Supreme Court of India
Pawan Kumar Tiwary vs Jharkhand State Electricity Board (Now … on 19 August, 2025
Author: Aravind Kumar
Bench: Aravind Kumar, J.K. Maheshwari
2025 INSC 1000 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). of 2025
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO(S).26860-26863 OF 2023
PAWAN KUMAR TIWARY AND OTHERS …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
JHARKHAND STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD
(NOW JHARKHAND URJA VIKAS NIGAM
LIMITED) AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeals arise from the common order dated 22.12.2021
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in
LPA Nos. 512 and 647 of 2018, whereby the Division Bench allowed the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Deepak Guglani
Date: 2025.08.20
appeals of the respondents and set aside the appellants’ appointments to
17:09:29 IST
Reason:
Class III posts, reversing the relief granted to them by the learned Single
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Judge in W.P. (S) Nos. 1248 and 1269 of 2010. Civil Review Nos. 5 and 6of 2022 filed thereafter also came to be dismissed by order dated 07.08.2023.
Hence, the appellants/writ petitioners are before this court assailing the
correctness of the said orders.
The brief facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeals are set forth
below:
3. The appellants, namely, Pawan Kumar Tiwary, Hemant Kumar
Choubey, and Amar Kumar, were appointed to Class IV posts in the
Jharkhand State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as “JSEB”) during
the years 2004–2006.
4. On 07.01.1999, the Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna issued
Standing Order No. 812 regarding appointment to Non-Technical Class III
posts through internal advertisement. The said Standing Order referred to
Resolution No. 7305 dated 02.12.1998, wherein the Board resolved to fill
up vacant posts of non-technical Class III by departmental candidates. The
Standing Order explicitly stated that the percentage of vacancies against
sanctioned posts to be filled through departmental candidates should not
exceed the percentage indicated against each post.
5. Pursuant thereto, the Director, Personnel, JSEB vide Letter No. 1341
dated 25.06.2008 invited applications for appointment to the posts of
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Routine Clerks, Junior Accounts Clerk, Lower Division Assistant and other
posts through internal process as per the qualifications prescribed for the
relevant posts. Subsequently, vide Letter No. 144 dated 19.01.2009, it was
notified that candidates who have applied for Correspondence Clerk/Junior
Accounts Clerk, may also apply for appointment to the post of Lower
Division Assistant, if interested. The appellants submitted their applications
in the prescribed format for the posts of Routine Clerk and Lower Division
Assistant and thereafter they appeared in the examination conducted by the
Board. On 15.02.2009, the Board published the list of successful candidates.
Appellant No.1(Pawan Kumar Tiwary) and Appellant No.3 (Amar Kumar)
figured in the list of successful candidates for the post of Routine Clerk
(hereinafter referred to as “RC”), and Appellant No.2 (Hemant Kumar
Choubey) figured in the list of successful candidates for the post of Lower
Division Assistant (hereinafter referred to as “LDA”). Subsequently, their
appointments were made vide Office Orders No. 758 and 759 dated
24.04.2009 and the appellants joined their respective posts and started
working.
6. The Secretary of JSEB vide office order No.860 dated 07.05.2009
stated that implementation of all orders related to internal appointments on
the post of RC, LDA and other posts stood adjourned i.e., stayed without
assigning any reason. The present appellants along with other appointees
3
made representations through their service association before the competent
authority for redressal of their grievances. However, no response was
received.
7. Thereafter, on 27.05.2009, JSEB constituted a three-member
Enquiry Committee to enquire about all the internal appointments made,
citing certain irregularities and illegalities. On 27.06.2009, the Enquiry
Committee submitted its report stating appointments were not made in
adherence to the prescribed rules of qualification, and additionally, the
appointments were made beyond the sanctioned vacancies for internal
appointments. Accordingly, the Enquiry Committee held all the
appointments made through various office orders to be unconstitutional,
including Office Order No. 758 and 759 dated 24.04.2009 through which
present appellants were appointed.
8. After the release of the Enquiry Report, the Chairman of JSEB
issued a directive on 07.10.2009, to take action against the administrative
personnel responsible for causing the irregular and illegal appointments
beyond prescribed qualifications and sanctioned strength. In the same
directive, the Chairman declared three officers responsible and cancelled the
appointments made internally.
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9. The present appellants made multiple representations for restoring
the appointments made, however, there was no response from JSEB. On
22.07.2010, vide Office Order No.881, JSEB cancelled the appointments of
the appellants citing the appointments were irregular and not in accordance
with appointment and reservation rules.
10. The appellants along with other appointees whose appointments
stood cancelled filed W.P. (S) No. 1248 of 2010 praying for quashing of
Office Order dated 07.05.2009 whereby their appointments were stayed. The
Writ Petition came to be amended later to include the prayer to quash Office
Order No. 881 dated 22.07.2010 whereby the appellants’ appointment stood
cancelled. It is important to note here that another W.P. (S) No. 1269 of 2010
was filed by other aggrieved appointees whose appointments were cancelled
for being in contravention of the sanctioned strength. Both the writ petitions,
namely, W.P. (S) No. 1248 and 1269 of 2010 came to be disposed of by a
common judgment/order dated 14.08.2018 passed by the Single Judge of
High Court of Jharkhand.
11. The Single Judge partly allowed the Writ Petitions and quashed the
orders impugned therein, namely, Office Orders dated 07.05.2009 and
22.07.2010 and directed JSEB to issue fresh order of appointment on their
promotional post on which they were earlier promoted/decision was taken
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to promote, whichever is applicable. However, the Single Judge held that
their appointment shall for all intent and purpose be treated as fresh
appointment and they would not be entitled for any back wages, seniority or
other benefit based on their earlier appointment/promotion. The Single
Judge placed reliance on Vikas Pratap Singh & Others. v. State of
Chhattisgarh & Others1 wherein this Court had held that where a wrongful
or irregular appointment is made without any mistake on the part of the
appointee and upon discovery of such error or irregularity, the appointee is
terminated, taking a sympathetic view, order of termination ought to be
quashed, and appointee should be reinstated. Accordingly, the Single Judge
observed that candidates/appointees have not committed fraud, and having
fulfilled all eligibility criteria their appointment cannot be held to be
unconstitutional or illegal.
12. The findings of the Single Judge were challenged by both JSEB as
well as the appellants. While JSEB in L.P.A. No. 647 of 2018 sought to
challenge the direction of fresh appointments to the appellants, the
appellants in L.P.A. No.512 of 2018 challenged the denial of consequential
benefits such as seniority and back wages. The Division Bench by its
order/judgement dated 22.12.2021 allowed L.P.A. No. 647 of 2018 and
dismissed L.P.A. No.512 of 2018. The Division Bench was of the view that
1 (2013) 14 SCC 494
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even though there is no element of fraud but if the process of selection has
been found to suffer from unfairness and malpractice, then the entire
selection process is required to be cancelled. Further, it held that
appointments were held to be illegal since they were beyond the sanctioned
strength, and in such a situation there is no question of consideration of the
element of fraud. The Division Bench also distinguished between irregular
and illegal appointment and reiterated that appointment made beyond
sanctioned strength is illegal as it is an encroachment upon the quotas of
posts to be filled up from direct recruitment.
13. The appellants took exception to the above order dated 22.12.2021
and preferred Civil Review No. 5 & 6 of 2022 to assail the findings of the
Division Bench. The High Court in exercise of its review jurisdiction
dismissed the review petitions on the ground that no new facts were made
out by the appellants and as such, the scope of review is extremely limited,
and finding no infirmity with the Division Bench’s order dated 22.12.2021,
the High Court vide Order dated 07.08.2023 dismissed the Civil Review
No.5 & 6 of 2022 filed by the appellants. Hence, the appellants are now
before us.
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14. We have heard Shri Gopal Shankarnarayanan and Shri Puneet Jain,
learned Senior Counsels appearing for the appellants and Shri Navaniti
Prasad Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents.
15. Shri Gopal Shankarnarayanan, the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the appellants No.1 and No.3 challenged the findings of the
Division Bench on various grounds. It was submitted that appointment of
the appellants Nos.1 and 3 to promoted Class III posts was not beyond the
cadre strength and even the report of the Enquiry Committee found that
appointment of Routine Clerk was not beyond the cadre strength. The cadre
strength of routine clerk posts was 23, out of which 22 were lying vacant
and 50% were to be filled through in-service candidates through internal
advertisement which would come to 11 posts. He would also contend that
appellants had also fulfilled the criteria of two years’ experience which is
very much evident from the date of joining of appellants. It was further
submitted that orders of cancellation of appointment are hit by principles of
natural justice as before issuance of said orders, appellants were not given
any notice or show cause. It was also contended that it is not a case where
any misconduct is alleged to have been committed by the appellants, but for
no fault on part of the appellants, they are subjected to suffer. Additionally,
Shri Puneet Jain, the Learned Senior Counsel appearing for appellant No.2
submitted that for Lower Division Assistant (LDA) 5 posts were available
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as per rules and the approval was given for 25 posts by the Secretary in the
interest of JESB due to extreme shortage of LDA, and that the approval was
with the knowledge of the Chairman. Further, it was submitted that 10% of
the vacant posts were allocated for internal recruitment, and 51 posts were
vacant, hence 10% of that would be minimum 5 posts which was within the
cadre strength. It was further urged that appellant No.2 has attained the age
of 50 years and has lost his eligibility to appear in any departmental
examination once he attained the age of 50 years, hence this was his last
opportunity for promotion.
16. Per contra, Shri Navaniti Prasad, learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents urged that the findings of the Division Bench which were
confirmed in Review did not call for any interference. It was also urged that
no substantial question of law was raised in the present appeals.
17. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the present appeals
and considered the submissions of the rival parties and perused records. It is
relevant to note that while the Enquiry Report held various appointments
unconstitutional, namely 537 posts which were filled up through internal
appointment in different cadres such as Routine Clerk, Lower Division
Assistant, Correspondence Clerk, Junior Accounts Clerk, Manpower and
Branch Clerk, and Writ Petitions and LPAs were preferred by various
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appointees, our findings and observations are confined only to the appellants
herein, namely, Pawan Kumar Tiwary, Hemant Kumar Choubey, and Amar
Kumar.
18. The questions that arise for our consideration are as below:
I. Whether the findings of the Division Bench with respect to
illegality in the appointment of appellants warrant interference?
II. If the appointment is held to be legal, whether they are entitled
to any consequential benefits?
RE: POINT 1
19. The primary basis on which the Division Bench set aside the
appellants’ appointments was on the basis of conclusion having been arrived
at that appointments were made beyond the sanctioned strength. However,
we find this conclusion to be factually incorrect and legally unsustainable as
evident from the analysis that follows.
20. The contention that there was an “excess appointment” namely it
was beyond the sanctioned strength was not substantiated by any reliable
material by the respondent – Board. No contemporaneous record has been
shown that contradicts the sanctioned strength status at the time of
appointments. In fact, the Standing Order No.812 highlights the posts were
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duly sanctioned and advertised through proper channels, followed by
selection through established norms of scrutiny.
21. Evidently, the Enquiry Report itself records that appointments to the
post of Routine Clerk were within the sanctioned strength. Specifically, out
of 23 sanctioned posts, 22 were vacant, and internal recruitment was
permitted for 50%, i.e., 11 posts. The appellants Pawan Kumar Tiwary and
Amar Kumar were appointed within this quota. Similarly, in the case of
Hemant Kumar Choubey, the post of LDA had 51 vacancies, and the 10%
quota allowed for at least 5 appointments, which were duly approved by the
competent authority. Despite this, the Division Bench broadly stated that
appointments were made beyond sanctioned strength and hence illegal,
without distinguishing between individual cases. During oral arguments,
this Court demanded an explanation regarding this specific finding in the
Enquiry Report, at which point the learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents fairly submitted that the appointments of the present appellants
was within prescribed sanctioned strength. At the outset, this admission
during the course of hearing would deter us from going into every factual
aspect, however, given that the Division Bench and the Review Court has
overlooked these glaring facts, we deem it necessary to satisfy our
conscience and make our detailed observations.
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22. The Division Bench also placed reliance on the procedural deviation
from the regular advertisement process, by observing that the internal notice
issued by the Chief Engineer did not amount to a proper recruitment
notification. While procedural irregularities, if proven to be mala fide or
substantially affecting fairness, may vitiate a selection process, in the present
case, the selection was conducted through tests and interviews overseen by
a selection committee. The entire process culminated in formal appointment
letters being issued. As held by this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka
and Others v. Umadevi (3) and Others2, mere technical irregularities in
appointment processes and in the absence of evidence of illegality,
arbitrariness or fraud cannot be a ground to undo appointments, especially
when the appointees are not at fault.
23. The Division Bench appears to have blurred the distinction between
irregular and illegal appointments. In Vikas Pratap Singh (supra), this Court
held that an appointment made without following every procedural formality
may be irregular, but it does not become illegal unless it violates statutory
provisions or is made without the existence of a post. This Court observed
that if the appointment is to a sanctioned post, made by a competent
authority, and not tainted by fraud or deceit, it cannot be labelled illegal
2 (2006) 4 SCC 1
12
merely due to some procedural lapse. The facts of the present case are
squarely covered by this reasoning. The posts were sanctioned, the
appellants were duly qualified, and the appointments were made by the
competent authority after following due process of selection and at worst,
any infirmity could only render the appointments irregular, not illegal.
In R.S. Garg v. State of U.P. and Others3, this Court held that appointments
made within sanctioned strength, even if temporary or irregular, do not
automatically become illegal unless shown to be in violation of statutory
rules. There is no evidence or even a finding that the posts were not
available or were created in violation of recruitment rules.
24. It is by now well settled in service jurisprudence that the validity of
an individual appointment must be assessed on the basis of the appointee’s
own merit, eligibility, and conformity to the applicable rules. Courts must
resist the tendency to issue blanket invalidations of entire batches of
appointments merely on the basis of procedural infirmities that affect only a
portion of the appointments. The principles of fairness, proportionality, and
individual justice are foundational to administrative law and demand that a
case-by-case analysis be undertaken before issuing sweeping orders of
cancellation.
3 (2006) 6 SCC 430
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25. This Court has in several decisions, including State of Bihar v.
Upendra Narayan Singh and Others4 , emphasized that when appointments
are found to be irregular, the inquiry must focus on whether such irregularity
amounts to illegality, and whether the appointee had any role or knowledge
of the deviation. If not, and the appointee was otherwise eligible, qualified,
and appointed against a sanctioned vacancy, there is no justification for
nullifying such appointment. The present appellants, as evidenced by record,
fulfilled all eligibility conditions, were appointed within the sanctioned
strength, and underwent the requisite selection process.
26. It is here that the doctrine of severability assumes great significance.
The rule is grounded in equity and legal logic: where bad can be separated
from good, the good must not perish with the bad. The doctrine, though
largely applied in constitutional and statutory interpretation, has gained
considerable traction in service jurisprudence where a set of appointments
are sought to be invalidated en masse.
27. The doctrine of severability is not merely a tool of constitutional
adjudication but a principle of fairness. In service law, it protects deserving
employees from the fallout of administrative missteps not attributable to
them.
4 (2009) 5 SCC 65
14
28. In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others v. State of U.P. and
Others5, this Court has emphasized that the State, even in contractual or
administrative matters, cannot act arbitrarily and must be guided by
constitutional values. These observations gain special relevance in cases
where authorities, rather than conducting granular scrutiny, proceed to
cancel entire appointments in a sweeping manner.
29. The case in hand presents a textbook scenario where the appellants’
appointments were lumped together with others without individualized
examination. The Enquiry Report itself conceded that appointments of
Routine Clerks were within the cadre strength, and there is no dispute that
the appellants fulfilled the prescribed qualifications and eligibility norms.
There is also no suggestion of mala fides, misrepresentation or procedural
breach on their part. At this juncture, it is pertinent to mention, that learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents during the course of hearing
fairly submitted that the appointments of the present appellants fell within
the sanctioned strength.
30. The right to employment, though not a fundamental right, is
nevertheless protected under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution insofar as
5 (1991) 1 SCC 212
15
it requires fair, just, and non-arbitrary treatment of similarly situated
individuals. The appellants’ dismissal, without issuing a show cause or
opportunity of hearing, is a clear violation of principles of natural justice,
and falls afoul of the law laid down in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
and Another6, wherein it was held that “even an administrative order which
involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of
natural justice.”
31. The jurisprudence around irregular versus illegal appointments
must not be blurred. An irregular appointment is one where procedure is not
strictly followed but the appointee is otherwise qualified and the post is
sanctioned. An illegal appointment, on the other hand, is void ab initio, such
as where the appointee is ineligible or the post does not exist. When
appointments are questioned on grounds of irregularity, the inquiry must not
end with detecting the infirmity but must proceed further to distinguish those
whose appointments are unimpeachable. Justice demands separation, not
erasure.
6 (1978) 1 SCC 248
16
32. The High Court failed to apply the test of individual scrutiny, which
is now a bedrock requirement in service jurisprudence. When appointments
of large numbers of persons are questioned, courts and authorities must:
(i) Separate the legally sustainable from the unsustainable
(ii) Apply the test of eligibility and sanctioned strength
(iii) Assess whether there was fraud or misrepresentation
(iv) Provide an opportunity of hearing before cancellation
33. The action of the Board in cancelling the appellants’ appointments
en masse without affording them an opportunity of hearing and without
considering the legality of each appointment separately reflects not only a
violation of principles of natural justice but also abdication of the duty to
make reasoned, individualized decisions.
34. As discussed hereinabove, facts upon being evaluated in their
entirety, reveal that the appellants were appointed against sanctioned
vacancies, pursuant to an internal selection process, and were fully eligible
for the posts in question. There is neither any suggestion nor proof of fraud,
collusion, or misrepresentation on their part. At best, the process suffers
from procedural lapses not attributable to the appointees. Such infirmities,
however, render the appointments irregular, not illegal.
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35. It must be underscored that the jurisprudential divide between
irregular and illegal appointments is neither artificial nor academic. An
appointment may be irregular if it deviates from established procedure, but
it crosses into the realm of illegality only where it violates statutory
mandates, is made without the existence of a sanctioned post, or is tainted
by fraud. Conflating the two categories leads to manifest injustice,
particularly when individuals, who have no role in the procedural defect, are
visited with the severest consequence of termination.
36. There is also an urgent need to discourage the mechanical
application of cancellation orders affecting large groups of appointees
without differentiation. Service jurisprudence in India must evolve to reflect
a nuanced, fact-specific approach that separates the legally sustainable
appointments from those that are vitiated. It is neither just nor desirable to
extinguish the careers of deserving employees merely for administrative
convenience or to avoid the labour of segregation. A practice of
indiscriminately declaring entire batches of appointments as void
undermines not only the morale of sincere employees but also the credibility
of the public administration. This Court deems it necessary to underscore
that in all future cases of large-scale appointment irregularities, authorities
and courts must mandatorily consider the possibility of segregation and
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apply the doctrine of severability before taking the extreme step of
cancellation.
37. Courts, therefore, must exercise heightened care and adopt a
calibrated approach, especially in matters involving mass appointments. The
doctrine of severability must not be relegated to a post-facto exercise; it
ought to inform the judicial inquiry from the threshold. Early-stage
discernment of whether appointments can be segregated based on sanctioned
strength, eligibility, and absence of wrongdoing, enables the court to
preserve what is lawful while excising only what is vitiated. Such an
approach aligns with constitutional morality, protects institutional
credibility, and ensures that administrative missteps do not culminate in
judicial overcorrection.
38. In the present case, each appellant: (i) fulfilled the eligibility
conditions; (ii) was appointed through a transparent internal selection
process; (iii)was within the sanctioned cadre strength; (iv) was not found
guilty of any misconduct or fraud. To uphold the Division Bench’s order
would be to punish the innocent for faults not attributable to them. This
would be a miscarriage of justice.
39. The present case, resting as it does on demonstrably sanctioned posts
and unblemished individual merit, deserves protection under these
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principles. Accordingly, we have intervened and the impugned orders passed
by the Division Bench and confirmed in review are set aside to the extent
they relate to the appellants herein. The appointments of the appellants vide
Office Orders dated 24.04.2009 are declared to be legal and valid.
40. Before concluding, we are constrained to clarify that the
observations made in the present case, particularly our invocation of the
doctrine of severability and the imperative of individualized scrutiny, must
not be construed as laying down an inflexible rule of universal application.
We are fully cognizant of the cautionary principles articulated by this Court
in State of West Bengal v. Baishakhi Bhattacharyya (Chatterjee) and
Others7, wherein, after an exhaustive analysis of precedent and the
evidentiary record, this Court observed:
“19. The following principles emerge from the aforesaid
discussion:
• When an in-depth factual inquiry reveals systemic
irregularities, such as malaise or fraud, that undermine the
integrity of the entire selection process, the result should be
cancelled in its entirety. However, if and when possible,
segregation of tainted and untainted candidates should be done
in consonance with fairness and equity.
• The decision to cancel the selection en masse must be based
on the satisfaction derived from sufficient material collected
through a fair and thorough investigation. It is not necessary
for the material collected to conclusively prove malpractice
beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard of evidence should be
reasonable certainty of systemic malaise. The probability test
is applicable.
• Despite the inconvenience caused to untainted candidates,
when broad and deep manipulation in the selection process is7
(2025) SCC OnLine SC 719
20
proven, due weightage has to be given to maintaining the purity
of the selection process.
• Individual notice and hearing may not be necessary in all
cases for practical reasons when the facts establish that the
entire selection process is vitiated with illegalities at a large
scale.”
41. The Baishakhi principle rightly recognizes that where the
recruitment process is irredeemably marred by pervasive fraud or
institutional malaise, the Court may be compelled albeit reluctantly to
nullify the entire selection process in the larger interest of constitutional
integrity. In such cases, exception to the principle of natural justice would
not lead to potential injustice to untainted candidates and the necessity of
maintaining public confidence in institutional processes ought to take
precedence.
42. However, the case at hand stands on a demonstrably different factual
and legal footing. There is neither any allegation nor proof of fraud,
impersonation, or collusion by the appellants. The internal recruitment
process in question, albeit allegedly irregular in procedural respects, was
conducted through a structured examination and selection mechanism
pursuant to duly sanctioned vacancies. The selection was made by a
competent authority, and the appointments were not impugned on grounds
of mala fides, corruption, or extraneous considerations.
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43. It is precisely this material distinction that warrants a calibrated
approach. To mechanically apply the drastic remedy of en masse
cancellation in such a scenario where the appointments are otherwise
regular, fall within the sanctioned strength, and are untainted by illegality,
would be to conflate irregularity with illegality, and to punish the innocent
for administrative lapses they neither caused nor participated in. The
doctrine of severability is not only available but must be invoked to uphold
the constitutional guarantee of equal treatment under Articles 14 and 16.
44. Thus, while we draw guidance from the Baishakhi judgment as to
the outer limits of judicial tolerance in the face of systemic corruption, we
hold that in the absence of demonstrable malaise and where individual
appointments are legally sustainable, we must lean in favour of preservation,
not obliteration.
RE: POINT 2
45. While we have held that the appellants’ appointments were legal and
within the sanctioned strength, we are also mindful of the settled principle
that in the absence of actual service rendered, back wages are not ordinarily
granted, particularly where the employee did not discharge any duties during
the period of cancellation. Accordingly, while the appellants shall be entitled
to continuity in service and restoration of seniority with effect from the date
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of their initial appointment on 24.04.2009, they shall not be entitled to
arrears of salary for the period they were out of service. However, to protect
their future service rights, they shall be granted notional fixation of pay and
other consequential benefits subject to applicable rules such as increments
and promotion eligibility.
46. We refer to the principles laid down in Union of India and Others
v. K.V. Jankiraman and Others8, where this Court held that seniority and
other service benefits can be protected through notional fixation, even if
back wages are not granted. Similarly, in Gowramma C. (Dead) by legal
representatives v. Manager (Personnel), Hindustan Aeronautical Limited
and Another 9, it was held that the doctrine of “no work, no pay” does not
preclude the grant of notional service benefits, particularly where the fault
lies not with the employee but with the administration.
47. Thus, the appellants shall be deemed to have continued in service
from the date of their original appointments for the purpose of seniority,
promotion, and pensionary benefits, but shall not be entitled to actual back
wages for the intervening period. Their pay shall be notionally fixed as per
rules, and future emoluments shall be computed accordingly.
8 (1991) 4 SCC 109
9 (2022) 11 SCC 794
23
48. At the cost of repetition, we reiterate that our findings and
observations made herein above are limited and confined to the appellants
only and it does not apply to none else of these proceedings.
49. We reiterate for future guidance that where multiple appointments
are challenged on general grounds, authorities and courts must undertake a
detailed fact-specific analysis before concluding that all such appointments
are void. The doctrine of severability must not remain a mere theoretical
doctrine but must guide real administrative action and judicial reasoning in
service matters.
50. In consequence to the above discussion, the appeals stand allowed
and the appointments of the appellants made by Office Order Nos.758 and
759 dated 24.04.2009 are declared to be legal and valid by quashing the
Office Order No.860 dated 7.05.2009 and the Office Order No.881 dated
22.07.2010 insofar as appellants are concerned. In the light of the facts of
this case, we make no order as to costs.
51. We have also considered I.A. No. 184914 of 2024 seeking
impleadment. The lis before us is confined to the appellants, namely, Pawan
Kumar Tiwary, Hemant Kumar Choubey and Amar Kumar, whose
appointments have been examined in detail above and found sustainable
only because they were within the sanctioned strength. The scope of these
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appeals is thus case-specific and limited to them alone. The applicants in the
present I.A. are not necessary parties for the adjudication of the issues
arising here, and their rights, if any, are not concluded by this judgment.
They are at liberty to pursue the remedies available to them in accordance
with law and no opinion is expressed in that regard. Accordingly, the I.A.
stands dismissed.
.……………………………., J.
[J.K. MAHESHWARI]
.……………………………., J.
[ARAVIND KUMAR]
New Delhi;
August 19, 2025.
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