Delhi High Court
Pawan Kumar Through His Lrs vs Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust on 11 June, 2025
Author: Tushar Rao Gedela
Bench: Tushar Rao Gedela
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Order reserved on : 06.06.2025 Order delivered on : 11.06.2025 + RC.REV. 60/2025 & CM APPL. 31166/2025 PAWAN KUMAR THROUGH HIS LRS ....Petitioner Through: Mr. Sanjeev Sahay & Ms. Shagun Saproo, Advocates. versus HARNARAIN DASS CHARITABLE TRUST .....Respondent Through: Mr. Shiv Charan Garg & Mr. Imran Khan, Advocates. + RC.REV. 61/2025 & CM APPL. 31169/2025 MS BAJRANG BARTAN BHANDAR .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Sanjeev Sahay & Ms. Shagun Saproo, Advocates. versus HARNARAIN DASS CHARITABLE TRUST .....Respondent Through: Mr. Shiv Charan Garg & Mr. Imran Khan, Advocates. + RC.REV. 85/2025 & CM APPL. 31163/2025 VINOD KUMAR .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Sanjeev Sahay & Ms. Shagun Saproo, Advocates. versus HARNARAIN DASS CHARITABLE TRUST .....Respondent Through: Mr. Shiv Charan Garg & Mr. Imran Khan, Advocates. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA ORDER
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By:MADHU SARDANA
Signing Date:11.06.2025
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TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J.
CM APPL. 11099/2025 & CM APPL.31165/2025 in RC.REV. 60/2025
CM APPL. 11229/2025 & CM APPL. 31168/2025 in RC.REV. 61/2025
CM APPL. 14141/2025 & CM APPL. 31162/2025 in RC.REV. 85/2025
1. The present applications have been filed seeking stay of the
operation of the impugned order dated 23.08.2024 passed by the learned
ADJ-cum-CCJ-cum-ARC, North, Rohini Courts, Delhi whereby the
Eviction Petitions bearing RC ARC No.21/2016 titled Harnarain Dass
Charitable Trust vs. Pawan Kumar through his Legal Heirs; RC ARC
No.19/2016 titled Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust vs. Bajrang Bartan
Bhandar; and RC ARC No.18/2016 titled Harnarain Dass Charitable
Trust vs. Vinod Kumar, were allowed in favour of the respondent; and
further seeking stay of the execution proceedings till the final disposal of
the present petitions.
2. Though this Court is a Vacation Bench, on the insistence of the
applicant/petitioner regarding the urgency expressed on account of
imminent threat of dispossession on account of pending execution
proceedings, this Court has taken up the present applications for disposal.
Mr. Sanjeev Sahay, learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners had
addressed common arguments across all the stay applications.
3. For the purpose of consistency and convenience, the petitioner/tenant
shall hereafter be referred to as ‘Tenant’ and the respondent/landlord as
‘Landlord’.
4. Before this Court proceeds with the merits of the stay applications, it
would be apposite to examine the scope and jurisdiction which a Court
exercises while adjudicating petitions filed against judgment and decree
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passed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1957. The
law in that regard, without an exception, has been fairly well settled and
authoritatively by the Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam vs. Inder Sain
Dua: (2022) 6 SCC 30.
5. The relevant paragraphs of Abid-ul-Islam (supra) circumscribing the
scope and jurisdiction of the High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction
are extracted hereunder:-
“22. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit of the
proviso to Section 25-B(8). The proviso creates a distinct and
unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order
passed by the learned Rent Controller over an application filed under
sub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is
to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal.
It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through
a covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.
23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power
of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the
nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making
process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not
expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court
by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the
process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very
restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the
face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a
decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters
which would otherwise amount to converting the power of
superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally
forbidden by the legislature.
24. We do not wish to go further on this settled proposition of law, except
by quoting the decision of this Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. [ (1998) 8 SCC 119] :
“5. Section 25-B of the Act lays down ‘special procedure for the
disposal of application for eviction on the ground of bona fide
requirement’. Sub-section (1) says that every application for
recovery of possession on the ground specified in Section
14(1)(e) of the Act shall be dealt with in accordance with the
procedure specified in Section 25-B. Sub-section (8) says that no
appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the
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recovery of possession of any premises made by the Rent
Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this
section. The proviso to that sub-section reads thus:
‘Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of
satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller
under this section is according to law, call for the records
of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it
thinks fit.’
6. The above proviso indicates that power of the High Court is
supervisory in nature and it is intended to ensure that the Rent
Controller conforms to law when he passes the order. The
satisfaction of the High Court when perusing the records of the
case must be confined to the limited sphere that the order of the
Rent Controller is “according to the law”. In other words, the
High Court shall scrutinise the records to ascertain whether any
illegality has been committed by the Rent Controller in passing
the order under Section 25-B. It is not permissible for the High
Court in that exercise to come to a different fact finding unless
the finding arrived at by the Rent Controller on the facts is so
unreasonable that no Rent Controller should have reached such
a finding on the materials available.
7. Although, the word “revision” is not employed in the proviso
to Section 25-B(8) of the Act, it is evident from the language
used therein that the power conferred is revisional power. In
legal parlance, distinction between appellate and revisional
jurisdiction is well understood. Ordinarily, appellate
jurisdiction is wide enough to afford a rehearing of the whole
case for enabling the appellate forum to arrive at fresh
conclusions untrammelled by the conclusions reached in the
order challenged before it. Of course, the statute which provides
appeal provision can circumscribe or limit the width of such
appellate powers. Revisional power, on the contrary, is
ordinarily a power of supervision keeping subordinate tribunals
within the bounds of law. Expansion or constriction of such
revisional power would depend upon how the statute has
couched such power therein. In some legislations, revisional
jurisdiction is meant for satisfying itself as to the regularity,
legality or propriety of proceedings or decisions of the
subordinate court. In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing
Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar [(1980) 4 SCC 259] this Court
considered the scope of the words (“the High Court may call for
and examine the records … to satisfy itself as to the regularity of
such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any
decision or order…”) by which power of revision has been
conferred by a particular statute. Dealing with the contention
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that the above words indicated conferment of a very wide power
on the revisional authority, this Court has observed thus in the
said decision :
‘3. … The dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of
the words ‘to satisfy itself’ under Section 25 appears to be
that the power conferred on the High Court under Section
25 is essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore,
despite the wide language employed in Section 25, the
High Court quite obviously should not interfere with
findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the
finding of the subordinate authority.’
8. Dealing with Section 32, the Delhi and Ajmer Rent (Control)
Act, 1952, which is almost identically worded as in the proviso
to Section 25-B(8) of the Act, a three-Judge Bench of this Court
has stated thus in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal
Chowdhury [AIR 1963 SC 698] :
‘8. … The section is thus framed to confer larger powers
than the power to correct error of jurisdiction to which
Section 115 is limited. But it must not be overlooked that
the section — in spite of its apparent width of language
where it confers a power on the High Court to pass such
order as the High Court might think fit, — is controlled by
the opening words, where it says that the High Court may
send for the record of the case to satisfy itself that the
decision is “according to law”. It stands to reason that if
it was considered necessary that there should be a
rehearing, a right of appeal would be a more appropriate
remedy, but the Act says that there is to be no further
appeal.’
9. In Malini Ayyappa Naicker v. Seth Manghraj
Udhavadas [(1969) 1 SCC 688] another three-Judge
Bench of this Court was considering a similarly worded
proviso in Section 75(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act,
1920. Though, the learned Judges did not give an
exhaustive definition of the expression “according to
law”, a catalogue of instance in which the High Court
may interfere under the said proviso was given in the
decision as the following [Ed. : The passage quoted is an
extract from Beaumont, C.J.’s judgment in Bell & Co.
Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, 1937 SCC OnLine Bom 99, para 4
: (1938) 40 Bom LR 125 which was approved by the
Supreme Court in the case cited.] :
‘7. … “4. … are cases in which the Court which
made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the
Court has based its decision on evidence which
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should not have been admitted, or cases where the
unsuccessful party has not been given a proper
opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof
has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever
the Court comes to the conclusion that the
unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial
according to law, then the Court can interfere.” ‘
10. The Bench has, however, cautioned that the High
Court should not interfere merely because it considered
that “possibly the Judge who heard the case may have
arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not
have arrived at”.
11. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in the
present case has reassessed and reappraised the evidence
afresh to reach a different finding as though it was
exercising appellate jurisdiction. No doubt even while
exercising revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal of
evidence can be made, but that should be for the limited
purpose to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by
the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable. A reading of
the impugned order shows that the High Court has
overstepped the limit of its power as a revisional court.
The order impugned on that score is hence vitiated by
jurisdictional deficiency.
12. Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act
affords one of the grounds to the landlord to seek recovery
of possession of the building leased. The said clause reads
thus:
’14. (1)(e) that the premises let for residential
purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for
occupation as a residence for himself or for any
member of his family dependent on him, if he is the
owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the
premises are held and that the landlord or such
person has no other reasonably suitable residential
accommodation;
Explanation.–For the purposes of this clause,
“premises let for residential purposes” include any
premises which having been let for use as a residence
are, without the consent of the landlord, used
incidentally for commercial or other purposes;’
13. If the landlord has another residential accommodation
which is reasonably suitable, he is not permitted to avail
himself of the benefit afforded in the ground set out in the
clause. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has noted
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that the landlord in this case has ‘admitted in her deposition
that the house in Calcutta was a 3-bedroom house with
drawing/dining room and one of the bedrooms was used by
her, another by her son with his wife and another bedroom
was kept for her daughter who used to come and stay’. This
was one of the reasons which persuaded the learned Single
Judge to interfere with the order of eviction. To deprive a
landlord of the benefit of the ground mentioned in Section
14(1)(e) on account of availability of alternative residential
accommodation, it is not enough that such alternative
accommodation is in a far different State. Such
accommodation must be available in the same city or town,
or at least within reasonable proximity thereof if it is outside
the limits of the city. The said limb of clause (e) cannot be
interpreted as to mean that if the landlord has another house
anywhere in the world, he cannot seek recovery of possession
of his building under clause (e). The High Court therefore
went wrong in observing that since the landlord has
possession of another flat at Calcutta she is disentitled to
seek recovery of possession of the tenanted premises situated
at Delhi.
14. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section
14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for
occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When
a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own
occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the
presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When
other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the
landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent
Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the
landlord is bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not
for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else
he can adjust himself without getting possession of the
tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides
of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to
make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have
adjusted himself.”
(emphasis in original)
25. The aforesaid decision has been recently considered and approved by
this Court in Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal [Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay
Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC 327]
“22. This Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co.
Ltd. [Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC
119] had an occasion to consider the scope of proviso to Section 25-
B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. This Court found, that
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though the word “revision” was not employed in the said proviso,
from the language used therein, the legislative intent was clear that
the power conferred was revisional power. This Court observed thus
:
’11. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in the
present case has reassessed and reappraised the evidence
afresh to reach a different finding as though it was exercising
appellate jurisdiction. No doubt even while exercising
revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal of evidence can be
made, but that should be for the limited purpose to ascertain
whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is
wholly unreasonable.’
It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that the High Court
while exercising the revisional powers under the Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958 though could not reassess and reappraise the evidence, as
if it was exercising appellate jurisdiction, however, it was
empowered to reappraise the evidence for the limited purpose so as
to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding
court is wholly unreasonable.
23. Again in Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani [Ram Narain
Arora v. Asha Rani, (1999) 1 SCC 141] , this Court had an occasion
to consider the aforesaid powers under the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958. This Court observed thus :
’12. It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision
petition under Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent
Control Act is a very limited one, but even so in examining
the legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent
Controller, the High Court could examine the facts
available in order to find out whether he had correctly or
on a firm legal basis approached the matters on record to
decide the case. Pure findings of fact may not be open to be
interfered with, but (sic if) in a given case, the finding of
fact is given on a wrong premise of law, certainly it would
be open to the Revisional Court to interfere with such a
matter.’
