Gauhati High Court
Page No.# 1/8 vs The State Of Assam And 4 Ors on 11 June, 2025
Page No.# 1/8
GAHC010204612022
2025:GAU-AS:7578
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/6555/2022
MINTU GOGOI
S/O. LT. MUKUNDRA GOGOI, VILL. DADORA, P.O. BALIJAN, P.S.
KAKOTIBARI, DIST. SIVSAGAR, ASSAM, PIN-785691.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM CUM THE
CHAIRMAN, STATE LEVEL SELECTION COMMITTEE FOR
COMPASSIONATE APPOINTMENT, DISPUR, GUWAHATI, PIN-781006.
2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECY.
TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI.
3:THE DIRECTOR OF SECONDARY EDUCATION
ASSAM KAHILIPARA GUWAHATI-19.
4:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
SIVSAGAR DISTRICT CUM CHAIRMAN
DISTRICT LEVEL COMMITTEE
SIVASAGAR
ASSAM FOR APPOINTMENT ON COMPASSIONATE GROUND.
5:THE DISTRICT ELEMENTARY EDUCATION OFFICER
SIVASAGAR AND CHARAIDEO DISTRICT
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. A SARMA, MR J P CHOUHAN
Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM, SC, ELEM. EDU
Page No.# 2/8
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR
ORDER
Date : 11.06.2025
Heard Mr. Aiswaryya Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard
Mr. Girin Pegu, learned Government Advocate, Assam, appearing on behalf of the
State respondents.
2. The petitioner by way of instituting the present proceedings, has raised a
grievance with regard to the non-consideration of his case for appointment on
compassionate ground in terms of the scheme formulated by the Government in
this connection.
3. The father of the petitioner, herein, while working as a Headmaster of
Rupali Boruah Lower Primary School, Chariadeo, had died-in-harness on
23.09.2014. The petitioner, thereafter, within the time frame prescribed, had
submitted an application for consideration of his case for appointment on
compassionate ground. The petitioner’s application was placed before the
jurisdictional District Level Committee. The said Committee on scrutinizing the
application submitted by the petitioner along with other applications received
from similarly situated aspirants, proceeded to reject the case of the petitioner on
the ground that he was economically better placed than the candidates
recommended for appointment on compassionate ground.
4. This Court, had, on earlier occasions, required the respondent authorities to
produce the records of the consideration made by the jurisdictional District Level
Committee with regard to the application submitted by the petitioner for
appointment on compassionate ground.
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5. The relevant records have been produced by Mr. Pegu, learned Government
Advocate, Assam, today.
6. This Court has perused the same and found that the economic condition of
the applicants in the fray, were duly considered by the respondent authorities and
on such consideration, the case of one Shri Partha Protim Boruah and Smti. Gitali
Sonowal, were recommended for appointment on compassionate ground against
the Grade-IV vacancies.
7. With regard to the consideration made in respect of the petitioner, herein;
the said Committee on such consideration being made, had proceeded to record
that the case of the petitioner was not permissible to be considered in the
absence of requisite vacancies being available.
8. The jurisdictional District Level Committee on consideration of the economic
condition of the aspirants placed before it and having made such
recommendations in favour of the 2(two) candidates, named-above, who were
found to be in necessity of appointment on compassionate ground in comparison
to others; no mala fide having been alleged against the members of the said
Committee in the present proceeding; this Court is of the considered view that
the recommendations as made by the jurisdictional District Level Committee both
in respect of the petitioner, herein, as well as in respect of the candidates
recommended for appointment on compassionate ground, would not mandate an
interference.
9. It is to be noted that the jurisdictional District Level Committee while
rejecting the case of the petitioner, herein, had also noticed that there were no
vacancies available within the 5% quota for recommending the name of the
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petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground.
10. The petitioner, herein, in the present proceeding, having also prayed for a
direction upon the respondent authorities for consideration of his case for
appointment on compassionate ground; it is to be noted that such a consideration
would now be required to be so directed to be made after around 11 years having
elapsed since the date of the death of the government servant involved.
11. It is a settled position of law that public service appointment should be
made strictly on the basis of open invitation of an application and on merits. The
appointment on compassionate ground cannot be a source of recruitment. It is
merely an exception to the requirement of law keeping in view the fact of the
death of the employee while in service, leaving his family without any means of
livelihood. In such cases, the object is to enable the family to get over the sudden
financial crises. Such appointments on compassionate ground, therefore, have to
be made in accordance with the Rules, Regulations, or, administrative instructions
taking into consideration, the financial condition of the family of the deceased.
The favourable treatment to the dependent of the deceased employee must have
a clear nexus with the object sought to be achieved thereby i.e. relief against
destitution. At the same time, however, it should not be forgotten that as against
the destitute family of the deceased employee, there are millions and millions of
other families which are equally, if not more, destitute. The exception to the Rule
made in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in consideration of the
service rendered by him and the legitimate expectation, and the change in the
status and affairs of the family endangered by the erstwhile employment, which
are suddenly upturned. The claims for of appointment on compassionate ground
would mandate that there be no delay in effecting such appointment, the object
being to mitigate the hardships faced by the family due to the death of the bread
earner.
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12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent decision in the case of State of W.B.
v. Debabrata Tiwari & ors. [reported in (2023) SCC Online SC 219], on the issue
involved in the present proceeding, has drawn the following conclusions:
“32. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles emerge:
i. That a provision for compassionate appointment makes a departure from the general
provisions providing for appointment to a post by following a particular procedure of
recruitment. Since such a provision enables appointment being made without following the said
procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions and must be resorted to
only in order to achieve the stated objectives, i.e., to enable the family of the deceased to get
over the sudden financial crisis.
ii. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. The reason for
making such a benevolent scheme by the State or the public sector undertaking is to see that
the dependants of the deceased are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only enables the
family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis.
iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in
future. Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after
the crisis is over.
iv. That compassionate appointment should be provided immediately to redeem the family in
distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years.
v. In determining as to whether the family is in financial crisis, all relevant aspects must be
borne in mind including the income of the family, its liabilities, the terminal benefits if any,
received by the family, the age, dependency and marital status of its members, together with
the income from any other source.
33. The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to enable the
family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to the death of the bread-
earner which has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure
humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood
is provided, the family would not be in a position to make both ends meet, a provision is made
for giving gainful appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for
such appointment. Having regard to such an object, it would be of no avail to grant
compassionate appointment to the dependants of the deceased employee, after the crisis which
arose on account of death of a bread-winner, has been overcome. Thus, there is also a
compelling need to act with a sense of immediacy in matters concerning compassionate
appointment because on failure to do so, the object of the scheme of compassionate would be
frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has occurred since the date of death of the deceased
employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking compassionate appointment would cease to exist
and thus lose its significance and this would be a relevant circumstance which must weigh with
the authorities in determining as to whether a case for the grant of compassionate appointment
has been made out for consideration.
34. As noted above, the sine qua non for entertaining a claim for compassionate appointment is
that the family of the deceased employee would be unable to make two ends meet without one
of the dependants of the deceased employee being employed on compassionate grounds. The
financial condition of the family of the deceased, at the time of the death of the deceased, is
the primary consideration that ought to guide the authorities’ decision in the matter.
35. Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance, regarding whether
applications for compassionate appointment could be considered after a delay of several years,
we are of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of
the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such
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claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial circumstances of the
family of the deceased, may have changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the
government employee. In such circumstances, Courts or other relevant authorities are to be
guided by the fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was able
to sustain themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment from some other source.
Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, as noted by this Court in Hakim Singh
would amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of
inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the Constitution. Since
compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative to the financial
condition and hardship faced by the dependents of the deceased government employee as a
consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after
lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the government employee.
36. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of
Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such
relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper
Armstrong, (1874) 3 P.C. 221 as under:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party
has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver
of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that
remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to
place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of
time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be
tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in
such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the
interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in
taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.”
37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a party by Equity
Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in the
exercise of its power under Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for consideration before a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M. R. Meher, President, Industrial Court,
Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450. In the said case, it was regarded as a principle that disentitled a
party for grant of relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary power under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court restated the principle
articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words:
“9…. the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and
the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the
part of the Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated
that this Rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause
confusion and public inconvenience and bring, In its train new injustices, and if writ
jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not
only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. Itwas pointed out
that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of
third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the
High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.”
39. While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation provided for filing a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed
Page No.# 7/8
within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538; NDMC v. Pan
Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278.
40. Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners submitted their applications to
the relevant authority in the year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that they diligently perused the
matter and had not slept over their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC
179, wherein the following observations were made:
“19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or
tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead
grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action
cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the
competent authority does not arrest time.”
13. Applying the said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Debabrata Tiwari(supra) to the facts of the present case, it is seen that the
father of the petitioner had died-in-harness on 23.09.2014. The consideration
that is now sought to be made in respect of the petitioner, herein, for
appointment on compassionate ground is a consideration so required to be made
after a lapse of around 11 years. The sense of immediacy in the matter of
compassionate appointment in respect of the petitioner has been lost.
Entertaining the claim at this point of time would be of no avail, because,
admittedly, the petitioner has been able to eke out a living even though he was
not favoured with an appointment on compassionate grounds. Accordingly, this
Court is of the considered view that it is not a fit case to direct the claim of the
petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground be considered or entertained
by the respondent authorities.
14. In view of the foregoing discussions and conclusions reached herein above
by this Court, this Court is of the considered view that the issue involved in the
present proceeding being a stale issue, it would not be permissible for this Court
to issue any direction requiring consideration of the case of the petitioner for
appointment on compassionate ground in pursuance to death of his father, in
harness, occasioning in the year 2014.
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15. In view of the above conclusions, this writ petition is held to be devoid of
any merit and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. However, there shall be no
order as to costs.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant