Himachal Pradesh High Court
Parkash Chand vs State Of H.P on 10 March, 2025
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5520 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No. 398 of 2014
Reserved on: 03.03.2025
Date of Decision: 10.03.2025
Parkash Chand
….Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P.
….Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
For the Petitioner : Ms. Sheetal Vyas, Advocate.
For the Respondent/ : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria,
State Additional Advocate
General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
The present revision is directed against the
judgment dated 25.09.2014 passed by learned Sessions Judge,
Bilaspur (learned Appellate Court) vide which, the judgment
passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur
(learned Trial Court) convicting and sentencing the petitioner
(accused before learned Trial Court) was upheld. (Parties shall
__________
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were
arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision are that the police presented a challan against the
accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the
Indian Penal Code (in short ‘IPC‘). It was asserted that the
informant, Dina Nath (PW1), and his son Sunil Dutt (PW7)
were returning from Shimla in a bus bearing registration No.
HP-10-0388, which was being driven by the accused. Sunil
Dutt had sustained a fracture earlier in an accident, and he
had gone to Shimla to get himself examined. When the bus
reached Namhol at 12-12:15 pm, the accused drove it towards
the other side of the road and hit a truck coming from the
opposite direction. 5-6 persons sustained injuries in the
accident. The injured were taken to the hospital. An
intimation was given to the police regarding the accident. An
entry (Ext. PW6/A) was recorded in the Police Station. ASI-
Ram Nath (PW8), HC Prakash Chand, HHC Harbans Singh
(PW5) and HHC Kamal Lal went to PHC Namhol for
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verification of the information. Ram Nath (PW8) recorded the
statement of the informant Dina Nath (Ext. PW1/A), which
was sent to the Police Station where FIR (Ext. PW8/A) was
registered. ASI Ram Nath conducted the investigation. He
prepared the site plan (Ext. PW10/B). He took the
photographs of the spot (Ext. P1 and Ext. P2) whose negatives
are Ext. P3 and Ext. P4. He filed an application for conducting
the medical examination of the injured and obtained the
MLCs of Sujata (Ext. PA), Vatani Devi (Ext. PB), Sunil Dutt
(Ext. PD), Rikhi Ram (Ext. PE), and Prakash Chand (Ext. PF).
He also collected X-rays of Sujata (Ext.PG, PG1 and PG2),
Vatani Devi (Ext. PH and PH1), and Sunil (Ext. PJ, PJ1 to PJ4).
ASI-Ram Nath seized the bus vide memo (Ext. PW4/B). Sher
Singh (PW3) mechanically examined the bus and found that it
had no mechanical fault in it. He issued the report
(Ext. PW3/A). ASI Ram Nath recorded the statement of
witnesses as per their version and arrested the accused. The
challan was prepared and presented before the Court after the
completion of the investigation.
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3. Learned Trial Court put the notice of accusation to
the accused for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC, to which he pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to
prove its case. Dina Nath (PW1), Vatani Devi (PW2) and Sunil
Dutt (PW7) were travelling on the bus. Sher Singh (PW3)
mechanic, conducted the mechanical examination of the bus.
Rakesh Kumar (PW4) was driving the truck. HHC Harbans
Singh (PW5) is the witness to the recovery of the truck.
Constable Geeta Ram (PW6) proved the entry in the daily
diary. ASI Ram Nath (PW8) conducted the investigation.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was driving the bus.
He claimed that he was innocent. He did not lead any
evidence in defence.
6. The Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies
of the eyewitnesses corroborated each other in material
particulars. The mechanic did not find any fault in the vehicle.
It was proved by the medical evidence that the occupants had
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sustained simple and grievous injuries. The defence version
that the accident occurred due to the mechanical fault in the
vehicle was not believable. The spot map showed that the
vehicle was being driven towards the wrong side of the road,
which constituted negligence on the part of the accused.
Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337
and 338 of IPC and sentenced him under:
Under Section 279 To undergo simple imprisonment till the
of IPC rising of the Court and a fine of ₹1000/-.
Under Section 337 To undergo simple imprisonment till the
of IPC rising of the Court and a fine of ₹500/-.
Under Section 338 To undergo simple imprisonment till the
of IPC rising of the Court and a fine of ₹1000/-.
7. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order
passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal,
which was decided by learned Sessions Judge Bilaspur.
