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Supreme Court of India
P. Nallammal vs State By The Inspector Of Police on 7 May, 2025
Author: Sudhanshu Dhulia
Bench: Sudhanshu Dhulia
1
2025 INSC 643 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2489 OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.2127 OF 2024]
P. NALLAMMAL …APPELLANT(S)
Versus
STATE BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, VIGILANCE AND ANTI-
CORRUPTION POLICE, DINDIGUL, TAMIL NADU
…RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2490 OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.2288 OF 2024]
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 2491-2492 OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO(S).5196-5197 OF
2024]
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
1. I had the benefit of going through the Judgment authored by my
Signature Not Verified
learned brother Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J. where the Accused
Digitally signed by
Nirmala Negi
Date: 2025.05.07
19:32:05 IST
Reason:
No.2 (P. Nallammal) has been acquitted for the offence under
2
Section 109 of IPC read with Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2)
of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as
‘the PC Act’). Though I agree with some of the observations
made by my brother Judge, yet I am unable to accept the
conclusion and findings of acquittal as regards Accused No.2,
who was the wife of the public servant Accused No.1.
Consequently, I have found it necessary to pen down my
reasons for doing so.
2. I would, first of all, make it clear that the delivery of this order
has taken more time than usual. But then I was only handed
over his opinion by my learned Brother a fortnight back and it
has taken this much of time further for me to give my reasons.
3. Leave granted.
4. There are four appeals before us:
a. Appeal arising from SLP (Crl) No.2127/2024 filed by the
Accused No.2 (P. Nallammal) challenging the impugned
order dated 20.11.2023 by which appellant’s conviction
and sentence of one year R.I for offence under Section 109
of IPC read with Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of PC
Act by the Trial Court, has been affirmed.
3
b. Appeal arising from SLP (Crl) No.2288/2024 filed by
Accused No.2 and Legal Heirs of the Accused No.1 (children
of the Accused No.1 and Accused No.2), challenging the
attachment Order as modified by the impugned order dated
20.11.2023.
c. Appeals arising from SLP (Crl) No.5196-5197/2024 filed by
the Legal Heirs of the Accused No.1 (children of the
Accused No.1 and Accused No.2), challenging the
Administrative Order dated 03.03.2022 by which the Chief
Justice of the High Court had listed the criminal appeals
for fresh hearing which finally resulted in the common
impugned order dated 20.11.2023 by which order of
Accused No.2’s conviction and sentence as well as the order
of the attachment, with modification, were affirmed.
5. For the sake of convenience, the facts of the case are being taken
from the Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 2127 of
2024. However, the facts are not being reproduced in detail.
6. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to take note of the
following details of this case:
a. Accused no.1 (husband of the appellant) who was a
Member of the Legislative Assembly and a Minister, was
4
accused of acquiring disproportionate assets while holding
public office as a public servant. The properties were also
accumulated in the name of the present appellant i.e.
Accused no.2 and their minor children. The present
appellant was thus accused of abetting the accumulation of
disproportionate assets.
b. The Trial Court convicted Accused No.1 under sections
13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, whereas the appellant
(Accused No.2) was convicted under sections 13(2) and
13(1)(e) of the PC Act read with section 109 of the IPC.
Accused No.1 and appellant (Accused No.2) were sentenced
to rigorous imprisonment of two years and one year,
respectively.
c. An attachment order dated 03.01.2001 was passed under
sections 3 and 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment
Ordinance, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Ordinance’),
whereby the disproportionate assets belonging to Accused
No.1 and the appellant were attached.
d. Against both these orders (of conviction and sentence, and
attachment, respectively), the accused filed appeals before
the High Court. The High Court dismissed the criminal
5
appeals by the impugned judgment dated 20.11.2023.
However, the High Court modified the attachment order by
reducing the quantum of disproportionate assets calculated
by the Trial Court.
e. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court,
Accused No.1 (husband of the appellant) has passed away.
Now, we have only Accused No.2 i.e. P. Nallammal, wife of
the main accused (A.M Paramasivam) who is now
deceased, before us.
7. The challenge before us is to a judgment delivered by the Madras
High Court on 20.11.2023, whereby the conviction of the
appellant under sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act read
with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘IPC’) and consequent sentence of rigorous
imprisonment of one year imposed by the Trial Court was
upheld.
8. At the outset, I must note that there are concurrent findings
against the accused in this case, holding her guilty of abetment
in amassing disproportionate assets during Accused No.1’s
tenure in public office i.e. between 16.06.1991 and 09.05.1996
(hereinafter ‘check period’).
6
9. The prosecution case was that the accused had amassed
disproportionate assets, since there was a vast difference
between the assets in their name at the beginning of the check
period i.e., between 16.06.1991 and 09.05.1996. The
prosecution case against the present appellant was that
although she had no independent income as such, she abetted
her husband in acquisition of these assets in her name and in
the name of her children as their representative and natural
guardian.
10. On the other hand, defence would argue that the figure of
disproportionate assets arrived at by the prosecution was
grossly exaggerated and based on arbitrary calculations. They
had also challenged the inclusion of many immovable
properties by the prosecution, arguing that these were acquired
before the check period. It was also the contention that their
assets were traceable to legitimate sources of income, such as
income from agriculture, gifts etc. and this was forthcoming
from the Income Tax returns submitted by them. Moreover, the
counsel for the appellant would also argue that the present
appellant, in any case, is not a public servant and thus, she
has no obligation to explain her sources of income and further,
7
she cannot be convicted under Section 109 of IPC read with
Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2).
11. We have heard both sides and perused the record.
12. The Trial Court undertook a thorough examination of the oral
and documentary evidence on record, as well as the arguments
made by both sides, to arrive at the conclusion that the
prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and
that the Accused No.1 was guilty of misusing his public office
in order to accumulate disproportionate assets, which
constituted ‘criminal misconduct’ under section 13 of the Act.
Further, the present appellant, i.e. Accused no.2, was held
guilty of abetment of the offence of Section 13(1)(e) of the PC
Act. It was specifically held that the accused had failed to
establish that the assets treated as disproportionate by the
prosecution were traceable to legitimate sources of income,
since the evidence brought on record by the accused to prove
the same was not satisfactory. These findings of the Trial Court
were affirmed by the High Court by the impugned judgment.
13. Before us, the learned counsel for the appellant also tried to
argue that many of the assets considered by the Courts as
‘disproportionate assets’, were actually gifted by the father of
8
the appellant at the time of her marriage to accused No.1.
Further, a substantial portion of the immovable properties
sought to be included in the ‘disproportionate assets’ by the
prosecution were, in fact, purchased long before the check
period. These arguments have rightly been disbelieved as the
Trial Court arrived at a specific finding on these on
examination of documents and witnesses which show that the
properties were purchased only between March and May 1996,
which falls within the check period.
14. The story of defence that some portion of land, included in
‘disproportionate assets’, was purchased by Accused No.1 from
his brother in the year 1988 (i.e. before the check period), but
for which the sale deed was executed in favour of the children
of the Accused No.1 and appellant only in the year 1994, is
very difficult to believe, and the High Court and the Trial Court
rightly rejected this line of reasoning.
15. The efforts to prove that the income alleged to be
‘disproportionate assets’ by the prosecution is from legitimate
sources failed as the evidence presented by the defence was not
only vague but lacked credibility as well.
9
16. We must also keep in mind that insofar as corruption cases
under section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act are concerned, the burden
of proof is reversed, and it becomes the responsibility of the
accused to dislodge the presumption against him. This position
has been reiterated by this Court in State of T.N. v. R.
Soundirarasu (2023) 6 SCC 768:
“83. Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act makes a
departure from the principle of criminal
jurisprudence that the burden will always lie on
the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the
offences charged and never shifts on the
accused to disprove the charge framed against
him. The legal effect of Section 13(1)(e) is
that it is for the prosecution to establish
that the accused was in possession of
properties disproportionate to his known
sources of income but the term “known
sources of income” would mean the sources
known to the prosecution and not the
sources known to the accused and within
the knowledge of the accused. It is for the
accused to account satisfactorily for the
money/assets in his hands. The onus in
this regard is on the accused to give
satisfactory explanation… ”
In the present case, the prosecution succeeded in establishing
that the accused were in possession of assets hugely
disproportionate to their known sources of income. The
prosecution had successfully discharged its initial burden.
Thereafter, it was for the accused to satisfy the Court, through
10
cogent evidence, that the assets are from legitimate sources.
Upon perusal of the material on record and considering the
concurrent findings of the Courts below, I am of the opinion
that the accused miserably failed to discharge this burden of
satisfactorily explaining the source of income behind the
‘disproportionate assets’.
17. In fact, as far as the evaluation of disproportionate assets is
concerned, I and my learned brother (Ahsanuddin Amanullah,
J.), both agree that the High Court has rightly evaluated the
assets, after considering the material on record. The only point
of our disagreement is the question of the culpability of the
appellant (P. Nallammal). In the opinion of my learned brother
Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J., it was the appellant’s husband
(Accused No.1) who had accumulated assets disproportionate to
his known sources of income and the prosecution could not
prove that the appellant was aware that the money from which
assets were being purchased or bought in her name, were from
unlawful sources. It is this finding that I disagree with.
18. There is no doubt that mere registration of disproportionate
assets in the name of a public servant’s relative or friend does
not make that person guilty of abetment of the offence of
11
Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. All the same, it is also a settled
position of law that a person who is not a public servant still
can commit an offence under Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2)
of the PC Act read with Section 109 of the IPC. I am of the
opinion that the appellant was an accomplice in the
commission of the crime when she allowed Accused No.1 to
register the properties in her name. Where there is abetment by
a close relative in corruption matters, such as the spouse in the
present case, the culpability of such a relative has to be tested
by the surrounding circumstances and his/her overall conduct.
This is because, in such cases, there would rarely be direct
evidence of abetment. This factor has to be kept in mind.
19. The appellant married Accused No.1 in the year 1983 and she
was a housewife without any independent source of income.
After going through the records, the High Court notes that from
the year of marriage (i.e.1983) till 1991, there is no acquisition
of immovable property either in the name of the appellant or
Accused No.1. Accused No.1 became MLA in the year 1991 and
minister in the year 1993 and then the acquisition of
properties, moveable and immovable, also starts. After perusing
the document showing the properties acquired by the accused,
12
the Trial Court observed how land was purchased in the name
of the appellant or in the name of minor children through the
appellant, on more than one occasion. This is what was
observed by the Trial Court:
“(5) On 25.11.92, the 2nd Accused purchased
0.45 Acres of land for a sale consideration of
Rs.16,875 situated at Kodikulam Village under
Ex.P.2, Stamp fee is Rs.2,030, PW-1, PW-46
deposed about sale. (6) On 14.02.1992, the 2nd
Accused purchased 9 cents of land for a sale
consideration of Rs. 4500 situated at Kodikulam
Village under Ex. P.11, Stamp fee is Rs.540, PW-
2, PW-48 deposed about sale. (7) On
16.04.1993, the 2nd Accused purchased 1.45
acre of land for a sale consideration of
Rs.64,980 on behalf of Selvakumar Pandian
situated at Kodikulum Village under Ex.P.3,
Stamp fee is Rs.7860, PW-1, PW-47 deposed
about sale. (8) On 22.09.1993, the 2nd Accused
purchased a house situated at K.K Nagar,
Madurai and 1 cents of land situated at Kerala,
for a sale consideration of Rs1,50,000 under
Ex.P.16, Stamp fee is Rs.9050, PW-4, PW-44
deposed about sale. On 04.04.1994, the 2nd
Accused purchased 2.48 acres of Nanja land for
a sale consideration of Rs.80,600 on behalf of
Selvakumar Pandian situated at Kodikulam
Village under Ex.P.4, Stamp fee is Rs.9680, PW-
1, PW-54 deposed about sale. (10) On
12.09.1994, the 2nd Accused purchased 2.43
acres of Nanja land for a sale consideration of
Rs.1,23,160 on behalf of Selvakumar Pandian
situated at Kodikulam Village under Ex.P.5,
Stamp fee is Rs.14,860, PW-1, PW-45 deposed
about sale. (11) On 23.09.1994, the 2nd
Accused purchased 1.29 acre of Nanja land for
a sale consideration of Rs.70,950 on behalf of
Selvakumar Pandian situated at Kodikulam
13
Village under EX.P.6, Stamp fee is Rs.8520, PW-
1, Pw-49 deposed about sale…..(14) On
11.04.1996, the 2nd Accused purchased 4.27
acres Nanja land for a sale consideration of
Rs.2,32,210 on behalf of daughter Suriyakala
situated at Kodikulam Village under Ex.P.7,
Stamp fee is Rs.28000, PW-1, PW-51 deposed
about sale….(16) On 06.05.1996, the 2nd
Accused purchased 1.61 acre of Nanja land for
a sale consideration of Rs.87,620 on behalf of
Rajkumar Pandian situated at Kodikulam
Village under Ex.P.6, Stamp fee is Rs.10,680,
PW-1, PW-50 deposed about sale….”
Not only this, but additionally, two cars and other movable and
immovable properties were also purchased in the name of the
appellant and the minor children through the appellant.
20. Thus, it is not the case that there were only one or two
transactions in the name of the appellant for which the
appellant can say that she acted in a bona fide manner without
knowing that the funds which were used for acquiring these
assets were from unlawful sources. In my considered opinion,
these transactions during the check period demonstrate how
the appellant aided her husband in the accumulation of
disproportionate assets by allowing him to register the same in
her name. The High Court notes that the total salary drawn by
accused No.1 during the check period was Rs. 2,17,178, and
considering this, it is impossible to imagine that the appellant
14
was not aware of her husband’s legitimate income. It is very
hard to believe that she was not aware that these assets which
were in her name were not acquired from her husband’s
legitimate sources of income.
21. Moreover, it was never the appellant’s case that she was not
aware that her husband had been purchasing the properties in
her name by using the funds gained from illegitimate sources.
From the Trial Court to this Court, what the appellant has only
been unsuccessfully arguing is that her independent income
was not taken into account and her assets prior to the check
period were not properly assessed. All these grounds have
already been dealt with by the Trial Court and High Court, and
the appellant has failed to show that there has been any
discrepancy in the evaluation of assets. Even on re-evaluation
by the High Court, the High Court has only found a
discrepancy of around Rs.2 lacs and even by reducing that
amount from the total worth of disproportionate assets, the
percentage of disproportionality remained above 400% of the
accused’s known sources of income. There is no doubt that the
appellant intentionally aided her husband in the accumulation
of disproportionate assets.
15
22. The Trial Court as well as the High Court have rightly relied upon
the decision of this Court in P. Nallammal & Anr. v. State
(1999) 6 SCC 559 to hold the appellant guilty of abetment of
the offence of Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. In that case, this
Court had accepted the submission of the State that a person
who is not a public servant, can also be an abettor for the
offences under Section 13 of the PC Act. Accepting and
reiterating the illustrations suggested by the State’s Counsel, it
was observed by this Court as follows:
“24.…
The first illustration cited is this:
If A, a close relative of the public servant tells him
of how other public servants have become more
wealthy by receiving bribes and A persuades the
public servant to do the same in order to become
rich and the public servant acts accordingly. If it
is a proved position there cannot be any doubt
that A has abetted the offence by instigation.
Next illustration is this:
Four persons including the public servant decide
to raise a bulk amount through bribery and the
remaining persons prompt the public servant to
keep such money in their names. If this is a
proved position then all the said persons are
guilty of abetment through conspiracy.
