Gauhati High Court
Page No.# 1/19 vs The State Of Assam on 1 April, 2025
Author: Soumitra Saikia
Bench: Soumitra Saikia
Page No.# 1/19
GAHC010029242021
2025:GAU-AS:3854-
DB
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : CRL.A(J)/7/2021
AMRIT TERANG
KARBI ANGLONG, ASSAM.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP. BY PP, ASSAM.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. N DEKA, AMICUS CURIAE,
Advocate for the Respondent : PP, ASSAM,
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SOUMITRA SAIKIA
HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SUSMITA PHUKAN KHAUND
JUDGMENT
Date : 01-04-2025
(Susmita Phukan Khaund, J.)
1. This criminal appeal is preferred against the Judgment and Order dated 30.06.2020
passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Karbi Anglong, Diphu in connection with Sessions Case
No. 37/2016, convicting Sri Amrit Terang (hereinafter referred to as the appellant or the
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accused) under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ( in short ‘IPC‘) to undergo
imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/-with default clause.
2 The genesis of the case was that on 26.04.2015 at about 7 pm, a quarrel broke out
between Smti Jayanti Ruma Teronpi (hereinafter also referred to as the ‘deceased’ or the
victim) and thereafter the appellant attacked the deceased with a wooden bat and committed
her murder. The victim’s brother Sri Dipak Ruma ( in short ‘informant’) received this
information from a person named Sri Lanki Kro and he immediately went to Diphu on the
following day on 27.04.2015 and learnt about the incident which occurred at Panch Kilo,
Diphu Lumding Road.
3. The investigating officer (‘I/O’ for short) embarked upon the investigation. He went to
the place of occurrence and forwarded the body for autopsy. He recorded the statements of
the witnesses. On completion of investigation, charge sheet was laid against the appellant.
4. At the commencement of trial, a formal charge under Section 302 of the IPC was
framed and read over and explained to the appellant, who abjured his guilt and claimed
innocence.
5. To substantiate its stance, the prosecution adduced the evidence of 8 witnesses and the
defence cross examined the witnesses to refute the charges. On the incriminating evidence
projected by the prosecution witnesses, several questions were asked to the appellant under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘CrPC‘ for short). The answers of the
appellant, however, appears to be evasive. The appellant has denied all the incriminating
circumstances against him as ‘this is false’. To the question No.9, the appellant has replied
that he did not kill his wife, but somebody else committed her murder. The appellant did not
tender any evidence in defence.
ARGUMENTS FOR THE APPELLANTS:
6. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the evidence of the witnesses
starting from PW-1 to PW-5 can be termed as hearsay evidence which is not admissible. The
evidence of PW-8 is based on extra judicial confession which was not conclusively proved by
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the prosecution. The chain of circumstances is not complete. Each circumstance ought to
have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt which the prosecution has failed to prove. The
cricket bat seized in connection with this case was not produced before the Court. The
medical officer who conducted the autopsy was not shown the weapon of offence to affirm
that the injuries sustained by the victim were caused by the wooden bat. The appellant was
inebribiated when the extra judicial confession was made and this has been affirmed by the
I.O. The other son of the deceased was not examined as a witness which thwarts the
evidence. The appellant was not in fit state of mind and thus the extra judicial confession
ought to be rejected. The appellant has relied on the following decisions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court.
i) Kartarey & Ors -vs- The State of U.P. (1976) 1 SCC 172
ii) C.K.Raveendran -vs- State of Kerala, (2000) 1 SCC 225
iii) State of Rajasthan -vs- Kistoora Ram, 2022 SCC Online SC 984
iv) Subramanya -vs- State of Karnataka, (2023) 11 SCC 255
ARGUMENTS FOR THE STATE
7. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has laid stress in her argument that there is no
missing link and the chain of circumstances is complete. The victim was last seen with the
appellant by PW-8. The other witnesses have also testified about the quarrel. The chain of
circumstances is complete with the ‘last seen theory’ and the ‘extra judicial confession of the
appellant.’ The appellant has failed to discharge his burden mandated under Section 106 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ( ‘ Evidence Act‘ for short). The submission of the learned
counsel for the appellant that the appellant was intoxicated when he made the extra judicial
confession cannot be accepted as it was not confronted during cross examination of the
witnesses. It cannot be held at this juncture, at the stage of appeal, that the appellant was
not in a fit state of mind to make his confession. The submission of the learned counsel for
the appellant also cannot be accepted that there is a dent in the evidence owing to the non-
production of the weapon of offence to be identified by the medical officer as well as the
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seizure witnesses.
