(A) Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963) , S.20— Suit for specific performance – Agreement to sell – Plaintiff entered into a registered agreement of sale with original owner of suit property – Original owner expired leaving behind defendants as his heirs – Plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract – There was nothing to indicate that there was a hardship of kind which original owner did not foresee at time he executed agreement of sale or that hardship which defendants would face was result of an act of plaintiff based on his supervening acts – Question of hardship in terms of S.20(2)(b) read with explanation (2) bears reference to hardship, which defendant did not foresee at time of entering into contract – Order of High Court holding that plaintiff was not entitled to decree for specific performance as same would cause hardship to defendants and setting aside decree of specific performance passed in favour of plaintiff was erroneous.
AIR 2023 (NOC) 221 (TRI)-ReversedAIR 1999 SC 2309-Relied on(Paras333436404142)
(B) Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963) , S.20— Specific performance of contract – Grant of relief of – Principles regarding – Discussed.
The relief of specific performance having its roots in equity, the Specific Relief Act, 1963, prior to its amendment has preserved the discretion of the Court not to grant the relief even though the agreement is specifically performable in law. The only fetters imposed by the statute on the exercise of the discretion are that the discretion must not be exercised arbitrarily but soundly and reasonably and guided by judicial principles. The phrase “capable of correction by a Court of appeals” has been inserted possibly to indicate the necessity for the Trial Court to state the reasons for exercising its discretion in a particular way. The circumstances when specific performance mentioned in the Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (2) of S.20 cannot be granted are not expressly exhaustive. They indicate the situations in which the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. However, certain considerations have been excluded as relevant factors. These are contained in Explanations 1 and 2 to the Section and in S.20(4). Each of these exclusions are preceded by the word “mere”. The word “mere” in the context means “sole”. In other words, any one of those factors by itself would not justify the exercise of discretion against granting specific performance. The factors cumulatively or with other factors may form the basis of a decision not to grant specific performance. Hardship of the defendant may be one of the grounds which may be taken into consideration for exercising its discretion by the Court in refusing to grant a decree for specific performance of contract.
S.20(1) indicates that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary. Yet, the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but is “sound and reasonable”, to be “guided by judicial principles”. The exercise of discretion is capable of being corrected by a court of appeal in the hierarchy of appellate courts. S.20(2) contains a stipulation of those cases where the court may exercise its discretion not to grant specific performance. A perusal of S.20, as it then stood would go to show as to under what circumstances ‘hardship’ can be taken into consideration in refusing specific performance. It is not possible to enumerate the different circumstances which constitute a hardship. It will suffice if it is noted that the question of hardship will have to be adjudged in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is also necessary to remember that mere rise in price subsequent to the date of the contract or inadequacy of price is not to be treated as a hardship entailing refusal of specific performance of the contract. Further, the hardship involved should be one not foreseen by the party and should be collateral to the contract. In sum, it is not just one factor or two, that is relevant for consideration. But it is the some total on various factors which is required to enter into the judicial verdict.