Gauhati High Court
Page No.# 1/14 vs The State Of Assam And 4 Ors on 30 July, 2025
Page No.# 1/14
GAHC010145172023
2025:GAU-AS:9795
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/4168/2023
DIPUMONI KALITA
S/O LATE DURNA CHARJYA KALITA, R/O DERGAON TOWN, P.S.-
DERGAON, DIST-GOLAGHAT, ASSAM
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS.
REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT.
OF ASSAM, DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS, ASSAM
2:THE CHAIRMAN OF STATE LEVEL COMMITTEE CUM CHIEF SECRETARY
ASSAM
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-06
DIST- KAMRUP (M)
ASSAM
3:THE DISTRICT LEVEL COMMITTEE
REPRESENTED BY DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
GOLAGHAT
ASSAM
4:ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE (W AND S)
ASSAM POLICE HEADQUARTERS
ULUBARI
GUWAHATI
ASSAM
5:THE COMMANDANT
11TH A.P. BATTALION
DERGAON
GOLAGHAT
Page No.# 2/14
ASSA
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. M J BARUAH, MS M NEOG,MS B MAJUMDER
Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM,
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI
ORDER
Date : 30.07.2025
Heard Mr. M. J. Baruah, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner. Also heard Mr. T. C. Chutia, learned Additional Senior
Government Advocate for the state respondent.
2. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, the petitioner is seeking appointment on compassionate
grounds.
3. The brief facts of the case is that the father of the petitioner,
i.e., Late Durna Charjya Kalita, who was a government employee while
working at 11th APBn, Dergaon, Golaghat, died on 15.09.2012, leaving
behind his wife and a son, i.e., the petitioner, as legal heirs. After the
death of the father of the petitioner, the mother of the petitioner
submitted a representation for compassionate appointment and while
the matter was pending consideration before the District Level
Committee, the mother of the petitioner died on 21.08.2015.
4. Thereafter, on 03.02.2015, the petitioner filed an application
before the respondent authorities for appointing him on compassionate
grounds against the Grade-IV post in the police department. Though
Page No.# 3/14
the DLC recommended the name of the petitioner for appointment on
compassionate ground, however, the State Level Committee by order
dated 14.03.2023 rejected the proposal submitted by the DLC for
appointment of the petitioner on compassionate ground. Situated thus,
the present writ petition.
5. Mr. M. J. Baruah, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner,
submits that after the petitioner’s application for appointment on
compassionate ground was rejected by the State Level Committee by
order dated 14.03.2023, which was communicated to him by order
dated 06.04.2023, the present writ petition has been filed. He
accordingly submits that there has been no delay in approaching
before this court.
6. Per contra, Mr. T. C. Chutia, learned Additional Senior
Government Advocate for the state respondent, submits that it
appears from the records that the petitioner was eligible to apply at
the time his father had died on 15.09.2012; however, instead, he
chose not to apply at that time, and it was his mother who at that time
had made an application. He further submits that during the pendency
of the consideration of the application filed by his mother before the
State Level Committee, the mother of the petitioner passed away. He
further submits that the petitioner has submitted his application for
appointment on compassionate ground after the death of his mother.
He further submits that since the case of the petitioner has already
been rejected by the State Level Committee on grounds of delay of
submission, the same warrants no interference from this court. He
relies upon the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of
Page No.# 4/14
State of West Bengal Vs. Debabrata Tiwari & Ors. reported
in 2023 SCC Online SC 219, the present writ petition is liable to
be dismissed at the threshold itself.
7. I have given my prudent consideration to the arguments
advanced by the learned counsel appearing for both the parties and
have perused the material available on record.
8. Further it further appears that the father of the petitioner died
on 15.09.2012. It further appears that though initially the mother of
the petitioner had applied, after she died in the year 2015 when her
case was pending consideration before the State Level Committee,
thereafter the petitioner had submitted an application in his name for
consideration for appointment on compassionate grounds. It further
appears that the application of the petitioner for consideration for
appointment on compassionate grounds was rejected by the State
Level Committee on 14.03.2023, which was communicated to the
petitioner on 06.04.2023
9. Apt to reproduce the letter dated 06.04.2023, which reads as
under:
“OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT, 11 TH ASSAM POLICE
BATTALION,DERGAON::: ASSAM
Memo No. Bn.11/R/PEN/08/2023/1995 Dtd.06/04/2023
To,
Sri Dipumoni Kalita
S/o Lt. Hav Durnacharjya Kalita
Vill:- Milonpur Ward No-07
Page No.# 5/14P.O/P.S:- Dergaon
Dist:- Golaghat, Assam
Sub:- Intimation letter.
Ref, your application dtd.14.01.2022 regarding
appointment on compassionate ground you are hereby informedthat your proposal has been rejected by the 15 th State Level
Committee Assam, Guwahati vide Memo No. HMA-08/2023/57-A
dtd. 14.03.2023 due to late submission of the application.
Reserve Inspector
11th A.P. Battalion, Dergaon”
10. Reading the aforesaid letter, it is apparent that the proposal
submitted by the District Level Committee for appointment of the
petitioner on compassionate grounds has been rejected by the 15 th
State Level Committee, Guwahati, Assam, by order dated 14.03.2023
due to late submission of an application.
11. It is well settled law that compassionate appointment is not a
source of recruitment and is not a vested right which can be exercised
any time in the future.
12. Apt to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Debabrata Tiwari (supra), wherein the Apex Court while dealing with
the issue as whether applications for compassionate appointments could
be considered after a delay of several years, has held that after a delay
of several years, either on the part of the applicant claiming
compassionate appointment, or on the part of the authorities in
deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost.
Page No.# 6/14
Paragraphs 30 to 40 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced
hereunder for ready reference:
“30. The majesty of death is that it is a great leveller for, it makes
no distinction between the young and the old or the rich and the
poor. Death being as a consequence of birth at some point of time is
inevitable for every being. Thus, while death is certain, its timing is
uncertain. Further, a deceased employee does not always leave
behind valuable assets; he may at times leave behind poverty to be
faced by the immediate members of his family. Therefore, what
should be done to ensure that death of an individual does not
mean economic death for his family? The State’s obligation in this
regard, confined to its employees who die in harness, has given
rise to schemes and rules providing for compassionate appointment
of an eligible member of his family as an instance of providing
immediate succour to such a family. Support for such a provision
has been derived from the provisions of Part IV of the Constitution
of India, i.e., Article 39 of the Directive Principles of State Policy.
31. It may be apposite to refer to the following decisions of this
Court, on the rationale behind a policy or scheme for
compassionate appointment and the considerations that ought to
guide determination of claims for compassionate appointment.
i. In Sushma Gosain v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 468, this Court
observed that in all claims for appointment on compassionate
grounds, there should not be any delay in appointment. That the
purpose of providing appointment on compassionate grounds is to
mitigate the hardship caused due to the death of the bread earner
in the family. Such appointment should, therefore, be provided
immediately to redeem the family in distress.
ii. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138,
this Court observed that the object of granting compassionate
employment is to enable the family of a deceased government
employee to tide over the sudden crisis by providing gainful
employment to one of the dependants of the deceased who is
eligible for such employment. That mere death of an employee in
harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood; the
Government or the public authority concerned has to examine the
financial condition of the family of the deceased and it is only if it is
satisfied that, but for the provision of employment, the family will
not be able to meet the crisis, that a job is to be offered to the
eligible member of the family, provided a scheme or rules provide
for the same. This Court further clarified in the said case that
Page No.# 7/14compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be
exercised at any time after the death of a government servant. That
the object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis
which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner,
compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered after
lapse of considerable amount of time and after the crisis is
overcome.
iii. In Haryana State Electricity Board v. Hakim Singh, (1997) 8
SCC 85, (“Hakim Singh”) this Court placed much emphasis on the
need for Immediacy in the manner in which claims for
compassionate appointment are made by the dependants and
decided by the concerned authority. This Court cautioned that it
should not be forgotten that the object of compassionate
appointment is to give succour to the family to tide over the sudden
financial crisis that has befallen the dependants on account of the
untimely demise of its sole earning member. Therefore, this Court
held that it would not be justified in directing appointment for the
claimants therein on compassionate grounds, fourteen years after
the death of the government employee. That such a direction would
amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as
though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of
succession.
iv. This Court in State of Haryana v. Ankur Gupta, (2003) 7 SCC
704: AIR 2003 SC 3797 held that in order for a claim for
compassionate appointment to be considered reasonable and
permissible, it must be shown that a sudden crisis occurred in the
family of the deceased as a result of death of an employee who
had served the State and died while in service. It was further
observed that appointment on compassionate grounds cannot be
claimed as a matter of right and cannot be made available to all
types of posts irrespective of the nature of service rendered by the
deceased employee.
v. There is a consistent line of authority of this Court on the
principle that appointment on compassionate grounds is given only
for meeting the immediate unexpected hardship which is faced by
the family by reason of the death of the bread earner vide Jagdish
Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 301. When an appointment
is made on compassionate grounds, it should be kept confined only
to the purpose it seeks to achieve, the idea being not to provide for
endless compassion, vide I.G. (Karmik) v. Prahalad Mani Tripathi,
(2007) 6 SCC 162. In the same vein is the decision of this Court in
Mumtaz Yunus Mulani v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC
384, wherein it was declared that appointment on compassionate
Page No.# 8/14grounds is not a source of recruitment, but a means to enable the
family of the deceased to get over a sudden financial crisis.
vi. In State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Sajad Ahmed Mir, (2006) 5
SCC 766: AIR 2006 SC 2743, the facts before this Court were that
the government employee (father of the applicant therein) died in
March, 1987. The application was made by the applicant after four
and half years in September, 1991 which was rejected in March,
1996. The writ petition was filed in June, 1999 which was
dismissed by the learned Single Judge in July, 2000. When the
Division Bench decided the matter, more than fifteen years had
passed from the date of death of the father of the applicant. This
Court remarked that the said facts were relevant and material as
they would demonstrate that the family survived in spite of death
of the employee. Therefore, this Court held that granting
compassionate appointment after a lapse of a considerable amount
of time after the death of the government employee, would not be in
furtherance of the object of a scheme for compassionate
appointment.
vii. In Shashi Kumar, this Court speaking through Dr. D.Y.
Chandrachud, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed that
compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule that
appointment to any public post in the service of the State has to be
made on the basis of principles which accord with Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution. That the basis of the policy is that it
recognizes that a family of a deceased employee may be placed in
a position of financial hardship upon the untimely death of the
employee while in service. That it is the immediacy of the need
which furnishes the basis for the State to allow the benefit of
compassionate appointment. The pertinent observations of this
Court have been extracted as under:
‘4.1. Insofar as the individual facts pertaining to the
Respondent are concerned, it has emerged from the record
that the Writ Petition before the High Court was instituted on
11 May 2015. The application for compassionate appointment
was submitted on 8 May 2007. On 15 January 2008 the
Additional Secretary had required that the amount realized
by way of pension be included in the income statement of the
family. The Respondent waited thereafter for a period in
excess of seven years to move a petition Under Article 226 of
the Constitution. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal (supra), this Court
has emphasized that the basis of a scheme of compassionate
Page No.# 9/14appointment lies In the need of providing immediate
assistance to the family of the deceased employee. This
sense of immediacy is evidently lost by the delay on the part
of the dependant in seeking compassionate appointment.
32. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the
following principles emerge:
i. That a provision for compassionate appointment makes a
departure from the general provisions providing for appointment to
a post by following a particular procedure of recruitment. Since
such a provision enables appointment being made without
following the said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to
the general provisions and must be resorted to only in order to
achieve the stated objectives, i.e., to enable the family of the
deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis.
ii. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of
recruitment. The reason for making such a benevolent scheme by
the State or the public sector undertaking is to see that the
dependants of the deceased are not deprived of the means of
livelihood. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the
sudden financial crisis.
iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be
exercised at any time in future. Compassionate employment cannot
be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is
over.
iv. That compassionate appointment should be provided
immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep
such a case pending for years.
v. In determining as to whether the family is in financial crisis, all
relevant aspects must be borne in mind including the income of the
family, its liabilities, the terminal benefits if any, received by the
family, the age, dependency and marital status of its members,
together with the income from any other source.
33. The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate
employment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide
over the sudden crisis due to the death of the bread-earner which
has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood.
Page No.# 10/14
Out of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact
that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would
not be in a position to make both ends meet, a provision is made for
giving gainful appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased
who may be eligible for such appointment. Having regard to such an
object, it would be of no avail to grant compassionate appointment to
the dependants of the deceased employee, after the crisis which
arose on account of death of a bread-winner, has been overcome.
Thus, there is also a compelling need to act with a sense of
immediacy in matters concerning compassionate appointment
because on failure to do so, the object of the scheme of
compassionate would be frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has
occurred since the date of death of the deceased employee, the sense
of immediacy for seeking compassionate. appointment would cease
to exist and thus lose its significance and this would be a relevant
circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in determining
as to whether a case for the grant of compassionate appointment has
been made out for consideration.
34. As noted above, the sine qua non for entertaining a claim for
compassionate appointment is that the family of the deceased
employee would be unable to make two ends meet without one of the
dependants the deceased employee being employed compassionate
grounds. The financial condition of the family of the deceased, at the
time of the death of the deceased, is the primary consideration that
ought to guide the authorities’ decision in the matter.
35. Considering the second question referred to above, in the first
instance, regarding whether applications compassionate
appointment could be considered after a delay of several years, we
are of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay,
either on the part of the applicant in claiming compassionate
appointment or the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of
immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial circumstances of
the family of the deceased, may have changed, for the better, since
the time of the death of the government employee. In such
circumstances, Courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided
by the fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the
deceased was able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing
gainful employment from some other source. Granting compassionate
appointment in such a case, as noted by this Court in Hakim Singh
would amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as
though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of succession
which is contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate
Page No.# 11/14
appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative to the
financial condition and hardship faced by the dependents of the
deceased government employee as a consequence of his death, a
claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after
lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the
government employee.
36. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in
approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary
relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained
succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, In Lindsay Petroleum Co. v.
Prosper Armstrong, [1874] 3 P.C. 221 as under:
‘Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary
or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give
a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that
which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in
which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time
and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument
against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried
upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always
important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature
of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party
and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course
or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.’
37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of
relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the
grant of relief to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its
power under Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for
consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon
Mills Ltd. v. M. R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR
1967 SC 1450. In the said case, it was regarded as a principle that
disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in the
exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this
Court restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements
in the following words:
‘9. …the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not
Page No.# 12/14ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on
the part of the Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily
explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant
relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this
Rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court
does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the
extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion
and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new
injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after
unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not
only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third
parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is
invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of
third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor
which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether
or not to exercise such jurisdiction.’
39. While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of
limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed within a
reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6
SCC 538; NDMC v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278.
40. Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners
submitted their applications to the relevant authority in the year
2005-2006, it cannot be said that they diligently perused the
matter and had not slept over their rights. In this regard, it may be
apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal
v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, wherein the
following observations were made:
’19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that
even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of
representations relating to a stale claim or dead
grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action.
The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix.
Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the
competent authority does not arrest time.’
13. Reading of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court, it is
apparent that the object of providing grant of compassionate
appointment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide
Page No.# 13/14over the suddent crisis due to the death of the bread earner which has
left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood.
14. It is thus with this very object that unless some source of
livelihood is provided, the family could not be in a position to make both
ends meet, appointment on compassionate ground is provided.
However, the same is not a vested right.
15. Thus, where a long lapse of time has occurred since the date
of death of the deceased employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking
compassionate appointment ceases to exist and looses its signification
and thereby disentitling the applicant for appointment on compassionate
grounds.
16. The Apex Court, as noted in the aforesaid decision, has clearly
held that in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the
part of the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the
authorities in deciding such claim, the claim for compassionate
appointment is not maintainable.
17. Apparent that the petitioner had filed the application in the year
2015 for appointment on the compassionate ground as his father died
on 15.09.2012 while in service. It appears that the aforesaid application
was rejected by the State Level Committee because of delay. It appears
that the petitioner during the interregnum period has been able to
sustain his livelihood and, therefore, the sense of immediacy has been
lost and diluted.
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18. In view of the above, I am of the unhesitant view that there is
no legal infirmity or illegality in the impugned rejection of the
application of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate
appointment ground by the State Level Committee in question.
19. That being so, this court finds no merit in the writ petition.
20. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant