Delhi High Court
Pramiti Basu vs Secretary General Supreme Court Of … on 29 August, 2025
Author: Prateek Jalan
Bench: Prateek Jalan
$~P-1 to P-5
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Decided on: 29.08.2025
+ W.P.(C) 11007/2025 & CM APPL. 45323/2025
PRAMITI BASU .....Petitioner
versus
SECRETARY GENERAL SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA .....Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 11008/2025 & CM APPL. 45325/2025
ANUJ CHAUHAN .....Petitioner
versus
SECRETARY GENERAL SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA .....Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 11043/2025 & CM APPL. 45467/2025
SHAHID AHMED .....Petitioner
versus
SECRETARY GENERAL SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA .....Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 11067/2025 & CM APPL. 45542/2025
TARU PANT .....Petitioner
versus
SECRETARY GENERAL, SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA .....Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 11115/2025 & CM APPL. 45732/2025
SAURABH NISHAD .....Petitioner
versus
SECRETARY GENERAL SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA .....Respondent
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Appearance:
Dr. Amit George, Mr. Arkaneil Bhaumik, Ms. Shivalika Rudrabatla and
Mr. Kartikay Puneesh, Mr. Dushyant Kaul, Ms. Rupam Jha, Ms. Medhavi
Bhaila, Advocates for petitioner in W.P.(C) 110067/2025.
Mr. Shubham Prajapati, Mr. Rakesh Kumar Mandal, Mr. Akash Kumar,
Mr. Phillip Massey, Mr. Mahipal Singh, Ms. Shrishti, Mr. Aditya Raj
Marandi and Ms. Muskan Dulet, Advocates for petitioners in W.P.(C)
11007/2025, W.P.(C) 11008/2025, W.P.(C) 11043/2025, W.P.(C)
11115/2025.
Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG with Ms. Pratima N. Lakra, CGSC, Mr. Amit
Gupta, Mr. Chandan Prajapati, Mr. R.V. Prabhat, Mr. Vinay Yadav, Mr.
Vikram Aditya, Mr. Shubham Sharma, Mr. Shailendra Kumar Mishra and
Mr. Naman, Advocates, with Mr. T.I. Rajput, Registrar with Ms. Neetu
Verma, Deputy Registrar, Ms. Sonika Khurana, Mr. Tarun Maurya, Court
Assistant, SCI.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN
JUDGMENT
1. The petitioners in these writ petitions are all candidates for
appointment to the post of Junior Court Assistant [“JCA”] in the
respondent-Supreme Court of India, pursuant to an advertisement dated
04.02.2025. They are aggrieved by a notification dated 14.07.2025, by
which results of the Typing Speed Test stage of the recruitment process
were declared. The petitioners’ grievance is that they have been excluded
from the next stage of recruitment [Descriptive Test], despite having been
declared as qualified in the Typing Speed Test.
2. As the petitions are predicated on virtually identical grounds, they
were taken up for hearing together. W.P.(C) 11007/2025 was treated as
the lead case. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the
pleadings filed therein have been considered in respect of all the petitions.
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A. FACTS:
3. The respondent advertised 241 vacancies for the post of JCA on
04.02.2025. The present dispute concerns the “Scheme of Examination”
provided in the advertisement, which is reproduced below:
“Scheme of Examination
The eligible candidates will have to appear in the tests in the following
subject:-
1. Objective Type Question paper with 2 hours
multiple choice answers containing 100
questions (consisting of 50 General
English questions including
comprehension, 25 General Aptitude
questions and 25 General Knowledge
questions).
2. Objective Type Computer Knowledge
Test (25 questions)
3. Typing (English) test on Computer with 10
minimum speed 35 w.p.m. (mistakes minutes
allowed upto 3% of total words to be
typed)
4. Descriptive Test (in English Language) 2 hours
consisting of Comprehension passage,
Precis Writing and Essay Writing
The candidates who qualify in the Objective Type Written Test and
Objective Type Computer Knowledge Test will only be called for
Typing Speed Test on Computer and Descriptive Test and those who
qualify the said tests will be required to appear for an Interview before
an Interview Board and qualify the Interview by securing minimum
qualifying marks. Number of candidates to be called for Interview
shall not exceed the ratio of 1:3 i.e. 3 candidates against 1 vacancy
subject to availability of candidates who would be qualified on the
basis of above Tests. After qualifying in prescribed tests and Interview,
the selected candidates will be empanelled in the order of merit for
appointment as Junior Court Assistant. The candidates may note that
mere placement in panel does not confer any right on the candidates to
claim appointment for the post of Junior Court Assistant.”11
Emphasis supplied.
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4. The petitioners were successful in the first two stages of the
examination, which comprised of Objective Type Question Paper and the
Objective Type Computer Knowledge Test. They were therefore called
for a Typing Test on computer. The admit cards for the Typing Speed
Test contained several “Instructions to Candidates”, of which the
following are relevant:
“Instruction to Candidates:
English Typing test of SCI will be conducted in following manner.
Exam Typing Passage Exam Structure Exam Duration
English Typing 350 Words Mock Test (5 25 mins
mins) + Break
(10 mins) +
English Typing
(10 mins)
xxxx xxxx xxxx
3. 10 minutes will be given for actual Typing Test (English)
4. Candidates will be able to do a practice typing test for 5 minutes
before the actual typing test
5. There will also be a break of 10 minutes between Mock / Practice
and the Actual Typing Test.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
Marking Formula for Typing Speed Test on ComputerNo. of mistakes Marks to be awarded out of maximum
50 marks
0 50.00
1 47.73
2 45.45
3 43.18
4 40.91
5 38.64
6 36.36
7 34.09
8 31.82
9 29.55
10 27.27
11 25.00″
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5. By the impugned notification dated 14.07.2025, the respondent
declared the result of the Typing Speed Test held on 04.06.2025 for
10,281 candidates. The opening paragraph of the notification and first 20
rows, by way of example, are reproduced below:
“Result of Typing Speed Test on Computer in respect of 10281
candidates for the post of Junior Court Assistant held on June 04,
2025
The candidates who have qualified Typing Speed Test on Computer
and secured 43.18 marks or more marks out of 50 marks in said test
along with 10 candidates of PwD category who have been exempted
from the said test are required to appear in Descriptive Test (in
English) to be conducted tentatively on 01.08.2025 in Delhi/NCR.
Sl.No. Name Roll No. Qualified/Not Marks Scored
Qualified
1 Rahul Kumar 111100190100 Qualified 38.64
Gupta
2 Shubham Saurabh 111100330053 Not Qualified N/A
3 Amardip Kumar 111100170058 Not Qualified N/A
4 Rishu Katiyar 111100190103 Qualified 43.18
5 Rohit Abhishek 111100350060 Not Qualified N/A
6 Surabhi Rai 111100300120 Qualified 34.09
7 Amit Abhishek 111100380318 Not Qualified N/A
8 Siddharth Kumar 111100380037 Not Qualified N/A
Singh
9 Arnav Raj 111100340132 Not Qualified N/A
10 Pranjal Priyadarshi 111100040194 Not Qualified N/A
11 Kriti Raj 111100010308 Not Qualified N/A
12 Sujit Prakash 111100190185 Not Qualified N/A
13 Vinay Kumar 111100290107 Not Qualified N/A
14 Avinash Kumar 111100290225 Not Qualified N/A
15 Md Adil Ansari 111100300119 Not Qualified N/A
16 Piyush Kumar 111100370100 Not Qualified N/A
17 Gaurav Kumar 111100640045 Exempted —-
18 Prince Kumar 111100290189 Not Qualified N/A
Verma
19 Sanehu Kumari 111100330200 Not Qualified N/A
20 Anupam Kumar Jha 111100350178 Qualified 27.27
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx"2
2
Emphasis supplied.
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6. As far as the five petitioners are concerned, their results were as
follows:
Sl.No. Name Roll No. Qualified/Not Marks
Qualified Scored
828 Saurabh 272104910110 Qualified 40.91
Nishad
1956 Pramiti Basu 136101030006 Qualified 38.64
4713 Anuj Chauhan 268104840252 Qualified 40.91
6634 Shahid Ahmed 158101620040 Qualified 38.64
9075 Taru Pant 145101300201 Qualified 38.64
7. It is evident from the above that, although the petitioners were
declared “Qualified”, they did not achieve the score of 43.18, as
required to appear in the Descriptive Test.
B. MATERIAL PLACED ON RECORD BY THE RESPONDENT
8. The respondent filed a counter affidavit dated 08.08.2025, and an
additional affidavit dated 14.08.20253. The respondent also produced
before the Court its record relating to the impugned recruitment. A copy
of the record was handed up to the Court at the hearing on 18.08.2025.
Although the extracts of the record have not been annexed to the affidavit
filed by the respondent, learned counsel for the petitioners were permitted
to inspect the record, and make their submissions thereupon. The order of
the Court dated 18.08.2025 records that this procedure was adopted with
the consent of learned counsel for the parties. A photocopy of the relevant
Note from the respondent’s record has been placed in a sealed cover with
the Registry.
3
Filed pursuant to permission granted by order dated 12.08.2025.
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9. In the affidavits filed by the respondent, they have traced the power
to shortlist candidates, to Clause 18 of the Advertisement, which reads as
follows:
“18. The Registry reserves its right to short-list candidates in any
manner as may be considered appropriate with the approval of
Competent Authority. The Registry reserves the right to
cancel/restrict/enlarge/modify/alter the recruitment process, if
needed, without issuing any notice.”4
10. The respondent has also relied upon the Supreme Court Officers &
Servants (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1961 [“the Rules”],
specifically Rule 47, which reads as follows:
“47. Residuary Powers – Nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to
affect the power of the Chief Justice to make such-orders, from time to
time, as he may deem fit in regard to all matters incidental or ancillary
to these rules not specifically provided for herein or in regard to
matters as have not been sufficiently provided for:
Provided that if any such order relates to salaries, allowances,
leave or pensions of Court servants, the same shall be made with the
approval of the President.”
11. In the respondent’s counter affidavit dated 08.08.2025, the
following data has been provided with regard to the recruitment in
question:
“5. That the complete data of candidates participated for the notified post
of 241 are as under:
Sr. No. Particulars Figures
i. Total Number of applications 1,34,608
received for the post of Junior
Court Assistant
ii. Number of candidates appeared in 76,749
MCQ Test (Written Test)
iii. Number of candidates qualified in 61,561
MCQ Test (Written Test)
iv. Number of candidates shortlisted 10,993
for typing speed test on computer
4
Emphasis supplied.
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shortlisted on the basis of 100 or
more marks out of 125 marks in
MCQ Test (Written Test)
v. Number of candidates appeared 10,281
for Typing Speed Test on
Computer
vi. Number of candidates qualified for 3731
Typing Speed Test on computer
having secured minimum qualified
25 marks or more
vii. Number of candidates shortlisted 2651+10
for appearing in Descriptive Test PwD
out of candidates who qualified Candidates
Typing Speed exempted from Test exempted
on Computer (Criteria applied - from
ratio of 1:10) candidates securing Typing
marks 43.18 or more were Test
shortlisted
viii. Number of candidates appeared in 2547"
Descriptive Test
12. The justification for the benchmark of 43.18 marks is provided in
the following extracts of the counter affidavit:
“8. That the benchmark of 43.18 marks (i.e., candidates committing
up to 3 mistakes in the Typing Test) was fixed by the Registry with the
approval of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘Competent Authority’), taking into account the limited
number of 241 vacancies and the requirement to maintain a 1:10
ratio of candidates for the next stage. Accordingly, only candidates
who secured 43.18 marks or more were shortlisted. This
administrative decision was based on performance merit and was
consistent with the shortlisting principle applied in the earlier stage
of recruitment.
9. That it is relevant to note that shortlisting on the basis of a
benchmark was also applied at the earlier stage. Out of 61,561
candidates who qualified in the Written Test, only 10,993 candidates
scoring 100 marks or more out of 125 were shortlisted for the Typing
Speed Test. This demonstrates that benchmarking has been a
consistent feature of the entire recruitment process and was applied
transparently and objectively at every stage and the petitioners were
well aware of the same.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
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12. That the benchmark of 43.18 marks was finalized upon the
submission of a note dated 09.07.2025 and approved by the
Competent Authority on 18.07.2025, in consultation with the Hon’ble
Judge nominated to oversee the conduct of the examination. Pursuant
to this, a total of 2,651 candidates, who secured 43.18 marks or more,
and 10 PwD candidates (exempted from the Typing Test) were
shortlisted for the Descriptive Test.