It was thus held, that though the scope of revisional powers of the High
Court was very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or
propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court
could examine the facts available in order to find out whether he had
correctly or on a firm legal basis approached the matters on record to
decide the case. It has also been held, that pure findings of fact may not
be open to be interfered with, but in a given case, if the finding of fact is
given on a wrong premise of law, it would be open to the Revisional
Court to interfere with the same.”
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6. What flows from the aforesaid enunciation of law by the Supreme
Court is, that the High Court exercises a jurisdiction which is in the nature
of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision making process,
inclusive of procedural compliance. The Supreme Court has cautioned that
the High Court is not expected to substitute and/or supplant its view with
that of the Trial Court by exercising an appellate jurisdiction. The role
ascribed is purely to satisfy itself on the process adopted. In other words,
the Supreme Court categorically held that the scope of interference by the
High Court is restricted and except in cases where there is an error apparent
on the face of the record, the High Court should not venture to disturb such
a decision. It would also be relevant to note that the High Court is not to
hold a roving inquiry in such matters so as to prevent converting the power
of superintendence into that of regular first appeal which was totally
forbidden by the legislature. Thus, the revisionary jurisdiction is highly
circumscribed and restricted in its expanse.
7. That said, this Court would now examine the merits of the stay
applications as argued by learned counsel for the parties.
8. Mr. Sahay, learned counsel appearing for the tenant vociferously
argued three primary issues, namely, (i) that the learned Additional Rent
Controller (hereinafter referred to as “the ARC”), though noted the
submission of the tenant in respect of additional/alternate accommodation
available with the landlord, yet gave no finding at all in respect thereto,
thereby committing an error apparent on the face of the record, making the
impugned judgment amenable to revisional jurisdiction of this Court; (ii)
the learned ARC, though noted that the tenant too had filed a site plan on
his behalf, contrary to the site plan filed by the landlord, yet, did not renderSignature Not Verified
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any finding at all on the said aspect making the impugned judgment, yet
again open to revision by this Court on the ground of error apparent on the
face of the record; and (iii) the learned ARC did not consider the arguments
based on the rent agreement executed in the year 1993 wherein consequent
upon payment of Rs.7.5 Lakhs, the parties had mutually agreed that the
tenancy shall not be terminated under any circumstances even if a new
body takes over the charge of management of the landlord trust, making the
impugned judgment amenable to the revisional jurisdiction. Thus,
according to Mr. Sahay, on the aforesaid errors on the face of the record,
the tenants are entitled to stay from eviction from the subject premises,
during the pendency of the revision petitions.
In Re. Issue No. (i):-
9. Learned counsel, while addressing arguments on issue no.(i), had
copiously referred to various paragraphs of the leave to defend application;
the reply thereto filed by the landlord; and ultimately the findings or, as
argued, no findings recorded by the learned ARC. Learned counsel
emphasizes that while the tenant had listed out as many as 15
additional/alternative accommodations, the landlord in his eviction petition
as also in the reply to the leave to defend application had given an evasive
and bald response. Primarily, learned counsel submits that for whatever
they were worth, on the averments of both parties contained in the
pleadings and argued, the learned ARC has not given any finding at all. In
order to buttress the aforesaid argument, learned counsel referred to para 33
of the impugned judgment which reads thus:-
“33.The respondent has next contended that the petitioner has alternate
accommodations which are sufficient for the purpose mentioned. The said
act has been vehemently denied by the petitioner thereby claiming that the
properties mentioned by the respondent are not owned by the petitioner
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trust.”
10. According to learned counsel, apart from the observations in para 33,
there is no finding of fact recorded at all by the learned ARC. This, as per
him, is, prima facie, an error apparent on the face of the record requiring
this Court to not only admit the main revision petitions, but also grant
immediate stay from eviction. Learned counsel vehemently argued that the
observation of the learned ARC that properties mentioned by the tenant in
the leave to defend application are not owned by the landlord, is itself
wrong and perverse. He forcefully contended that it was not even the case
of the landlord that the properties mentioned in para 9 of the leave to
defend application did not belong to it, therefore, wherefrom the learned
ARC concluded this observation, is a mystery. This, according to him, is
not just an error apparent but a perverse finding, based on no evidence.
In Re. Issue No. (ii):-
11. The second issue raised by learned counsel for the tenant is in
respect of no finding having been recorded at all by the learned ARC in
regard to the site plan filed on record by the tenant as against the site plan
filed by the landlord in support of the eviction petition. Learned counsel
stoutly argued that the tenant had taken a specific stand in the leave to
defend application that the site plan placed on record by the landlord is not
correct, and that the site plan placed on record by the tenant is the correct
plan which according to him, is a triable issue which needed to have been
appreciated by the learned ARC and consequently leave to defend ought to
have been granted. He submits that when there are two competing and
contradictory site plans on record, it is incumbent upon the Court to have
recorded a finding after evidence is permitted to be led on that account by
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both the parties. He contended that passing of the impugned judgment in
the absence of such vital evidence violates the law as settled by this Court
in Babu Ram Gupta vs. Chander Prakash, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine
Delhi 1467. He submits that this Court in Babu Ram Gupta (supra),
particularly in para 10, held that if the tenant seeks to dispute the site plan
filed by the landlord and/or contend that the same does not depict entire
details of the suit property, it is open for the tenant/opposite party to file a
site plan of his own. Learned counsel on the aforesaid observation of this
Court in Babu Ram Gupta (supra) sought to contend that in the present
case, since the tenant had undisputedly placed on record his own site plan,
it was incumbent upon the Court to have rendered a finding one way or the
other by not only granting leave to defend but also permitting the tenant to
lead evidence. Having not done so, learned ARC has violated the law as
settled in Babu Ram Gupta (supra). This issue itself, being a triable one
and not having been considered at all by the learned ARC, entitles the
tenant to an immediate stay from eviction.
In Re. Issue No. (iii):-
12. The last issue contended by learned counsel for tenant is in respect of
a bar from being evicted from the tenanted premises. He submitted that the
parties had entered into a tenancy agreement in the year 1993 wherein
consequent upon payment of Rs.7.5 Lakhs by the tenant to the landlord, it
was mutually agreed that the tenancy shall not be terminated under any
circumstances and even if a new body takes over charge of the management
of the landlord, such tenancy shall continue. He emphasizes that the mutual
understanding was recorded in writing in Clause 5 of the tenancy
agreement. The tenancy agreement indicated that the parties are ad idem on
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the said issue. Premised thereon, he contended that the landlord is
precluded from seeking eviction at all. Though, he fairly admitted that the
tenancy agreement is an unregistered document.
13. Learned counsel submitted that the learned ARC had returned a
contrary finding with respect to the tenancy agreement, in that, on the one
hand, he relied upon it to base the finding of landlord-tenant relationship,
yet simultaneously, rejected the aforesaid contention of the tenant on the
basis that the agreement is unregistered and hence, hit by Section 17 of the
Registration Act, 1908. According to the learned counsel, despite the fact
that tenancy agreement is unregistered, it can be taken into evidence to
prove collateral purposes forming subject matter of the tenancy agreement.
Thus, learned counsel sought to impress upon this Court that the mutually
destructive findings recorded by the learned ARC in respect of the very
same document would be, per se, perverse and consequently, requiring this
Court to exercise its revisional power to set the impugned judgment aside.
He contended that, for the time being, immediate orders restraining the
landlord from evicting the tenant be passed.
14. Per Contra, Mr. Garg, learned counsel appearing for the landlord
vehemently refutes the submissions addressed on behalf of the tenant. In
respect of issue (i), learned counsel refers to para 10 of the leave to defend
application to submit that para 33 of the impugned judgment was rendered
in respect of the contents of para 10 of the leave to defend application read
with its response by the landlord in the corresponding paragraph of the
reply to the leave to defend. He drew attention to para 10 of the reply to the
leave to defend application which reads thus:-
“10. That the contents of para no.10 of the application are wrong, false
& frivolous, hence, the same are denied. It is denied that the petitioner
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has not disclosed the properties which are owned and possessed by it. It
is denied that the petitioner has deliberately concealed these material
facts. Rest of the para is wrong and denied.
