Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Pinnika Madhusudhana Rao vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 11 August, 2025
APHC010403352025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY, THE ELEVENTH DAY OF AUGUST
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 846/2025
Between:
PINNIKA MADHUSUDHANA RAO, S/O. GANGAIAH, AGED 44 YEARS,
R/O. MADHU CHILDREN HOSPITAL, PERAM BAZAR, MARKAPUR,
ONGOLE.
...PETITIONER
AND
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, (Markapur Town Police Station),
Rep by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravati.
...RESPONDENT
Counsel for the Petitioner:
P SAI SURYA TEJA
Counsel for the Respondent:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
Criminal Revision Case has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401
of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) feeling
aggrieved by the order of declining to discharge the Petitioner/Accused No.2,
vide order dated 11.03.2025 in Crl.M.P.No.31 of 2025 in S.C.No.47 of 2023 on
the file of the learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ongole, for
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the alleged offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 120-B, 323, 341 and
302 read with 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the I.P.C.,’).
2. Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of Sri P.Sai Surya Teja, learned Counsel for the Petitioner while reiterating the
grounds of the Revision, argued that the impugned order of discharge passed
by the learned Magistrate is patently illegal, improper, and contrary to the
settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. The learned Additional Sessions
Judge committed a manifest error in declining to consider the discharge
petition filed under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ solely on the ground that the
petitioner had previously invoked the revisional jurisdiction challenging the
cognizance order passed by the learned Additional Judicial First-Class
Magistrate under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ which was dismissed. The
rejection of the earlier revision does not preclude the petitioner from seeking
discharge under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ as both proceedings are
governed by distinct legal parameters. It is well settled that the scope of
consideration under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ by the learned Judicial First-
Class Magistrate (committal court), which acts upon the police report under
Section 173 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is materially different from the judicial scrutiny
required under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ by the learned Trial Court. While
the committal court merely examines whether the allegations prima facie
disclose the commission of an offence, the Sessions Court, under Section 227
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of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is obligated to evaluate the entire material accompanying the
charge sheet and, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the accused,
determine whether sufficient grounds exist to proceed to trial. If no such
grounds are found, the accused must be discharged.
3. It is further argued that the learned Sessions Judge failed to assign
cogent reasons for rejecting the discharge petition, which is a mandatory
requirement under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The absence of such reasoning
renders the order unsustainable in law. Further, the learned Sessions Judge
failed to appreciate that the petitioner’s alleged involvement in the offence is
not supported by any credible material. The initial witnesses expressed
uncertainty regarding the petitioner’s presence at the scene, while others
categorically denied his involvement. In light of these contradictions, the
investigating agency rightly omitted the petitioner’s name from the final charge
sheet.
4. Learned Senior Counsel furthermore argued that the petitioner, being a
Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO), was stationed far from the locus delicti and
falsely implicated due to intra-family disputes among the complainant’s
relatives. The learned Additional Sessions Judge ought to have taken judicial
notice of this context. Moreover, the statements of LW.6, LW.7, and LW.13,
who were examined as eyewitnesses, do not contain any identification of the
petitioner. Even the confessional statements of the co-accused are silent with
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respect to the petitioner’s alleged role, thereby negating any inference of
complicity.
5. In view of the above, the learned Additional Sessions Judge failed to
appreciate that the prosecution had not adduced any substantive evidence or
material to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner. The
continuation of proceedings against the petitioner amounts to abuse of
process and warrants judicial interference and urged to set aside it.
6. On the other hand, Ms. P.Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Public
Prosecutor would argue that the learned Trial Court had rightly appreciated
the material available. There was no flagrant miscarriage of justice. There
were no perverse findings. There was no irregularity let alone material
irregularity. The order impugned is not vitiated by manifest error of law or
procedure which had resulted in miscarriage of justice. The impugned order
doesn’t suffer from any illegality or infirmity. Hence, it is urged to dismiss the
criminal revision case.
7. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by
the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record.
8. Now the point for consideration is:
“Whether the order in Crl.M.P.No.31 of 2025 in S.C.No.47 of 2023
dated 11.03.2025, passed by the learned III Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Ongole, is correct, legal, and proper with respect
to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material
irregularities? And to what relief?”
