Gauhati High Court
Page No.# 1/16 vs Md Kamaluddin Ahmed And 4 Ors on 4 August, 2025
Page No.# 1/16
GAHC010164042025
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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/2357/2025
ASSAM STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND 2 ORS
REPRESENTED BY THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, HAVING ITS OFFICE AT
ASTC COMPLEX, PALTAN BAZAR, GUWAHATI 78108, KAMRUP (M),
ASSAM.
2: THE MANAGING DIRECTOR
ASSAM STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT ASTC COMPLEX
PALTAN BAZAR
GUWAHATI 781008
KAMRUP (M)
ASSAM.
3: THE STATION SUPERINTENDENT
ASSAM STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION
MORAN
DIST. DIBRUGARH
ASSAM
VERSUS
MD KAMALUDDIN AHMED AND 4 ORS
S/O LATE PAJIRUDDIN AHMED, R/O MORAN TOWN, P.O., P.S. MORAN,
DIST. DIBRUGARH, ASSAM, PIN 785675
2:ZAMALUDDIN
S/O LATE PAJIRUDDIN AHMED
3:SMTI. BULIN AHMED
Page No.# 2/16
D/O LATE PAJIRUDDIN AHMED
4:SMTI. ALIN AHMED
D/O LATE PAJIRUDDIN AHMED
ALL ARE R/O MORAN TOWN
P.O. AND P.S. MORAN
DIST. DIBRUGARH
ASSAM
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. A CHAMUAH, MR. R BHUYAN
Advocate for the Respondent : MR. B K DAS (R-1,4,5), MR H P GUWALA(R-1,4,5),I J
SINGPHO(R-1,4,5)
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
ORDER
04.08.2025
Heard Mr. A. Chamuah, learned counsel for the applicants and also heard Mr. B.K.
Das, learned counsel for the respondents.
2. This application under Order XLI Rule 3A read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure along with Section 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is preferred by the
applicants for condonation of delay of 633 days in preferring the connected appeal
against the judgment dated 22.03.2018, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Dibrugarh, in
Title Appeal No.11/2013.
3. Mr. Chamuah, learned counsel for the applicants submits that the applicant No.1 is
the Assam State Transport Corporation (ASTC) and was the defendant in Title Suit
No.11/2005, filed by one Md. Kamaluddin Ahmed for a decree for recovery of arrears of
rent from October 1950, till filing of the suit and permanent injunction refraining the ASTC
from raising any permanent construction. Mr. Chamuah further submits that the said suit
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came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 10.12.2012, passed by the learned Munsiff,
Dibrugarh and being aggrieved, the opposite party No.1 herein had preferred an appeal
before the Court of learned Civil Judge, Dibrugarh, being Title Appeal No.11/2013,
wherein the learned Civil Judge, Dibrugarh (‘First Appellate Court’ in short) had reversed
the judgment of the learned Munsiff, vide impunged judgment dated 22.03.2018, without
any valid ground and passed the decree beyond the scope under Order VII Rule 7 of the
CPC. Thereafter, the applicants ought to have filed one second appeal before this Court
within 90 days from the date of the impugned judgment dated 22.03.2018. But, due to
bonafide belief they had instituted one civil revision petition before this Court on
16.08.2021 on an erroneous understanding that since the suit was for recovery of rent, it
was related to the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 and the second appeal does
not lie against the first appeal in the suit under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act,
1972. However, later on, after a long deliberation in the Court, it was found that the suit
was only for recovery of money and as such, it was a money decree simpliciter and
therefore, against first appeal, no civil revision shall lie and it will be regular second
appeal and in the meantime, the civil revision petition was withdrawn and the second
appeal was prepared, but there is delay of about 633 days in preferring the second
appeal.
3.1 Mr. Chamuah, learned counsel for the applicants has drawn the attention of this
Court to paragraph No.6 of the interlocutory application to show how the delay of 633
days is counted. Mr. Chamuah also submits that the delay has been explained in
paragraph No.5 of the application and it is stated that the applicant No.3 herein being the
local head of applicant No.1, unable to take regular stock of the situation regarding the
case pending in the Civil Court. He came to know about the impugned judgment only in
the first part of April 2018 and then immediately applied for the certified copy of the
judgment and received the same on 26.04.2018 and thereafter, he wrote a letter to the
then Law and Claims Officer, Sri Nirmal Kakati on 23.05.2018 and also informed Mr. Kakati
of the matter over phone and requested him to place the matter before the applicant
No.2 for further necessary action. However, for the reasons best known to him, he kept
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everything under lock and key till December 2018 and in December 2018, Mr. Kakati was
discharged and then the present Law and Claims Officer, Ms. Mayuri Kalita took charge
from him and although Ms. Mayuri Kalita was appointed in September 2017, Mr. Kakati did
not handover anything to her despite several orders from the applicant No.2 and
thereafter, she took maternity leave from December 2018 to May 2019, and took child
care leave from June 2019 to October 2019, and she assumed her duties in November
2019 and she took sometime to bring the legal department into order, which was not in
an organized form.
3.2 And in the meantime, in the month of March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic broke
out and continued till February 2022 and Ms. Kalita, despite having an infant in her lap,
continued working in the office and discovered a locked drawer inside and managed to
open the drawer forcefully and found the concerned file there and she immediately
placed the file before the applicant No.2 and started the required official procedure to
take necessary course of action against the impugned judgment of the First Appellate
Court. Then, in September 2020, the file was handed over to the standing counsel of the
ASTC, namely, Mr. J. Roy, who fell seriously sick inside the Court and was indisposed till
April 2021. The applicants could not retrieve the file, in the hope that their counsel would
recover and take charge, however, by April 2021 the applicants handed over the file to
another lawyer, namely, Mr. N.N. Upadhyaya, for necessary action, but Mr. Upadhyaya
informed that the certified copy of the judgment, which was to be impugned in the
appeal, is not available in the file. Then the applicants had to re-apply for the certified
copy in the month of April 2021, which they could obtain only on 15.07.2021.
3.3 And thereafter, the standing counsel of the applicants filed one civil revision
petition on 16.08.2021, having a bonafide understanding that since the suit was for
recovery of rent, it was related to the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 and
ultimately, the Court arrived at a conclusion that no civil revision will lie against the
money suit simpliciter and a regular second appeal would lie and that the delay is not
intentional, rather it is circumstantial and he has arguable points in the appeal, which are
to be heard and decided on merit and therefore, it is contended to allow this application.
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3.4 In support of his submission, Mr. Chamuah, learned counsel for the applicants has
referred following decisions:-
(i) Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary,
Irrigation Department & Ors., reported in (2008) 7 SCC 169;
(ii) Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy & Ors., reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649;
(iii) Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC
600; and
(iv) N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123.
4. Per contra, Mr. Das, learned counsel for the opposite parties has vehemently
opposed the application. Mr. Das submits that the explanation so put forwarded in
paragraph Nos.5(I) and 5(II) of the interlocutory application are not tenable and since the
judgment was delivered on 22.03.2018, and the copy of the judgment was obtained on
26.04.2018, by the applicants, they had taken the decision to file appeal only in the
month of September 2020 and thereafter, the file was handed over to the standing
counsel of the applicants in the month of September 2020 and they took 1 year 5 months
for taking a decision for filing appeal against the impugned judgment and for engaging
Advocate and from September 2020 to April 2021, for a period of 7 months and there was
no correspondence from the earlier counsel for filing the appeal and that no medical
document was furnished to justify that the erstwhile standing counsel was sick for the
period from September 2020 to April 2021.
4.1 Mr. Das, learned counsel for the opposite parties also pointed out that the
explanation, so put forwarded that Mayuri Kalita was appointed as Law and Claims Officer
in the month of September 2017 and took charge in the month of September 2018 from
the then Law and Claims Officer Sri Nirmal Kakati in the month of December 2018 and
while taking over the charge of the office of the Law and Claims, it is not understood as
to how the applicants could allege that she was not handed over the particular file, since
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the statement was not supported by any correspondence/letter issued by the MD, ASTC,
except a bald statement that the file was not handed over despite several orders and that
the explanation made in paragraph Nos.5(II) and 5(IV) of the application are also
absolutely not tenable and the office of the applicants, being a public office, there is a
procedure for handing over of charge while going on long leave and since, Ms. Mayuri
Kalita went on maternity leave for a period of one year, it is absolutely beyond one’s
imagination to wait for her, for taking a decision for filing appeal against the impugned
judgment and there is no substance in the statement made in paragraph No.5(V) and
that the applicants were never serious and vigilant for taking recourse to the impugned
judgment and as such, the explanation put forwarded is not sufficient to condone the
delay and the statement made in paragraph No.5(VI) of the application is also not tenable
as in I.A. No.2356/2025 filed by the applicants for withdrawal of CRP filing No.6944/2021,
nothing was observed by this Court while allowing the said application and therefore, the
period of 1240 days has to be calculated by the applicants along with the original delay of
633 days till withdrawal of the CRP on 25.07.2025, and in view of delay of 1873 days, the
condonation application is liable to be dismissed.