13. That the decision to apply the said benchmark is further
supported and validated by Rule 4(2)(c) and Rule 6 of the Supreme
Court Officers & Servants (Conditions of Service and Conduct)
Rules, 1961, as well as Article 146 of the Constitution of India, which
vests the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India with absolute discretion in
matters of appointment and conduct of recruitment in the Supreme
Court.
14. In view of the above, it is submitted that the fixation of the
43.18 benchmark is neither arbitrary nor retrospective, but rather a
lawful, consistent, and rational exercise of administrative discretion.
The same was necessary to ensure efficient processing of candidates
for the limited vacancies and is fully in line with the terms of the
recruitment notification, service rules, and constitutional scheme. The
Petitioner’s challenge to the shortlisting process is, therefore,
unfounded and liable to be rejected.”
13. In the additional affidavit dated 14.08.2025, paragraph 12 of the
counter affidavit dated 08.08.2025 has been clarified, to the extent that
the Registry Note dated 09.07.2025 was approved by the Hon’ble Chief
Justice of India [“Competent Authority”] on 10.07.2025, in consultation
with the Hon’ble Judge nominated to oversee the conduct of the
examination [“Nominated Authority”]. The date of “18.07.2025” referred
to in paragraph 12, was in fact the date of approval of a
modification/corrigendum, which was approved by the Nominated
Authority.
C. SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONERS
14. Dr. Amit George, who appears for the petitioner in W.P. (C)
11067/2025, advanced arguments on her behalf. Mr. Shubham Prajapati,
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learned counsel for the petitioners in the other four writ petitions,
supplemented Dr. George’s arguments.
15. The principal submission of Dr. George was that the imposition of
a cut-off of 43.18 marks in the Typing Test, to proceed to the Descriptive
Test stage, was not provided in the advertisement and was, therefore,
tantamount to “changing rules of the game mid-way”. He submitted that a
plain reading of the “Scheme of Examination” provided the criteria for
qualification in the Typing Test, both in terms of minimum speed (35
words per minute) and maximum error count (3% of the total words to be
typed). In fact, it was submitted that the petitioners have rightly been
declared as qualified, on the basis of these very criteria. Once these
conditions were met, they were entitled to participate in the Descriptive
Test without any further condition, but have been excluded, for which
there is no justification. There was neither any ambiguity in the
advertisement, nor any statutory rule, which permitted such a condition.
16. Dr. George submitted that, in the facts of the present case, Clause
18 could not have been used to insert a further qualification requirement
to the criteria already mentioned in the advertisement. In circumstances
when the benchmark has been set in the advertisement, it was submitted
that the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Tej Prakash Pathak
& Ors. v. Rajasthan High Court & Ors5 precludes setting of an additional
merit-based benchmark6, in the manner indicated in paragraph 11 of the
respondent’s additional affidavit. Dr. George argued that the effect of
permitting such a broad interpretation of Clause 18 would, in fact,
5
(2025) 2 SCC 1 [hereinafter, “Tej Prakash Pathak”].
6
Ibid, paragraph 52.
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diminish the central ratio of the Constitution Bench decision, that “rules
of the game ought not to be changed mid-way”.
17. Dr. George urged that shortlisting based on a multiple of the
number of vacancies, cannot be permitted at the Descriptive Test stage. In
the advertisement, such a process was expressly applicable only at the
Interview stage, for which a maximum of three candidates were to be
called for each vacancy. He argued that, prior to the Interview stage, the
minimum qualifications prescribed ought themselves to have been
employed for the purposes of shortlisting.
18. It was further submitted that, to the extent that Tej Prakash Pathak
permits setting of benchmark at different stages of the recruitment
process, it requires this to be done before the stage in question is reached.