It is submitted that the petitioner has no concern with the property
bearing no. 231 & 97 Pana Udyan, Narela, Delhi and further the
respondent has not filed any document in this respect for proving his
contention that the aforesaid properties belong to the petitioner. It is
further submitted that the property being no. 19A has already been
mentioned in the present petition along with its documents.
It is further submitted that petitioner is not an owner/landlord of
Aggarwal Bhawan as stated in property no. 17/25, Shakti Nagar, Delhi –
110007. It is further submitted that 17/25, Shakti Nagar, Delhi -110007
is a residential property.”
He submitted that the finding in respect of the contentions stated in
para 10 of both, the leave to defend application and its reply, are contained
in para 34 of the impugned judgement. He thus submitted that the
submissions of the tenant in respect of para 33 of the impugned judgment is
misleading, fallacious and absolutely irrelevant. So far as the contents of
properties mentioned in para 9 of the leave to defend application are
concerned, learned counsel invites attention of this Court to para 18(a)(viii)
to submit that the correct and proper description of the properties in
question have been delineated in detail with the specifications of the
tenants who are in possession of such portions or shops. According to him,
these are the 15 properties that the tenant has referred to in para 9 of its
leave to defend application. That apart, he submits that conveniently,
learned counsel for the tenant has not referred to para 34 of the impugned
judgment. He contended that the learned ARC has not only dealt with
contents of para 10 of the leave to defend application but also dealt with the
other properties in para 34 of the impugned judgment. Thus, according to
the learned counsel, there is neither any perversity nor any lack of cogent
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finding in respect of the property so mentioned which were stated to be
additional/alternate accommodation.
15. In the context of issue (ii) regarding the site plan filed by the tenant,
learned counsel vociferously contended that the said submissions are not
tenable. According to learned counsel, the reliance on Babu Ram Gupta
(supra) is misplaced since in Babu Ram Gupta (supra), the tenant had not
filed the site plan and this Court had concluded therein that in the absence
thereof, the tenant was not entitled to raise a dispute regarding the site plan
filed by the landlord therein. He further emphasized that in the present case,
the tenant has admitted the landlord-tenant relationship, also admitted the
rent for such occupation and infact, has himself relied upon the
unregistered tenancy agreement. According to the learned counsel, in such
circumstances, the site plan of the admitted tenancy may not at all be a
relevant issue much less, a triable issue which may entail grant of leave to
defend. Thus, according to him, issue (ii) is irrelevant.
16. So far as the argument regarding issue (iii) in the context of the
unregistered tenancy agreement is concerned, learned counsel submits that
the tenants have not paid a single penny from the time the eviction petition
had been filed and as such, have been enjoying the subject premises and
despite such infractions, to rely on an unregistered document would be
contrary to the provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. He
also emphasized that except for a bald and vague assertion, no proof or any
document worth its name to establish payment of Rs.7.5 Lakhs as security
having been paid to the landlord sometime in year 1993, has at all been
placed on record. He contended that considering both the aforesaid aspects,
one that the tenancy agreement is unregistered and two, there being no
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proof of payment of Rs.7.5 Lakhs, the contention that the clause relied
upon by the tenant to bind the landlord and bar him from seeking eviction
is untenable. Learned counsel further contended that the submission of the
landlord is self serving without any proof thereof.
17. This Court has heard the arguments of learned counsel for the
parties, perused the records of the case and minutely examined the
impugned judgment.
18. The enunciation of law by the Supreme Court in Abid-ul-Islam
(supra) clearly circumscribes the scope and jurisdiction of a High Court
while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B(8) proviso of the
Act. Having regard thereto, this Court would now proceed to consider each
of the issues as raised.
