Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Pepakayala Chakrarao, vs Kompella Suryanarayana, on 6 August, 2025
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VGKR, J.
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HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO
Second Appeal No.85 of 2015
Judgment:
This second appeal is filed aggrieved against the Judgment and decree
dated 24.01.2015 in A.S.No.147 of 2012 on the file of learned I Additional
Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, East Godavari District, confirming the Judgment
and decree dated 25.08.2011 in O.S.No.645 of 2004 on the file of learned II
Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada, East Godavari District.
2. The appellant herein is the plaintiff and the respondents herein are
the defendants in O.S.No.645 of 2004 on the file of learned II Additional Junior
Civil Judge, Kakinada, East Godavari District.
3. The plaintiff initiated action in O.S.No.645 of 2004 on the file of
learned II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada, with a prayer to grant
permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their henchmen, agents etc.,
from ever interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of
the plaint schedule property in any manner till completion of 99 years lease
period from 12th March, 1967 and for costs of the suit.
4. The learned II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada, dismissed the
suit without costs. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful plaintiff in the
above said suit filed the aforesaid appeal before the first appellate Court. The
learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, dismissed the first appeal
with costs by confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court.
Aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful plaintiff/appellant approached this Court
by way of second appeal.
5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the appeal will be
referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit.
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6. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in
O.S.No.645 of 2004, is as follows:
The plaint schedule property is a vacant site. The father of the plaintiff
Pepakayala Lovaraju obtained lease deed for a period of 99 years on
12.03.1967 from the father of the defendants Kompella Veerraju. The father
of the plaintiff took possession of the property and raised a thatched hut
therein. As per the lease agreement, the father of the plaintiff or his legal
heirs are entitled to keep the schedule property in their peaceful possession
and enjoyment by cultivating the same at their own will and wish for a period
of 99 years. The lease consideration of Rs.1,500/- was paid by the plaintiff’s
father to Kompella Veerraju. The defendants 1 to 7 are the children of
Kompella Veerraju. The plaintiff’s father died at about 5 years back. After the
death of his father, the plaintiff alone is in peaceful possession and enjoyment
of the plaint schedule property without any interruption. The plaintiff was
given sugar card in the same door number and Panchayat Secretary also
issued possession certificate to the plaintiff. The plaintiff perfected his rights
over the plaint schedule property even as per the lease agreement. The
defendants bore grudge against the plaintiff and without considering the lease
deed, they are proclaiming in the village that they can trespass into the plaint
schedule property. Hence, the plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit.
7. The defendants filed written statement denying the contents of plaint
averments and further contended as follows:
The alleged lease deed dated 12.03.1967 is a rank forged one and it is
not true, valid and binding on the defendants. The defendants 1 to 5, late
Kompella Nageswara Rao and Kompella Somaraju are the sons of late
Lovaraju and these defendants are not aware who is 6th defendant Kompella
Satyanarayana and to their knowledge, there is no such person in the name of
6th defendant. Kompella Jagannadham @ Satyam (7th defendant) is son of
senior paternal uncle of the defendants and he is nothing to do with the plaint
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schedule property. The plaintiff has not acquainted with these defendants or
their father at any point of time and the plaintiff does not know even the
approximate age of the defendants and their correct addresses. Further
contended that the existence of thatched hut at present in the plaint schedule
property is raised by the plaintiff at about 10 days prior to receiving the notices
in the suit by the defendants and no door number is allotted to the thatched
hut. The defendants came to know that house bearing door No.6-111 stands
in the name of one Pepakayala Venkata Ramana, son of Sriramulu, who is in
possession and enjoyment of the same by paying taxes up to date. The plaint
schedule property is the ancestral property of the defendants which was
originally situated in S.No.426/4, old S.No.330 in total extent of Ac.2-00 cents.
The defendants’ father handed over the land to an extent of Ac.1-88 cents to
the summit office for public utility purpose around in the year 1965, after that,
the father of the defendants has been in peaceful possession and enjoyment
of the same till his death and after that, his wife Venkata Rattamma has been
in possession and enjoyment of the same. The pattadar passbook and title
deed were also issued in her favour for the schedule property. Further
contended that the plaintiff with an intention to grab the schedule property,
raised a small thatched house in the schedule property at about 10 days prior
to receiving of notices by the defendants, as the value of the property raised in
recent past and taking advantage of absence of the defendants. When the
defendants questioned the plaintiff about his highhanded behavious, the
plaintiff agreed to remove the same in the plaint schedule property, but
contrary to his promise, he fabricated the suit documents and got filed the suit
with false allegations. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit.
During pendency of the suit, the 2nd defendant died. The defendants 8
to 11 are added as legal heirs of the 2nd defendant.
8. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned II Additional Junior Civil
Judge, Kakinada, framed the following issues for trial:
(1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for?
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(2) To what relief?
9. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff,
P.Ws.1 to 5 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-4 were marked. On behalf of
the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B-1 and B-2 were
marked. Ex.X-1 was marked through D.W.4.
10. The learned II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada, after
conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on
consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, dismissed the suit
without costs. Felt aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful plaintiff filed the
appeal suit in A.S.No.147 of 2012 before the learned I Additional Senior Civil
Judge’s Court, Kakinada, wherein, the following points came up for
consideration:
(1) Whether the plaintiff is in lawful possession and enjoyment of the plaint
schedule property?
(2) Whether the possession of the plaintiff is traceable to the lease deed dated
12.02.1967?
(3) Whether the findings of the trial Court requires any interference?
(4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for?
(5) To what relief?
11. The learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, i.e., the first
appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the points, as above,
against the plaintiff/appellant and in favour of the defendants/respondents and
dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff. Felt aggrieved of the same, the
unsuccessful plaintiff in O.S.No.645 of 2004 filed the present second appeal
before this Court.
12. After institution of the second appeal by the plaintiff in the suit, this
Court ordered notice to the respondents before admission and the said
notices are served on the respondents / defendants. Heard Sri P.Rajesh
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Babu, learned counsel for the appellant / plaintiff and heard Sri P.Durga
Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents / defendants.
13. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural
nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. It is regulated in accordance
with law. A second appeal preferred under Section 100 of CPC could be
admitted only when the appellant satisfies this Court that the substantial
question of law between the parties arise in this case. A proper test for
determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would
be or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if
so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally
settled by the superior Courts or is not free from difficulty or cause for
discussion of alternative views. In a case of Boodireddy Chandraiah v.
Arigela Laxmi1, the Apex Court held that it is not within the domain of the
High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at by
the last Court of fact namely, the first appellate Court. In a case where from
a given set of circumstances two inferences of facts are possible, one drawn
by the lower appellate Court will not be interfered by the High Court in
a second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. Where, the
facts required for a point of law have not been pleaded, a litigant should not be
allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second
appeal. The mere appreciation of facts, the documentary evidence and the
contents of the documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial question
of law.
14. The plaintiff having chosen to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court
under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, it is for him to meet the above
principles and satisfy the Court whether there exists any substantial question
of law.
1
(2007) 8 SCC 155
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15. This second appeal is filed against the concurrent findings arrived
by both the Courts below, therefore the grounds urged in the second appeal
are to be scrutinized to find out whether the appellant has shown any
substantial question of law. The contention of the appellant is that the
judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court are
contrary to law and that the second appeal may be allowed by setting aside
the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below i.e. the trial Court
and the first appellate Court.
16. The appellant is the plaintiff in the suit. He filed the suit for seeking
the relief of prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants and their men
from ever interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff in the
plaint schedule property. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that his father
Pepakayala Lovaraju obtained a registered lease deed for a period of 99
years on 12.03.1967 from the father of the defendants Kompella Veerraju.
Since the respondents / defendants are disputing execution of the said lease
deed by their father in favour of the father of the plaintiff, the duty cast upon
the plaintiff to prove the Ex.A.1 lease deed. Admittedly, the plaintiff is not
having personal knowledge about the execution of Ex.A.1 alleged lease deed.
The plaintiff admits that he never paid any rent either to father of defendants
Veerraju or the defendants. It is also admitted by the appellant that the father
of the defendants is the owner of the plaint schedule property. It is undisputed
by the appellant that the father and mother of the defendants are no more and
died intestate and therefore, the defendants are having title over the plaint
schedule property. Even as per the own case of the appellant, the defendants
herein are the owners of the plaint schedule property.
17. As stated supra, since the defendants are disputing the alleged
Ex.A.1 lease deed, the burden cast upon the plaintiff to prove the same.
Admittedly, the plaintiff / P.W.1 is not having any personal knowledge over
execution of lease deed. As per the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3, though they
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claim to be present at the time of execution of lease deed, it does not contain
their signatures. Therefore, the presence of P.Ws.2 and 3 at the time of
alleged lease deed is highly doubtful. As could be seen from the evidence of
P.W.4, he stated in his chief examination affidavit that he cultivated the land
belongs to father of the defendants 1 to 5 and in cross-examination, he admits
that he never cultivated the agricultural land belongs to the father of the
defendants. Though P.W.4 claimed that he was present at the time of
execution of Ex.A.1 lease deed, his signature is not there in the lease deed.
Admittedly, the alleged lease deed does not contain the signature of P.W.4.
Therefore, the presence of P.W.4 at the time of alleged execution of Ex.A.1
lease deed, is highly doubtful. As could be seen from the evidence of P.W.5,
he admits in cross-examination that he does not know the nature of the
document and he does not know about the schedule land and he was not
present at the time of execution of alleged registered lease deed. For the
aforesaid reasons, the alleged lease deed is not proved by the plaintiff.
18. The recitals of Ex.A.1 alleged lease deed reveals that the period of
lease is for 99 years. Therefore, it requires compulsory registration under
Section 17 of the Registration Act. But it was unregistered document. As
could be seen from the evidence produced by the defendants, the plaintiff has
trespassed into the suit schedule property just 20 days prior to filing of the
suit. A trespasser, who alleged to have been occupied just 20 days prior to
filing of the suit, even cannot maintain a suit, against the true owner for
seeking the relief of prohibitory injunction. The claim of the plaintiff is that he
is only a lessee, but not a owner of the plaint schedule property and the
plaintiff claimed leasehold rights over the plaint schedule property. As noticed
supra, the plaintiff claimed that his father was the lessee under the father of
the defendants in pursuance of Ex.A.1 alleged lease deed and after the death
of his father, he is a lessee in view of Ex.A.1 lease deed. As stated supra, the
alleged Ex.A.1 lease deed is not at all proved by the plaintiff. The ownership
of the defendants in the plaint schedule property is undisputed by the plaintiff.
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Moreover, the defendants instituted a suit in O.S.No.744 of 2004 before the
trial Court and sought for eviction of the plaintiff herein i.e. 1st defendant in
O.S.No.744 of 2004 and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule
property and after completion of the trial, the learned trial Judge decreed the
suit in O.S.No.744 of 2004 by evicting the plaintiff herein from the plaint
schedule property which was confirmed by the first appellate Judge.
19. Having regard to the reasons assigned, this Court is satisfied that
the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below on all the
issues/points in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff do not brook
interference and that both the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suit
of the plaintiff. The findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below were
based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record and
there was neither illegality nor irregularity in those findings and therefore, the
findings do not require to be upset. Further, the existence of a substantial
question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
as per Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. The questions raised, strictly
speaking, are not even pure questions of law, let alone substantial questions
of law.
20. Viewed thus, this Court finds that none of the questions raised are
substantial questions and there is no subsistence in the questions raised and
that therefore, the second appeal is devoid of merits and is liable for dismissal
at the stage of admission. The law is well settled that a second appeal shall
not be admitted if no substantial question of law arises for consideration and
when no substantial question of law is involved. The view of this Court is
reinforced by the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Gurdev
Kaur v. Kaki2. In the case on hand, as stated supra, this Court finds after
careful examination of the pleadings, evidence and contentions that no
substantial question of law is involved, this second appeal is liable for
2
AIR 2006 SC 1975
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dismissal at the stage of admission, in view of narrow compass of Section 100
of Civil Procedure Code.
21. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed at the stage of
admission, confirming the judgment and decree of both the Courts below. No
costs.
Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.
__________________________
V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J.
6th August, 2025.
ARR
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VGKR, J.
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HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO
Second Appeal No.85 of 2015
(P.D. Judgment)
6th August, 2025
(ARR)
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