The last illustration is this:
If a public servant tells A, a close friend of his,
that he has acquired considerable wealth through
bribery but he cannot keep them as he has no
known source of income to account, he
requests A to keep the said wealth in A's name,
16
and A obliges the public servant in doing so. If it
is a proved position A is guilty of abetment falling
under the “Thirdly” clause of Section 107 of the
Penal Code.
25. Such illustrations are apt examples of how
the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act
can be abetted by non-public servants. The only
mode of prosecuting such offender is through the
trial envisaged in the PC Act.”
It is clear that the appellant’s case squarely falls within the
third illustration produced above. Interestingly, the case cited
above i.e. of P. Nallamal (Supra) relates to none other but the
present appellant and her deceased husband, who had earlier
approached this Court seeking quashing of the present
criminal case.
23. My learned brother has also discussed two other cases of this
Court, though in my humble opinion, these are distinguishable
on facts and would be of no help to the appellant.
24. The first case is K. Ponnuswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu (2001)
6 SCC 674. In this case, the High Court upheld the conviction
of the main accused for acquiring disproportionate assets while
his wife and daughter were acquitted. When the main accused
came before this Court, this Court dismissed his criminal
appeal, whereas in relation to the acquittal of wife and
daughter, this Court did not say anything since the State had
17
submitted that they are going to file an appeal challenging the
acquittal of the daughter and wife of the main accused. No
such appeal was filed by the State. On the contrary, the wife
and daughter of the main accused therein approached this
Court challenging the order confiscating their properties. This
Court remitted the matter to the High Court on the ground that
the Courts below did not record proper reasons for confiscating
the properties belonging to the wife and daughter. Finally, the
High Court gave directions for the exclusion of their assets from
the order of confiscation, considering that they stand acquitted
in the matter. However, that case cannot be read as a decision
in favour of the daughter and wife, since the innocence or guilt
of the daughter and wife of the public servant involved in that
case was never an issue before this Court. Hence, that case
cannot come to the aid of the present appellant.
25. The second case which my learned brother relies upon is State v.
Uttamchand Bohra (2022) 16 SCC 663. The facts of this case
are also totally distinguishable from the case at hand. In that
case, a public servant (main accused) working for the Central
Government was accused of buying some property, in the name
of a company named M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd., using
18
the money from his unknown sources of income. There one
Uttamchand Bohra (respondent therein) was also made an
accused, alleging that he had abetted the public servant in the
accumulation of disproportionate assets inasmuch as
Uttamchand Bohra’s employee was the witness of the sale
deed, and title deeds were also recovered from his house. The
respondent moved a discharge application, which was
dismissed by the Trial court. Later, in revision, the High Court
quashed the case against Uttamchand Bohra. Thereafter, the
State approached this Court against the order of the High
Court. This Court dismissed the State’s appeal and affirmed
the order of the High Court. The relevant portion of the
judgment is as follows:
“25. The charge-sheet further does not contain
any allegation which can amount to an offence
under Section 109IPC. The prosecution has not
suggested that he abetted A-1 to acquire
disproportionate assets in any manner; the only
allegation is that the title deeds to the flat, which
is in the name of M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt.
Ltd. was seized from his custody and that he had
instructed his employee to witness the document.
An allegation of the existence of signatures of
Uttamchand's employee, as a witness to the sale
deed cannot amount to his aiding or abetting A-1
to acquire disproportionate assets. Witnessing a
sale deed is a formal requirement. Likewise, the
fact that the sale deed was in Uttamchand's
19
residence cannot satisfy the ingredient of any of
the offences alleged against him.
26. The statements of the approvers, A-3 and A-
4, who were tendered pardon by the Court, do
not reveal any involvement by Uttamchand in
commission of the alleged offence. During the
pendency of the present proceedings the
recording of depositions of 74 witnesses was
completed. Those were part of this Court's record;
they do not show any incriminating material as
far as Uttamchand is concerned. Furthermore,
crucially, the money trail for the property bought
under the sale deed, does not show
Uttamchand's involvement. It may implicate A-3
and A-4, however as stated before, the Court has
granted a pardon to them, for which they have
turned approvers.
….
29. CBI cannot deny that Uttamchand's name
was included in the present case, although the
sale deed was seized during a search conducted
in relation to another FIR (the earlier case) — and
not in relation to the present case, which relates
to the disproportionate assets case. The FIR in
the present case names only A-1 and A-2 as the
accused. The sale deed had already been seized
from Uttamchand's house by then.
….
36. An entire overview of the material produced
before the trial court, with the charge-sheet and
final report, as well as deposition of the 74
witnesses who were examined during the trial,
does not support CBI's allegation of Uttamchand.
He did not directly or indirectly finance the
transaction by which property was sold to M/s
Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd., which, according to
that prosecution, was in fact by A-1. The
respondent also is not alleged to have facilitated
the flow of money to fund acquisition of the flat.
The material put against him is that the sale
20
deed was seized, prior to the present case. The
other circumstance put against him is that his
employee witnessed the sale deed. The
respondent is concededly neither the owner, nor
has any links with M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt.
Ltd. In these circumstances, this Court is of the
opinion that no material which can prima facie
support an inference that Uttamchand was either
a conspirator or had abetted the commission of
the offences alleged against the accused A-1 is
made out.”
(Emphasis Provided)
Thus, it is clear that the facts of the above case are entirely
distinct from the present matter. The accused in that case had
no involvement in the offence as the assets were allegedly
purchased by the public servant in the name of a company
with which the accused (Uttamchand Bohra) had nothing to do.
The only allegations against Uttamchand Bohra were that the
title deeds were recovered from his residence, and that one of
his employees was a witness to the sale deed by which assets
disproportionate to known sources of income were purchased
by the public servant.
26. In no way can the facts of the above cases be compared to the
case at hand. In the present case, the appellant actively
participated in the purchase of various movable and immovable
properties in her name. It has come in unrebuttable evidence of
21
the prosecution that the present appellant had visited the office
of the concerned Registrar for getting the sale deeds registered.
And this had happened on more than one occasion for different
sale deeds. The Trial Court and the High Court had rightly
accepted the prosecution’s case that the appellant knowingly
allowed her husband to accumulate illegal wealth in her name
and thus, committed an offence under Section 109 of the IPC
read with Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
27. In view of the above, I find no reason to interfere with the
impugned order dated 20.11.2023 passed by the High Court.
Also, like my brother Judge, I do not see any fault in the
administrative order dated 03.03.2022 passed by the High
Court. Accordingly, I dismiss all these appeals.
28. The appellant is directed to surrender within ten weeks from
today to undergo her remaining sentence.
29. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) vacated.
30. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
.......………………………….J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
NEW DELHI;
May 07, 2025.
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2489 OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.2127 OF 2024]
P. NALLAMMAL …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2490 OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.2288 OF 2024]
TMT. P. NALLAMMAL & ORS. …APPELLANTS
A1: TMT. P. NALLAMMAL
A2: THIRU A. M. PARAMASIVAM (DIED) THROUGH LRS.
A2.1: P. RAJAKUMAR PANDIAN
A2.2: P. SELVAKUMAR PANDIYAN
A2.3: SELVI SURIYAKALA @ SUDARSENA
VERSUS
STATE OF TAMIL NADU, REPRESENTED BY
INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2491-2492 OF 2025
2
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NOS.5196-5197 OF 2024]
THIRU A. M. PARAMASIVAM (DIED) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.
…APPELLANTS
A1.1: TMT. P. NALLAMMAL
A1.2: P. RAJAKUMAR PANDIAN
A1.3: P. SELVAKUMAR PANDIYAN
A1.4: SELVI SURIYAKALA @ SUDARSENA
VERSUS
STATE OF TAMIL NADU, REPRESENTED BY
INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeals arise from a common set of facts and have,
therefore, been heard together, and are disposed of by this Judgment. It
is necessary to first advert to the relevant factual background, wherefrom
the instant appeals have traversed to this Court.
FACTUAL LENS:
3
3. A. M. Paramasivam (hereinafter also referred to as the ‘1 st
Accused’) was an elected Member of the Tamil Nadu Legislative
Assembly during the period 16.06.1991 to 09.05.1996. He also served as
the Minister for Labour Welfare, Government of Tamil Nadu during the
period 17.05.1993 to 09.05.1996. On 20.08.1996, CR
No.5/AC/96/Headquarters was registered against him and his wife, P.
Nallamal (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2nd Accused’) alleging acquisition
of properties beyond known pecuniary resources, which were
disproportionate to the extent of Rs.38,72,545/- during the Check Period
i.e., between 16.06.1991 to 09.05.1996. The 1 st Accused and 2nd
Accused are hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘Accused’.
4 A. M. Paramasivam was charged for the offence under Section
13(2) read with 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) for acquiring properties and
pecuniary resources which were disproportionate to his known sources
of income to the extent of Rs.38,72,545/-, which he had not satisfactorily
accounted for. Whereas, P. Nallamal was tried for offence under Section
109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’)
read with Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(c) of the Act for abetting the
offence by permitting the 1st Accused to acquire a substantial portion of
4
the properties in her name and in the names of her minor children and for
holding such properties on his behalf.
5. Before the learned III Special Judge/XIII Additional Judge,
Chennai (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’), on behalf of the
prosecution, 62 witnesses (PW1 to PW62) were examined, 160 Exhibits
(Ex.P1 to Ex.P160) were marked along with 31 material objects (MO1 to
MO31). On the side of the defence, 30 witness (DW1 to DW30) were
examined and 15 Exhibits (Ex.D1 to Ex.D15) were marked.
6. The Trial Court vide Judgment and Order dated 15.11.2000
determined the value of the assets acquired by the 1st Accused
disproportionate to his known source of income as being Rs.35,25,136/-
for the purpose of action under Section 12 of the Criminal Law
(Amendment) Ordinance Act, 1944, and convicted both the 1 st and 2nd
Accused:
Accuse Offence Conviction and
d Sentence
[under the
Act as it
then stood]
1st Section To undergo two years
Accused 13(2) r/w Rigorous Imprisonment
13(1)(c) of and to pay fine of
the Act Rs.10,000/. In default of
payment of fine, to
5
undergo 2 months
further Simple
Imprisonment.
2nd Section To undergo one year
Accused 109, IPC Rigorous Imprisonment
r/w 13(2) and to pay fine of
r/w 13(1) Rs.5000/-. In default of
(c) of the payment of fine, to
Act undergo 1 month further
Simple Imprisonment.
7. In view of the above conviction, the learned Principal Sessions
Judge, Madurai by Order dated 03.01.2001 in Crl. O.P. No.2 of 1997
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Attachment Order’) made the earlier
interim attachment order dated 06.03.1997 of the schedule-mentioned
properties in Crl. M.P. No.1168/1997, absolute and ordered that the
amount of Rs.35,25,136/- shall be recovered by forfeiture of the attached
properties.
8. The 1st and 2nd Accused filed Criminal Appeal No.1170/2000
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Criminal Appeal’) before the High Court of
Judicature at Madras (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’)
challenging the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court.
Along with this Criminal Appeal, the accused filed Civil Miscellaneous
Application No.425/2001 challenging the Attachment Order. With the
6
leave of the High Court, the accused marked two additional documents
as Ex.D16 & Ex.D17.
9. The story takes a rather interesting turn from here. It would be
material to note the case of the appellants. According to them, between
08.02.2013 and 20.02.2013, the Criminal Appeal was listed before the
High Court and elaborate arguments were advanced by both sides,
subsequent to which the judgment was reserved by a learned Single
Judge. On 30.04.2013, as put forth by the appellants, the learned Single
Judge pronounced Judgment and acquitted both the accused.
Thereafter, the counsel for the accused filed applications dated
30.04.2013, 09.12.2013 and 16.02.2015 praying for a Certified Copy of
the Judgment/Order dated 30.04.2013, which was not made available.
On 23.03.2015, the 1st Accused passed away. Later, the 2nd Accused also
made a complaint to the Registrar General of the High Court to the effect
that a Certified Copy of the Judgment/Order dated 30.04.2013 had not
been furnished by the Registry and no reason was assigned for the
same. The Assistant Registrar (Administration) of the High Court, on
19.08.2015, replied to the 2 nd Accused, stating that no action could be
taken in judicial proceedings on letters received by post.
7
10. After over five years, the High Court, on 19.07.2018, listed the
criminal appeal for ‘fresh hearing’. The 2nd Accused filed Writ Petition
(Criminal) No.437/2021 titled P Nallammal v The Registrar General
High Court of Judicature at Madras before this Court challenging the
fresh listing of the Criminal Appeal, which was disposed of vide Order
dated 13.12.2021 with a request to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the High
Court to conduct an enquiry on the administrative side and to take a
decision. Pursuant to this Order, an enquiry was conducted by the
learned Chief Justice on 23.02.2022, in which the 2 nd Accused
participated. By an order dated 03.03.2022 in R.O.C. No.2/2022/Crl.Sec.
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Administrative Order’), the
Chief Justice, in the absence of a judgment on record, directed the
appeal to be listed for fresh hearing.
11. Pursuant to the Impugned Administrative Order, the appeal along
with CMA No.425/2001 challenging the Attachment Order, was re-heard.
Vide Final Judgment and Order dated 20.11.2023 (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Impugned Order’), the High Court dismissed the Criminal Appeal
and confirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court.
The High Court, in the Impugned Order, found the value of the assets
disproportionate to the known source of income of the accused to be
Rs.33,25,136. Accordingly, CMA No.425/2001 was dismissed and the
8
Attachment Order was confirmed with a modification to the effect of
recovering a sum of Rs.33,25,165/- instead of Rs.35,25,136/- with
interest @ 6% per annum from the date of interim attachment viz.
06.03.1997.
12. For the sake of clarity, the three appeals before us presently are:
(i) Appeal arising from SLP (Criminal) No.2127/2024 filed by the 2 nd
Accused challenging the conviction and sentence imposed by the
Impugned Order.
(ii) Appeal arising from SLP (Criminal) No.2288/2024 filed by the 2 nd
Accused and the Legal Heirs of the 1 st Accused (children of the 1st and
2nd Accused), challenging the Attachment Order as modified by the
Impugned Order.
(iii) Appeal arising from SLP (Criminal) Nos.5196-5197/2024 filed by the
Legal Heirs of the 1st Accused (2nd Accused and children of the 1 st and 2nd
Accused) challenging the Impugned Administrative Order directing fresh
hearing of the Criminal Appeal as well as the Impugned Order.
APPELLANTS’ SUBMISSIONS:
9
13. At the outset, learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted
that after the acquittal of the appellants by the High Court by
pronouncing a Judgment in open court on 30.04.2013, it was not
constitutionally permissible to rehear the disposed of appeal only on the
ground that the Judgment which was pronounced in open court was not
found in the case bundle, that too after over five years of the
pronouncement of the judgement and almost three years after the death
of the 1st Accused. It was submitted that the Judgment dated 30.04.2013
had properly appreciated the evidence on record and acquitted the
accused, and this, in itself, would prove that the Impugned Order is
erroneous and illegal.
14. It was submitted that in terms of DSP v K Inbasagaran, (2006) 1
SCC 420, when there is evidence that the wife had independent income
and the same is proved, it cannot be included with the assets of the
husband-public servant. In the present case, in Statement-II, the
prosecution had admitted that at the time of marriage, the 2 nd Accused
was given 100 sovereigns of gold. The properties acquired in the name
of the 2nd Accused during the Check Period were valued at Rs.5,42,375/-.