4.2 In support of his submission, Mr. Das has referred the following decisions:-
(i) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, reported in 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 3612;
(ii) Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh & Ors., reported in (2010) 8 SCC
685;
(iii) Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial
Development Corporation & Anr., reported in (2010) 5 SCC 459; and
(iv) Esha Bhattacharjee (supra).
5. Having heard the submission of learned counsel for both the parties, I have
carefully gone through the application and the documents placed on record and also gone
through the decisions referred by learned counsel for both the parties.
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6. As pointed out by Mr. Chamuah, learned counsel for the applicants, the delay can
be calculated as under from the date of the impugned judgment dated 22.03.2018, till
filing of the second appeal on 24.07.2025:-
Sl. Particulars Days to be Days
No. deducted
1 Total length of days from 22 March 2018 till 23 July 2678
2025
2 Less, deduction under the Limitation Act for filing an 90 2588
appeal
3 Less, relaxation in Limitation by the Hon'ble Supreme 715 1873
Court during Covid-19 (March 15, 2020 to February 28,
2022)
4 Less, u/s 14 of the Limitation Act, the period spent on 1240 633
preferring a Civil Revision Petition is from August 16,
2021 to July 23, 2025 and is equal to 1436 days. Out of
these days, a span of 196 days shall be deducted since
that span is already condoned by the Supreme Court.
That is to say, from August 16, 2021 to February 28,
2022 is equal to 196 days (1436-196=1240)
5 The Net Delay is 633 days
7. It appears that after deduction of 90 days from 22.03.2018, being the statutory
period, there remains 2588 days, out of which a period of 715 days has to be deducted in
view of the order of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Moto Writ Petition (C) No.3/2020,
dated 10.01.2022 and after exclusion of 715 days there remains 1873 days. Further, it
appears that the applicants had persuade the civil revision petition from August 16, 2021
to July 23, 2025 before this Court for a period of 1436 days and they are entitled to
exclusion of the said period in view of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, as there is
nothing on record to suggest absence of diligence and good faith. Then another 196 days
has to be deducted since Hon’ble Supreme Court has already condoned 196 days and
thus, there remains 633 days.
8. It appears from perusal of paragraph No.5 of the application that some explanation
has been put forwarded for delay of 633 days in preferring the connected regular second
appeal.
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9. Before directing a discussion into the grounds and its sufficiency in the present
application, it would be in the interest of justice to go through the decision of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in respect of condonation of delay presently holding the field, so to deal
with the issue in this application with greater precision.
10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Mst.
Katiji, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107, has observed as under:-
“The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the
Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties
by disposing of matters on “merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the
legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner
which sub-serves the ends of justice – that being the life purpose for the existence of the
institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably
liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have
percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy, and such a liberal approach is
adopted on principle as it is realized that:
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out
at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay
is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits
after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic
approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The
doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each
other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot
claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account
of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to
Page No.# 9/16benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. It must be grasped that
judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for
condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which
was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of
equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded
the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no
warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the “State” is the applicant praying
for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal
machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to
be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-
making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to
understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the
collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts
therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course
of the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause”. So also the same approach has to
be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even- handed
justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits.”
11. Again in N. Balakrishnan (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court went a step further
and made the following observations:-
“It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the
delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter; acceptability of the explanation
is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be un-condonable due to a
want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range
can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the
explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the
superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless
the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is
Page No.# 10/16a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the
superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open
to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of
the lower court.
Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to
see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object
of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The
law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so
suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time,
newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by
approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for
launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law
of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest
reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation).
Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see
that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that
every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the
part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the
door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as
part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when
there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to
gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While
condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be
borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation
expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches
on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.”
12. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court, referring
to earlier authorities, broadly culled out the principles of condonation of delay as under:-
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i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-
pedantic approach while dealing with an application for
condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to
legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their
proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the
fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be
applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-
situation.
iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical
considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for
emphasis.
iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of
delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or
litigant is to be taken note of.
v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of
delay is a significant and relevant fact.
vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should
not affect public justice and cause public mischief because
the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the
conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of
short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of
prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be
attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach
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whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its
inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that
the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of
justice in respect of both parties and the said principle
cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged
in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant
not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a
litigation.
xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud,
misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and
the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial
discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on
individual perception.
xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a
collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
13. To the aforesaid principles, Hon’ble Supreme Court also added some more
guidelines taking note of the present day scenario, in the said case. They are –
(a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with
careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the
notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock
of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to
justice dispensation system.
(b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in
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a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is
basically subjective.
(c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the
concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for
achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system
should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
(d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter
and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-
challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal
parameters.
14. Again in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by Lrs. v. Exe. Eng.
Jalgaon Medium Project & Anr., reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448, while dealing with
the issue of condonation of delay, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation
is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general
welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their
legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the
assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.
30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts’
discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and
multiplicity of proceedings in no manner sub-serves public interest. Prompt and timely
payment of compensation to the land losers facilitating their rehabilitation/ resettlement is
equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the
beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to
unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the
claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any
fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land
but the livelihood of the land losers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in
mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under
Page No.# 14/16Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the land losers to courts of law years after the
termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot
be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper
explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no
public interest.
31. It is true that when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking
condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of
limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. The Limitation Act does not
provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such. It
would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest
was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or
agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any
such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those
factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and
proved though a feeble attempt by the learned counsel for the respondent was made to
suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission made
across the Bar without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings.”
15. The legal proposition, which can be crystallized from the aforesaid decisions and
discussion, is that courts are not supposed to legalize injustice, but are obliged to remove
injustice. Therefore, liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach has to be
adopted while dealing with an application for condonation of delay if ‘sufficient cause’ is
being shown. The terms ‘sufficient cause’ should be understood in their proper spirit,
philosophy and purpose and regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically
elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation. The
paramount and pivotal consideration is substantial justice; the technical considerations
should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. In respect of deliberate causation
of delay, the presumption is not available but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel
or litigant is to be taken note of, besides lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay, which is a significant and relevant fact. The courts should not
Page No.# 15/16
adhere to strict proof, but required to be vigilant so that there is no real failure of justice.
The approach of the court must be liberal but at the same time, it must be reasonable
also. In case of inordinate delay, strict approach is required to be taken while in case of
delay of short duration, a liberal delineation is required. The fundamental principle, being
weighing the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle
cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. While condoning delay the
conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration. In the case of the explanation, being
offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should
be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such litigation. The entire
gamuts of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the
paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on
individual perception. The State or a public body or an entity, representing a collective
cause, should be given some acceptable latitude. But, the law of limitation is same for
citizen and for governmental authorities.
16. Thus, having informed ourselves about the proposition of law, presently holding the
field, in respect of condonation of delay, now an endeavour will be made to ascertain how
far the applicants have been able to explain the delay of 633 days in preferring the
connected regular second appeal.
17. In the instant case the grounds for delay has already been explained by Mr.
Chamuah, learned counsel for the applicants. Having examined the said explanation, so
put forwarded for the delay of 633 days in the present application, in the light of the
principles discussed herein above, this Court is of the view that though the delay has not
been explained on day to day basis, yet in substance the same appears to be explained.
It is well settled that the Law of Limitation are founded on public policy and having
examined the delay so forthcoming in this application keeping in mind the public policy,
this Court is of the view that the same stands sufficiently explained. It is also well settled
that when the State and its instrumentality are the applicants in seeking condonation of
delay, they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude, as held in the case of Pundlik
Page No.# 16/16
Jalam Patil (supra).
18. In the result, this I.A. stands allowed. The delay of 633 days in preferring the
regular second appeal stands condoned.
19. Now, the Registry shall register and number the connected appeal and list the
matter before the Court as soon as practicable.
Sd/- Robin Phukan
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant