Gauhati High Court
Page No.# 1/9 vs The State Of Assam And 5 Ors on 20 January, 2025
Page No.# 1/9
GAHC010229582019
2025:GAU-AS:500
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/7225/2019
SHITAL CHANDRA ROY
S/O- LATE SUSHIL KUMAR ROY, R/O- VILL AND P.O- BALAJAN, DIST-
DHUBRI, ASSAM
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 5 ORS
THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM,
PANCHAYAT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPTT, DISPUR, GUWAHATI- 06
2:THE STATE LEVEL COMMITTEE FOR COMPASSIONATE APPOINTMENT
REP. BY ITS CHEF SECRETARY TO GOVT OF ASSAM
DISPUR
GUWAHATI- 6
3:THE COMMISSIONER
PANCHAYAT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPTT
JURIPAR
PANJABARI
GUWAHATI- 781037
4:THE DISTRICT LEVEL COMMITTEE FOR COMPASSIONATE
APPOINTMENT
REP. BY ITS CHAIRMAN
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
DHUBRI
P.O AND DIST- DHUBRI
ASSAM
PIN-
5:THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
DHUBRI ZILLA PARISHAD
Page No.# 2/9
P.O AND DIST- DHUBRI
ASSAM
PIN-
6:THE CIRCLE OFFICER
GOLAKGANJ REVENUE CIRCLE
GOLAKGANJ
DIST- DHUBRI
ASSAM
PIN
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. A DAS,
Advocate for the Respondent : SC, PNRD, GA, ASSAM
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR
JUDGMENT & ORDER (Oral)
Date : 20.01.2025
Heard Mr. A. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S.
Dutta, learned Standing Counsel for the Panchayat & Rural Development
Department appearing for the respondent nos. 1, 3 & 5 and Mr. R. Dhar, learned
Addl. Senior Government Advocate appearing for the respondent nos. 2, 4 & 6.
2. The petitioner by way of instituting the present proceeding has prayed for a
direction upon the respondent authorities to consider the case of the petitioner
for appointment on compassionate ground against any vacant post
commensurating to his educational qualification and to place his case for the
purpose before the District Level Committee, Dhubri.
3. The brief facts requisite for adjudication of the issue arising in the present
proceeding is noticed as under:-
The father of the petitioner late Sushil Kumar Ray, while working as a
Page No.# 3/9Secretary, Saheloganj Gaon Panchayat, Dhubri had died in harness on
06.03.1996. The petitioner, thereafter, submitted an application for consideration
of his case for appointment on compassionate grounds. It is projected in the writ
petition that in pursuance to the application submitted by the petitioner, an
enquiry was conducted into the matter by the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner
through the Circle Officer, Golakganj. In the enquiry, the names of the family
members of late Sushil Kumar Ray were brought on record, including the
description of the landed property owned by the family of late Sushil Kumar Ray.
It is the contention of the petitioner that in spite of the said enquiry being
completed, the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds
was not considered.
The petitioner, in the writ petition had further projected that the Executive
Committee of Balajan Gaon Panchayat, vide a resolution dated 29.12.2005, had
resolved to engage him as a Tax Collector on honorary basis for a month which
was thereafter, being extended. Accordingly, the President of said Gaon
Panchayat vide communication dated 29.12.2005, appointed the petitioner on
honorary basis as a Tax Collector for a period of one month. The petitioner,
accordingly, joined his services on 02.01.2006. It is projected in the writ petition
that the petitioner had voluntarily given up the said engagement on the account
of certain difficulties faced by him and he is not attending to his duties w.e.f. from
the year 2014. The petitioner thereafter, submitted representations before the
authorities for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate
grounds, however, the same not being considered, the petitioner had instituted
the present proceeding.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the
respondents has reiterated the facts stated in the writ petition and the affidavit-
in-opposition filed in the matter respectively.
Page No.# 4/9
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also perused the
materials available on record.
6. The facts as noticed herein above are not disputed. The father of the
petitioner had died in harness on 06.03.1996. Although the petitioner had
submitted his application for appointment on compassionate grounds, the case of
the petitioner was not placed before the jurisdictional DLC for consideration. The
petitioner, for the first time had approached this Court by way of instituting the
present proceeding on 17.09.2019 i.e. after around 23 years from the death of
the government servant involved. The petitioner and his family having sustained
for a period of 23 years since the date of death of the government employee
involved, after such a long lapse of time has occurred, the sense of immediacy for
seeking compassionate grounds would cease to exist and thus lost its
significance. It is a settled position of law that a scheme for appointment on
compassionate grounds is so formulated with the object to provide for immediate
assistance to the family members of a deceased government servant who are
faced with financial constraints on the death of the bread earner of the family.
Having regard to such an object, it would be no avail to grant compassionate
appointment to the dependents of the deceased employee, after the crisis which
arose on account of death of a bread winner, has been overcome. In the present
case, the father of the petitioner having died in harness on 06.03.1996; and the
petitioner and his family having sustained themselves till this very date without
being favoured with an appointment on compassionate grounds, renders the
claim of the petitioner as made to the present proceeding, to be a stale one.
