Delhi District Court
Parhlad Rai (Dar) vs Shankar Yadav (243/19Kk) on 4 June, 2025
IN THE COURT OF MS. SHELLY ARORA
DISTRICT JUDGE AND ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE
PO MACT (SE), SAKET COURTS : NEW DELHI
MACT No.: 771/2019
FIR no. 243/2019
PS Kalindi Kunj
U/s 279/338 IPC
CNR No.: DLSE01 -007363-2019
Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors.
Prahalad Rai
S/o Radha Mohan Ray
R/o H. No. 65, Subhash Market
Kotla Mubarakpur, New Delhi.
.....Petitioner
Versus
1. Shankar Yadav
S/o Ram Daresh Yadav
R/o H. No. Vill. Bhitta Dharampura
PS Anchal, Pupuri Distt. Sitamarhi, Bihar.
.....R-1/ Driver
2. M/s Triveni Road Car Pvt Ltd
R/o 8GF Transport Center, Rohtak Road
Punjabi Bagh, New Delhi.
.....R-2/ Owner
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3. M/s United India Insurance Company Ltd
8th Floor, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi.
....R-3/ Insurance Co.
Date of accident : 09.07.2019
Date of filing of DAR : 30.10.2019
Date of Decision : 04.06.2025
AWARD
1. DAR
1(a). Detailed Accident Report (hereinafter referred as DAR)
was filed by IO ASI Onkar in terms of provisions of Motor
Vehicle Act, which is treated as Claim Petition under Section 166
(1) read with Section 166 (4) MV Act. It pertains to alleged
accident of injured Sh. Prahalad Rai (hereinafter referred as
claimant) by vehicle bearing Reg. No. DL 1GC 2666 (hereinafter
referred as offending vehicle), which was driven by Sh. Shankar
Yadav (hereinafter referred as R-1), owned by M/s Triveni Road
Car Pvt Ltd (hereinafter referred as R-2) and insured with M/s
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred as R-3).
2. Brief Facts:
2(a). Preliminary information about the accident was received
on 09.07.2019 recorded vide DD no.23A, at PS Kalindi Kunj in
respect of accident on Pusta Road Cut Loop Road near Kalindi
Kunj New Delhi, upon receipt of which, ASI Dharam Prakash
along with Ct. Nitin proceeded to the spot where Truck bearing
Reg. No. DL 1GC 2666 and a scooty bearing Reg. No.DL 9SBA
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2995 (black colour) were found in accidental condition and they
learnt that injured has already been rushed to hospital in a PCR
van. ASI Dharam Prakash then proceeded to AIIMS Trauma
Center where he found injured Prahalad Rai to be hospitalized
with MLC no. 500180770/19. Statement of Prahalad Rai was
recorded who informed that he was commuting by his scooty
from Kalindi Kunj to Madanpur Khadar, crossing Loop Road Cut
on Pusta Road when a truck bearing Reg. No. DL 1GC 2666,
being driven speedily, rashly and dangerously impacted his
scooty, severely injuring him in the process. He stated that
someone from the public informed the police and he was rushed
to AIIMS Trauma Center in a PCR vehicle. He informed the
name of Truck driver as Shankar Yadav and asserted that the
accident is attributed to his speedy and rash driving. FIR was
registered on the basis of statement of injured Prahalad Rai. The
accidental vehicles were seized and taken into police possession.
Notice u/s 133 MV Act was served upon Sh. Ram Singh, the
truck operator working for M/s Triveni Road Carrier Pvt Ltd who
informed that he was responsible for supervising and managing
the offending vehicle and that Shankar Yadav was at wheels at
the time of accident. He also produced the document pertaining
to offending vehicle as well as the driving license of Shankar
Yadav. Driver Shankar Yadav was also interrogated and arrested.
The Mechanical Inspection of the accident vehicle was got done.
The documents pertaining to offending vehicle as well as the
driving license were found to be genuine. Driver Shankar Yadav
was charge sheeted for injuring the claimant on account of
speedy and rash driving of offending vehicle on a public way.
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DAR was also filed by Investigating Officer.
3. Reply:
3(a) Reply to DAR was not filed by R-1 as well as by R-2.
3(b) Reply was filed by Insurance Company wherein the
validity and the genuineness of the Insurance Policy was
conceded, however, it was asserted that neither the Refresher
Course Certificate to drive Transport Vehicle carrying hazardous
goods was filed nor any endorsement was made on the license for
the relevant period, thus driver/ R-1 was not authorised to drive
vehicle transporting hazardous goods which constitutes violation
of the terms and conditions of the insurance company, therefore,
insurance company is not liable to indemnify the insured and to
pay compensation to victim.
4. Issues:
4(a) From the pleadings of parties, following issues were
framed vide order dated 30.10.2019:
i). Whether the injured suffered injuries in a road traffic accident on
09.07.2019 due to rash and negligent driving of vehicle bearing no.
DL 1GC 2666 being driven by R-1, owned by R-2 and insured with
R-3? OPP.
ii). Whether the injured is entitled to any compensation, if so, to what
extent and from whom?OPP
iii). Relief.
5. Evidence:
5(a) Matter was then listed for Petitioner Evidence. PW-1 Sh.
Prahalad Rai tendered his evidentiary affidavit as Ex.PW1/A. He
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relied upon following documents:
Ex.PW1/1 - Copy of MLC
Ex.PW1/2- Copy of the medical records.
Ex.PW1/3 to Ex.PW1/7- Copy of the discharge certificates
Ex.PW1/8- Copy of medical Prescription
Ex.PW1/9- Copy of bills
Ex.PW1/10 & Ex.PW1/11- Copies of Salary Certificates
Ex.PW1/12- Copy of his Aadhar Card
Ex.PW1/13- Copy of Driving License
Ex.PW1/14- Copy of the PAN Card
5(a) PW-1 was cross examined by counsel for Insurance
Company.
5(b) Sh. Anil Harsh was examined as PW-2 who appeared on
behalf of employer of claimant namely Harsh Specialty Coating
Pvt Ltd. He was cross examined by counsel for insurance
company.
5(c) Petitioner Evidence was closed. Matter was then listed for
RE.
5(d). R3W1 Ms. Pooja, Administrative Officer, M/s United
India Insurance Co. Ltd examined on behalf of Insurance
Company. She tendered her evidentiary affidavit as Ex.R3W1/A.
She relied upon copy of insurance policy as Ex.R3W1/1, Report
of Licensing Authority filed by the Investigating Officer as
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Ex.R3W1/2, copy of notice dated 05.04.2024 in terms of Order
12 Rule 8 CPC as Ex.R3W1/3, copy of the postal receipts as
Ex.R3W1/4 & Ex.PW1/5. She was cross examined by counsel
for claimant.
5(e) Respondent Evidence was accordingly closed. Matter was
then listed for Final Arguments.
6. Final Arguments:
6(a) Final Arguments were advanced by the contesting
counsels. Counsel for the claimant filed Written Submissions
arguing that R-1 & 2 chose not to cross examine PW-1 on the
aspect of rash and negligent driving and also did not produce any
evidence to revert the same and therefore, negligence on their
part can be inferred against them. It is further argued that the
petitioner suffered with open traumatic grade -III fracture of both
bones of his left leg and underwent surgeries, and prolonged
medical treatment which has also rendered him 63% permanent
disabled, leading to substantial loss of income, having adversely
affected his earning capacity. He also argued that the claimant is
entitled to compensation for loss of future earning. It is also
asserted that R-3 is liable to indemnify R-1 & 2 and pay
compensation to the claimant. He has relied upon following case
laws:
-Bimla Devi & Ors. Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation
& Ors. (2009) 13 SCC 530.
-Oriental Insurance Company Ltd Vs. Meena Variyal & Ors.
(2007) 5 SCC 428
-NKV Bros Pvt Ltd Vs.M Karumai Ammal & Ors. (1980) 3 SCC
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457
-United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shila Datta & Ors. (2011)
10 SCC 509
-Minu B Mehta & Anr. Vs. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan &
Anr (1977) 2 SCC 441
-Jagadish Vs. Mohan & Ors. (2018) 4 SCC 571
-Mohan Soni Vs. Ram Avtar Tomar & Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 267
6(b) Written Submissions filed on behalf of R-2 wherein
counsel for R-1 & 2 contended that R-1 was holding a valid
driving license with authorisation to drive transport vehicle
carrying hazardous goods under the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act. It is also stated that R-1 had already passed the the
certifying test on 19.02.2019, required for driving the hazardous
vehicle under the Motor Vehicle Act much prior to the date of
accident and therefore, R-1 was authorised to drive the hazardous
goods transport vehicle at the time of accident. It is also stated
that the driving license of R-1 was valid throughout the country
as per Rule 9 of Central Motor Vehicles Rules 1989. It is stated
that the owner has no responsibility to grant compensation to the
petitioner and as the insurance policy has been conceded by
Insurance Company to be valid as on the date of accident thus the
entire liability be falls upon the insurance company. It is also
argued that the insurance company is under an obligation to
prove willful breach on the part of vehicle owner and as such if
the driver has produced driving license which looks genuine on
the face of it then the employer is not expected to investigate into
the authenticity of the said license and same would not occasion
any breach of Sec. 149 (2) (a) (ii) and therefore, the insurance
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company would be solely liable to pay compensation. Counsel
for R-1 & R-2 relied upon judgments in the case of Iffco Tokio
General Insurance Company Ltd Vs. Geeta Devi & Ors SLP (C)
no. 19992 of 2023, Ram Shabad Yadav Vs. Harilal First Appeal
No. 217/2018.
6(c) Counsel for R-3 also filed written submissions asserting
that the driver of the offending vehicle was not authorised to
drive a transport vehicle carrying goods of hazardous nature,
relying upon report of Licensing Authority, Motor Vehicle
Department, Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh, as per which, the license
was valid from 24.02.2018 till 19.02.2019 whereas the accident
took place in July 2019. it is pointed out that there is no requisite
endorsement in the driving license which amounts to violation of
the conditions laid down in Sec. 14 (2) (a) of the MV Act. It is
asserted that the owner of the offending vehicle / insured
deliberately / knowingly permitted the driver without requisite
endorsement and authorisation to drive the offending vehicle,
which amounts to violation of the terms and conditions of the
insurance policy. Validity and effectiveness of the insurance
policy is however conceded. Therefore, the Insurance Company
seeks recovery rights against owner / insured. Counsel for R-3/
Insurance Company has relied upon judgments in the case of
Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Ltd Vs. Ramesh
Chand Sharma, MAC APP 447/2013, Laxmi Narain Vs.
Tirlochan Singh & Ors. FAO No. 289/2019, Reliance General
Insurance Co. Ltd Vs. Kiran Sharma & Ors. MAC Appeal
No.610/2015.
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7. Discussion:
On the basis of material on record, evidence adduced and
arguments addressed, issue wise findings are as under :
Issue No.1
i). i). Whether the injured suffered injuries in a road traffic accident
on 20.12.2022 due to rash and negligent driving of vehicle bearing no.
DL 3SET 4197 being driven by R-1, owned by R-2 and insured with
R-3? OPP.
7(a). PW-1 / injured affirmed by way of evidentiary affidavit
Ex.PW1/A that he was enroute Madanpur Khadar from Kalindi
Kunj via Pusta Road by his scooty at about 01.00 PM on
09.07.2019 when a truck bearing Reg. No. DL 1GC 2666, driven
by R-1 in a speedy and rash manner came from the side of loop
road and struck his scooty forcefully on account of which, he
sustained serious injury on his left leg. He stated that police
officials rushed him to the hospital after the accident. None
appeared on behalf of R-1 & 2 to cross examine him. During
cross examination by counsel for insurance company, he
reaffirmed the specifics of the accident. He was not cross
examined in respect of mode and manner of the accident. He
declined the suggestion that the accident took place due to his
negligence. He also stated that his driving license was valid at the
time of accident.
7(b). PW-1 has practically not been cross examined on the
aspect of mode and manner of the accident. The rashness on the
part of R-1 was also not questioned by the insurance company in
its reply. FIR was registered on the basis of statement of injured
on the date of accident itself. Injured was rushed to hospital by
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police officials. The accidental vehicles were found and seized
from spot itself. The specification about the offending vehicle as
well as about R-1 as driver of the offending vehicle were
mentioned in the first complaint leading to the registration of
FIR. In response to notice u/s 133 MV Act, the truck operator
accepted that R-1 was driving the offending vehicle at the time of
accident. Mechanical Inspection Report also reflects fresh
accidental damages on both the accidental vehicles corroborating
the deposition made by PW-1. Therefore, there is absolutely no
dispute in respect of the identification or the involvement of the
offending vehicle as well as R-1 as its driver, causing the
accident.
7(c). R-1 has been charge sheeted for causing injury to victim
due to speedy and rash driving of the offending vehicle. Perusal
of record reflects that no reply has been filed by owner or driver
contesting or barely denying the allegations/ averments in the
petition. R-1, being the driver was the best person to divulge
crucial details leading to the accident, however, he has chosen
not to testify about the contextual circumstances of the accident.
R-3/ Insurance Company could also have called upon R-1 as
driver of the offending vehicle to testify about the facts and
circumstances of the accident, however, same was not resorted
to. It is settled that filing of charge sheet itself is a significant
step towards the inference of negligence on the part of driver of
the offending vehicle. (Support drawn from the Judgment in the
case of National Insurance Company Vs. Pushpa Rana 2009 ACJ
287 Delhi as referred and relied by Hon'ble Supreme Court of
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India in case of Ranjeet & Anr. Vs. Abdul Kayam Neb & Anr
SLP (C) No. 10351/2019). It is also settled that adverse inference
can be drawn against the driver of the offending vehicle in case
he does not appear as a witness to depose and clarify about his
stance in respect of the accident. (support drawn from the
judgment in the case of Cholamandlam insurance company Ltd.
Vs. Kamlesh 2009 (3) AD Delhi 310.)
7(d). It is a well-established legal principle that negligence in
motor accident cases should be determined based on the
preponderance of probabilities, not on proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The facts and circumstances must be considered in a broad
and practical manner. It is also settled that proceedings under the
Motor Vehicles Act are different from regular civil suits and are
not strictly governed by the technical rules of the Indian
Evidence Act. This view has been supported in the judgments of
Bimla Devi & Ors. v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation &
Ors., (2009) 13 SCC 530; Kaushnumma Begum & Ors. v. New
India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2001 ACJ 421 (SC); and National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpa Rana, 2009 ACJ 287.
7(e). All material on record, including GD entries, FIR, charge-
sheet, mechanical inspection reports, findings, also as no attempt
has been made by the contesting respondents to set up any
defence support the necessary inference that the accident
occurred on account of speedy and rash driving of offending
vehicle. Issue No.1 is decided in favour of claimant and against
the respondents.
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ISSUE NO. 2
"Whether the injured is entitled to any
compensation, if so, to what extent and from whom?
OPP"
"The determination of quantum must be liberal, not
niggardly since the law values life and limb in a free
country in generous scales"
{as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the
case of Concord of India Insurance Company Limited Vs.
Nirmala Devi (1979 )4SCC 365}
8. Sec. 168 MV Act enjoins the Claim Tribunals to hold an
inquiry into the claim to determine the compensation payable and
pass an award. Relevant portion of Section 168 MV Act is
reproduced hereunder for ready reference:
"(1) Award of the Claims Tribunal.--On receipt of an
application for compensation made under section 166, the
Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to
the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an
opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as
the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the
provisions of section 162 may make an award determining the
amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and
specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be
paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify
the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver
of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them,
as the case may be: Provided that where such application makes
a claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of the
death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and
any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise)
for compensation in respect of such death or permanent
disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter X.
.
.
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.
9. “….Money cannot renew a physical frame that has been
battered.” {as observed in the case of H. West and Son Limited
Vs. Shephard 1958 -65 ACJ 504 (HL, England)}. It recognizes
that the physical damage caused once cannot be fully undone.
Something which remains as an indelible permanent signs of an
unfortunate incident cannot be balanced merely by paying some
monetary compensation. The process of damage and the ugly
scars left on physical body and mental self, navigating through
the entire process post accident and the unintended but
compulsory turns that it brings in the course of life is indeed
painful and traumatic. It is also required to be underlined that the
damage is not restricted to the tangible injuries visible on the
body of the injured rather catapults the lives of his family
members also.
10. The assessment or grant of compensation is a small
attempt to render assistance to the injured to navigate through the
hairpin unanticipated sudden and traumatic turn in order to bring
some elbow space for him to move towards stability and
normalcy to the extent possible. The underlying principle
remains thus to make good the damage so far as possible as
equivalent in money.
11. Section 168 MV Act puts an obligation over Tribunal to
assess ‘just’ compensation with the object of putting the sufferer
in the same position as nearly as possible as he would have been
if he had not sustained the wrong. It is worthwhile to reproduce
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certain observations made by Karnataka High Court in the case
of K. Narasimha Murthy v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd ILR 2004
KAR 2471 as referred and relied in the case of Rekha Jain Vs.
National Insurance Company Limited Civil Appeal No. 5370-
5372 of 2013 which enumerates the milestones to be kept in
mind by the Tribunal in an endevour to assess just compensation,
at the same time acknowledging that any amount of money
cannot compensate fully an injured man or completely renew a
shattered human physical frame as under:
“16. The Courts and Tribunals, in bodily injury cases, while
assessing compensation, should take into account all relevant
circumstances, evidence, legal principles governing quantification of
compensation. Further, they have to approach the issue of awarding
compensation on the larger perspectives of justice, equity and good
conscience and eschew technicalities in the decision-making. There
should be realisation on the part of the Tribunals and Courts that the
possession of one’s own body is the first and most valuable of all
human rights, and that all possessions and ownership are extensions
of this primary right, while awarding compensation for bodily
injuries. Bodily injury is to be treated as a deprivation which entitles
a claimant to damages. The amount of damages varies according to
gravity of injuries.”
12. It is also settled that the monetary assessment is a
methodology known to law as social and legal security to a
victim even though the nature of injuries and the individual
ramifications might vary in different cases, therefore, it is
understandable that one remedy cannot heal all. Further, the loss
is in the nature of deprivation and it is unlike a personal asset
with a price tag which can be simply awarded and therefore,
complete accuracy in making such assessment is not humanly
possible. The endevour is thus to make an assessment as best and
as fair as possible under the given circumstance. The uncertainty
of bringing justness to an assessment has been recognized, still
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holding that substantial damages must be awarded. The
observations made by Lord Halsbury in the case of Mediana In re
1900 AC 113 (HL) give valuable insights into the aspect and
reproduced as under:
“……Of course the whole region of inquiry into damages is
one of extreme difficulty. You very often cannot even lay
down any principle upon which you can give damages;
nevertheless it is remitted to the jury or those who stand in
place of the jury, to consider what compensation in money
shall be given for what is a wrongful act. Take the most
familiar and ordinary case: how is anybody to measure
pain and suffering in money counted? Nobody can suggest
that you can by any arithmetical calculation establish what
is the exact amount of money which would represent such
a thing as the pain and suffering which a person has
undergone by reason of an accident……. But nevertheless
the law recognises that as a topic upon which damages may
be given”
13. The uncertainty involved has also been recognized by
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Rekha Jain (supra)
where observations of Lord Blacburn in the case of Livingstone
Vs. Rawyards Coal Company (1880) 5 APP CAS 25 were
referred as under:
“…….where any injury is to be compensated by damages,
in settling the sum of money to be given… you should as
nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will put
the party who has been injured.. in the same position as he
would have been if he had not sustained the wrong….”
14. It is further observed by their Lordship in the case of
Rekha Jain (supra) as follows:
“41…..Besides, the Court is well advised to remember that
the measures of damages in all these cases ‘should be such
as to enable even a tortfeasor to say that he had amply
atoned for his misadventure’. The observation of Lord
Devlin that the proper approach to the problem or to adopt
a test as to what contemporary society would deem to be a
fair sum, such as would allow the wrongdoer to ‘hold upMACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 15 of 53
his head among his neighbours and say with their approval
that he has done the fair thing’ is quite opposite to be kept
in mind by the Court in assessing compensation in personal
injury cases.”
15. It is also settled that the compensation is not granted only
for the physical injury but for the entire loss which results from
the injury in an endevour to place the victim in a position as close
as possible as prior to the accident (support drawn from National
Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi & Ors (2017) 16
SCC 680 also in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343). It
is also settled as held in catena of judgments that the Motor
Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation and the object of
the Tribunal ought to be to assist the injured persons, (support
drawn from Helen C Rebello (Mrs) & Ors. v. Maharashtra State
Road Transport Corporation and Anr (1999) 1 SCC 90).
16. It is settled that an injured is required to be compensated
for his inability to lead full life, his inability to enjoy those
natural amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the
injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or
could have earned (support drawn from C. K. Subramonia Iyer
vs. T. Kunhikuttan Nair – AIR 1970 SC 376 as further referred
and relied in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) and then in a recent
pronouncement of Sidram Vs Divisonal Manager United India
Insurance Company & Anr SLP (Civil) No.19277 of 2018).
17. What is required of the Tribunal is to attempt objective
assessment of damages as nearly as possible without fanciful or
whimsical speculation even though, some conjecture specially in
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reference of the nature of disability and it consequence would be
inevitable. {support drawn from Raj Kumar (supra) as referred
and relied in Sidram (supra)}.
18. Observing that a measure of damages cannot be arrived with
precise mathematical calculations and that much depends upon
peculiar facts and circumstances of any matter, Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India elaborated upon the expression “which appears to
it to be just” in the case of Divisional Controller, KSRTC v.
Mahadeva Shetty and Another, (2003) 7 SCC 197.
19. The observations made by Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in the case of K. Suresh Vs. New India Assurance
Company Limited (2012) 12 SCC 274 provide valuable insights
into the factors to be weighed by the Tribunal for determination
of quantum of compensation. The relevant extract of which is
reproduced as under:
“10. It is noteworthy to state that an adjudicating authority, while
determining the quantum of compensation, has to keep in view the
sufferings of the injured person which would include his inability to
lead a full life, his incapacity to enjoy the normal amenities which he
would have enjoyed but for the injuries and his ability to earn as much
as he used to earn or could have earned. Hence, while computing
compensation the approach of the Tribunal or a court has to be broad-
based. Needless to say, it would involve some guesswork as there
cannot be any mathematical exactitude or a precise formula to
determine the quantum of compensation. In determination of
compensation the fundamental criterion of “just compensation”
should be inhered.”
20. The compensation has been broadly delineated as pecuniary
and non pecuniary in the case of R. D. Hattangadi Vs. Pest
Control India Pvt Ltd. 1995 AIR 755, it is worthwhile to
reproduce certain observations made therein:
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“9….while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a
victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed
separately as pecuniary damages and special damages.
Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually
incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of
money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are
incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In
order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may
include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical
attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial;
(iii) other material loss. So far non- pecuniary damages are
concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and
physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely
to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the
loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of
matters i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able
to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of
life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the
person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship,
discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in
life.”
21. The issue of determination of compensation in a personal
injury matter was extensively deliberated by Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) Relevant extract
of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced hereunder for further
discussion:
6. The heads under which compensation is awarded in
personal injury cases are the following:
Pecuniary damages (Special damages)
(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation,
medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and
miscellaneous expenditure.
(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured
would have made had he not been injured, comprising:
(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;
(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent
disability.
(iii) Future medical expenses.
Non-pecuniary damages (General damages)
(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a
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consequence of the injuries.
(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of
marriage).
(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal
longevity).
In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be
awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in
serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical
evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that
compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)
(b),
(iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on
account of permanent disability, future medical expenses,
loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and
loss of expectation of life.
7. Assessment of pecuniary damages under Item (i) and under
Item (ii)(a) do not pose much difficulty as they involve
reimbursement of actuals and are easily ascertainable from the
evidence. Award under the head of future medical expenses–
Item (iii)–depends upon specific medical evidence regarding
need for further treatment and cost thereof. Assessment of non-
pecuniary damages–Items (iv), (v) and (vi)–involves
determination of lump sum amounts with reference to
circumstances such as age, nature of injury/deprivation/disability
suffered by the claimant and the effect thereof on the future life of
the claimant. Decisions of this Court and the High Courts contain
necessary guidelines for award under these heads, if necessary.
What usually poses some difficulty is the assessment of the loss
of future earnings on account of permanent disability–Item (ii)
(a). We are concerned with that assessment in this case.
22. PECUNIARY DAMAGES
Damages under pecuniary heads primarily involves
reimbursement of actual amount spent on account of injury
suffered in an accident to undo the monetary loss, suffered by the
claimant, as ascertainable from the evidence on record. Given
hereunder are various heads under which compensation for
pecuniary damages is assessed:
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 19 of 53
A. Expenditure on Medical Treatment: Claimant has filed
medical treatment bills as Ex.PW1/10 (colly) & Ex.PW1/15
colly. As per computation filed by claimant, the total sum of such
bills was calculated to be Rs. 57,314/-. Sundry / miscellaneous
expenses cannot be ruled out during the admission in the hospital
and subsequently also. Accordingly, injured is awarded
Rs.67,314/- (Rs.57,314/- + Rs. 10,000/-) towards expenditure on
medical treatment.
B. Expenditure on Conveyance: Claimant has deposed that he
has visited hospital about 500 times and incurred more than
Rs. 30,000/- on conveyance. Any conveyance bill, however, has
not been filed on record. It is evident from the medical records
that injured suffered grievous injuries which is why he was not in
a state of free unrestricted mobility that he could undertake
hospital visits on his own without appropriate vehicular
arrangements. Injured underwent prolonged medical treatment
for about two years as per record with recurrent hospitalization
and numerous OPD visits. The family members of the injured
would also necessarily have made hospital visits to attend the
injured during hospitalization/ OPD visits. As such, an amount of
Rs. 30,000/- is awarded towards the head of conveyance.
C. Expenditure on Special Diet: Claimant has deposed that he has
spent more than Rs. 1,00,000/- on his special diet. However,
apart from medical bills any other bills related to special diet has
not been filed. Injured suffered severe crush injury on his left leg
with exposed bone and remained hospitalized for about 2 months
post accident. As per record, he underwent surgical proceduresMACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 20 of 53
several times during his treatment extending to more than two
years. He was prescribed high protein diet vide Discharge
Summary dated 07.09.2019 Ex.PW1/4 (colly) and later in
Discharge Summary dated 09.02.2021 Ex.PW1/5 as well. Given
the nature of injuries and the prolonged treatment including
certain operative procedures, as also prescribed in the Discharge
Summary, injured would have required to consume healthy
protein diet for prompt and effective recovery. Compensation to
the tune of Rs. 50,000/- is awarded to injured towards
expenditure on special diet.
D. Expenditure for Attendant: PW-1 deposed that his movements
were restricted on account of injuries sustained in the accident.
Thus his entire family used to render assistance for 24 hours a
day as he could not avail the services of attendant due to his poor
financial condition as hiring of attendant would have costed him
about Rs. 15,000/- per month. As per the medical records, he was
hospitalized for two months post accident wherein he underwent
two surgical procedures on 10.08.2019 & 31.08.2019 and later
again in February 2021, he remained hospitalized for
transposition of flap in left leg. Again, he underwent surgical
procedure in September 2021 and then in November 2021. His
bone grafting was done in March 2022. Considering the nature of
injuries sustained by injured, it cannot be stated that he was on
his own and did not need any assistance. During treatment, he
suffered recurrent hospitalization for about more than 2 years as
well as several operative procedures. It can be inferred that he
would have required the presence as well as service of his familyMACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 21 of 53
members during prolonged treatment. It is settled that the
services provided by family members are also required to be
compensated. An amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- is thus awarded
awarded towards expenditure for attendant charges.
E. Loss of earning during the period of treatment: PW-1 further
deposed that he served with Harsh Specialty Coating Pvt Ltd
with salary of Rs. 15,000/- per month. He also stated that he was
doing part time job and earning about Rs. 7000/- per month. In
support thereof, PW-1 produced Salary Certificate issued by an
Authorised Representative on behalf of Harsh Specialty Coating
Pvt Ltd. Ex.PW1/11 certifying his earning / salary as a delivery
boy to be Rs. 15,000/- per month. PW-1 also produced a
certificate issued by Proprietor, Malhotra Pvt Ltd that he worked
as a delivery boy in a Mother Dairy from the year 2014-2019 on
a monthly salary of Rs. 7,000/-.
E(i) PW-2 Sh. Anil Harsh, Director of Harsh Specialty Coating
Pvt Ltd was examined who deposed that Prahalad Rai joined
their company in year 2013 as a delivery boy and worked till the
date of accident, however, he could not join back due to injuries
sustained in the accident. He also stated that injured was getting a
salary of Rs. 15,000/- per month. During cross examination, he
stated that any appointment letter was not issued to the claimant
and that he used to be paid salary sometimes in cash and
sometime by cheque. He also clarified that the operations of the
company has been closed since the year 2020 and therefore, cash
vouchers cannot be produced. Insurance Company in its Written
Submissions has applied minimum wages for an unskilledMACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 22 of 53
workman in the State of NCT of Delhi as the monthly earnings of
injured which is Rs. 14,806/-. Considering that the injured has
produced salary certificate duly supported by testimony of PW-2,
which also commensurate with the minimum wages relied by the
insurance company, the monthly income of injured is accepted to
be Rs. 15,000/- per month. Since the proprietor for Malhotra
Enterprises has not been examined therefore, the certification
dated 28.10.2022 is not taken as proved and hence not counted as
part of monthly income.
E(ii) Injured deposed that he was admitted at AIIMS Trauma
Center on 09.07.2019 right after the accident, however, was later
transferred to Safdarjung Hospital on the same day where he
remained admitted all the while for about two months and
underwent surgical procedures on 10.08.2019 and 31.08.2019
and later discharged on 07.09.2019. Again he was admitted in the
month of February 2021 and underwent surgical procedures
involving Transposition of Superiorly based Fascio Cutaneous
Flap Left Leg + SSG, having been diagnosed with left leg upper
one third bone Fascio cutaneous flap delay. He was advised limb
elevation and weekly dressing as per the Discharge Summary.
Again in September 2021, he was readmitted in Safdarjung
Hospital with the complaint of pain and swelling of left lower
limb and underwent surgical procedures. He was again advised
limb elevation and active toe movement. In Nov. 2021, he
remained admitted for about a week in Safdarjung Hospital,
underwent a surgical procedure and advised limb elevation and
active toe movements. Subsequently, in March 2022, heMACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 23 of 53
remained admitted for about 10 days when he presented with
complaint of deformity at injury site and underwent bone
grafting. He was again advised limb elevation, active toe
movements, partial weight bearing and walker assisted
mobilization in the Discharge Summary dated 14.03.2022. He
was also advised weekly dressing till December 2019.
Considering the medical history placed on record, it is evident
that injured was constrained to remain under active medical
treatment including several surgical procedures, post accident
for the injuries sustained by him for about more than two years
post accident. It is also on record that injured could never joined
back his duty as a Delivery Boy on account of injuries sustained
in the accident. It can thus be inferred that injured would not
have been in a position to work for gain for at least 2 years (24
months) post accident.
E(iii) Amount towards loss of income during period of treatment
is thus calculated to be Rs. 15,000/- x 24 = Rs. 3,60,000/-.
F. Loss of future earning: It is settled that a person is required to
be compensated not just for the physical injury but also for the
loss he has suffered as well as the loss which he might entail for
the rest of his life on account of those injuries which he sustained
in the accident. This necessarily means that he is required to be
compensated for his inability to lead a full life, his inability to
enjoy normal amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the
injury, his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could
have earned. (Support drawn from the judgment titled as C. K.
Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair (1969) 3 SCC 64.
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 24 of 53
F(i) Claimant was assessed with 63% permanent physical
impairment in relation to left lower limb.
F(ii) Before proceeding further, it is important to understand as
to what disability means and also types thereof. This aspect has
been delved into by Hon’ble SC in Raj Kumar (supra):
“8. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to perform
an activity in the manner considered normal for a human being.
Permanent disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of
use of some part of the body, found existing at the end of the
period of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the
maximum bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to
remain for the remainder life of the injured. Temporary disability
refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on
account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the
period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be
either partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers to a
person’s inability to perform all the duties and bodily functions
that he could perform before the accident, though he is able to
perform some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful
activity. Total permanent disability refers to a person’s inability to
perform any avocation or employment related activities as a result
of the accident. The permanent disabilities that may arise from
motor accident injuries, are of a much wider range when
compared to the physical disabilities which are enumerated in the
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (“the Disabilities Act”,
for short). But if any of the disabilities enumerated in Section 2(i)
of the Disabilities Act are the result of injuries sustained in a
motor accident, they can be permanent disabilities for the purpose
of claiming compensation.”
F(iii) The term ‘disability’ means the decrements to the
functional efficacy of body of injured whereas ‘functioning’
encompass all the body functions and activities for an
independent life. Functional disability is to determine the extent
of loss or extent of restrictive functionality considering the nature
of activities required to be necessarily performed in efficient
discharge of duties and the limb effected. This computes the
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 25 of 53
extent of adverse effect of physical disability upon the functional
efficacy of an injured person, in turn adversely impacting his
earning capacity. The process entails understanding and
enumerating the skill set required for performing specific
activities. To sum up, functional disability basically measures the
extent of ability having been compromised to carry out basic
everyday tasks or even more complex tasks required for and
independent living. The limitations may occur on account of
disability in the personal sphere, in the social sphere and in the
occupational sphere. In the personal sphere it may encompass the
daily activities of a person, his body function and his
involvement in basis life situations. At the societal level, it could
mean difficulty in involvement and participation in social and
community activities interfering the interpersonal interaction and
relationship adversely impacting the civic life. When disability
restricts the vocation or employment avenues to make earning for
his living, it falls in the category of disability in the occupational
sphere. The disability might occur on account of age or any
illness and in the case at hand by way of an accident. A person
living a normal life in particular set of circumstance and making
his living by engaging in any work has suffered disability which
might impead his daily life activities, both on a personal and
social scale and might also impact his ability to continue earning
as much as before and his future employment avenues.
F(iv) What is thus required to be assessed is the effect and
impact of disability upon the working efficiency of injured and
whether it would adversely impact his earning capabilities in
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 26 of 53
future. It is settled that the Tribunal should not mechanically
apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of
economic loss or loss of earning capacity.
F(v) Hon’ble SC laid down certain guidelines for the Tribunal
to be able to arrive at an objective figure to quantify the loss for
the purpose of computing the compensation in the judgment of
Raj Kumar (supra). Relevant extracts of this judgment for the
purpose of further discussion are reproduced hereunder:
“Assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent
disability
9. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the
doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not,
with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate
states that the injured has suffered permanent disability to an
extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not the same as 45%
permanent disability with reference to the whole body. The extent
of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of
a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot
be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If
there is 60% permanent disability of the right hand and 80%
permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent
of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140%
(that is 80% plus 60%). If different parts of the body have
suffered different percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof
expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to
the whole body cannot obviously exceed 100%.
10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result
of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of
loss of future earnings would depend upon the effect and impact
of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The
Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of
permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of
earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of
economic loss, that is, the percentage of loss of earning capacity,
arising from a permanent disability will be different from the
percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly
assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of
permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of
earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence producedMACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 27 of 53
show 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45%
loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the
extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent
(percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either
too low or too high a compensation.
11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of
the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured;
and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a
percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terms of
money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the
standard multiplier method used to determine loss of
dependency). We may however note that in some cases, on
appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find
that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the
permanent disability, is approximately the same as the
percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, the
Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of
compensation. (See for example, the decisions of this Court in
Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [(2010)
10 SCC 254 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1258 : (2010) 10 Scale 298]
and Yadava Kumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2010) 10
SCC 341 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1285 : (2010) 8 Scale 567] )
12. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is
any permanent disability and, if so, the extent of such permanent
disability. This means that the Tribunal should consider and
decide with reference to the evidence:
(i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary;
(ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent
total disablement or permanent partial disablement;
(iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with
reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such
disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire
body, that is, the permanent disability suffered by the
person.
If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent
disability then there is no question of proceeding further and
determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the
Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it
will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal
ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the
claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine
whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect
his earning capacity.
13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the
actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal has to
first ascertain what activities the claimant could carry on in spite
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 28 of 53
of the permanent disability and what he could not do as a result of
the permanent disability (this is also relevant for awarding
compensation under the head of loss of amenities of life). The
second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of
work before the accident, as also his age. The third step is to find
out whether (i) the claimant is totally disabled from earning any
kind of livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent
disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on the activities
and functions, which he was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he
was prevented or restricted from discharging his previous
activities and functions, but could carry on some other or lesser
scale of activities and functions so that he continues to earn or can
continue to earn his livelihood.
.
.
.
.
19. We may now summarise the principles discussed above:
(i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from
injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity.
(ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to
the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the
percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently,
the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as
the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few
cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence,
concludes that the percentage of loss of earning capacity is
the same as the percentage of permanent disability).
(iii) The doctor who treated an injured claimant or who
examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his
permanent disability can give evidence only in regard to the
extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity
is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal
with reference to the evidence in entirety.
(iv) The same permanent disability may result in different
percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons,
depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job,
age, education and other factors.”
F(vi) Further in the case of “Mohan Soni v Ram Avtar Tomar &
Ors. I (2012) ACC 1 (SC), the question at hand was deliberated
and following observations as relevant in the context were made:
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 29 of 53
“In the context of loss of future earning, any physical
disability resulting from an accident has to be judged with
reference to the nature of work being performed by the
person suffering the disability. This is the basic premise and
once that is grasped, it clearly follows that the same injury or
loss may affect two different persons in different ways. Take
the case of a marginal farmer who does his cultivation work
himself and ploughs his land with his own two hands; or the
puller of a cycle-rickshaw, one of the main means of
transport in hundreds of small towns all over the country.
The loss of one of the legs either to the marginal farmer or
the cycle-rickshaw-puller would be the end of the road
insofar as their earning capacity is concerned. But in case of
a person engaged in some kind of desk work in an office, the
loss of a leg may not have the same effect. The loss of a leg
(or for that matter the loss of any limb) to anyone is bound
to have very traumatic effects on one’s personal, family or
social life but the loss of one of the legs to a person working
in the office would not interfere with his work/earning
capacity in the same degree as in the case of a marginal
farmer or a cycle-rickshaw-puller.
F(vii) The question of assessment of impact of disability on the
earning capacity has been dealt in several cases but it is
understood that each case has to be evaluated on its contextual
dynamics established by way of evidence at hand. It brings us to
a question whether extent of permanent disability as medically
determined can simply be taken to be the extent of functional
disability and hence, the loss of earning capacity. It has been held
in various pronouncements of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
and Hon’ble High Court that equating the two as a criteria would
result in an inobjective and absurd compensation. There however,
might be certain cases where the two would correspond to each
other but it cannot be mechanically applied rather requires
evaluation of applicable factors independently in each case to
reach at a fair quantification of loss of earning capacity.
F(viii) Claimant has testified himself to be employed as a
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 30 of 53
delivery boy prior to the accident which requires extensive and
unrestricted mobilisation. Claimant has placed on record his
driving license to show that his work involved driving a two
wheeler and delivering products. He underwent several surgical
procedures over a duration of about 2 & ½ years post accident
and had to endure substantial disability including deformity in
the left lower limb. It is unlikely that injured would be able to
perform the same task requiring driving of two wheeler for
extended duration for making his living post accident which is
bound to have an adverse impact on his earning efficiency. This
impairment significantly restricts mobility, a critical requirement
for his prior employment, which heavily relied on driving and
physical activity. The nature of his injury directly impacts his
ability to perform essential job functions, particularly those
involving extensive fieldwork and continuous driving, which are
indispensable for a delivery boy. Moreover, the psychological
and emotional consequences of the injury further diminish his
capacity to adapt to alternative employment or social settings,
compounding the overall effect on his earning ability. Given the
substantial impact on his ability to undertake field-oriented work,
his functional disability is assessed as 50% concerning his
earning capacity.
F(ix) Future Prospect: It is settled that future prospect (as laid
down in the well considered judgment of National Insurance
Company Vs. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680) shall be payable,
not only in fatal cases but also in the case of permanent disability.
(Support drawn from Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar & Ors.,MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 31 of 53
AIR 2020 SC 4424).
F(x) PW-1 has filed his Aadhar Card as Ex.PW1/13 on record as
per which his date of birth is 20.06.1979, therefore, his age as on
the date of accident was about 40 years and 19 days. Since the
injured was between the age of 40 to 50 years (at the time of
accident) and purportedly earning fixed income thus the
percentage towards future prospect is taken to be @ 25 % {as
laid down in the case of Pranay Sethi (supra)}. Further, multiplier
of 16 is applicable {as per table mentioned in para no.40 of Sarla
Verma (supra)}.
F(xi) In view of the above discussion of law, the calculation
under future loss of income in the present case is as under:
(a) Annual income (Rs. 15,000/- x 12) = Rs.1,80,000/-
(b) Future prospect (25% of Rs.1,80,000/-) = Rs.45,000/-
__________________
(c) Total = Rs. 2,25,000/-
(d) Thus, Multiplicand = Rs. 2,25,000/-
(e) Hence, the ‘Total Loss of Future Income’ shall be :-
Percentage of Functional Disability (Multiplicand X Multiplier).
50% (Rs. 2,25,000/- X 16) = Rs. 18,00,000/- MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 32 of 53 23. NON-PECUNIARY LOSS (i) Injured is entitled to both, pecuniary as well as non-
pecuniary damages. As the name suggests pecuniary damages are
designed to make good the pecuniary loss which can be
ascertained in terms of money whereas non pecuniary damages
are general damages to compensate the injured for mental and
physical shock, pain, suffering, loss of expectation of life,
inconvenience, hardship, frustration, stress, dejectment and
unhappiness suffered by him on account of injuries sustained in
the accident. It takes into account all the aspects of a normal life
which deluded injured on account of accident. Given the nature
of heads covered, it is bound to involve guess work on the part of
Tribunal involving some hypothetical consideration as well,
primarily considering the special circumstances of the injured
and the effect of those upon his future life.
(ii) Regarding non-pecuniary loss, following was stated in
Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4 th Edition, Vol. 12 (page 446):
“Non-pecuniary loss: the pattern: Damages awarded for pain and
suffering and loss of amenity constitute a conventional sum which is
taken to be the sum which society deems fair, fairness being
interpreted by the courts in the light of previous decisions. Thus
there has been evolved a set of conventional principles providing a
provisional guide to the comparative severity of different injuries,
and indicating a bracket of damages into which a particular injury
will currently fall. The particular circumstances of the plaintiff,
including his age and any unusual deprivation he may suffer, is
reflected in the actual amount of the award.
(As also referred in the case of Sidram…………………)
7. In Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India, (1999)
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 33 of 53
6 SCC 667, the Supreme Court held that the object of an award of
damages is to give the plaintiff compensation for damage, loss or
injury he has suffered. The Court further held that the elements of
damage recognized by law are divisible into two main groups:
pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. While the pecuniary loss is
capable of being arithmetically worked out, the non- pecuniary loss
is not so calculable. Non-pecuniary loss is compensated in terms of
money, not as a substitute or replacement for other money, but as a
substitute, what McGregor says, is generally more important than
money: it is the best that a court can do.
8. In Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 274, the Supreme
Court held that if a collection of cases on the quantum of damages is
to be useful, it must necessarily be classified in such a way that
comparable cases can be grouped together. No doubt, no two cases
are alike but still, it is possible to make a broad classification which
enables one to bring comparable awards together. Inflation should be
taken into account while calculating damages.
(referred and relied in the case of A. Rupin Manohar Through Sh.
S. Anandha vs Mohd. Ansari & Ors. 605/2015 passed by Hon’ble
Delhi High Court)
(iii) To sum up, Compensation under non-pecuniary heads
involves objective assessment of the damages in a bid to undo the
loss, the injured would incur on account of his inability to a
normal life and earn as much as he would, but for the injuries
sustained. The whole idea behind assessment for damages for
compensation is to put the claimant in the same position in so far
as money can. The very nature of these damages, compulsorily
involves some guesswork and hypothetical considerations,
however, efforts should be made to adjudicate these on the basis
of objective parameters rather than guided by subjective
sympathy. The nature and severity of injury, the age, nature of
disability are some of those parameters. Given hereunder are
various heads under which compensation for non-pecuniary loss
(general damages) is assessed:
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 34 of 53
(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma on account of
injuries: The mental and physical loss cannot always be
arithmetically computed in terms of money. These form the
intangible losses suffered by injured for no fault of his. Although
any form of human suffering cannot be equated in money,
however, the object remains to compensate in so far as the money
can compensate. Certain observations made by the Supreme
Court of India in R. D. Hattangadi are relevant in the context:
“10. It cannot be disputed that because of the accident the appellant
who was an active practising lawyer has become paraplegic on
account of the injuries sustained by him. It is really difficult in this
background to assess the exact amount of compensation for the pain
and agony suffered by the appellant and for having become a
lifelong handicapped. No amount of compensation can restore the
physical frame of the appellant. That is why it has been said by
courts that whenever any amount is determined as the compensation
payable for any injury suffered during an accident, the object is to
compensate such injury “so far as money can compensate” because
it is impossible to equate the money with the human sufferings or
personal deprivations. Money cannot renew a broken and shattered
physical frame.”
(v) Certain factors were also laid down for consideration in the
case of The Divisional Controller, KSRTC vs Mahadeva Shetty
And Anr Appeal (Civil) 5453 of 2003 further relied in the case of
Sidram (supra) for awarding compensation for pain and
suffering. The observations made in the aforesaid case as relevant
to the context are reproduced hereunder:
“113. Before we close this matter, it needs to be underlined, as
observed in Pappu Deo Yadav (supra) that Courts should be
mindful that a serious injury not only permanently imposes
physical limitations and disabilities but too often inflicts deep
mental and emotional scars upon the victim. The attendant
trauma of the victim’s having to live in a world entirely different
from the one she or he is born into, as an invalid, and withMACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 35 of 53
degrees of dependence on others, robbed of complete personal
choice or autonomy, should forever be in the judge’s mind,
whenever tasked to adjudge compensation claims. Severe
limitations inflicted due to such injuries undermine the dignity
(which is now recognized as an intrinsic component of the right
to life under Article 21) of the individual, thus depriving the
person of the essence of the right to a wholesome life which she
or he had lived, hitherto. From the world of the able bodied, the
victim is thrust into the world of the disabled, itself most
discomfiting and unsettling. If courts nit-pick and award
niggardly amounts oblivious of these circumstances, there is
resultant affront to the injured victim. [See: Pappu Deo Yadav
(supra)]
(vi) Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K. Suresh
(supra) observed as follows:
“2. … There cannot be actual compensation for anguish of the heart or
for mental tribulations. The quintessentiality lies in the pragmatic
computation of the loss sustained which has to be in the realm of
realistic approximation. Therefore, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 (for brevity “the Act”) stipulates that there should be grant
of “just compensation”. Thus, it becomes a challenge for a court of
law to determine “just compensation” which is neither a bonanza nor
a windfall, and simultaneously, should not be a pittance.”
But the measure of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt of
the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our yardsticks of
compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question
whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must
provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of
suffering. Awards of compensation are not law’s doles. In a discourse
of rights, they constitute entitlements under law. Our conversations
about law must shift from a paternalistic subordination of the
individual to an assertion of enforceable rights as intrinsic to human
dignity. (as relied in the case of Jagdish Vs. Mohan AIR 2018
SUPREME COURT 1347, by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India).
(vii) Injured suffered grievous injuries which led to 63%
permanent physical impairment in relation to his left lower limb.
He must have suffered immense physical, mental and emotional
trauma for what he was compelled to undergo on account of
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 36 of 53
injuries sustained in the accident. He was compelled to endure
prolonged medical treatment and several surgical procedures.
There is no measure with the court to quantify the pain and
suffering of the injured, however, an attempt is being made to
compensate in terms of money for the agony he must have
suffered. Therefore, an amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- is awarded to
the injured against pain, suffering and and trauma sustained in
the accident.
(viii) Loss of amenities of life: It compensates the victim on
account of his inability to enjoy the basic amenities of life as any
other normal person can, taking into account the age and the
deprivation he would have to undergo and suffer due to injuries.
Considering the nature of injuries suffered by claimant, an
amount of Rs. 50,000/- is awarded towards loss of amenities.
24. The compensation awarded against pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages under various heads is being sequentially put
in a tabulated form hereunder for ease of reference to all
concerned:
Sl. no. Pecuniary loss : - Quantum
1. (i) Expenditure on treatment : As Rs. 67,314/-
discussed above.
(ii) Expenditure on Conveyance : As Rs. 30,000/-
discussed above.
(iii) Expenditure on special diet : As Rs.50,000/-
discussed above.
(iv) Cost of nursing / attendant : Rs.1,50,000/-
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 37 of 53
(v) Loss of earning during the period of Rs.3,60,000/-
treatment:
(vi) Loss of Future Income Rs.18,00,000/-
2. Non-Pecuniary Loss :
(i) Damages for pain, suffering and Rs. 2,00,000/-
trauma on account of injuries:
(ii) Loss of amenities of life Rs. 50,000/-
3 Total Compensation Rs.27,07,314/-
Deduction, if any, Nil
Total Compensation after deduction Rs.27,07,314/-
Interest As directed
below
25. Interest:
25(a). It is settled that any fixed rate of interest cannot be
prescribed for all cases at all times and would largely depend
upon the prevailing rate of interest as per the applicable
guidelines. As such, interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum is
deemed fit and accordingly granted in the present case. (Reliance
placed upon National Insurance Company Ltd Vs. Yad Ram
MAC APP 526/2018 also referred and relied in case of The
Oriental Insurance Company Ltd Vs. Sohan Lal & Ors. MAC
APP 70/2024 of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court).
26. Liability:-
26(a). Ld. counsel for Insurance Company has contended that the
driver of the offending vehicle, though had a valid license to drive
transport vehicle, however, had no endorsement of the transportMACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 38 of 53
authority authorizing him to drive the hazardous goods carrying
vehicle, which constitute breach of the terms and conditions of
the policy and therefore, insurance company has prayed for
complete exoneration to pay compensation to the claimants.
Having said that, Ld. Counsel for insurance company has
conceded the validity and effectiveness of the insurance policy as
on the date of accident. Per contra, respondent no.2/owner of the
offending vehicle has contended that driver has the valid driving
license of the category of hazardous vehicle and had already
passed the test on 19.02.2019, as required for driving the
hazardous goods carrying vehicle as listed in the category of
hazardous vehicle under the motor Vehicle Act and thus there is
no reason to doubt the eligibility of R-1 to drive the hazardous
goods vehicle at the time of accident. R-2 also contended that the
owner duly performed its part of liability and thus not liable to
pay any amount of compensation to the petitioner. It is also stated
that the burden is upon the insurance company to prove that the
vehicle owner has failed to exercise due diligence to verify the
driving license before employing him as a driver. It is also stated
that the driver has been able to produce driving license which is
genuine on the face of it thus insured is under no liability to make
enquiries with RTOs to ascertain the veracity of the driving
license.
26(b). Insurance company has examined its Administrative
Officer who deposed that a notice dated 05.04.2024 was issued in
terms of Order XII Rule 8 CPC addressed to R-1 & R-2 toMACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 39 of 53
produce valid license to drive offending vehicle, covering the date
of accident, however same was not replied to. She deposed that
driver of the offending vehicle was not holding valid license to
drive vehicle carrying goods of hazardous nature. She relied upon
report of Licensing Authority, Motor Vehicles Department,
Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh which certifies that the license was valid
from 24.02.2018 to 19.02.2019 for driving vehicle carrying goods
of hazardous nature whereas accident took place on 09.07.2019
and thus said license was not valid on the date of accident for
driving Transport vehicle carrying goods of dangerous and
hazardous nature. She also deposed that the license did not have
requisite endorsement by the Licensing Authority in terms of
Section 14 (2) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. She also deposed
that the driver filed 3 days refresher course certificate, however,
his license did not carry any endorsement by the Licensing
Authority authorising him to drive a transport vehicle carrying
goods of dangerous and hazardous nature, effective for a period
of one year. She relied upon report of Licensing Authority as
Ex.R3W1/A. She however, stated that the insurance policy is
valid as on the date of accident. During cross examination by
counsel for claimant, she stated that she had no knowledge
whether the vehicle was indeed carrying any dangerous goods at
the time of accident. She also specified that the truck was moving
towards Indian Gas Plant as mentioned in the charge sheet. His
cross examination was adopted by counsel for R-2/ owner of the
offending vehicle.
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 40 of 53
26(c). The MV Act doesn’t explicitly define “hazardous
goods”, however it does recognize the need for safe
transportation of these goods. The MV Act, along with other
regulations, outlines requirements for the transportation of
dangerous goods, including vehicle design, operator
requirements, and driver training. Table 2 of Rule 137 of Central
Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 defines the indicative criteria for
categorization of a material as dangerous or hazardous which
includes flammable gas. Before proceeding ahead with the
discussion, it is imperative to advert to Rule 9 of the Central
Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 which lays down the educational
qualifications for driver of goods carriages carrying dangerous or
hazardous goods. It mandates that any such person shall
additionally be required to possess the ability to read and write
atleast one Indian Language and English and shall also possess a
Certificate of Training as per the syllabus prescribed therein.
Rule 9 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules is reproduced
hereunder for ease of reference :
“[9. Educational qualifications for drivers of goods carriages
carrying dangerous or hazardous goods.–24[(1) One year
from the date of commencement of Central Motor Vehicles
(Amendment) Rules, 1993, any person driving a goods
carriage carrying goods of dangerous or hazardous nature to
human life shall, in addition to being the holder of a driving
licence to drive a transport vehicle, also has the ability to read
and write at least one Indian language out of those
25[specified in the VIII Schedule of the Constitution] and
English and also possess a certificate of having successfully
passed a course consisting of following syllabus and
periodicity connected with the transport of such goods.”
26(d). Against the backdrop of the qualification laid under
Rule 9, Respondent no.2/owner of the offending vehicle has not
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 41 of 53
adduced any evidence to show that the driver had complied with
the qualifications as laid under Rule 9 Central Motor Vehicles
Rules 1989. Written Submissions, however, were filed by counsel
for R-2 wherein no submissions was made that the truck was not
carrying hazardous goods rather it was submitted that the driver
had a valid driving license as required under Rule 9 MVR and
that he had attended the training programme for safe
transportation of hazardous goods conducted from 17.02.2019 to
19.02.2019 which was valid upto 18.02.2020, thus there is no
violation of Sec. 14 (2) (a) of MV Act.
26(e). The contention on behalf of R-2 emphasises on the
certification of training imparted upon respondent no.1 to drive
the goods carriage carrying the hazardous goods. Against this
backdrop, it is relevant to enlist the duties or responsibilities
saddled upon owner of any such vehicle transporting the
hazardous goods. It is noted that Rule No. 132 of CMVR, 1989,
saddles duty upon owner to ensure that driver of the goods
carriage carrying such dangerous or hazardous goods hold a
driving license as per provisions of Rule 9 of CMVR, 1989.
Section 132 in The Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 has been
reproduced hereunder for ready reference :
“132. [ Responsibility of the transporter or owner of goods
carriage. [Rule132 substituted by GSR 338(E), dated
26.3.1993 (w.e.f. 26.3.1993).](1) It shall be the Responsibility of the owner of the goods
carriage transporting any dangerous or hazardous goods to
ensure the following, namely:
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 42 of 53
(a) that the goods carriage has a valid
registration to carry the said goods and the
said carriage is safe for the transport of the
said goods; and
(b) the vehicle is equipped with necessary
first-aid, safety equipment, tool box and
antidotes as may be necessary to contain any
accident.
(2) Every owner of a goods carriage shall, before
undertaking the transportation of dangerous or hazardous
goods in his goods carriage,satisfy himself that the
information given by the consignor is full and accurate in all
respects and correspond to the classification of such goods
specified in rule 137.
(3) The owner of a goods carriage shall ensure that the driver
of such carriage is given all the relevant information in
writing as given in Annexure V of these rules in relation to
the dangerous or hazardous goods entrusted to him for
transport and satisfy himself that such driver has sufficient
understanding of the nature of such goods and the nature of
the risks involved in the transport of such goods and is
capable of taking appropriate action in case of an emergency.
(4) The owner of the goods carriage carrying dangerous or
hazardous goods, and the consignor of such goods shall lay
down the route for each trip which the driver shall be bound
to take unless directed or permitted otherwise by the Police
Authorities. They shall also fix a time table for each trip to
the destination and back with reference to the route so laid
down.
(5) It shall be the duty of the owner to ensure that the driver
of the goods carriage carrying dangerous or hazardous goods
holds a driving license as per provisions of rule 9 of these
rules.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 131 and
132,it shall be sufficient compliance of the provisions of
these rules if the consignor transporting dangerous or
hazardous goods and the owner of the goods carriage or the
transporter, abides by these conditions within six months
after the date of coming into force of the Central Motor
Object 1
Vehicles (Amendment) Rules,1993.]”
26(f). Possessing Certificate of successful completion of
the requisite training as per the syllabus prescribed in Rule No.9,
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 43 of 53
is only one of the qualifications laid down for any driver of goods
carriage carrying dangerous or hazardous goods. Mere
certification cannot be equated with necessary compliance of
Rule 9 of CMVR, 1989. There is no evidence led that the driver
had the ability to read and write atleast one Indian language and
English, although it has not been disputed that he was holding a
valid driving license to drive the transport vehicle. At this stage it
is relevant to advert to Sec. 14 (2) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act
which lays down the requirement of license to drive a transport
vehicle carrying goods of hazardous nature that such a license
shall be effective only for a period of one year and its renewal
would require one day refresher course of the prescribed syllabus
by the driver. Sec. 14 (2) (a) is reproduced hereunder for further
reference:
“(2)A driving license issued or renewed under this Act shall,
(a) in the case of a license to drive a transport vehicle, be
effective for a period of [five years]: [*]
[Provided that in the case of license to drive a transport
vehicle carrying goods of dangerous or hazardous nature be
effective for a period of [three years and renewal thereof
shall be subject to such conditions as the Central
Government may prescribe; and] ]”
26(g). In a similar situation deliberated in the case of
Ramesh Chand Sharma (supra), Hon’ble Delhi High Court did
not consider the driving license to be valid in the absence of
required endorsement to drive a vehicle carrying hazardous
goods. Following observations as relevant to the issue at hand are
reproduced as under:
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 44 of 53
“7. It emerges from the pleadings before the Tribunal, and
the evidence adduced during inquiry into the claim petition
before it, that the offending vehicle was one which would
fall in the category of a transport vehicle meant to carry
dangerous or hazardous substances. In these circumstances,
the driving licence of the driver deputed to drive such
vehicle could not be the one ordinarily issued for purposes
of a heavy transport vehicle, as appears to be the case
pleaded by the driver and owner of the offending vehicle in
the matter at hand. Noticeably, the accident information
report (page 46 of the paper book) shows that the driving
license issued in favour of the driver (the second
respondent) in this case was claimed to be one valid for the
period 18.06.2004 to 17.06.2007. There is no material made
available to show that the driver had secured the
authorisation necessary in terms of Section 14(2) of MV
Act, read with rule 9 of Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989.
The rules as noted above, do not permit such validity in
case the driver is to be on duty on a vehicle carrying
dangerous or hazardous substances.”
26(h). In another case of United India Insurance
Company Ltd. vs. Salimuddin decided on 23.09.2019, in similar
facts where driver had a valid driving license and also possessed
the certificate of prescribed training, however, bereft of the
necessary endorsement of compliance of Rule 9 and
authorization by the Transport Authority to drive goods carriages
carrying hazardous goods, was held to be a case without valid
and proper driving license to drive a vehicle carrying hazardous
goods, observing that mere possession of a certificate from a
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 45 of 53
training school cannot substitute the statutory requirement of
driving license to be issued by a relevant authority, as the driver
had neither been tested nor approved by the licensing authority to
drive the hazardous carrying vehicle. Absence of the necessary
endorsement was also seen as a fundamental breach of policy
condition in view of the obligation upon owner to ensure that the
vehicle is driven by a person holding valid driving license in
terms of Rule 9 of CMVR 1989. Relevant extracts of case of
Salimuddin (supra) are reproduced hereunder :
“5. What emanates from the above is that the owner was able
to establish that the driver possessed the requisite driving
skills as certified by the aforementioned Government-
licenced Motor Driving Training School. However, it is
nobody’s case that mere possession of the certificate will
necessarily result in the Transport Authority certifying and/or
licencing the person as having the requisite skills to drive a
hazardous-goods carrying vehicle. As the name itself
suggests, a motor driving training school is a school/institute
which trains candidates to drive motor vehicles. It purports
to impart a trainee the requisite skills as well as teach them
the basic road signs and rules related to driving of motor
vehicles on roads.
6. Nevertheless, at the end of any such training, whenever a
candidate appears before the Transport Authority, his motor
driving skills and knowledge of the applicable rules are
tested by the Authority. It is only when the candidate passes
the tests that he is issued a driving licence. Mere possession
of a certificate from a training school cannot substitute the
statutory requirement of a Driving Licence to be issued by
the relevant authority. For driving of hazardous-goods
carrying vehicles, a further endorsement is required on the
Driving Licence.
7. In the present case, for indemnification against insurance
claims under the said policy, the insurer had proceeded in
good faith, that the driver of the hazardous-goods carrying
motor vehicle would have been duly licenced by the relevant
Licencing Authority, to drive the said vehicle. But on the
driving licence, there was no such endorsement. In other
words, the driver had neither been tested nor approved by theMACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 46 of 53
Licencing Authority to drive the hazardous-goods carrying
vehicle. There is a breach of policy condition, therefore, the
owner of the vehicle would be liable to indemnify the loss.”
26(i). Above case was referred and relied by Hon’ble
Delhi High Court in another case Mangla Goods Carrier Vs.
National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors., MACP APP
270/2021 (DOD : 14.09.2023), wherein following observations
were made :
“17. In view of the above dictum, even if it is accepted that
the respondent no.5 had undertaken the certificate course for
driving a vehicle carrying hazardous goods, in absence of an
endorsement in the driving licence authorizing him to do so, it
will remain a case of the respondent no.5 not having a valid
and proper driving licence to drive a vehicle carrying
hazardous goods.
18. In that view of the matter, the respondent no.1 has rightly
been granted the right to recover the compensation paid to the
claimants from the appellant.”
26(j). There is no evidence that the owner of the offending
vehicle was led to believe that the driving license was valid and
effective in terms of Rule 9 of CMVR. It is the case of
respondent no.2 that the driver underwent requisite training
programme which was valid upto 18.02.2020 thus covering the
date of accident. There is no positive evidence to show that any
application in terms of Rule 9 of CMVR was made by the driver
or any steps were taken on behalf of owner to ensure such
compliance. As held by Hon’ble Delhi High Court in number of
cases, absence of mandated endorsement for the compliance of
Section 14 (2) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, constitutes
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 47 of 53
fundamental breach of terms and conditions of the insurance
policy.
26(k). The judgments relied upon by R-2 mentions that
unless the license is demonstrably fake on the face of it, there is
no liability of the owner,however, in the present case, absence of
endorsement on the driving license was very apparent and evident
on the face of driving license which did not require any
verification from the concerned RTOs given the duty as cast upon
the owner of the transport vehicle carrying hazardous goods
about ensuring the compliance of Rule 9 of CMVR Act and the
mandate of Sec. 14 (2) (a) about additional necessary
endorsement.
26(l) Perusal of Ex.R3W1/2 which is an extract of driving
license issued by Licensing Authority, Motor Vehicle
Department, Prayagraj UP clearly shows that the license was
valid for driving transport vehicle from 24.02.2018 to 24.02.2021,
in distinction from its validity to drive hazardous goods carrying
transport vehicle from 24.02.2018 till 19.02.2019 whereas
accident took place on 09.07.2019, therefore, it is evident that the
driving license of R-1 had the authorisation for driving transport
vehicle carrying hazardous goods only till 19.02.2019 which did
not cover the date of accident. It also mentions the last
endorsement date by RTO Prayagraj as 24.02.2018 which shows
that any further endorsement in respect of authorization to drive
the hazardous goods vehicle was never made in respect of the
driving license of R-1. It is thus held that the driving license of
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 48 of 53
R-1, although valid for driving a transport vehicle, however, was
invalid for driving a transport vehicle carrying hazardous goods.
There is no contention that the vehicle was indeed not carrying or
was not meant to carry or transport any dangerous or hazardous
goods. It is also held that R-2 knowingly allowed the transport
vehicle to be driven by R-1 without valid driving license which
constituted fundamental breach of terms and conditions of the
insurance policy.
26(m). Considering that the insurance policy was valid and
effective as on the date of accident and also considering that
driver had a valid driving license to drive the goods carriage as on
the date of accident, in the interest of justice and in view of the
statutory obligation upon the insurance company to provide
coverage to the third party against the accident, it is directed that
the insurance company shall pay the entire compensation to the
injured along-with interest @ 7.5% from the date of filing of
Claim Petition till realization, however, shall be at liberty to
recover the same from driver as well as owner of the offending
vehicle.(If there is any order regarding exclusion of interest for
specific period, same be complied at the time of calculation of
award amount. Further, if any auction proceed is received, same
be adjusted in the final award amount).
27. The award amount shall be deposited by the Insurance
Company. Counsel for the Insurance Company is also directed to
furnish the complete case details, including the MACT case
number, CNR number, FIR number, name of Police Station,
name of the deceased/claimant(s), date of accident, and any other
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 49 of 53
relevant particulars, to the State Bank of India, Saket Court
Branch, New Delhi at the time of getting the amount deposited.
The amount shall be deposited through RTGS/NEFT/IMPS in the
account titled “MACT FUND PARKING”, Account No.
00000042706870765, IFSC Code SBIN0014244, MICR Code
110002342, under intimation to the Nazir of this Tribunal.
28. Release of Award Amount/ Disbursement
Out of total award amount, Rs.20,00,000/- along with
proportionate interest shall be kept in form of monthly FDR of
Rs. 15,000/- each. Remaining amount shall be released to him in
his bank account.
29. In terms of the Practice Directions issued by Hon’ble
High Court, vide reference no. 134/Rules/DHC, dated
14.05.2025, the claimant (s) are directed to produce their bank
account details along with either a certificate of the banker giving
all details of the bank account of the person or persons entitled to
receive the compensation including IFS Code, or a copy of
cancelled cheque of the bank account to this Tribunal with seven
days of the date of Award, if not already placed on record. They
are also directed to file their Aadhar Card and PAN Card if not
already filed.
30. Directions to the Branch Manager, SBI, Saket Court
Complex
30(a). The Manager, SBI, Saket Court Complex, is further
directed to verify the documents and details submitted by the
claimant pertaining to their bank account, and upon proper
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 50 of 53
verification, under certification of the Branch Manager (of the
bank whose details have been provided by the claimant for
release of the compensation amount) disburse the amount,
directed to be released to the claimant, directly into the verified
bank account of the claimant under notice to the Tribunal.
31. Directions with respect to Fixed Deposit:
31(a) As per Practice Directions, Hon’ble High Court, vide
reference no. 134/Rules/DHC, dated 14.05.2025, the bank shall
invest the amount to be deposited in fixed deposit with any
nationalised bank and fixed deposit shall be with the standing
instructions to the bank to renew the same after periodical
intervals till further orders are passed by the Tribunal.
31(b) The Bank shall not permit any joint name (s) to be added
in the savings bank account or fixed deposit accounts of victim
i.e. the savings bank account of the claimant shall be individual
savings bank account and not a joint account.
31(c) The original fixed deposit shall be retained by the bank in
safe custody. However, the statement containing FDR number,
FDR amount, date of maturity and maturity amount shall be
furnished by bank to the claimant.
31(d) The monthly interest be credited by Electronic Clearing
System (ECS) in the savings bank account of the claimant near
the place of their residence.
31(e) The maturity amounts of the FDR (s) be credited by
Electronic Clearing System (ECS) in the savings bank account of
the claimant near the place of their residence.
31(f) No loan, advance or withdrawal or pre-mature discharge be
allowed on the fixed deposits without permission of the Court.
31(g) The concerned bank shall not issue any cheque book and/
or debit card to claimant (s). However, in case the debit card and/MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 51 of 53
or cheque book have already been issued, bank shall cancel the
same before the disbursement of the award amount. The bank
shall debit freeze the account of the claimant so that no debit
card be issued in respect of the account of the claimant from any
other branch of the bank.
31(h) The bank shall make an endorsement on the passbook of
the claimant to the effect, that no cheque book and / or debit card
have been issued and shall not be issued without the permission
of the Court and claimant shall produce the passbook with the
necessary endorsement before the Court on the next date fixed
for compliance.
SUMMARY OF COMPUTATION OF AWARD
AMOUNT IN INJURY CASES TO BE INCORPORATED IN
THE AWARD.
1 Date of accident 09.07.2019
2 Name of injured Prahalad Rai
3 Age of the injured 40 years
4 Occupation of the Not proved
injured5 Income of the injured As per minimum wages.
6 Nature injury Grievous injury and disability
7 Medical treatment taken As per record.
by the injured:
8 Period of As per record.
Hospitalization
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 52 of 53
9 Whether any permanent Yes.
disability?
32. Copy of this award be given to the parties free of cost. The
copy of award be also sent to the Ld. Secretary DLSA and
concerned criminal court. Digitally signed
by SHELLY
SHELLY ARORA
Announced in the open court ARORA Date:
2025.06.04
16:24:53 +0530
on 04.06.2025
Shelly Arora
PO (MACT)-02, SE/Saket/Delhi
04.06.2025MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 53 of 53
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