Delhi High Court
Paramjit Singh vs Hardaman Singh Anand & Ors on 29 July, 2025
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 22.07.2025
Judgment pronounced on: 29.07.2025
+ FAO(OS) 77/2025
PARAMJIT SINGH .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, Mr.
Kshitij Palliwal, Mr. Sumit
Saini, Mr. Prabhpreet Singh
Wadhwa, Mr. Vipul Biala and
Mr. Utkarsh Dwivedi,
Advocates.
versus
HARDAMAN SINGH ANAND & ORS. ...Respondents
Through: Mr. Prashant Mehta, Mr. Dhruv
Chawla, Mr. Vaibhav Chawla
and Ms. Aadya Sinha,
Advocates for Respondent Nos.
1(A) to 3.
Mr. Siddharth A. Advocate for
Respondent No. 1 (B).
Mr. Aviral Tiwari, Advocate
for Respondent No. 4.
Mr. Dhiraj Sachdeva, Advocate
for Respondent Nos. 5 and 6.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 19081 read with Section 10 of the Delhi High Court
Act, 1966, impugns the Order dated 06.05.2025 2 passed by the
1
CPC
2
Impugned Order
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA FAO (OS) 77/2025 Page 1 of 12
Signing Date:30.07.2025
15:30:16
learned Single Judge of this Court in CS(OS) 166/2023 titled as
Paramjit Singh vs. Hardaman Singh & Ors.
2. Issue notice. Notice is accepted by Mr. Prashant Mehta,
Advocate on behalf of Respondent Nos.1(A), 2 & 3, Mr. Siddharth A.,
Advocate on behalf of Respondent No.2, Mr. Aviral Tiwari, Advocate
on behalf of Respondent No.4 and Mr. Dhiraj Sachdeva, Advocate on
behalf of Respondent Nos.5 & 6.
3. The short question that arises in the instant appeal relates to the
time period within which the replications on behalf of the
Plaintiff/Appellant herein, to the written statements on behalf of
Defendant/Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3; and Defendant/Respondent
Nos. 5 and 6 had to be filed.
4. The relevant facts which led up to the filing of this appeal are
stated hereinbelow:
A. A civil suit was filed by the Plaintiff/Appellant herein
seeking declaration of the Appellant’s share in the estate in
question, for rendition of bank accounts and permanent and
mandatory injunction.
B. On 07.03.2023, notice was issued in the suit. The counsel
for Defendant/Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, and the counsel for
Defendant/Respondent Nos. 5 and 6, entered appearance.
C. Vide Order dated 09.05.2023, written statement on behalf
of Defendant/Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 was taken on record and
a period of four weeks was given to the Appellant to file
replication. The written statement on behalf of
Defendant/Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 was taken on record vide
Order dated 15.05.2023.
D. On 17.07.2023, the Appellant/Plaintiff filed replication to
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA FAO (OS) 77/2025 Page 2 of 12
Signing Date:30.07.2025
15:30:16
both above-mentioned written statements along with two
applications; the first application bearing I. A. No. 15437 of
2023 was filed under Section 151 of the CPC for condonation
of delay of 16 days in filing of Replication to the written
statement of Defendant/Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and the
second application bearing I.A. No. 15441 of 2023 was filed
under Section 151 of the CPC for condonation of delay of 22
days in filing of Replication to the written statement of
Defendant/Respondent Nos. 5 and 6.
E. The grounds for delay in filing the two replications, as
stated in both applications, are similar. The Appellant submitted
that delay was due to the summer vacation of the Court and the
unavailability of his counsel. Further, it was submitted that the
Appellant is a senior citizen and has multiple age-related
ailments.
F. The learned Single Judge vide the impugned Order
dismissed both the applications.
APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:
5. Learned counsel for the Appellant would first refer to Rule 5,
Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 20183,
which reads as follows:
“5. Replication.- The replication, if any, shall be filed within
30 days of receipt of the written statement. If the Court is
satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause for
exceptional and unavoidable reasons in filing the replication
within 30 days, it may extend the time for filing the same by a
further period not exceeding 15 days but not thereafter. For
such extension, the plaintiff shall be burdened with costs, as
deemed appropriate. The replication shall not be taken on
record, unless such costs have been paid/ deposited. In case no3
Rules, 2018
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA FAO (OS) 77/2025 Page 3 of 12
Signing Date:30.07.2025
15:30:16
replication is filed within the extended time also, the Registrar
shall forthwith place the matter for appropriate orders before
the Court. An advance copy of the replication together with
legible copies of all documents in possession and power of
plaintiff, that it seeks to file along with the replication, shall be
served on the defendant and the replication together with the
said documents shall not be accepted unless it contains an
endorsement of service signed by the defendant/ his
Advocate.”
6. Learned counsel for the Appellant states that as per said Rule 5,
the prescribed period for filing that replication is 30 days, beyond
which the condonable period within which the replication may be filed
is “a further period not exceeding 15 days but not thereafter”.
7. Learned counsel for the Appellant would thereafter refer to
Rule 6, Chapter I of the Rules, 2018, which reads as under:-
“6. Period how calculated.–Where a particular number of
days are prescribed by these Rules or by or under any other
law, or is fixed by the Court for doing any act, the starting day
from which the said period is to be reckoned shall be excluded,
and if the last day expires on a day when the office of the
Court is closed for the day or a part thereof, that day and any
succeeding day(s) on which the Court remains closed for the
day or a part thereof, shall also be excluded.”
8. Learned counsel for the Appellant also refers to the definition of
“the Court”, which is set out in Rule 4(e), Chapter I of the Rules,
2018, as well as “Registry”, which is set out in Rule 4(m), Chapter I
of the Rules, 2018.
9. The primary contention based on the afore-extracted/stated
provisions is that, if limitation expires on a day when the Court is
closed, then that day and any succeeding dates on which the Court
remains closed for the day or a part thereof are to be excluded.
10. He would submit that, given the factual scenario in the present
case, since the last day for filing of an application expired in the midst
of the Court vacations (a term now referred to by the Hon’ble
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA FAO (OS) 77/2025 Page 4 of 12
Signing Date:30.07.2025
15:30:16
Supreme Court as “Partial Working days”), the entire period of the
vacations being days when the Court was closed would have to be
excluded and the period for reckoning the condonable period would
commence from the first working day after the reopening of the Court.
11. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the Appellant that
the said Rule 6, Chapter I of the Rules, 2018 does not make any
distinction between prescribed period and condonable period and,
therefore, even in respect of the condonable period, Rule 6, Chapter I
of the Rules, 2018 would have to apply and the entire period during
which the Court was not working would need to be excluded from the
calculation of the period of limitation.
12. Learned counsel for the Appellant, in support of his contention,
would rely upon paragraph Nos. 16 and 17 of Order dated 03.07.2025
in CS(OS) 243/2021 titled as Anil Jain v. Paritosh Jain, which reads
as under:
“16. Read in conjunction with the facts, Rule 6 squarely
applies to the present scenario. The expiry of the 15th and
final condonable day on a Court holiday brings the case within
the protective ambit of Rule 6. Accordingly, the replication
filed on 15.04.2024, the immediate next working day, cannot
be considered belated. The language of Rule 6 does not draw a
distinction between the prescribed and condonable periods,
and once the Court is closed on the last day of any period
prescribed, or fixed by law or the Court, the benefit of
exclusion applies. Hence, the replication filed by defendant
Nos. 1 and 2 is within the permissible time limit.
17. As regards the contention advanced by learned counsel for
defendant Nos. 1 and 2, relying on the decision in Rajpath
Contractors & Engineers Ltd. to argue that the benefit of
Section 4 of the Act applies only to the prescribed period and
not to the condonable period, it is correct that the Supreme
Court adopted such a view. However, it is significant to note
that the said decision arose in the context of an arbitration
proceeding under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as „Arbitration
Act‟). The Court therein examined the interface between
Section 4 of the Act and the statutory timelines prescribed
under the Arbitration Act, and, while affirming the strict
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA FAO (OS) 77/2025 Page 5 of 12
Signing Date:30.07.2025
15:30:16
separation between the prescribed and condonable periods,
also acknowledged that such a rigid construction effectively
precluded any relief in light of the legislative intent for
expedition embedded in the Arbitration Act. The observations
of the Supreme Court must, therefore, be understood within the
specific statutory framework governing arbitral disputes,
which prioritizes finality and speed over procedural flexibility,
and such interpretation should not be dovetailed with matters
of purely civil nature.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
13. It is also apposite to refer to Section 4 of the Limitation Act,
19634, which reads as follows:
“4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed.–Where
the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application
expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or
application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day
when the court re-opens.
Explanation.–A court shall be deemed to be closed on any
day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its
normal working hours it remains closed on that day.”
14. Learned counsel for the Appellant would strenuously argue that
the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Manhar Sabharwal
v. High Court of Delhi5, has categorically held that under Section 129
of the CPC, High Courts are empowered to frame their own rules of
procedure, and such rules would prevail over the generic provisions of
the CPC to the extent of any inconsistency. He would, thus, submit
that the provisions of Rule 6, Chapter I of the Rules, 2018 reads in a
manner, such as to suggest that if the last day of the reckonable period
expires on the day when the Court is closed, then the entire period of
the vacation would need to be excluded from the calculation of
limitation.
RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTIONS:
4
Limitation Act
5
2024 SCC OnLine Del 5945
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA FAO (OS) 77/2025 Page 6 of 12
Signing Date:30.07.2025
15:30:16
15. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondents would state
that the said argument is “preposterous” as it goes against the
fundamental concept of limitation and the manner in which it is to be
calculated. Learned counsel for the Respondents refers to the
applications filed for condonation of delay in filing of the replications
and states that the case as sought to be set up in appeal is not
maintainable, given what is contended in the said applications, even as
per the calculation of the Appellants herein.
16. Learned counsel for the Respondents would state that the period
of Court Vacations is not a period where the Court is not functioning
insofar as the Registry is concerned, and what needs to be considered,
especially for the purposes of filing, is the factum of the functioning
of the Registry of the Court.
17. He further relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra6, and its
paragraph No. 6 thereof, to contend that the judicial sittings of the
Court may not be transpiring, but the offices of the Court remain open
for presentation of the pleadings. The Court is, therefore, open for the
purpose of presentation of pleadings even though the Judge is not
engaged in judicial functions or present in the Court itself. Paragraph
No. 6 of the said judgement reads as follows:
“6. A long course of decisions have held that a Court is not
closed notwithstanding the fact that Judges do not sit on any
day if otherwise the Court is open on that day. Harries, C.J.,
during the course of the arguments in Lachmeshwar Prasad
Shukul v. Girdhari Lal Chaudhuri [AIR 1939 Pat 667 : 185 IC
353 : ILR 19 Pat 123] observed that “Saturday” is a Court
day although the Judges are not sitting on that day. The
learned Chief Justice and Fazl Ali, J., as he then was,
(Agarwala, J., dissenting) went to the extent of holding that
even in the vacations the Court is not closed and money can be6
(1974) 2 SCC 133
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA FAO (OS) 77/2025 Page 7 of 12
Signing Date:30.07.2025
15:30:16
deposited. Turner, C.J., speaking for himself, Kernan,
Kindersley and Muttusami Ayyar, JJ., (Innes, J., dissenting)
observed in Nachiyappa Mudali v. Ayyasami Ayyar: [ILR
(1882) 5 Mad 189, 192]“The judicial sittings of the Court may be adjourned; but
the offices of the Court may still remain open for the
presentation of pleadings. The Court may be open for this
purpose although the Judge is not engaged in judicial
functions or is not present in the Court-house or in the
place where the Court is held.”
A Bench of the Madras High Court in In re Thokkudubivyanu
Immaniyelu [AIR 1948 Mad 521 : (1948) 1 MLJ 49] dealt with
a similar practice which is followed by all High Courts and
this Court for the summer vacation when the Courts close. The
notifications in respect thereof specify a period between
Monday to Friday both days inclusive as the vacation. The
Court reopens on a Saturday, but judicial work starts only on
the following Monday. It was held that the first day of the
Court was a Saturday which was the day for receiving papers
though the Judges actually sat for judicial work on Monday, as
such an application, for which the prescribed period of
limitation expired on Saturday the 5th when the Court was
open and was not filed on that day, but on Monday the 7th,
was held to be barred. See also Dwarka Prasad v. Union of
India; [AIR 1954 Pat 284 : ILR 1954 Pat 176] and
Sajjansingh v. Bhogilal Pandya [AIR 1958 Raj 307 : ILR
(1958) 8 Raj 912] .”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Learned counsel further relies upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Gupta v. Raju7, and paragraph No. 2
thereof, wherein again it is reiterated that simply because the Court is
closed for vacation, it is not always a holiday for the Registry.
19. Learned counsel for other Respondents would also rely upon
the Notification No. 103/I-G-4/Genl.-I/DHC of the High Court of
Delhi dated 28.10.2022, in respect of Vacations and contend that the
same does not denote that the Registry would be shut during the
period of vacations.
7
(2016) 14 SCC 314
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA FAO (OS) 77/2025 Page 8 of 12
Signing Date:30.07.2025
15:30:16
ANALYSIS
20. We have heard the counsel for the parties. In our view, there is
no error in the Order dated 06.05.2025 of the learned Single Judge.
The relevant portion of the Impugned Order is as follows:
“I.A. 15437/2023 (for condonation of delay)
1. This is an application filed by the plaintiff seeking
condonation of delay of 16 days in filing the replication to the
written statement of defendant nos. 1 and 3.
2. Although, the application prays for condonation of 16 days‟
delay, what the applicant intends to plead is, that the delay is
of 16 days beyond the statutorily permissible period of 45
days. The applicant is therefore, seeking condonation of delay
of 61 days and not 16 days.
3. In view of the judgement of the Division Bench in Ram
Swaroop Lugani & Another v. Nirmal Lugani [2020 SCC
OnLine Del 1353 at paras 21 to 25], and in view of the Rule 5
Chapter VII, Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018,
the relief sought is not permissible and barred in law.
4. Even otherwise, the grounds set out in the application do
not make out any sufficient ground for condonation of delay.
5. The application stands dismissed.
I.A. 15441/2023 (for condonation of delay)
6. This is an application filed by the plaintiff seeking
condonation of delay of 22 days in filing of replication to the
written statement of defendant nos. 5 and 6.
7. Although the application prays for condonation of 22 days‟
delay, what the applicant intends to plead is, that the delay is
of 22 days beyond the statutorily permissible period of 55
days. The applicant is therefore, seeking condonation of delay
of 77 days and not 22 days as pleaded.
8. In view of the judgement of the Division Bench in Ram
Swaroop Lugani (supra) and in view of the Rule 5 Chapter
VII, Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, the relief
sought is not permissible and barred in law.
9. Even otherwise, the grounds set out in the application do
not make out sufficient grounds for condonation of delay.
10. The application stands dismissed.”
21. The replications themselves came to be filed on 17.07.2023.
As per the statutory limitation, the replication to the written statement
on behalf of Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 was supposed to be filed by
08.06.2023, and the replication to the written statement on behalf of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA FAO (OS) 77/2025 Page 9 of 12
Signing Date:30.07.2025
15:30:16
Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 was supposed to be filed by 14.06.2023.
However, the replications along with their respective applications for
condonation of delay came to be filed only on 17.07.2023. For the
sake of convenience, a tabular representation of the timelines with
respect to both the IAs is as follows:
I. A. No. 15437 of 2023- for condonation of delay of 16 days in
filing replication to written statement of Defendant/
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3
Commencement of the limitation 15.05.2023
Expiry of 30-Day Period under Rule 5, Chapter 14.06.2023
VII
Expiry of Condonable Period of 15 days, which 29.06.2023
commenced after the expiry of Prescribed Period
under Rule 5, Chapter VII
I. A. No. 15441 of 2023- for condonation of delay of 22 days in
filing replication to written statement of Defendant/
Respondent Nos. 5 and 6
Commencement of the limitation period 09.05.2023
Expiry of 30-Day Period under Rule 5, Chapter 08.06.2023
VII
Expiry of Condonable Period of 15 days, which 23.06.2023
commenced after the expiry of Prescribed Period
under Rule 5, Chapter VII
Both IAs admittedly filed on 17.07.2023
22. Rule 6, Chapter I of the Rules, 2018 is not a rule which relates
to reckoning of the period of exclusion from when the “Court” is
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA FAO (OS) 77/2025 Page 10 of 12
Signing Date:30.07.2025
15:30:16
closed but for reckoning of the period to be excluded from when the
“office of the Court is closed”. The fundamental fallacy of the
Appellant’s argument lies in the attempt to ignore the words “office of
the”.
23. The office of the Court can mean nothing but the Registry of
that Court, and the same is also clarified from the extracted paragraph
No. 6 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hukumdev
Narain Yadav (supra).
24. We are of the opinion that the Order of the learned Single Judge
in Anil Jain (supra) stipulates that it would also regulate the manner
in which condonable period would be brought within the protective
ambit of Rule 6, Chapter I of Rules, 2018. The said Order holds that it
is due to this protective ambit that any pleadings sought to be filed
could have been so filed, on the immediate working day upon the
reopening of the Courts. The said Judgment, in our opinion, militates
against the view sought to be canvassed by the Appellant herein.
25. We are of the opinion that it would be necessary that Section 4
of the Limitation Act, 1963 would need to be read harmoniously with
the above-referred rules of the Delhi High Court (Original Side)
Rules, 2018.
26. The result of such a harmonious reading would suggest that, in
the event the condonable period of limitation expires during the
vacations, the same would be permitted to have the benefit of being
filed on the first re-opening day post-vacations. If the arguments
suggested by the Appellant are accepted, it would not only constitute a
rewriting of the statute of limitation, but it would also encourage
indolence on part of such parties who are not vigilant about exercising
their rights. Such an interpretation is neither warranted nor desirable.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA FAO (OS) 77/2025 Page 11 of 12
Signing Date:30.07.2025
15:30:16
27. We are also of the view that, as rightly pointed out by the
learned counsel for Respondents, it was the Appellant’s own
understanding that the period of vacations of the Court did not bring to
a halt the running of the clock, and which is the reason why the
applications bearing I. A. No. 15437 of 2023 and I. A. No. 15441 of
2023 expressly states that there was a delay of 16 and 22 days in the
filing of the replication.
28. In view of the afore-stated, there is no merit in the appeal and
the same is rejected.
29. The appeal, with all pending application(s), if any, is disposed
of. No order as to costs.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JULY 29, 2025/v/er
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA FAO (OS) 77/2025 Page 12 of 12
Signing Date:30.07.2025
15:30:16
[ad_1]
Source link