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9. In Hareram Satpathy v. Tikaram Agarwala1, a judgment relied on by
the learned Senior Counsel, it is held at para No.12 as follows:
“12. Before parting with the case we wish to observe that the grievance
of the respondents that there is no material to support the faked and
cooked up story against them is taken care of [as held in Sanjay
Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 2 SCC 39 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 172] to
which one of us(Jaswant Singh, J.) was a party] by Section 227 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 under which it is open to the Court of
Session on committal of the case to it to discharge the accused if upon
consideration of the record of the case and documents submitted
therewith and after hearing the submissions of the parties it considers
that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
The respondents would therefore be at liberty to invoke the provisions of
Section 227 of the Code on the case being committed to the Court of
Session.”
10. Merely because the Petitioner on earlier occasion had invoked the
revisional jurisdiction of this Court challenging the order of cognizance taken
by the learned Magistrate under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and the Criminal
Revision Case was dismissed, the said order of dismissal of earlier revision
case would not preclude the Petitioner from filing a petition seeking discharge
under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ since the two provisions namely Section
190 and 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ are founded on distant legal parameters. The
scope under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is based upon the police report filed
under Section 173 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or other material produced by the
complainant. Whereas the judicial scrutiny required under Section 227 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is altogether different.
1
(1978) 4 SCC 58
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11. Indeed, the committal court merely examines whether the allegations,
prima facie, discloses the commission of the offence. Further, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge while invoking powers under Section 227 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ is duty bound to evaluate the entire material filed with police report
and after affording an opportunity of being heard and determine whether
sufficient grounds existed to proceed with trial. The accused is required to be
discharged, when no such grounds are found. As seen from the impugned
order, the learned Additional Sessions Judge failed to assign any reasons, let
alone valid and sustainable reasons for dismissing the discharge petition.
Non-mentioning of the reasons for dismissing the discharge petition simply
because on earlier occasion this Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Case
filed by the Petitioner, when cognizance was taken against the Petitioner by
the learned Magistrate under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ vitiates the
impugned order. Since the learned Additional Sessions Judge had not
assigned any reasons for dismissing the discharge petition, it would be proper
to set aside the discharge order and direct the learned Additional Sessions
Judge to pass an order afresh assigning cogent reasons under Section 227 of
‘the Cr.P.C.’ Hence the appreciation of the contention of the Petitioner about
his alleged involvement in the offence is not proper and prudent while
remanding back the case for fresh consideration.
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12. In Hareram Satpathy‘s case also police took up the investigation on
receipt of report from the complainant therein and on completion of
investigation filed chargesheet, deleted the names of the respondents therein
as no offence appeared to have been made out against them, but on a
complaint filed by the Appellant therein, the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate
found a prima face case under Section 302 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ against the
respondents also and therefore directed the issuance of NBW. On revision, at
the instance of the respondents, the High court set aside the order of the
learned Magistrate. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court found fault with the
order of the High Court quoting the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Nagawwa v. V.S. Konjalgi2, wherein at para No.5, it is held as under:
“5. Mr Bhandare laid great stress on the words “the truth or
falsehood of the complaint” and contended that in determining whether
the complaint is false the court can go into the question of the broad
probabilities of the case or intrinsic infirmities appearing in the evidence.
It is true that in coming to a decision as to whether a process should be
issued the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent
improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence
led by the complainant in support of the allegations but there appears to
be a very thin line of demarcation between a probability of conviction of
the accused and establishment of a prima facie case against him. The
Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the
discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once the Magistrate has
exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even this Court, to
substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the
case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in
the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the
accused. These considerations, in our opinion, are totally foreign to the
scope and ambit of an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure which culminates into an order under Section 204 of the
Code. Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of
the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or
set aside:
2
(1976) 3 SCC 736
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witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value
make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does
not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged
against the accused;
(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and
inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused;
(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is
capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on
materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and
(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as,
want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent
authority and the like.”
13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Hareram Satpathy‘s case observed that the
High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the order of the
learned Jurisdictional Magistrate as the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of
the High Court was very limited and the High Court could not launch a detailed
examination of the case on merits.
14. It is pertinent to point out that the order of dismissal of
Crl.R.C.No.2811/2017 filed at the behest of the Petitioner was only detailing
with the validity of the order of the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate in
proceeding against the Petitioner, Accused No.5 and Accused No.9 as prima
facie there was a material to proceed against them. The observations of the
learned Single Judge while dismissing the Criminal Revision Case was
pertaining to the validity of the order of cognizance taken by the Magistrate
under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ As mentioned supra, the parameters for
evaluation of the cases under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and Section 227 of
‘the Cr.P.C.,’ are altogether different.
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15. In this regard, it is apposite and profitable to refer the decisions of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Mona Panwar v. High Court of Judicature of
Allahabad3, wherein at para Nos.9 & 10 it is held as under:
“19. The phrase “taking cognizance of” means cognizance of an offence
and not of the offender. Taking cognizance does not involve any formal
action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate
applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence.
Cognizance, therefore, takes place at a point when a Magistrate first
takes judicial notice of an offence. This is the position whether the
Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint or on a police
report or upon information of a person other than a police officer. Before
the Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence
under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code, he must have not only applied his
mind to the contents of the complaint presented before him but must
have done so for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the
provisions following that section. However, when the Magistrate had
applied his mind only for ordering an investigation under Section 156(3)
of the Code or issued a warrant for the purposes of investigation, he
cannot be said to have taken cognizance of an offence.
20. Taking cognizance is a different thing from initiation of the
proceedings. One of the objects of examination of the complainant and
his witnesses as mentioned in Section 200 of the Code is to ascertain
whether there is prima facie case against the person accused of the
offence in the complaint and to prevent the issue of process on a
complaint which is either false or vexatious or intended only to harass
such person. Such examination is provided, therefore, to find out
whether there is or not sufficient ground for proceeding further.”
16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon
International Ltd.4, at para Nos.19 & 20 it is held as under:
“19. The expression “cognizance” has not been defined in the
Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric
or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means “become aware
of” and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes “to
take notice of judicially”. It indicates the point when a court or a
Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating
proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by
someone.
3
(2011) 3 SCC 496
4
(2008) 2 SCC 492
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20. “Taking cognizance” does not involve any formal action of any kind.
It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected
commission of an offence. Cognizance is taken prior to commencement
of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or
condition precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an
offence and not of an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken
cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of
each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down as to
when a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance.”
17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Fakhruddin Ahmad v. State of
Uttaranchal5, at para Nos.13 & 14, it is held as under:
“13. The next incidental question is as to what is meant by the
expression “taking cognizance of an offence” by a Magistrate within the
contemplation of Section 190 of the Code?
14. The expression “cognizance” is not defined in the Code but is a word
of indefinite import. As observed by this Court in Ajit Kumar Palit v. State
of W.B. [AIR 1963 SC 765 : 1963 Supp (1) SCR 953] : (AIR p. 770, para
19)
“19. … The word ‘cognizance’ has no esoteric or mystic
significance in criminal law or procedure. It merely means–
become aware of and when used with reference to a court or
Judge, to take notice of judicially.”
Approving the observations of the Calcutta High Court
in Emperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty [ILR (1910) 37 Cal 412] (at
ILR p. 416), the Court said that
“taking cognizance does not involve any formal action, or indeed action
of any kind, but occurs as soon as a Magistrate, as such, applies his
mind to the suspected commission of an offence.””
18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal6,
at para Nos.7 to 10 it is held as under:
“7.Section 227 of the Code runs thus:-“If, upon consideration of the
record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after
hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this
behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and
record his reasons for so doing.” The words ‘not sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not a5
(2008) 17 SCC 157
6
AIR 1979 SC 366
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11.08.2025mere post-office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution,
but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution.
In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the
pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence
and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the
stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order
to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold
the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents
produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are
suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge
against him.
8.The scope of Section 227 of the Code was considered by a recent
decision of this Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh,
(1978) 1 SCR 257 : (AIR 1977 SC 2018) where Untwalia J. speaking for
the Court observed as follows (at p. 2019):-“Strong suspicion against the
accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the
place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial
stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that
there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an
offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt
of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stages is not in the
sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where
the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it
is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should
proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor
proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully
accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the
defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the
offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the
trial.” This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may not
take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for
the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge in order to frame a charge against
the accused. Even under the Code of 1898 this Court has held that a
committing Magistrate had ample powers to weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a case of commitment to
the Sessions Judge has been made out.
9.In the case of K. P. Raghavan v. M. H. Abbas, AIR 1967 SC 740 this
Court observed as follows (at p. 742):-“No doubt a Magistrate enquiring
into a case under S. 209, Cr. P. C. is not to act as a mere Post Office,
and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for
commitment of the accused to the Court of Session”.To the same effect
is the later decision of this Court in the case of Alamohan Das v. State of
West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 520 : (AIR SC 863) where Shah, J.
speaking for the Court observed as follows (at p. 866) :-“A Magistrate
holding an enquiry is not intended to act merely as a recording machine.
He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for
seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not
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whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima
facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is his duty
to discharge the accused : if there is some evidence on which a
conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case.”In the
aforesaid case this Court was considering the scope and ambit of
Section 209 of the Code of 1898.
10.Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the
following principles emerge:(1) That the Judge while considering the
question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose
of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has
been made out;(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly
explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and
proceeding with the trial.(3) The test of determine a prima facie case
would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to
lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two
views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence
produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave
suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to
discharge the accused.(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under
Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a
senior and experienced Court cannot act merely as a Post-Office or a
mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the
documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in
the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should
make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh
the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.”
19. The Hon’ble Apex Court in P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala7, at para
No.11 it is held as under:
“11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the
evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of
ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by
the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie
disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so
as to frame a charge against him.”
7
(2010) 2 SCC 398
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20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh
Rao8, at para Nos.7 & 10 it is held as under:
“Discussion and findings
7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind being necessary to
determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for
proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros
and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the accused when
an application for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial Judge has to
merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to
determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against
the accused on basis of charge-sheet material. The nature of the
evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the
documents produced in which prima facie it reveals that there are
suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge
would suffice and such material would be taken into account for the
purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be
discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of
the material there are grounds for presuming that the accused has
committed the offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be
framed.
10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an
application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that
the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true
and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts
emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the
existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged.”
21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar
Kashyap9, at para No.11.1 it is held as under:
“11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC
398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488] , this Court had an occasion to consider
Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at the time of
framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has
been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held
that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the
evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the
sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the
evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the
court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances8
(2023) 17 SCC 688
9
(2021) 11 SCC 191
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11.08.2025against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further
observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient
ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if
not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while
exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine
whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not
necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or
into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is
really the function of the court, after the trial starts.”
22. Upon careful consideration of the submissions made by both parties
and perusal of the record, this Court finds that the order passed by the learned
Trial Court suffers from procedural irregularity and lacks a reasoned analysis
of the material placed before it. The learned Additional District Judge, while
rejecting the discharge petition, has not adequately addressed the specific
contentions raised by the petitioner nor has it recorded cogent reasons
demonstrating application of judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of
the case. The order appears to be cryptic and mechanical, failing to reflect the
rationale behind the decision to frame charges.
23. It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of
‘the Cr.P.C.,’ the learned Trial Court is required to consider whether the
material on record, if unrebutted, would reasonably lead to a conviction.
Though a detailed evaluation of evidence is not warranted at this stage, the
learned Court must nonetheless indicate the basis for its satisfaction that a
prima facie case exists. In the present case, the absence of such reasoning
renders the impugned order vulnerable to judicial scrutiny. The principles of
natural justice and fair trial demand that the accused be informed of the
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grounds on which the learned Court proceeds to frame charges, especially
when a discharge is sought.
24. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
matter deserves to be remanded back. Accordingly, the impugned order dated
11.03.2025 in Crl.M.P.No.31 of 2025 in S.C.No.47 of 2023 passed by the
learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ongole is set aside. The
matter is remanded back to the learned Trial Court for fresh consideration and
disposal of the discharge petition in accordance with law. The learned Trial
Court shall make endeavour to pass a reasoned order after affording
opportunity of hearing of both the parties and upon considering material
available on record, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of
this order.
25. With the above observations and directions, this Criminal Revision Case
is disposed of. No order as to costs.
As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand
closed.
_________________________
Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
Dt: 11.08.2025
VTS
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