19. In so far as issue (i) is concerned, it is clear that the landlord has, in
para 18(a)(viii) of the eviction petition clearly given details of the
properties, the description thereof as also the portions in occupation of each
of the tenants. Thereafter, in answer to para 9 and 10 of the leave to defend
application, the landlord in its reply to the corresponding paragraphs has
only reiterated the position and status of the shops etc. as contained in the
eviction petitions. Thus, the submission that the landlord has given an
evasive or a bald reply to such paragraphs is not borne out from the
records. It is trite that the pleadings and its contents have to be read not
only together and harmoniously but also in the context in which they are
made. In that view of the matter, it is clear that the landlord has clarified his
position in respect of the alleged additional accommodation as contended
in para 9 of the leave to defend by mere denial whereas so far as para 10 is
concerned, it had categorically responded to the contentions in detail in its
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reply to the leave to defend Application. The submission of the tenant in so
far as lack of finding recorded by the learned ARC is concerned, this Court
finds that the said issue has been noted in para 33 and succinctly dealt with
in para 34 of the impugned judgment. The learned ARC has made the
following observations:-
33.The respondent has next contended that the petitioner has alternate
accommodations which are sufficient for the purpose mentioned. The
said fact has been vehemently denied by the petitioner thereby claiming
that the properties mentioned by the respondent arc not owned by the
petitioner trust.
34.In this context, as discussed above, mere bald averments that
petitioner owns certain other properties will not be sufficient.
Respondent needs to substantiate the same by documents, which has not
been done in the present case. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case titled
as Om Prakash Bajaj v. Sh. Chander Shekhar, 102 (2003) DLT 746, has
observed that:
“Suitability of the alternate premises cannot be determined by
mere counting the rooms. But it has to determine keeping in view
the totality of facts, the nature of need pleaded by the landlord, his
and his families standard and style of life and the purpose to which
the landlord wants to actually put it after coming it into possession.
The landlord has right to choose which of the accommodation is
required by him for himself and for his family members.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. Contrary to what has been vehemently argued, the learned ARC has
only noted the arguments of the parties in para 33 and no more. Ergo, to
contend that those are observations of the Court, is fallacious and
unmerited.
21. Learned counsel projected a truncated version of the observations
recorded by the learned ARC. In order to appreciate the application of mind
while reaching a particular conclusion as noted in para 34, this Court finds
that the learned ARC had, from para 29 of the impugned judgement
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onwards, critically examined the issue of the bonafide need of the landlord
in respect of the ground floor portion of the tenanted premises. While
examining the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in various judgements
on the issue, including Sarla Ahuja vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,
(1998) 8 SCC 119 and also keeping in mind that the tenant had not filed
even a single documentary evidence to substantiate the allegations
regarding availability of additional/alternative accommodations, came to
the right conclusion as noted in para 34. Therefore, it cannot be canvassed
that the learned ARC had neither examined the submission nor rendered
any finding thereon.
22. Furthermore, it appears that the tenant is expecting that the issue be
addressed as if this Court is sitting in appeal and not in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction. This Court is unable to find any perversity or
illegality in the finding recorded by the learned ARC in as much as it has
been clearly observed that the tenant except for making bald assertions has
not placed on record any document to substantiate his contention. Having
himself failed in placing relevant documentary evidence in that regard and
to now contend that the learned ARC has not rendered a proper or justified
finding, is unpersuasive and unmerited. Further, the same is also not borne
out from the record. In terms of Abid-ul-Islam (supra), this Court is
precluded from re-examining or re-appreciating findings or evidence. Thus,
this Court is not persuaded to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.
23. Issue (ii) is regarding non consideration of the site plan placed on
record by the tenant. The submissions of the tenant, on a prima facie view,
appear to be untenable. The reliance upon the judgment of this Court in
Babu Ram Gupta (supra) is completely misplaced. Babu Ram Gupta
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(supra) was a case for the proposition as to what would be the right of the
tenant to question the veracity of the site plan filed by the landlord, if the
tenant himself does not file a site plan. However, with utmost deference, is
not a proposition in respect of what needs to be done by the learned ARC in
case a tenant does file, purportedly, a contrary site plan. Learned counsel
for the tenant has neither placed on record nor cited any authoritative
judgement for the proposition arising in the present petition, as crystallized
above. Learned counsel for the tenant is attempting to draw support,
inferentially. That is impermissible in law. It is trite that a judgement is an
authority for the ratio it lays down on the basis of the peculiar facts
obtaining in that case and not what may flow logically from it. This
principle has been enunciated by the authoritative pronouncement of the
Supreme Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. N.R.
