
were not directly challenged in revision. The failure of either the
landlord or the tenant to assail the earlier remand order of the
Appellate Authority is, therefore, of no consequence so far as the
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revisional jurisdiction of this Court is concerned.
22. Lease commenced in this matter from 08/06/2020
onwards. The tenant thereafter paid only Rs. 4,22,500/-. The
monthly rate of rent is Rs. 1,20,000/-. In the objection filed by the
tenant in R.C.P. No.134/2021, it was contended that in March 2021,
the landlord removed the lock and put new locks to prevent the
tenant from occupying the building. It is also stated that electricity
as well as water connections were cut off in the month of July 2021.
As a result, litigation started between the parties. In the counter
affidavit submitted by the tenant in I.A. No. 3/2021, it is specifically
admitted by the tenant that he moved the statutory authorities for
the restoration of the amenities. However, it is admitted that the
electricity supply was restored, but the water supply was not
restored. This counter was filed on 02/12/2021. In the main
objection filed by the tenant in R.C.P. No.134/2021, it was stated that
electricity was restored in September 2021. It is also specifically
stated in the main objection that the leased premise was restored in
August 2021. Thus, it is clear that the dispute was between the
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months of March 2021 and September 2021. The order under
S.12(1) of the Act was passed only on 10/06/2022. At best, the
tenant would be able to resist the application for non-payment of
rent from March 2021 to September 2021. There is no reason to
withhold payment of the rent from October 2021 onwards. Nowhere
in the counter, the tenant has made a case that he cannot occupy
the building without a water connection, and he cannot run the
business or enjoy the leased premises without a water connection. It
is to be noted that the building was leased for the commercial
purpose of an interior decoration showroom. When the order was
passed under S.12(1) of the Act on 10/06/2022, the tenant was
legally liable to pay the rent arrears and continue to pay the rent
falling thereafter. This is not a case where the doctrine of suspension
could have been effectively taken up by the tenant, though he made
an attempt to rake up this matter in proceedings under Section 12(3)
of the Act. So, even on merit, the tenant failed to establish the
ground to deny payment of the rent to the landlord. He has not even
offered to deposit the arrears of rent, excluding the period from
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March 2021 to September 2021. In such circumstances, we find no
reason to interfere with the impugned order. The rent control revision
is dismissed. No Costs. Sd Sd/-
A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, JUDGE
Sd/-
23rd August 2025
After pronouncement of the judgment, the learned counsel for
the revision petitioner submitted that the revision petitioner may be
granted a certificate to appeal. Considering the legal issue already
answered, we decline the same. However, we direct the Rent Control
Court to defer the delivery till 08/09/2025 and reschedule the
execution petition to be taken up on 10/09/2025.
Sd/-
A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, JUDGE
Sd/-
ms/skk