Learned Sessions concurred with the findings recorded by the
learned Trial Court that the testimonies of the witnesses
corroborated each other. The site plan showed that there was
sufficient space towards the left side of the bus, and the bus
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was being driven towards the right side of the road. The
defence version that the accident had taken place due to a
mechanical defect was not proved. Driving the bus after
leaving 10.5 feet of space towards the left side of the road
constituted negligence, which caused simple and grievous
injuries to the occupants of the vehicle. Learned Trial Court
had imposed a lenient sentence. Hence, the appeal filed by the
petitioner/accused was dismissed.
8. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by
learned Sessions Judge, the petitioner/accused has filed the
present petition asserting that learned Courts below erred in
appreciating the evidence. The accident had taken place on a
blind curve from where the oncoming traffic could be seen at
a distance of 2-4 feet. Dina Nath Kaundal (PW1) stated in his
cross-examination that he was not aware whether the brakes
were applied, which is highly improbable because the
passenger would feel the jerk caused by the application of the
brake. PW2 stated that she was deposing about the
registration number of the vehicle after being told by the
police and the witnesses, which affected her credibility. There
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5520 )
is no evidence of high speed. Learned Trial Court erred in not
granting the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the
petitioner. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition
be allowed and the judgment passed by learned Courts below
be set aside.
9. I have heard Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent/State.
10. Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in
appreciating the evidence. It was duly proved that the
accident had taken place on a blind curve. The plea of the
petitioner that there was a mechanical defect in the vehicle
due to which the bus was dragged towards the right side of
the road was plausible. The driver of the truck corroborated
this version and the learned Courts below erred in rejecting it.
There was no rashness or negligence of the accused. She
submitted in the alternative that learned Trial Court had
erred in not granting the benefit of the Probation of Offenders
Act to the accused. Therefore, she prayed that the present
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revision be allowed and the judgments passed by learned
Courts below be set aside.
11. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent/State, supported the
judgments passed by learned Courts below. He submitted that
the defence version regarding the mechanical defect in the
vehicle was not proved by any satisfactory evidence. The
mechanic specifically stated that there was no mechanical
defect in the vehicle, which could have led to the accident.
This Court will not interfere with the finding of facts while
exercising revisional jurisdiction, and there is no patent
defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law in the judgments of
learned Courts below; hence, he prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the
records carefully.
13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:
(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the
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revisional court is not an appellate jurisdiction and it can onlyrectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It
was observed on page 207: –
“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions,
at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are
concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two
courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and
evidence brought on record. The High Court in
criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to
exercise the jurisdiction like to the appellate court and
the scope of interference in revision is extremely
narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in
short “CrPC“) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or
himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of
any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and
as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior
court. The object of the provision is to set right a
patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There
has to be a well-founded error which is to be
determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also
well settled that while considering the same, the
Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the
facts and evidence of the case to reverse those
findings.
14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294 wherein it
was observed:
“13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court
under Section 397 Cr. P.C. which vests the court with
the power to call for and examine records of an inferior
court is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the
legality and regularities of any proceeding or order
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made in a case. The object of this provision is to set
right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law
or the perversity which has crept into such
proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the
judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh
Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460 where the scope of Section
397 has been considered and succinctly explained as
under:
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of
an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying
itself as to the legality and regularity of any
proceedings or order made in a case. The object
of this provision is to set right a patent defect or
an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a
well-founded error and it may not be
appropriate for the court to scrutinise the
orders, which upon the face of it bear a token of
careful consideration and appear to be in
accordance with the law. If one looks into the
various judgments of this Court, it emerges that
the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where
the decisions under challenge are grossly
erroneous, there is no compliance with the
provisions of law, the finding recorded is based
on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
perversely. These are not exhaustive classes but
are merely indicative. Each case would have to
be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a
very limited one and cannot be exercised in a
routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is
that it should not be against an interim or
interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in
mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction
itself should not lead to injustice ex-facie.
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Where the Court is dealing with the question as
to whether the charge has been framed properly
and in accordance with the law in a given case, it
may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of
its revisional jurisdiction unless the case
substantially falls within the categories
aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-
advanced stage in the proceedings under
the CrPC.”