It was submitted that Item 19 (second-hand Ambassador Car) was
valued at Rs.1,30,000/- whereas PW55 (the vendor) stated that he had
10
sold it for only Rs.40,000/-. Thus, the total amount of properties acquired
in the name of the 2nd Accused is only Rs.4,52,375/-.
15. It was contended that way before the Check Period, the 2 nd
Accused had agricultural lands as per Ex.P93 and her father/DW29 had
given 1.18 acres and 1.35 acres of Nanja land to her as stridhana. For
some lands, the patta stands in her name. Further, DWs 3, 6, 11, 14, 19,
23, and 25 have given evidence stating that they borrowed money from
the 2nd Accused before the Check Period and were paying interest for the
same. The income from agriculture and by way of interest also stands
corroborated from Ex.D2 and Ex.D3, which are the returns recovered
from PW62 (auditor) during the course of investigation.
16. Next, it was argued that the Income Tax Department has
assessed the agricultural income and the income by way of interest and
the Trial Court has disbelieved the defence witnesses and documents in
this behalf, without assigning any cogent reasons. It was argued that the
2nd Accused was not a pauper, that she was a daughter of a rich family
and also paying income tax of her own. Learned senior counsel
submitted that the Courts below had rejected the explanation so offered
by the 2nd Accused without any reasoning. Further, it was pointed out that
there is no evidence that the 1st Accused contributed anything ever to the
11
2nd Accused to purchase any assets. Instead, the purchases made by the
2nd Accused were from her own income and from the contributions of her
father/DW29.
17. It was further contended that if the assets standing in the name of
the 2nd Accused are excluded, then the assets held by the 1 st Accused at
the end of the Check Period itself would be within limits. It was urged that
there was no disproportionality in the assets held by him. There were as
many as fifteen documents and 30 witnesses on the side of the defence,
which would discharge the 1st accused from the burden under Section
106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Impugned Order failed to refer
to the defence documents. As per Ex.D3, Ex.D16 and Ex.D17 and the
oral evidence of the defence witnesses, it has been clearly established
that the 1st Accused had an agricultural income of Rs.13,55,715/- and the
2nd Accused had an agricultural income of Rs.1,59,250/-. Furthermore,
the Impugned Order failed to note the evidence of PW29 and Ex.P60
which would prove that the income of the 2nd Accused from the sale of
sugarcane at the mill and the amounts earned by the sugarcane mill
were to the tune of Rs.4,21,349/-. The Travelling Allowance and
Dearness Allowance paid to the 1st Accused totalling Rs.1,20,779/- has
also not been taken into account by the Courts below. Kartarey v State
of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 76 and Reena Hazarika v State of
12
Assam, (2019) 13 SCC 289 were referred to in support of the
propositions canvassed by the learned senior counsel.
18. Learned senior counsel submitted that the Accused have
discharged the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and
established their lawful sources of income and the acquisitions made by
them. In such scenario, the Impugned Order is liable to be set aside and
the 2nd Accused is entitled to be acquitted. As a consequence, the
Impugned Attachment Order in CMA No.425/2001, upholding the
Attachment Order is also liable to be set aside in the absence of proof
that such properties were acquired by committing a scheduled offence. It
was prayed to allow the respective appeals as aforesaid.
19. We may also note that though, in the pleadings, there is an
argument that the ingredients of Section 107 of IPC are not made out
and hence, the 2nd Accused cannot be punished for abetment by
invoking Section 109 of IPC, the same was not canvassed during oral
submissions.
RESPONDENT-STATE’S SUBMISSIONS:
13
20. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted
that the appeals are without merit and the prosecution had proved the
charges beyond reasonable doubt. It was submitted that the prosecution
had demonstrated, through witness testimonies and documentary
evidence, that the accused, particularly the 1st Accused, Late Mr. A. M.
Paramasivam, who held public office as a Member of the Legislative
Assembly and later as Minister for Labour Welfare, Government of Tamil
Nadu, had amassed wealth significantly beyond his disclosed income
sources. Despite claims by the Accused that their incomes were from
agricultural lands and independent sources of income of the 2 nd Accused,
these claims had not been substantiated by reliable documentation or
testimony.
21. The assessment of the Accuseds’ assets, submitted learned
counsel, as determined by the Trial Court, was accurate and based on
credible evidence, which led to a determination that the appellants were
in possession of assets worth Rs.37,71,590/-, significantly
disproportionate to their known income sources, amounting to a 442%
disparity, which justified conviction. It was submitted that except for about
5 acres of land in possession at the beginning of the Check Period, the
accused had not produced any acceptable evidence to show that they
had other lands that they were cultivating or owned.
14
22. It was contended that the 2 nd Accused had no independent
income and aided the 1st Accused in illegally acquiring wealth in her and
her children’s name. It is submitted that the Accused relied heavily on
Income Tax Returns and agricultural income claims, but the returns alone
cannot substantiate the claim of legal acquisition of assets. The income
disclosed in the Income Tax Returns and the findings of the Income Tax
Department are confined to income assessable to tax and is not proof
that the assets from which the income is derived, were acquired legally. It
was submitted that Ex.D1, Ex.D2 and Ex.D3 were self-serving
documents which surfaced after the search conducted at the residential
premises of the Accused, and would be of no evidentiary value.
23. It was further submitted that the self-serving evidence testified by
interested witnesses in respect of the Accuseds’ immovable properties
are hard to believe. Particularly, when the 1 st Accused himself claims that
he was a full-time politician, his tall claim of cultivating about 6.61 acres
of land under lease besides owning 5 acres of land, has rightly been
disbelieved by the Trial Court as lacking evidence.
24. For the sake of argument, even if the explanation of the Accused
is accepted, assuming that the relatives of the Accused presented
15
household articles during the house-warming ceremony, the entire value
of such house-hold appliances like Colour Television, Fridge etc. being
only a sum of Rs.1,24,740/- could be reduced from the total value of the
assets acquired during the Check Period. At the most, the dispute in
valuation can be only in respect of Architect fees (less Rs.75,000/-) and
the value of the household articles alleged to have been gifted by known
persons and relatives (less Rs.1,24,740/-). At this, the value of assets
acquired during the Check Period would reduce, from Rs.37,70,590/- to
Rs.35,71,330/.
25. Moreover, the marriage of the Accused took place in 1983,
whereas the Check Period commenced from 16.06.1991. It was
submitted that no document was placed before the Courts to indicate
that, after the marriage and till soon before the Check Period, the 1 st
Accused had any source of income other than 5 acres of land shown in
Statement-I or had purchased any property. It is submitted that the Act
shifts the burden of proof to the public servant when disproportionate
assets are found. The Accused attempted to rely on Income Tax Returns
and self-serving testimony regarding gifts and agricultural income, but
these efforts failed to meet the required standards. Reliance was placed
on State of Karnataka v J Jayalalithaa, (2017) 6 SCC 263. In the
context of burden of proof when disproportionate assets are found being
16
on the defence, learned counsel cited Kedari Lal v State of Madhya
Pradesh, (2015) 14 SCC 505 and State of Tamil Nadu v R
Soundirarasu, (2023) 6 SCC 768.
26. With regard to the grievance of the appellants regarding the fresh
listing of the Criminal Appeal, learned counsel stated that it is pertinent to
mention that the appellants had not pursued the matter immediately in
the year 2013 itself, when the Judgment is said to have been delivered
on 30.04.2013. No explanation was given by the appellants, except
stating that repeated prayers were made to the learned Single Judge
concerned for obtaining Certified Copy(ies) of the said Judgment. It was
thus within the appellants’ knowledge that the Judgment dated
30.04.2013 had not been furnished. Moreover, the contention urged was
that the Impugned Administrative Order cannot be challenged directly via
filing a Special Leave Petition and the appellants should have
approached the High Court by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. In this backdrop, the State sought dismissal of
all the appeals.