In the present case, Dr. George submitted that the benchmark was set
only after the Typing Test had been concluded. He argued additionally
that the Typing Test and Descriptive Test are, in terms of the
advertisement, a single stage of recruitment, and no filtering of candidates
was permissible, other than by application of the qualifying criteria.
19. In addition to Tej Prakash Pathak, Dr. George cited the
judgements of the Supreme Court in Manoj Kumar v. Union of India7 and
Hemani Malhotra v. High Court of Delhi8, in support of the above
contentions. He also referred to an article by Professor C.H. Powell in the
Constitutional Court Review9, to submit that the respondent, being the
7
(2024) 3 SCC 563 [hereinafter, “Manoj Kumar”].
8
(2008) 7 SCC 11 [hereinafter, “Hemani Malhotra”].
9
C H Powell, ‘Judicial Independence and the Office of the Chief Justice’ (2019) 9 Constitutional Court
Review 497.
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highest Court of the land, must not only lay down the law, “but be
constituted and maintained by it”.
20. With regard to the scope of Rule 47 of the Rules, Dr. George
submitted that it confers only a “residuary power”, which can be
exercised in matters incidental or ancillary to the Rules, or those which
have been inadequately provided for. Rule 4 of the Rules, on the other
hand, confers a specific power with regard to recruitment, including the
power to direct the manner in which recruitment shall be made in a case
of direct recruitment, thus denuding Rule 47 of applicability.
21. Dr. George’s next argument was centered around the requirement
that an exercise of shortlisting, even if permitted by the rules and/or
advertisement, cannot be arbitrary. He submitted that no reasons are
given in the Noting of the respondent, which was ultimately approved by
the Nominated Authority and the Competent Authority, as to why such
shortlisting was required. The only observation was with regard to calling
an “appropriate number of candidates” for interview, but no further
elaboration was provided. Dr. George submitted that no such
administrative exigency occurs in the present case, so as to justify the
implementation of a cut off of 43.18 marks. Out of the total number of
1,34,608 candidates who had applied, 76,749 candidates participated in
the first stage of the examination, and the number of candidates had
already been reduced to 10,281 at the stage of participation in the Typing
Test. 3,731 candidates qualified in the Typing Test, out of which 2,661
candidates10, were called for the Descriptive Test. The total number of
10
Including 10 candidates in the Persons with Disability category, who were exempted in the Typing
Test.
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qualified candidates was 3,731, which would have led to an addition of
only 1,080 candidates. He submitted that the participation of a large
number of candidates was entirely foreseeable and could not lay the
foundation for a claim of administrative necessity.
22. Dr. George lastly submitted that the supply of additional grounds
or reasoning in the affidavit of the respondent cannot be used to justify
the order, relying upon Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr.11.
He also referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramjit Singh
Kardam v. Sanjeev Kumar12, to argue that decisions cannot be supported
by undisclosed “administrative reasons”.
D. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
23. Mr. Chetan Sharma, learned Additional Solicitor General [“ASG”],
and Ms. Pratima N. Lakra, learned counsel, advanced arguments on
behalf of the respondent.
24. Learned ASG submitted that Clause 18 of the advertisement,
specifically permitted shortlisting of candidates in any manner considered
appropriate, with the approval of the Competent Authority. He contended
that such a reserved power was consistent with the Constitution Bench
decision in Tej Prakash Pathak, as also the earlier decision of the
Supreme Court in Yogesh Yadav v. Union of India13.
25. Relying upon the material placed on record by the respondent,
learned ASG contended that the benchmark of 43.18 marks was applied
on the basis of a ratio of 10 candidates for every vacancy. This exercise
11
(1978) 1 SCC 405 [hereinafter, “Mohinder Singh Gill”].
12
(2020) 20 SCC 209 [hereinafter, “Ramjit Singh Kardam”].
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was approved by the Competent Authority in exercise of powers
specifically reserved in Clause 18 of the advertisement, and was applied
uniformly to all candidates. He also submitted that the petitioners
participated in the selection process, and must therefore live with the
consequences of Clause 18, which was known to them from the very
beginning of the recruitment process. Specifically, he drew my attention
to the counter affidavit dated 08.08.202514, which shows that an exercise
of shortlisting was conducted even at an earlier stage of the recruitment,
i.e. after the Objective Test (Written Test). The affidavit states that
61,561 candidates qualified in the Written Test (Multiple Choice
Question), out of which 10,993 were shortlisted for Typing Speed Test,
including the petitioners herein. This shortlisting was also carried out, not
on the basis of any express criteria in the advertisement, but in exercise of
power under Clause 18.
26. Learned ASG further submitted that such a decision was not
arbitrary or unreasonable, but was justified by requirements of
administrative exigency. He argued that such an administrative decision
was also not contrary to any statutory rule, and in fact was authorised by
Rule 47 of the Rules.
27. It was, therefore, submitted that the decision was not open to
challenge within the limited jurisdiction available under Article 226 of
the Constitution. Learned ASG additionally cited West Bengal Central
13
(2013) 14 SCC 623 [hereinafter, “Yogesh Yadav”].
14
Paragraphs 5 & 7.
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School Service Commission & Ors. v. Abdul Halim & Ors. 15 in support
of his submissions.
E. ANALYSIS:
i. Constitution Bench judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak
28. The recent Constitution Bench decision in Tej Prakash Pathak lays
down the legal principles which govern the doctrine against “changing
the rules of the game mid-way”. As learned counsel on both sides placed
considerable emphasis on the said judgment, a detailed analysis thereof is
required.
29. The issue in that case concerned recruitment to the post of
Translator from amongst Judicial Assistants and Junior Judicial
Assistants in the Rajasthan High Court. The recruitment was held under
Staff Service Rules framed by the Rajasthan High Court in the year 2002.
21 candidates participated in the examination, and three were declared
selected, on the basis of a decision of the Hon’ble Chief Justice, that only
those candidates who secured a minimum of 75% of the marks would be
selected. A writ petition filed on behalf of unsuccessful candidates was
dismissed by the Rajasthan High Court. The challenge to the Rajasthan
High Court decision was referred to a Constitution Bench, questioning
the judgment in K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh16, on the
ground that it failed to consider an earlier decision in State of Haryana v.
Subhash Chander Marwaha17.
15
(2019) 18 SCC 39 [hereinafter, “West Bengal Central School Service Commission”].
16
(2008) 3 SCC 512 [hereinafter, “K. Manjusree”].
17
(1974) 3 SCC 220 [hereinafter, “Subhash Chander Marwaha”].
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30. The Constitution Bench has described the basis of the doctrine as
follows:
“25. Candidates participating in a recruitment process have
legitimate expectation that the process of selection will be fair and
non-arbitrary. The basis of doctrine of legitimate expectation in
public law is founded on the principles of fairness and non-
arbitrariness in government dealings with individuals. It recognises
that a public authority’s promise or past conduct will give rise to a
legitimate expectation. This doctrine is premised on the notion that
public authorities, while performing their public duties, ought to
honour their promises or past practices. The legitimacy of an
expectation can be inferred if it is rooted in law, custom, or
established procedure.
26. However, the doctrine of legitimate expectation does not impede
or hinder the power of the public authorities to lay down a policy or
withdraw it. The public authority has the discretion to exercise the
full range of choices available within its executive power. The public
authority often has to take into consideration diverse factors,
concerns, and interests before arriving at a particular policy
decision. The courts are generally cautious in interfering with a bona
fide decision of public authorities which denies legitimate expectation
provided such a decision is taken in the larger public interest. Thus,
public interest serves as a limitation on the application of the
doctrine of legitimate expectation.
27. Courts have to determine whether the public interest is
compelling and sufficient to outweigh the legitimate expectation of
the claimant. While performing a balancing exercise, courts have to
often grapple with the issues of burden and standard of proof
required to dislodge the claim of legitimate expectation.”
31. The Court reconciled the decisions in Subhash Chander Marwaha
and K. Manjusree, and also considered the judgments in K.H. Siraj v.
High Court of Kerala18 and Hemani Malhotra, as follows:
“42. A close reading of the judgment in Subash Chander Marwaha
would disclose that there was no change in the rules of the game qua
eligibility for placement in the select list. There the select list was
prepared in accordance with the extant rules. But, since the extant
rules did not create any obligation on the part of the State Government18
(2006) 6 SCC 395.