8. Learned Addl.Public Prosecutor has relied on the following decisions:
i) State of Rajasthan -vs- Dhool Singh, (2004) 12 SCC 546
ii) State of Rajasthan -vs- Kistoora Ram, 2022 SCC Online SC
984
9. Heard Mr. N.Deka, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant and learned Additional Public
Prosecutor Ms. S.Jahan.
10. To decide the case in its proper perspective, the evidence is re-appreciated.
EVIDENCE
11. The informant as PW-1 has deposed that the incident occurred in the year 2015 at
Panch Kilo, Diphu Lumding Road. At about 10′ 0 clock, the co-villagers of the accused
informed him from Diphu P.S. that his younger sister Jayanti Ruma has passed away and her
body was at Diphu P.S. He called the Diphu PS and he immediately proceeded to Diphu from
Howraghat and reached Diphu at about 1 pm. Post-mortem was already performed and after
his arrival, the police allowed the body to be taken to the appellant’s house. The appellant
and his son informed him that the appellant killed his sister. He then lodged the FIR with the
police. He has proved his signature on the FIR as Exhibit-1 (i).
12. In his cross-examination, PW-1 has admitted that he has not written the FIR. It was not
read over to him. He could not recall the exact date of the incident. The police recorded his
statement after he reached the police station. He did not know the person who informed him
about the incident. He did not know if there was any quarrel between the deceased and the
appellant. The appellant admitted in presence of his aunt and his son, that the appellant
killed his wife ( deceased ). He has also admitted that both the deceased and the appellant
used to consume alcohol.
13. Longi Kro has deposed as PW-2 that the informant is not known to him whereas the
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accused and the deceased are known to him. On the day of the incident, at around 5.30
pm/6 pm, he was in a shop at Diphu Lumding road, when he heard from fellow villagers that
the appellant had killed his wife. He immediately went to their house and noticed the dead
body inside the house. The appellant was inebribiated at that point of time. He learnt from
the villagers that a quarrel broke out between the appellant and his wife. He immediately
informed the police about the incident. The police came and arrested the appellant and
forwarded the body for autopsy.
14. In his cross-examination, PW-2 has admitted that he did not know the name of the
appellant but the appellant is known to him as he frequently used to meet the appellant.
Some villagers whose names are not known to him, informed him that the appellant killed his
wife after a quarrel. He was aware that the appellant used to consume alcohol and the
appellant has two children.
15. The evidence of Shri Sanjay Karmakar, who deposed as PW3 reveals that he heard
about the death of the deceased at about 9 p.m. and went to her house and he met the
police. The police asked him to place the dead body in the vehicle and thereafter, he placed
the body in a vehicle and accompanied the body for post-mortem examination. He received
back the dead body and took back the body to the house of the deceased. He also stated
that he did not know who killed the deceased.
16. Similarly, another witness from the same locality Sri Monusing Tisso has deposed as
PW4 that the incident occurred in the year 2015. While he was returning from school, he
learnt from his fellow villagers that the appellant killed his wife by assaulting her with a
cricket bat. He then went to the appellant’s house and met the villagers. The police took the
dead body in an ambulance. The police seized the cricket bat in his presence and he affixed
his signature on the seizure list. He has proved his signature on the seizure list as Exhibit – 2
(1).
In his cross-examination, he has deposed that he could not remember the names of the
villagers who informed him about the incident. He has also admitted that prior to this
incident, the appellant and the deceased were not known to him.
17. Another person from the locality Shri Dilip Terang has deposed as PW-5 that he could
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not remember the date of the incident but he could remember that when he returned from
work, he heard from the villagers that the appellant killed his wife. He then went to the
appellant’s house and a woman informed him that the deceased has been killed. Appellant’s
son also showed him a cricket bat and informed him that the appellant assaulted the
deceased with a cricket bat. He then informed the police about the incident and the police
arrived at the place of occurrence at about 7/8 p.m. and seized the cricket bat. He has proved
his signature on the seizure list as Exhibit – 2(2). He has further deposed that when he
reached the place of occurrence, he noticed that the appellant was consuming alcohol from a
bottle. When he confronted the appellant about the reason for killing his wife, the appellant’s
reason was that ‘as his wife was asleep at that time and as she would wake up later.’ The
police took the appellant and the dead body to the police station.