ANALYSIS, REASONING & CONCLUSION:
17
27. We have heard the rival contentions and perused the material on
record. At the outset, we may indicate that we do not intend to undertake
the exercise of re-evaluation/re-assessment of the quantum insofar as
the disproportionate assets are concerned. The Impugned Order has
rightly considered the material on record and is well-reasoned in that
regard. Therefore, we circumscribe our enquiry to the question of
culpability of the 2nd Accused under Section 109 IPC read with Sections
13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the Act. The 2 nd Accused was charged with
colluding with the 1st Accused and purchase of properties in her name, in
the names of her daughter and sons and keeping the said properties on
behalf of the 1st Accused.
28. It would be profitable to set out Sections 107 and 109 of the IPC
at the outset:
‘107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of a
thing, who—
First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act
or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that
conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the
doing of that thing.
xxx
109. Punishment of abetment if the act abetted is
committed in consequence and where no express
provision is made for its punishment.—Whoever abets
18any offence shall, if the act abetted is committed in
consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is
made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be
punished with the punishment provided for the offence.
Explanation.—An act or offence is said to be committed in
consequence of abetment, when it is committed in
consequence of the instigation, or in pursuance of the
conspiracy, or with the aid which constitutes the abetment.
Illustrations
(a) A offers a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward for
showing A some favour in the exercise of B’s official
functions. B accepts the bribe. A has abetted the offence
defined in S. 161.
(b) A instigates B to give false evidence. B, in consequence
of the instigation, commits that offence. A is guilty of abetting
that offence, and is liable to the same punishment as B.
(c) A and B conspire to poison Z. A, in pursuance of the
conspiracy, procures the poison and delivers it to B in order
that he may administer it to Z. B, in pursuance of the
conspiracy, administers the poison to Z in A’s absence and
thereby causes Z’s death. Here B is guilty of murder. A is
guilty of abetting that offence by conspiracy, and is liable to
the punishment for murder.’
29. The question as to whether offences under the Act are abettable
by non-public servants and whether they can be prosecuted by the
Special Courts under the Act is no longer res integra. Interestingly, the
position of law was also expounded in an earlier round of litigation
wherein the 2nd Accused had approached this Court seeking pre-trial
exoneration. The decision is reported as P Nallamal v State, 1999 6
SCC 559, wherein the Court cited illustrations fitting within each of the
three clauses in Section 107 of the IPC vis-à-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the
Act. They are:
19
‘24. Shri Shanti Bhushan cited certain illustrations which,
according to us, would amplify the cases of abetments fitting
with each of the three clauses in Section 107 of the Penal
Code vis-a-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act.
The first illustration cited is this:
If A, a close relative of the public servant tells him of how
other public servants have become more wealthy by
receiving bribes and A persuades the public servant to do the
same in order to become rich and the public servant acts
accordingly. If it is a proved position there cannot be any
doubt that A has abetted the offence by instigation.
Next illustration is this:
Four persons including the public servant decide to raise a
bulk amount through bribery and the remaining persons
prompt the public servant to keep such money in their
names. If this is a proved position then all the said persons
are guilty of abetment through conspiracy.
The last illustration is this:
If a public servant tells A, a close friend of his, that he has
acquired considerable wealth through bribery but he cannot
keep them as he has no known source of income to account,
he requests A to keep the said wealth in A’s name,
and A obliges the public servant in doing so. If it is a proved
position A is guilty of abetment falling under the “Thirdly”
clause of Section 107 of the Penal Code.’
30. Although the illustrations supra were cited by the
prosecution/respondents therein, the Court was ad idem therewith.
Ultimately, this Court held that the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the
Act can be abetted by a non-public servant.
31. We may note that it is not the case of the prosecution that the 2 nd
Accused instigated the 1st Accused to amass wealth disproportionately or
20
that she is holding the properties benami. No material has been brought
on record by the prosecution to suggest so. Therefore, the act of
abetment as alleged is either one of conspiracy or one of intentionally
aiding. The properties acquired in the name of the 2 nd Accused during the
check period were valued at Rs.5,34,179/- (Rupees Five Lakhs Thirty
Four Thousand One Hundred and Seventy Nine) by the Impugned Order.
The question, therefore, before us is whether the 2 nd Accused is liable for
abetment merely by reason of the fact that she was the wife of the 1 st
Accused and some properties were acquired/purchased in her name.
32. At this juncture, it is expedient to understand the scope of Section
109 of the IPC vis-à-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the Act and the evidentiary
burden to be discharged by the prosecution. In K Ponnuswamy v State
of Tamil Nadu, (2001) 6 SCC 674, which lies in a similar factual
scenario, the main accused therein challenged his conviction by the High
Court, which challenge was negatived by this Court. The High Court
convicted the main accused (A1) for being unable to satisfactorily
account for the disproportionate assets, while acquitting his wife (A2) and
daughter (A3), in whose name the bulk of the properties were held. While
doing so, the High Court [vide its Judgment and Order dated 12.04.2001
in Criminal Appeal No.749/2000] returned the following findings:
‘45. It has been clearly found that the properties and
resources standing in the name of A2 and A3 were not
21satisfactorily accounted for by A1. A4’s explanation was
already found to be not acceptable. A2 and A3 are not the
earning members of the family, except they get a meagre
income from agricultural property. The defence of A2 is that
she purchased movable and immovable property by using
the gift cheques received by her through A4. This theory was
not accepted for the reasons already recorded. So far as A3
is concerned she could not say anything as to how the
properties came in her name. She being a student may not
be knowing naturally. Therefore, merely because A2 & A3
have acquired properties in their names whether they can be
held to have abetted the first accused to commit the offence?
The offence of abetment can be established only by proving
that the abettor instigated the main offender to do the offence
or conspired together or intentionally aided by any act or
illegal omission, for the commission of the offence. Insofar as
the first limb of Section 107 I.P.C. is concerned, there is no
evidence that either A2 or A3 instigated A1 to acquire
properties and resources disproportionate to his known
sources of income. There is also no evidence of any
conspiracy for that end. The last limb of Section 107 is
intentional aid by any act or illegal omission. Nodoubt [sic],
A2 & A3 are holding properties rather purchased properties in
their names. There is ample proof to that effect. Whether
mere purchase of properties including jewels would amount
to intentional aid is a point to be decided. This last limb can
be held to be established only either when A1 informs A2 and
A3 or A2 & A3 have knowledge that the ill-gotten money was
being used for the purpose of purchasing properties in their
names. In the absence of such a proof, A2 & A3 cannot be
held to be liable for the offence of abetment…
46. Though Section 13(1)(e) of the Act was abettable still
there is no evidence to bring A2 to A5 within the ambit of
abetment. Therefore, benefit of doubt has to be given to
them…’
(emphasis supplied)
33. K Ponnuswamy (supra), however, noted that ‘…As we are told
that the State is going to file an appeal against the acquittal of Accused 2
and 3, we are not making any comments thereon.’ Yet, the same was not
22filed as is apparent from Order dated 31.03.2009 passed by this Court in
Criminal Appeals No.849-850 of 2001, where A2 and A3 had
approached this Court challenging the order of the High Court in ordering
confiscation of the properties in their name despite acquitting them of all
charges. By the said Order dated 31.03.2009, this Court allowed their
appeals and remitted the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration,
on the ground that no tangible or sustainable reasons were recorded by
the Courts below in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 452 1 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with regard to the confiscation of
properties owned and possessed by A2 and A3. Post-remand, on fresh
consideration, the High Court by its Judgment dated 28.07.2018 2 in
Criminal Appeals Nos.882/2000 and 884/2000 allowed the appeals and
held that having acquitted A2 and A3, assets standing in their names had
to be excluded from the order of confiscation and ordered accordingly. In
1
‘452. Order for disposal of property at conclusion of trial.—(1) When an inquiry or trial in any Criminal Court is con-
cluded, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the disposal, by destruction, confiscation or delivery to any
person claiming to be entitled to possession thereof or otherwise, of any property or document produced before it or in
its custody, or regarding which any offence appears to have been committed, or which has been used for the commis –
sion of any offence.
(2) An order may be made under sub-section (1) for the delivery of any property to any person claiming to be
entitled to the possession thereof, without any condition or on condition that he executes a bond, with or without
sureties, to the satisfaction of the Court, engaging to restore such property to the Court if the order made under sub-
section (1) is modified or set aside on appeal or revision.
(3) A Court of Session may, instead of itself making an order under sub-section (1), direct the property to be
delivered to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who shall thereupon deal with it in the manner provided in Sections 457,
458 and 459.
(4) Except where the property is livestock or is subject to speedy and natural decay, or where a bond has
been executed in pursuance of sub-section (2), an order made under sub-section (1) shall not be carried out for two
months, or when an appeal is presented, until such appeal has been disposed of.
(5) In this section, the term “property” includes, in the case of property regarding which an offence appears to
have been committed, not only such property as has been originally in the possession or under the control of any
party, but also any property into or for which the same may have been converted or exchanged, and anything ac –
quired by such conversion or exchange, whether immediately or otherwise.’
2
This Judgment was amended by the Madras High Court by Order dated 11.03.2019.
23
Kishori Lal v State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 10 SCC 797, this Court
explained:
‘6. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence
of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in
IPC. A person, abets the doing of a thing when (1) he
instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with
one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of
that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission,
the doing of that thing. These things are essential to
complete abetment as a crime. The word “instigate” literally
means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by
persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by
instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the
three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides that if the
act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and
there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment,
then the offender is to be punished with the punishment
provided for the original offence. “Abetted” in Section 109
means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence
for the abetment of which a person is charged with the
abetment is normally linked with the proved offence.’
(emphasis supplied)
34. Relevant reference can be made to the discussion in State v
Uttamchand Bohra, (2022) 16 SCC 663 which although not in reference
to a family member of the principal accused but explains in-depth the
requirements of conspiracy and abetment vis-à-vis a charge of
accumulation of disproportionate assets by a public servant:
‘22. As is evident from the discussion of the facts,
Uttamchand is accused of abetting and/or conspiring with the
principal accused, a public servant (A-1), so as to permit him
to accumulate assets disproportionate to his known sources
of income. A-1 was a senior official of the Central
Government, working in the Income Tax Department.
According to the prosecution, he acquired the flat, through
the Company. Two other accused, who facilitated the
24acquisition, turned approver; they also deposed during the
trial. The role attributed to the respondent is that he helped in
the execution of the sale deed of the property, and kept
custody of the title deed to it. The document was in fact
seized from his house. The seizure took place over a year
before the present case was initiated; in fact, CBI had
initiated another criminal proceeding, in which A-1 too was
implicated. In that case, CBI had seized Rs 50 lakhs from
him. In the present case, the recovery from Uttamchand’s
custody of the sale deed of the property, owned by the
Company led to initiation of separate proceeding; inter alia,
Uttamchand was charged with “criminal conspiracy”, defined
under Section 120-A IPC and punishable under Section 120-
B IPC and “abetment”, defined by Section 107 IPC and
punishable under Section 109 IPC.
xxx
25. The charge-sheet further does not contain any allegation
which can amount to an offence under Section 109 IPC. The
prosecution has not suggested that he abetted A-1 to acquire
disproportionate assets in any manner; the only allegation is
that the title deeds to the flat, which is in the name of M/s
Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. was seized from his custody
and that he had instructed his employee to witness the
document. An allegation of the existence of signatures of
Uttamchand’s employee, as a witness to the sale deed
cannot amount to his aiding or abetting A-1 to acquire
disproportionate assets. Witnessing a sale deed is a formal
requirement. Likewise, the fact that the sale deed was in
Uttamchand’s residence cannot satisfy the ingredient of any
of the offences alleged against him.
xxx
31. This Court explained the essence of conspiracy in the
context of acts or omissions, and allegations relating to
conspiracy along with offences under the PCA, in K.
Narayana Rao [CBI v. K. Narayana Rao, (2012) 9 SCC 512:
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 737: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1183], and
observed that: (SCC p. 530, para 24)
“24. The ingredients of the offence of criminal
conspiracy are that there should be an agreement
between the persons who are alleged to conspire
and the said agreement should be for doing of an
illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, an act
which by itself may not be illegal. In other words, the
25essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to
do an illegal act and such an agreement can be
proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial
evidence or by both and in a matter of common
experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy
is rarely available. Accordingly, the circumstances
proved before and after the occurrence have to be
considered to decide about the complicity of the
accused. Even if some acts are proved to have
been committed, it must be clear that they were so
committed in pursuance of an agreement made
between the accused persons who were parties to
the alleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved
circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn
only when such circumstances are incapable of any
other reasonable explanation. In other words, an
offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have
been established on mere suspicion and surmises
or inference which are not supported by cogent and
acceptable evidence.”
32. The material to implicate someone as a conspirator
acting in concert with a public servant, alleged to have
committed misconduct, under the PCA, or amassed assets
disproportionate to a public servant’s known sources of
income, thus, has to be on firm ground. In the present case,
only two circumstances — the custody of the sale deed (of
the property allegedly belonging to A-1) and the fact that it
was witnessed by Uttamchand’s employee — are alleged
against the respondent. These are wholly insufficient to raise
a reasonable suspicion, or make out a prima facie case
against him, for conspiracy.
33. It would be useful, in the context of the present case, to
recollect the decision of this Court, in P.
Nallammal v. State [P. Nallammal v. State, (1999) 6 SCC 559:
1999 SCC (Cri) 1133] which observed, as follows: (SCC pp.
564-65, para 15)
“15. Thus, the two postulates must combine
together for crystallisation into the offence, namely,
possession of property or resources
disproportionate to the known sources of income of
public servant and the inability of the public servant
to account for it. Burden of proof regarding the first
limb is on the prosecution whereas the onus is on
the public servant to prove the second limb. So it is
26contended that a non-public servant has no role in
the trial of the said offence and hence he cannot
conceivably be tagged with the public servant for
the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act.”
34. As far as the respondent Uttamchand is concerned, the
initial burden of showing that a conspiracy existed, cannot
even be alleged against him, given the nature of the material
presented along with the charge-sheet.
xxx
36. An entire overview of the material produced before the
trial court, with the charge-sheet and final report, as well as
deposition of the 74 witnesses who were examined during
the trial, does not support CBI’s allegation of Uttamchand. He
did not directly or indirectly finance the transaction by which
property was sold to M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd.,
which, according to that prosecution, was in fact by A-1. The
respondent also is not alleged to have facilitated the flow of
money to fund acquisition of the flat. The material put against
him is that the sale deed was seized, prior to the present
case. The other circumstance put against him is that his
employee witnessed the sale deed. The respondent is
concededly neither the owner, nor has any links with M/s
Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. In these circumstances, this
Court is of the opinion that no material which can prima facie
support an inference that Uttamchand was either a
conspirator or had abetted the commission of the offences
alleged against the accused A-1 is made out.’
(emphasis supplied)
35. In the above light, let us turn back to the facts of the instant case.
The defence put forth by the 2 nd Accused before the Trial Court has been
noted in its Judgment dated 15.11.2000 as below:
‘The summary of the written statement filed by the 2nd
Accused: During the time of marriage of the Accused, to the
2nd Accused the family of him had given 100 sovereigns of
gold and lands as Sreedhanam. Through which the Accused
family got income. During the time of marriage, the gift
amount of Rs.10,000/- has acquired. The above said
incomes were all shown in the list which is annexed herewith.
27
The 1st Accused was head of the family and he maintained
the income and expenditure of the family. A false case is filed
to take revenge and to cause disgrace against the Accused.’
(sic)
(emphasis supplied)
36. The 2nd Accused is the widow of the 1 st Accused-public servant.
The assets standing in her name are three immovable properties, two
cars, share certificates and some cash balance in the bank. Pausing
here, we may note that the Trial Court has observed that the 2 nd Accused
showed interest to purchase the land, that she had given the sale
consideration which is proved by witnesses and therefore her acts fall
within the third limb of Section 107 of the IPC, which is one of intentional
aid. Regard being had to the fiduciary relationship shared between the
Accused, mens rea cannot ipso facto be presumed by the mere fact that
some assets stood in the name of the 2 nd Accused, and she had
extended consideration for the same. This Court cannot be oblivious to
human realities, especially the usual course of human conduct in marital
relationships. We are cognizant of the presumptions provided for in
criminal law, but the same by itself cannot supplant evidence. We
reiterate that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of
evidence. To presume culpability of a close relative of the public servant
merely on the ground that certain transactions were made in such
relative’s name would be akin to reversing the burden of proof. This may
28
have dangerous consequences and result in diluting the presumption of
innocence, beyond what the statute in question contemplates.
37. Another striking feature in the present case is that during the
entire trial, the prosecution never took the line of proving that the 2 nd
Accused was all along aware that the money from which the assets were
being bought in her name was obtained through ill-gotten or unlawful
sources. Thus, under bonafide belief, she has tried to defend the
acquisition of the assets trying to explain the sources from various
means which cannot lead to the presumption in law that she was party
ab initio to such illegal acquisition(s) as ultimately she is a housewife
and, from the record, it can be safely stated that it was the late husband-
1st Accused who arranged for the money from which the assets,
disproportionate to the known sources of the income of the family, have
been bought in her name. Thus, the role of the 2 nd Accused, in our
opinion, does not fall within the three illustrations taken note of by this
Court in P Nallamal (supra).
38. It is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable
doubt and a solitary circumstance of name-lending, such as the one at
present, cannot lead us to draw and sustain an inference which
unerringly points to the guilt of the 2 nd Accused. There has to be
29
something more in the form of positive evidence to satisfy the essential
requirements for the offence of abetment. Life and liberty are not things
to be trifled with on the basis of conjectures and surmises. Suresh
Thipmppa Shetty v State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine 1038
held:
‘18. On a deeper and fundamental level, when this Court is
confronted with a situation where it has to ponder whether to
lean with the Prosecution or the Defence, in the face of
reasonable doubt as to the version put forth by the
Prosecution, this Court will, as a matter of course and of
choice, in line with judicial discretion [Although in the context
of bail jurisprudence, for a working idea as to what ‘judicial
discretion’ entails, peruse the views of a learned Single Judge
(sitting as Judge-in-Chambers) of this Court in Gudikanti
Narasimhulu v Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240.], lean in favour of the Defence.
We have borne in mind the cardinal principle that life and
liberty are not matters to be trifled with, and a conviction can
only be sustained in the absence of reasonable doubt. The
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and
insistence on the Prosecution to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt are not empty formalities. Rather, their
origin is traceable to Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution of
India. Of course, for certain offences, the law seeks to place
a reverse onus on the accused to prove his/her innocence,
but that does not impact adversely the innocent-till-proven-
guilty rule for other criminal offences.
19. In Coffin v. United States, 156 US 432 (1895), the United
States’ Supreme Court held:
‘The principle that there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted
law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement
lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law.’
20. We see no quarrel with the afore-noted statement as the
same applies on all fours to our criminal justice system. The
presumption of innocence is also a human right, per the
pronouncement in Narendra Singh v. State of Madhya
30Pradesh, (2004) 10 SCC 699. In Ranjeetsing Brahmajeetsing
Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294, a 3-
Judge Bench of this Court, at Paragraph 35, had opined that
‘… Liberty of a person should not ordinarily be interfered with
unless there exist cogent grounds therefor. …’’
(emphasis supplied)
39. The presumption of innocence is a basic tenet of criminal
jurisprudence and it gets dislodged only by presenting cogent and
reliable evidence. Not for nothing is it stated that the accused is the
favourite child of the law and to him/her enure all the benefits of doubt as
available in law. There is absolutely no evidence on record, much less
any evidence to satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt to
establish that the 2nd Accused conspired/colluded with or intentionally
aided the 1st Accused in committing offence(s) under Sections 13(2) r/w
13(1)(e) of the Act. Therefore, we hold that the acts of the 2 nd Accused do
not fall within the ambit of Section 107 of the IPC and in such
circumstances, it would be unsafe to sustain her conviction with the aid
of Section 109 of IPC.
40. Accordingly, the Impugned Order is set aside to the extent of
conviction of the 2nd Accused and she stands discharged of the liability of
her bail bonds and sureties. As we have acquitted the 2nd Accused, we
see no reason to interfere in the Attachment Order as it attaches the
assets standing in her name beyond the value which has been explained
31
by her and accepted by the Courts below. Further, the Impugned
Administrative Order, having worked itself out, does not call for any
interference. However, the learned Single Judge who pronounced the
‘Judgment’ dated 30.04.2013, as revealed by the Impugned
Administrative Order, is already under appropriate scrutiny. The conduct
of this learned Single Judge in not making available copies of his
judgments/orders at all, or having made them available much after his
date of retirement (26.05.2017) has been adversely commented upon by
this Court in State through Inspector of Police CBI Chennai v Naresh
Prasad Agarwal, (2024) 3 SCC 515 and State through the Inspector
of Police CBI, ACB, Chennai v S Murali Mohan, Criminal Appeal
No.4166/2024 [Order dated 01.10.2024]. We say no more. As evincible
from the Impugned Administrative Order, there did not exist any
‘Judgment’ dated 30.04.2013. The learned then Chief Justice of the High
Court, thus, cannot be faulted for restoring the criminal appeal for fresh
hearing.
41. Consequently, the appeal arising from SLP (Criminal)
No.2127/2024] is allowed; the appeal arising from SLP (Criminal)
No.2288/2024 is dismissed, and; the appeals arising from SLP (Criminal)
Nos.5196-5197/2024 are dismissed.
32
42. No order as to costs.
43. Pending I.A.s/Crl. M.P.s are closed.
.…………………………………….J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]
NEW DELHI
MAY 07, 2025
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2489 OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.2127 OF 2024]
P. NALLAMMAL …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2490 OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.2288 OF 2024]
TMT. P. NALLAMMAL & ORS. …APPELLANTS
A1: TMT. P. NALLAMMAL
A2: THIRU A. M. PARAMASIVAM (DIED) THROUGH LRS.
A2.1: P. RAJAKUMAR PANDIAN
A2.2: P. SELVAKUMAR PANDIYAN
A2.3: SELVI SURIYAKALA @ SUDARSENA
VERSUS
STATE OF TAMIL NADU, REPRESENTED BY
INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT
WITH
2
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2491-2492 OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NOS.5196-5197 OF 2024]
THIRU A. M. PARAMASIVAM (DIED) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.
…APPELLANTS
A1.1: TMT. P. NALLAMMAL
A1.2: P. RAJAKUMAR PANDIAN
A1.3: P. SELVAKUMAR PANDIYAN
A1.4: SELVI SURIYAKALA @ SUDARSENA
VERSUS
STATE OF TAMIL NADU, REPRESENTED BY
INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT
ORDER
We have authored separate judgments, though
we differ only with respect to the appeal arising
from SLP (Criminal) No.2127/2024.
2. We are though unanimous as to the appeals
emanating from SLP (Criminal) No.2288/2024 and SLP
(Criminal) Nos.5196-5197/2024 and these are hereby
dismissed.
3
3. In view of the above, Registry to place the
relevant papers of the appeal arsing from
SLP(Criminal) No.2127/2024, before Hon’ble the
Chief Justice of India for appropriate directions.
.…………………………………….J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
.…………………………………….J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]
NEW DELHI
MAY 07, 2025
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