15. The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
16. Learned Courts below held that the petitioner was
negligent because he was driving the vehicle towards the
right side of the road. This conclusion was based on the
evidence led before the learned Trial Court. The informant-
Dina Nath (PW1), stated that the accused left sufficient space
towards his side and hit the truck on the other side of the
road. The site plan (Ext. PW10/B) shows that the bus had left
its side and was being driven towards the other side. The
width of the road was 25 feet at the place of the accident.
10/½ feet of space was available towards the left side of the
bus, whereas only 2 feet of space was available towards the
left side of the truck. The photograph (Ext. P2) shows that the
bus had crossed the dividing white marks. Its right tyre is
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5520 )
towards the right side of the divider, marked by white lines.
This evidence clearly shows that the bus had left its side and
was being driven towards the right side of the road. Rule 2 of
the Rules of Road Regulation 1989 provides that a driver of a
motor vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of
the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic
which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his
right side. Therefore, the driver of a motor vehicle is
supposed to drive the vehicle towards the left side of the road.
In the present case, the accused had breached this duty by
driving the vehicle towards the right side of the road, which
shows his negligence. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs.
State AIR 1961 Orissa 71 that driving the vehicle on the wrong
side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed:
“The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a
space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus,
however, was on the right side of the road leaving a
gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no
doubt that the car was coming on the proper side
whereas the bus was coming from the opposite
direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is
only 7 feet 6 inches and as there was a space of more
than 10 feet on the left side the bus could easily have
avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side
of the road.”
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17. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh
Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399 that where the vehicle was taken
towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It
was observed:
“The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point
‘A on the right side of the road were blood stain marks
and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point ‘E’ is the
place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time
of the accident and point ‘G’ is the place where P.W. 3
Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from
Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point ‘A’ in spot map Ext.
P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the
road.”
18. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti
Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 and it was held:
“16. The evidence in the present case has to be
examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the
Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out
clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was
10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side while going from Dangri
to Kangoo there was a 7 ft. kacha portion and on the
other side, there is an 11 ft. of kacha portion. The total
width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured was
coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the
left side of the road. This has been stated both by the
injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is apparent also
from the fact that after he was hit the injured fell into
the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The
learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been
argued before me, that nobody has stated that the
motorcycle was on its wrong side. This fact is apparent
from the statement of the witnesses who state that
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they were on the extreme left side and the motorcycle
which was coming from the opposite side hit them. It
does not need the genius to conclude that the
motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road
and therefore on the wrong side.”
19. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held
that the accused had breached the Rule of the Road
Regulation while driving the bus towards the right side of the
road after leaving sufficient space towards the left side.
20. It was submitted that there was a mechanical
defect in the vehicle, which led to the accident. Learned
Courts below had rightly pointed out that Sher Singh (PW3)
mechanic specifically stated that there was no mechanical
fault in the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-10-0388. His
statement does not corroborate the defence version regarding
the mechanical defect in the vehicle.
21. Sher Singh (PW3) stated in his cross-examination
that there was a blind curve at the place of the accident, and
the vehicles were visible from a distance of 2-4 feet. Ms
Sheetal Vyas learned counsel for the petitioner/accused,
submitted that the accident had taken place on a blind curve
where there was no visibility, and it was a circumstance
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beyond the control of the accused. This submission overlooks
the fact that the proximate cause of the accident was that the
vehicle was being driven towards the right side of the road.
Since the width of the road was 25 feet on the spot, the
accident would not have taken place had the bus been driven
towards the left side of the road. Hence, the place of accident
being a blind curve will not help the petitioner.
22. Sher Singh (PW3) stated in his cross-examination
that an emergency brake was applied, due to which the bus
skidded towards the right side. He also stated that the vehicle
can skid because of the sudden application of the brake due to
the damage in the lining spring. It was submitted that the
sudden application of the emergency brake led to the
accident. This submission cannot be accepted because the site
plan (Ext. PW10/B) specifically mentions that there were no
skid marks on the spot to suggest that any attempt was made
to apply the brakes. The photographs (Ext. P1 and P2) also do
not show any skid marks on the spot, and this hypothetical
possibility that the vehicle can skid because of the damage to
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the lining spring has not been established by the
circumstances on record.
23. Further, the accused nowhere stated in his
statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he
applied the brakes or there was damage to the lining spring
that dragged the bus towards the right side of the road.
Therefore, the plea regarding the dragging of the bus cannot
be accepted merely because of some hypothetical answer
given by the mechanic.
24. Nothing was brought on record to show why the
accused had to apply the emergency brake. As has been
noticed above, had the bus been driven towards its left side,
there would not have been any necessity to apply any brake,
and there would not have been any accident. Thus, the
proximate cause of the accident was not the application of the
brake but not driving the bus towards the left side of the road.
25. Sher Singh, the mechanic, stated that he had not
checked the lining springs of the vehicle because they were
inside the front and rear wheels. He volunteered to say that
the fault could be detected by driving the vehicle. The vehicle
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was driven by the accused. This part of the cross-
examination shows that he had not checked the lining spring,
and his testimony regarding the damage to the lining spring
is not acceptable.
26. Rakesh Kumar (PW4) stated in his cross-
examination that the accused applied emergency brake and
the bus was dragged towards the right side due to the
skidding. He and the accused had checked the front wheel
lining spring and found that it was damaged. The accident
was caused due to the damage to front wheel lining spring.
27. The testimony of this witness is not at all
acceptable. Learned Appellate Court has rightly pointed out
that he was trying to help the accused. It is not shown that he
is a mechanical expert. As already stated, the accused
nowhere stated in his statement recorded under Section 313
of Cr.P.C. that he had checked the front lining spring. He had
not even pointed out any such damage to the mechanic who
conducted the mechanical examination. Therefore, the
testimony of this witness regarding the damage to the front
lining spring was rightly rejected by the learned Courts below.
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28. Vatani Devi (PW2) stated in her cross-
examination that the accused applied the brakes on the curve,
and the bus skidded towards the driver’s side, leading to the
accident. Her version is not supported by the circumstances
on record because no skid marks were found on the spot.
Secondly, even if her version is accepted as correct, no reason
has been assigned for the application of the emergency brake.
Hence, her testimony will not help the accused.
29. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly
held that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle by
leaving sufficient space towards the left side of the road.
30. It was submitted that Sunil Dutt had already
suffered a fracture, and the fracture noticed by the Medical
Officer cannot be attributed to the present incident. This
submission is not acceptable. MLC (Ext. PC), which was
admitted by the accused, mentions that there was evidence of
a fresh fracture of the shaft of the left femur. This report of
the Medical Officer clearly shows a fresh fracture, and it
cannot be said that Sunil Dutt had not sustained any fresh
fracture and that the Medical Officer had only noticed the
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earlier fracture. Further, Vatani Devi’s MLC (Ext. PB), which
was admitted by the accused, shows a grievous injury. Thus,
it was duly proved on record that Sunil Dutt and Vatani Devi
had sustained grievous injuries.
31. MLCs of Sujata (Ext. PA), Dina Nath Kaundal
(Ext.PB) and Rikhi Ram (Ext. PE) show the simple injuries,
which were caused within less than 6 hours of the
examination. These MLCs were admitted by the accused, and
it is duly proved on record that Sujata, Dina Nath and Rikhi
Ram had sustained simple injuries.
32. Therefore, it was duly proved on record that the
accused had negligently driven the vehicle, and his
negligence led to the accident, causing simple and grievous
injuries to the occupants of the vehicle. Therefore, he was
rightly convicted by the learned Trial Court, and the
conviction was rightly upheld by the learned Appellate Court.
33. It was submitted that learned Courts below erred
in not granting the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act.
This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana
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(2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders
Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-
A of IPC. It was observed:
“11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is
made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a
convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road
accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent and
the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no
solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to
bring them down. When this Court lamented two
decades ago that “more people die of road accidents
than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highway
are among the top killers of the country” the
saturation of accidents toll was not even half of what it
is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the
said decision thus :
“Rashness and negligence are relative concepts,
not absolute abstractions. In our current
conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and
under the rubric of negligence, must have due
regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of
heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces.”
12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1
SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine,
imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-
A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too
had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was
convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and
causing the death of a human being. In that case, this
Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous
imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine.
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13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road
accidents in India and the devastating consequences of
visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts
cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A,
I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of
the PO Act. While considering the quantum of
sentence, to be imposed for the offence of causing
death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one
of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A
professional driver pedals the accelerator of the
automobile almost throughout his working hours. He
must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford
to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness
when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion.
He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that
rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or
even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily
result in the death of any human being, or even if such
death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence,
and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be
dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep
in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the
offence of causing the death of a human being due to
his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from
a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can
play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for
lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the
callous driving of automobiles.”
34. A similar view was taken in Thakur Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 208, wherein it was observed: –
6. Learned counsel lastly made an alternative plea that
the Probation of Offenders Act may be applied to
secure his job. This Court has held in Dalbir
Singh v. State of Haryana [(2000) 5 SCC 82] that the
Probation of Offenders Act cannot be invoked in cases
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involving rash or negligent driving of the bus resulting
in death of human beings.”
35. In State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC
182, it was held: –
13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a
policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good
driver, must have better training in traffic laws and
moral responsibility with special reference to the
potential injury to human life and limb. Considering
the increased number of road accidents, this Court,
on several occasions, has reminded the criminal
courts dealing with the offences relating to motor
accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the
offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the
benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view
expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC
82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208].
36. Therefore, in view of these binding precedents, it
is not permissible to grant the benefit of the Probation of
Offenders Act in an offence involving rash and negligent
driving.
37. This Court held in State of H. P. Versus Sushil Kumar
2010(1) HLJ 298 that no leniency should be shown to a person
convicting or for driving a vehicle in a rash or negligent
manner. It was observed:
“21. In so far as the sentence part is concerned, in my
considered opinion, the learned trial Court has lost
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sight of the fact that there has been a spiralling
increase in motor vehicular accidents in recent years.
Thousands of valuable lives are being lost by a sheer
act of rash and negligent driving, which is more than
the loss of lives in any war between countries.
22. The Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh v. State of
Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 on the question of sentence in
a case of an identical nature stated:-
“13. While considering the question of a sentence
to be imposed for the offence of causing death by
rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of
the prime considerations should be deterrence. A
professional driver pedals the accelerator of an
automobile almost throughout his working hours.
He must constantly inform himself that he cannot
afford to have a single moment of laxity or
inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a
vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not
take a chance thinking that rash driving need not
necessarily cause an accident; or even if any
accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in
the death of any human being; or even if such
death ensues, he might not be convicted of the
offence and lastly, that even if he is convicted he
would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He
must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if
is convicted of the offence for causing the death of
a human being due to his callous driving of the
vehicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This
is the role which the Courts can play, particularly
at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high
rate of motor accidents, due to callous driving of
automobiles.”
23. Hon’ble Shri Justice K.G. Balakrishnan, as he then
was, while speaking for the Court, in State of Karnataka
v. Sharanappa Basnagouda Aregoudar AIR 2002 Supreme
Court 1529, where the accused was held guilty for
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5520 )
causing the death of four persons and the High Court
took a lenient view in sentencing the accused,
observed:-
“We are of the view that having regard to the
serious nature of the accident, which resulted in
the death of four persons, the learned Single
Judge should not have interfered with the
sentence imposed by the Court, below. It may
create and set an unhealthy precedent and send
wrong signals to the subordinate Courts which
have to deal with several such accident cases. If
the accused are found guilty of rash and negligent
driving, Courts have to be on guard to ensure that
they do not escape the clutches of law very lightly.
The sentence imposed by the Courts should have a
deterrent effect on potential wrongdoers and it
should be commensurate with the seriousness of
the offence. Of course, the Courts are given
discretion in the matter of sentence to take stock
of the wide and varying range of facts that might
be relevant for fixing the quantum of sentence,
but the discretion shall be exercised with due
regard to the larger interest of the society and it is
needless to add that passing of sentence on the
offender is probably the most public face of the
criminal justice system.”
24. Therefore, on the examination of the matter in the
above circumstances and on facts, I think no word is
sufficient to criticize the conduct and prudence of the
learned trial Magistrate dealing with the point of
sentence in a shockingly reckless manner. Looking at
the gravity of the offence, the sentence imposed by the
learned trial Court is wholly inadequate. The learned
trial court has inflicted a fleabite sentence on the
respondent who has not atoned adequately for his
misadventure.”
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5520 )
38. In the present case, the occupants of the vehicle
had sustained simple and grievous injuries. Learned Trial
Court had imposed a sentence till the rising of the Court.
Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that this was a
lenient sentence, and in the absence of the appeal by the
State, nothing could have been done. Learned Trial Court had
shown the leniency, and no further leniency is justified.
39. No other point was urged.
40. Consequently, the present revision fails, and the
same is dismissed.
41. The present petition stands disposed of and so are
the pending applications, if any.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
10th March, 2025
(saurav pathania)