His cross examination is not noteworthy.
18. The Medical Officer Dr. Ratul Thakur has deposed as PW-6 that on 27.09.2016 when he
was posted at Diphu Civil Hospital, he performed the postmortem on the dead body of Jayanti
Roma Teronpi and found the following :-
“EXTERNAL APPEARANCE
The dead body of a thin built young lady was lying in postmortem hall. Rigor Mortis present. Eyes
and mouth closed.
There was extensive bruise over left lower chest and left flank. There was extensive bruise over left
shoulder and over both scapular area.
PERINOUM and SPINAL CANAL
Scalp, skull are healthy and membranes and brain were healthy.
THORAX
There was fracture of left 7th 8th and 9th Ribs. Left sided plurae is hemorohagic and the cavity
contains moderate amount of blood.
Larynx and trachea:-
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Both the lungs, heart and vessels were healthy.
ABDOMEN
Left flank is bruised, abdomen moderately distended. The Peritoneum is full of blood. Mouth
pharynx and oesophagus, stomach, small intestine and large intestines were healthy. The liver was
congested, spleen was irregularly lacerated upto the hilum with extensive perisplenic blood clot. The
kidneys and bladder were healthy.
Muscle Bones and Joints.
There was fracture of both bones of right leg.
OPINION
Death was due to hemorrhagic shock resulting from spleenic rupture and fracture of right leg bones
following blunt trauma. Ext-3 is the PM report. Ext-3(1) is my signature. Ext-3(2) is the signature of
Superintendent Diphu Civil Hospital. Ext-3(3) is the signature of Joint Director of Health Services,
Karbi Anglong, Diphu.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Alcohol was not tested in Post Mortem Examination.”
19. The Investigating Officer, Anil Bhagwati, deposed as PW-7 that on 26.04.2015, while
serving as A.S.I. of Police at Diphu Police Station, a person named Longi Kro, from Panchkilo,
informed the police about a murder committed at Panchkilo, The O.C. then registered a GD
entry and entrusted him with the investigation. He then went to the place of occurrence and
prepared a sketch map. He found a dead body of a woman lying on the ground inside a room
of a house and forwarded the same for autopsy. He recorded the statements of the witnesses
and recovered a homemade cricket bat and seized the same through Ext-2. He has proved
his signature as Ext-2(3) on the seizure list and his signature on the sketch map as Ext-4(1).
He carried on with his investigation and produced the accused at the Police Station. On the
following day i.e., on 24.04.2015, he made preparations for inquest and postmortem. On the
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same day, at about 02:30 p.m., a person named Deepak Ruma, lodged an FIR. On
completion of investigation, he submitted charge-sheet against the appellant. He has proved
his signature on the charge-sheet as Exhibit-5(1).
20. In his cross-examination, the Investigating Officer has testified that Longi Kro a VDP
Secretary informed the police of the incident before a GD entry was registered. At 07:35 p.m.,
on 26.04.2015, he arrested the appellant from the place of occurrence and he was kept in the
police station from the time of his apprehension. The appellant was inebriated at the time of
his arrest, and he was not interrogated at that time. He did not examine the informant. He
recovered the seized article from a room at the place of occurrence and the article was lying
near the dead body of the deceased.
21. The appellant’s son, Luhid Kairom deposed as PW-8, that the incident occurred about
four years ago. In the afternoon of the fateful day, he along with his younger brother, went
outside their house to play. At that time, his parents were alone at home. At 05’O Clock, they
returned home and saw his mother sitting on a bed. He called his mother but she did not
respond. He saw his father lying on a bed and asked him about his mother, and his father
replied to his queries that he killed his mother. His father confessed before him that he killed
his mother by assaulting her with a wooden bat. Then, he screamed and the neighbouring
people arrived, and Longi Kro called the informant over phone and informed him about (PW-
8’s) his mother’s death. Thereafter, the police came to their house and took his mother’s body
to the Diphu hospital. The police arrested his father.
22. In his cross examination, he deposed that he could not recall the exact time when he
returned in the afternoon. He along with his younger brother went out to play while his parents
were consuming alcohol. He has admitted that he did not witness who killed his mother. He
has also testified in his cross examination that when he returned home, he noticed that his
father was sleeping.