7. Support with regard to the said conclusion reached by this Court is drawn
from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West
Bengal Vs Debabrata Tiwari & Ors., reported (2023) SCC Online SC 219.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said decision had drawn the following
Page No.# 5/9
conclusions:-
“32. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following
principles emerge:
i. That a provision for compassionate appointment makes a
departure from the general provisions providing for appointment to a
post by following a particular procedure of recruitment. Since such a
provision enables appointment being made without following the
said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general
provisions and must be resorted to only in order to achieve the
stated objectives, i.e., to enable the family of the deceased to get
over the sudden financial crisis.
ii. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of
recruitment. The reason for making such a benevolent scheme by the
State or the public sector undertaking is to see that the dependents
of the deceased are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only
enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial
crisis.
iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can
be exercised at any time in future. Compassionate employment
cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis
is over.
iv. That compassionate appointment should be provided
immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep
such a case pending for years.
v. In determining as to whether the family is in financial crisis,
all relevant aspects must be borne in mind including the income of
the family, its liabilities, the terminal benefits if any, received by the
family, the age, dependency and marital status of its members,
together with the income from any other source.
33. The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate
employment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over
the sudden crisis due to the death of the bread-earner which has left the
family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure
humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some
source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be in a position to
make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to
one of the dependents of the deceased who may be eligible for such
Page No.# 6/9appointment. Having regard to such an object, it would be of no avail to
grant compassionate appointment to the dependents of the deceased
employee, after the crisis which arose on account of death of a bread-
winner, has been overcome. Thus, there is also a compelling need to act
with a sense of immediacy in matters concerning compassionate
appointment because on failure to do so, the object of the scheme of
compassionate would be frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has
occurred since the date of death of the deceased employee, the sense of
immediacy for seeking compassionate appointment would cease to exist
and thus lose its significance and this would be a relevant circumstance
which must weigh with the authorities in determining as to whether a case
for the grant of compassionate appointment has been made out for
consideration.
34. As noted above, the sine qua non for entertaining a claim for
compassionate appointment is that the family of the deceased employee
would be unable to make two ends meet without one of the dependents of
the deceased employee being employed on compassionate grounds. The
financial condition of the family of the deceased, at the time of the death of
the deceased, is the primary consideration that ought to guide the
authorities’ decision in the matter.
35. Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance,
regarding whether applications for compassionate appointment could be
considered after a delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case
where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in
claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such
claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial
circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have changed, for the
better, since the time of the death of the government employee. In such
circumstances, Courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided by the
fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was
able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment
from some other source. Granting compassionate appointment in such a
case, as noted by this Court in Hakim Singh would amount to treating a
claim for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of
inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the
Constitution. Since compassionate appointment is not a vested right and
the same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by the
dependents of the deceased government employee as a consequence of
his death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained
after lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the
government employee.
36. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in
approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief
which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by
Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong, [1874]
Page No.# 7/9
3 P.C. 221 as under:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or
a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a
remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that
which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards
to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are
most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of
course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the
validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are,
the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the
interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of
Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it
relates to the remedy.”
37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to
a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a
person by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of
our Constitution, came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of
this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M. R. Meher, President, Industrial Court,
Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450. In the said case, it was regarded as a principle
that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in the exercise
of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution.
38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court restated
the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words:
“9. … the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily
assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic.
If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner and such
delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was
stated that this Rule is premised on a number of factors. The High
Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary
remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ
jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the
effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also
injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation
of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also
weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise
Page No.# 8/9such jurisdiction.”
39. While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation
provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution,
ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time, vide
Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538; NDMC v. Pan Singh,
(2007) 9 SCC 278.
40. Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners submitted
their applications to the relevant authority in the year 2005- 2006, it cannot
be said that they diligently perused the matter and had not slept over their
rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to the decision of this
Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC
179, wherein the following observations were made:
“19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if
the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations
relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a
fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a
phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the
competent authority does not arrest time.”
8. Applying the said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Debabrata Tiwari (supra) to the facts of the present case, it is seen that the
father of the petitioner having died in harness on 06.03.1996, the consideration
that is now prayed to be made in respect of the petitioner herein, for
appointment on compassionate grounds is a consideration so required to be
made after a lapse of around 28 years. The sense of immediacy in the matter of
compassionate appointment in respect of the petitioner has been lost. Such delay
is attributable to both the authorities of the State as well as the petitioner;
however, entertaining the claim at this point of time would be of no avail,
because, admittedly, the petitioner has been able to eke out a living even though
he was not favoured with an appointment on compassionate grounds.
Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that it is not a fit case to direct
the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds to be
considered or entertained by the respondent authorities.
9. At this stage, it is required to be noticed that the petitioner had contended
Page No.# 9/9
in the writ petition that he was engaged as a Tax Collector by the Balajan Gaon
Panchayat, on honorary basis. The said engagement of the petitioner has got no
relation to the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds
and the same was purely a temporary arrangement so made between the
authorities of the said Gaon Panchayat and the petitioner, herein. In the present
proceeding, the petitioner has not prayed for any relief in connection with his
engagement on honorary basis by the authorities of Balajan Gaon Panchayat; and
further, it is the projected case of the petitioner that since the year 2014, he is no
longer working as a Tax Collector on honorary basis with Balajan Gaon Panchayat.
Accordingly, no direction on this count is called for, to be issued by this Court in
the present matter.
10. In view of the above conclusions, this writ petition is held to be devoid of
any merit and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. However, there would be
no order as to costs.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
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