Vairamani ; AIR 2004 SC 778, and the relevant para is extracted
hereunder:-
“Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to
how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on
which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read
as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken
out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in
which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be
construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a
statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy
discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define.
Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret
words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.”
This principle was also followed by a learned Division Bench of this
Court in Ex. Sep. Ranjeet Kumar vs. Union of India, 2012 SCC OnLine
Del 3137.
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24. Besides, the fact that the tenant had neither disputed the landlord-
tenant relationship, nor the rent to be paid apart from himself placing on
record the admitted unregistered tenancy agreement, undoubtedly appears
to be an overwhelming reason as to why a mere filing of a contrary site
plan may not be a triable issue. Though, this opinion may not be read as
laying down a rule, rather, an exception and may need to be considered on
a case to case basis. It is relevant to note that under Section 14(1)(e) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, the landlord needs to establish that the premises
are required bonafide, for his occupation or for any member of his family
and that he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation. Once the
landlord is able to sustain these conditions, he would be entitled to a decree
of eviction. This coupled with the fact that the tenant has neither denied the
landlord-tenant relation nor the factum of requirement to pay rent, the
emphasis that the site plan filed by the tenant shall necessarily be
considered as a triable issue does not, prima facie, appeal to this Court. At
this stage, this Court is only to consider whether, prima facie, any case is
made out to stay the eviction of the tenant. This Court is unable to accede
to the arguments of learned counsel for the tenant in respect of the site plan.
Moreover, it is well settled by now that a tenant cannot dictate as to how
and in what manner or what portion of the rented premises the landlord can
put to use. The landlord is a complete authority to decide how to utilize the
tenanted premises. Thus, even this argument is unpersuasive to impel this
Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to grant stay.
25. So far as the issue (iii) in respect of the unregistered tenancy
agreement and the purported payment of Rs.7.5 Lakhs is concerned, the
said submissions are neither here nor there. The unregistered tenancy
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agreement is conspicuous by the absence of any reference to the purported
payment of Rs.7.5 Lakhs in lieu whereof, Clause 5 is purported to have
been inserted. Even if it is assumed, that the said clause had been inserted
by the parties with consent, the same cannot bar the landlord from
maintaining a suit or a petition for eviction since it is trite that there cannot
be any estoppel against law. A landlord by virtue of such clause, cannot be
compelled to give up a right which is conferred upon him or her by law. In
other words, the substantive provisions of Section 14 of the DRC Act, 1957
conferring a right and entitlement upon the landlord to initiate action for
eviction of the tenant cannot be overridden by any clause executed between
the parties. Acceding to such proposition would result in absurdity. As a
corollary, this Court also cannot countenance a situation where the tenant
also can be forced to continue to remain a tenant when it does not seek to
remain so. This clause, prima facie, appears to be an unconscionable clause
and may not be enforceable. Thus, the said argument is not only
unpersuasive but also unmerited. An argument, predicated on an
unconscionable covenant, that too in an admittedly unregistered tenancy
agreement, surely would not propel this Court to exercise its revisional
jurisdiction, much less, the discretionary jurisdiction to grant any stay.
26. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds no merits in the arguments
on the stay applications of the tenant and the same are dismissed without
any orders as to costs.
27. Needless to observe that the analysis and recording of facts above
will not tantamount to any expression on merits of the cases.
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RC.REV. 60/2025 & CM APPL. 31166/2025
RC.REV. 61/2025 & CM APPL. 31169/2025
RC.REV. 85/2025 & CM APPL. 31163/2025
28. List before the Roster Bench on 28th July, 2025.
TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J
(VACATION JUDGE)
JUNE 11, 2025/kct/rl
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