Decision of the Trial Court
23. It has been held by the learned Trial Court that this is a case of uxoricide. It is a case of
circumstantial evidence. The children of the deceased went out while the deceased and her
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husband were at home and were consuming alcohol. After they returned at about 5 p.m., PW-
8 saw his mother lying dead, in a sitting position, whereas his father was sleeping. When
confronted, his father, i.e., the appellant confessed that he killed his wife with a bat. Thus, the
chain of events form a complete chain. The extra-judicial confession was relied upon to
convict the appellant. It was held that this extra-judicial confession was conclusively proved,
more so, when the confession was before his son, who was a young lad at that time. It was
held that when PW-8 raised alarm, the neighbours came and the police was informed and the
body was forwarded for postmortem. The postmortem report clearly reveals that death was
ante mortem in nature. The learned Trial Court has emphasized on the last seen theory. It
was also held that although the bat was not exhibited, evidence has surfaced that there were
blood stains on the homemade bat.
Discussions and Decision
24. The learned counsel for the appellant has laid stress in his argument that PW-1 has
categorically mentioned that a person by the name of Longi Kro had informed him from Diphu
that a quarrel broke out between his sister and the appellant whereas in his deposition PW-1
has mentioned that he did not know the person who had informed him about the incident.
However, Longi Kro deposed as PW-2 that the informant is not known to him. When he heard
from the villagers that the appellant had killed his wife, he went to their house and noticed the
dead body of the victim inside the house. He then learnt from the villagers about the quarrel
between the appellant and his wife and he immediately informed the police about the incident.
Thus, there is not an iota of doubt that Longi Kro had informed the police about the incident.
This has been affirmed by the Investigating Officer, PW-7 that on 26.04.2015, Longi Kro from
Pachkilo informed him about the murder committed at Pachkilo. This argument by the learned
counsel for the appellant can be safely brushed aside. Although PW-1 did not know the name
of Longi Kro, he has categorically stated that he received information about his sister’s death
from Diphu i.e., from fellow villagers. Thereafter, he immediately rushed to his sister’s house
at Pachkilo from Howraghat and reached the place of occurrence at 1 pm. This has been
confirmed by the I.O.’s evidence who has testified as PW-7 that on the following day, Deepak
Kumar lodged the FIR at 2.30 pm.
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25. Longi Kro as PW-2 has affirmed that he heard about the incident from the villagers and
informed the police about the incident. It is true that PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 could not
name the villagers who informed them about the incident, yet the evidence cannot be
discarded as hearsay evidence. Sri Dilip Terang, PW-5 has categorically stated that the son of
the appellant showed him a cricket bat and informed him that the appellant had assaulted the
deceased with the cricket bat. One of the appellant’s son was examined as PW-8 and he
informed him that his father had confessed that he killed his wife with a wooden bat. Thus the
evidence of PW-5 cannot be labeled as hearsay evidence. The evidence of PW-5 is direct
evidence under Section 60 of the Evidence Act.
26. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the extrajudicial confession
has not been proved because the confession was made by a person who was inebriated at
the time he made the confession.
27. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in C. K. Raveendran Vs. The State of Kerala reported in (2000) 1 SCC 225, wherein
it has been held that:
” … The extra-judicial confession as deposed by PW 15 has
not been relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge and the
High Court also came to the conclusion that it is difficult to
rely upon the same, as the exact words or even the words as
nearly as possible have not been reproduced by PW 15 That
apart, as has been stated earlier even the evidence of PW 15
indicates that Raveendran and he went to an arrack shop
and consumed liquor, whereafter Raveendran disclosed the
entire incident and therefore, such statement cannot be said
to be a voluntary and truthful one and on the other hand it is
the outcome of the consumption of liquor, both by the
witness as well as the accused, if at all he can be said to
have made the statement. In this view of the matter, the so-
called extra-judicial confession has to be excluded from the
Page No.# 11/19purview of consideration for bringing home the charge…”
The ratio of the decision in C. K. Raveendran‘s case is, however, not applicable to this
case. The extra-judicial confession was not accepted on the ground that both the accused
and the witness were inebriated. Other factors were also taken into consideration. However,
in this case, the witness, PW-8 was not inebriated. In the instant case, it was the appellant
who was inebriated and not PW-8.
28. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Subramanya Vs. The State of Karnataka reported in (2023) 11 SCC 255, wherein
it has been held that:
“An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made
in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The
confession will have to be proved like any other fact The
value of the evidence as to confession, like any other
evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom
it has been made The value of the evidence as to the
confession depends on the reliability of the witness who
gives the evidence. It is not open to any court to start with a
presumption that extra-judicial confession is a weak type of
evidence It would depend on the nature of the
circumstances, the time when the confession was made and
the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a
confession. Such a confession can be relied upon and
conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence about the
confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear
to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused,
and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may
tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an
untruthful statement to the accused, the words spoken to by
Page No.# 12/19the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey
that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing
is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. After
subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on
the touchstone of credibility, the extra-judicial confession can
be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it passes
the test of credibility.”
29. Reverting back to this case, it is held that in this case too, the value of the evidence
as to the confession depends on the reliability of the witness, PW-8 who has given the
evidence. The veracity of the witness inspires confidence as no contradictions could be
elicited through the cross-examination of PW-8 vis-à-vis, the cross-examination of the I.O. It
has to be borne in mind that PW-8 is the appellant’s son and not an interested witness to
falsely implicate the appellant.
30. It has also been held by the Hon’nle Supreme Court in the case of
Subramanya(Supra) that not in all cases extra-judicial confession is required to be
corroborated.
31. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC
984 wherein it has been observed that :-
“10. That only leaves with the extra-judicial confession allegedly made by
Guman Singh (PW-4). The High Court, relying on the judgment of this Court in
the case of State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh, so also in the case of Gopal Sah v.
State of Bihar has held that extra-judicial confession was a weak piece of
evidence and unless there was some corroboration, the conviction solely on the
basis of extra-judicial confession could not be sustained. The view taken by the
High Court cannot be said to be either impossible or perverse meriting out
interference.”
32. In this case, the Supreme Court did not interfere with the decision of the High Court of
Judicature at Rajasthan. The appeal was dismissed by observing that the High Court’s
decision was not found to be impossible or perverse. The appeal against acquittal was
thereby dismissed.
33. The extra-judicial confession of the appellant although in an inebriated state is one of
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the circumstances forming the chain of circumstances. It has to be borne in mind that the
appellant was last seen by his son, PW-8. The appellant failed to discharge his burden under
Section 106 of the Evidence Act to rebut the evidence that he was last seen with his wife
when his wife was still alive and thereafter, when his wife was found dead in a sitting position
by their son, PW-8.
34. In this case, the conviction is not based solely on the plank of extrajudicial confession.
The extra-judicial confession in this case is a link completing the chain of circumstances
against the appellant.
35. Although Rule of prudence does not require each and every circumstance mentioned in
the evidence must be separately and independently corroborated, yet corroboration could be
culled out when PW-5 stated that the appellant’s son has implicated his father and has stated
that his father attacked his mother with a wooden bat.
36. We have overwhelming and robust evidence that PW-8 informed PW-5 that his father
killed his mother with a wooden bat. The seizure of this homemade wooden bat has been
proved by PW-4, who has proved his signature on the seizure list as Exhibit -2(1). The
defence has not disputed the seizure of this bat vide Exhibit-2.
PW-4 and PW-5 were not cross-examined by the appellant about the seizure of this bat vide
Ext-2.
37. PW-5 has categorically stated that police arrived at the place of occurrence at about
7/8 pm and seized the cricket bat used as a weapon of offence.
The Investigating Officer, PW-7 has also proved his signature on the seizure list as Exhibit-
2(3). The seizure list Exhibit-2 clearly reveals seizure of one handmade wooden cricket bat.
The length of the bat was about 2 ½ feet.
38. The postmortem report marked as Exhibit-3 clearly reveals that the death was owing to
haemorrhagic shock due to splenic rapture and fracture of leg bones following blunt trauma.
The victim has sustained several injuries.
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Bruises were noticed over her left lower chest and left flank. over her left shoulder and over
both her scapular area.
Fracture on 7th, 8th & 9th left ribs.
Left plurae was haemorrhagic.
Laceration of spleen with extensive perisplenic blood clot and fracture of both bones of right
leg.
39. Thus, it appears that the victim was bludgeoned to death with the homemade bat
seized by the I.O. The opinion of the M.O. clearly reveals blunt trauma. Thus the injuries
were caused by the cricket bat.
40. In his statement under Section 313 of CrPC the appellant has stated that he did not kill
his wife but his wife was killed by someone else. This defense of the appellant cannot be
accepted at all. He was last seen with his wife by his son, PW-8. Who could have killed his
wife in his presence? Both the deceased and the appellant were found on a bed by PW-8. On
noticing the still figure of his mother and after confronting his father, PW-8 screamed and the
neighbours arrived. Immediately, Lonki Kro then informed PW-1 about the incident.
41. The chain of circumstances is complete when this wooden bat was seized by the I.O. as
the victim was found dead in her house by PW-8 who went out to play in the afternoon and
returned at about 5 pm The appellant was last seen with the victim who was in the same
house with the victim by PW-8 and his younger brother.
42. Thus, the time gap when the victim was last seen alive with her husband and when she
was found dead, is too narrow and the entire sequel of events implicate the appellant. It
appears that the appellant tried to circumvent this last seen circumstance.
43. The appellant has not disputed that he was last seen with the deceased. The appellant
has failed to discharge his onus by attributing cogent reasons for exoneration as mandated
under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. He has failed to delink the chain of
circumstances closing in on him. On the contrary much emphasis has been laid by the
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appellant relating to the non-production of weapon of offence by the prosecution. It has
already been held in our foregoing discussions that the seizure of weapon of offence has
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
44. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Kartarey & Ors-vs- The State of U.P. reported in (1976) 1 SCC 172
wherein in paragraph 26, it has been observed as follows:
“26. We take this opportunity of emphasising the importance of eliciting the
opinion of the medical witness, who had examined the injuries of the victim,
more specifically on this point, for the proper administration of justice.
Particularly in a case where injuries found are forensically of the same species.
e.g. stab wounds, and the problem before the Court is whether all or any of
those injuries could be caused with one or more than one weapon. It is the
duty of the prosecution, and no less of the Court, to see that the alleged
weapon of the offence, if available, is shown to the medical witness and his
opinion invited as to whether all or any of the injuries on the victim could be
caused with that weapon. Failure to do so may sometimes, cause aberration in
the course of justice. Fortunately, in the instant case, the number, nature and
dimensions of the injuries of the deceased, as deposed to by Dr. Sohan Lal,
afford a sure indication that they were caused with three different weapons.
There were sixteen stab-wounds, which fall into three groups. The wounds in
each group being of almost identical length and breadth. Thus, the length of
each of the wounds 1, 3, 4, 5 and 15 was 3 cm. The breadth of each of these
wounds (excepting that of Nos., 1 and 15 which was slightly less) was 1.5 cms
Wound No 2 was 3.5 cm.x1.5 cms. The length and breadth of wound No. 15
was 2.5 x 1 cm. The length of wounds 6, 8, 11, 12, 13 and 16 was 4 cms. each.
Giving allowance for slight variations, it can be said that the breadth of these
six injuries was very nearly the same.”
In the case of Kartarey (supra), the ‘chhura’ recovered from one of the accused was
neither shown to the medical officer nor his opinion was specifically invited as to whether all
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or any of the injuries on the deceased could have been caused with that weapon. The appeal
preferred by the appellants was dismissed and their conviction was upheld.
45. In the instant case too, non-production of the weapon of offence before the Court by
the prosecution does not discredit the prosecution case as the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses were found to be reliable and trustworthy.
Therefore, we would like to gainfully refer to the decision relied upon by the learned
Additional Public Prosecutor in the case of Dhool Singh (supra) wherein it has been held and
observed that:-
“14. Mr. Kochar, learned senior counsel as an amicus curiae however,
supported the judgment of the High Court by contending that the
prosecution has failed to establish the fact that the respondent has
caused this injury with a sword measuring 3 ft. as stated above. He
pointed out that though a sword was said to have been recovered from
the respondent the same was not produced in the court nor was it
established that it contained blood stains nor has any witness identified
the said weapon. In such a situation, therefore, we cannot rely upon the
fact that the respondent has used a dangerous weapon. We are unable
to accept this argument of the learned counsel for the purpose of
deciding whether the injury in question was caused by a sword
measuring 3 ft. as alleged by the prosecution or by some other weapon.
The doctor who was examined to prove the injuries on the deceased has
stated that the injury in question was an incised cut wound causing
extensive damage to various blood vessels in the neck, leading to excess
bleeding. In our opinion, such an injury cannot but be caused by a sharp
edged weapon; be it a sword as alleged by the prosecution or some
other sharp-edged weapon. Assuming that the prosecution has not
established that this injury was caused by a particular sword as alleged
by it, it is clear that this injury has been caused by a sharp-edged cutting
weapon; be it a sword or otherwise. The fact that the respondent has
caused this injury is accepted by both the courts below which finding is
Page No.# 17/19not under challenge before us therefore it goes without saying that the
respondent has caused this injury with a sharpedged weapon hence the
factum of not proving that those injuries were caused by a particular
sword measuring 3 ft. would not in any manner prevent us from coming
to the conclusion that the injuries were caused by the respondent with
such a weapon which causes incised cut injuries, therefore, the
argument of learned counsel that non-production of the weapon would
not establish an offence under section 302, cannot be accepted. Learned
counsel then pleaded that according to the evidence of the doctor the
cause of death was not only due to the injury inflicted on the deceased
but was the cumulative effect of bleeding and heart failure, therefore, it
is not possible to come to the conclusion that a single injury caused by
the respondent could be the cause of death of the victim. We are unable
to accept this argument. The cause of death as explained by the doctor
is primarily due to the injury caused by the respondent. Bleeding and the
consequential heart failure are the effects of such injury, therefore, they
cannot be treated as different causes of death. Learned counsel then
submitted that according to the doctor, if proper medical care were to be
provided, the injured could have survived. This, in our opinion, is a
hypothetical answer given by the doctor and is not something which is
applicable to the facts of this case. Even otherwise we are not in
agreement with the views expressed by the doctor that with the injury
like the one suffered by the victim, in the normal course he could have
survived. Section 300 does not contemplate such a situation of
miraculous survival. On the contrary, it contemplates an ordinary
situation and that is why the Legislature had advisedly used the words :
“bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death.”
(emphasis supplied). Therefore, from an understanding of the legislative
intent of section 300 IPC, in our opinion, a culpable homicide becomes
murder if the attacker causes an injury which he knows is likely to cause
death and, of course, consequent to such injury, the victim should die. In
Page No.# 18/19
the instant case, all these ingredients have been established by the
prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt. Learned counsel then relied on
some judgments of this Court in Toran Singh v. State of M.P. [2002 6 SCC
494], Ramchandra Ohdar v. State of Bihar [1999 9 SCC 97] and The
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kalu Ram & Anr. [JT 2002 9 SC 416] to
support his contention that the injuries caused by the respondent in this
case would attract only a punishment under section 304 Part II IPC and
not one imposable under Section 302.”
46. Reverting back to this case and in the wake of the foregoing discussions, it is held that
non-production of the cricket bat by the prosecution does not thwart the evidence. The
sequel of events in this case are that:
(i) In the afternoon, the appellant was with his wife. (ii) The children went out to play and when they returned home in the evening (at 5 p.m.),
PW-8 saw his mother’s still body, and his father lying on the bed in an inebriated state.
(iii) When confronted, his father (appellant) informed him that he killed his wife with the
wooden bat and immediately, he, PW-8 screamed.
(iv) Lonki Kro and the other neighbours arrived and Lonki Kro informed PW-1 about the
incident whilst PW-5, who heard that the appellant killed his wife from PW-8, was present
when the police arrived and seized the cricket bat from the place of occurrence.
(v) The bat was seized in presence of PW-2, PW-3 and PW-5.
(vi) The body was thereafter forwarded for autopsy and fatal injuries were described by the
M.O.
(vii) PW-1 lodged the FIR on the following day.
Page No.# 19/19
47. Thus, the circumstances form a complete chain pointing only towards the guilt of the
appellant. The appellant was last seen with his wife by PW-8 and the appellant confessed
before PW-8 that he killed his wife and PW-8 informed PW-5 that his father killed his mother
and thereafter, all the witnesses heard about the incident and finally, the FIR was lodged by
PW-1.
48. The time gap when the appellant was last seen with his wife vis-a-vis the time of death
of appellant’s wife is too narrow to extend a benefit of doubt to the appellant. The evidence
of the witnesses are consistent and uncontroverted to even dismiss the extrajudicial
confession of the appellant. As the chain of circumstances is complete, it is held that the
judgment and order of conviction is sustainable.
49. In view of the foregoing discussions, appeal is hereby dismissed and the judgment and
order dated 30.06.2020 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Karbi Anglong, Diphu in
connection with Sessions Case No. 37/2016 is upheld.
50. We appreciate the assistance provided by the learned Amicus Curiae and recommend
for payment of the honorarium.
51. Send back the Trial Court Record.
JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant
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