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to make appointments against all notified vacancies, this Court opined
that the State could take a policy decision not to appoint candidates
securing less than 55% marks. With that reasoning and by taking into
account that appointments made were of top seven candidates in the
select list, who had secured 55% or higher marks, this Court found no
merit in the petition of the writ petitioners.
43. On the other hand, in K. Manjusree, the eligibility criteria for
placement in the select list was changed after interviews were held
which had a material bearing on the select list. Thus, Subash Chander
dealt with the right to be appointed from the select list whereas K.
Manjusree dealt with the right to be placed in the select list. The two
cases therefore dealt with altogether different issues. For the foregoing
reasons, in our view, K. Manjusree could not have been doubted for
having failed to consider Subash Chander Marwaha.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
47. The decision in K.H. Siraj makes it clear that if the rules governing
recruitment provides latitude to the competent authority to devise its
procedure for selection it may do so subject to the rule against
arbitrariness enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. Even K.
Manjusree does not proscribe fixing minimum marks for either the
written test, or the interview, as an eligibility criterion for selection.
What K. Manjusree does is to regulate the stage at which it could be
done. This is clear from the decision of this Court in Hemani Malhotra
v. High Court of Delhi.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
52. Thus, in our view, the appointing authority/recruiting
authority/competent authority, in absence of rules to the contrary,
can devise a procedure for selection of a candidate suitable to the
post and while doing so it may also set benchmarks for different
stages of the recruitment process including written examination and
interview. However, if any such benchmark is set, the same should be
stipulated before the commencement of the recruitment process. But
if the extant Rules or the advertisement inviting applications
empower the competent authority to set benchmarks at different
stages of the recruitment process, then such benchmarks may be set
any time before that stage is reached so that neither the candidate
nor the evaluator/examiner/interviewer is taken by surprise.
53. The decision in K. Manjusree does not proscribe setting of
benchmarks for various stages of the recruitment process but mandates
that it should not be set after the stage is over, in other words after the
game has already been played. This view is in consonance with the
rule against arbitrariness enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution
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and meets the legitimate expectation of the candidates as also the
requirement of transparency in recruitment to public services and
thereby obviates malpractices in preparation of select list.
54. As already noticed in Section (A), a recruitment process inter alia
comprises of various steps like inviting applications, scrutiny of
applications, rejection of defective applications or elimination of
ineligible candidates, conducting examinations, calling for interview
or viva voce and preparation of list of successful candidates for
appointment. Subject to the rule against arbitrariness, how tests or
viva voce are to be conducted, what questions are to be put, in what
manner evaluation is to be done, whether a shortlisting exercise is
needed are all matters of procedure which, in absence of rules to the
contrary, may be devised by the competent authority. Often
advertisement(s) inviting applications are open-ended in terms of
these steps and leave it to the discretion of the competent authority to
adopt such steps as may be considered necessary in the
circumstances albeit subject to the overarching principle of rule
against arbitrariness enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
57. Likewise in Union of India v. T. Sundararaman19 where the
eligibility conditions referred to a minimum of 5 years’ experience, the
selection committee was held justified in shortlisting those candidates
with more than 7 years’ experience having regard to the large number
of applicants compared to the vacancies to be filled. The relevant
observations are being extracted below:
“4. … Note 21 to the advertisement expressly provides
that if a large number of applications are received the
Commission may shortlist candidates for interview on the
basis of higher qualifications although all applicants may
possess the requisite minimum qualifications. In M.P.
Public Service Commission v. Navnit Kumar Potdar20 this
Court has upheld shortlisting of candidates on some
rational and reasonable basis. In that case, for the
purpose of shortlisting, a longer period of experience than
the minimum prescribed was used as a criterion by the
Public Service Commission for calling candidates for an
interview. This was upheld by this Court. In State of A.P.
v. P. Dilip Kumar21 also this Court said that it is always
open to the recruiting agency to screen candidates due for19
(1997) 4 SCC 664.
20
(1994) 6 SCC 293.
21
(1993) 2 SCC 310.
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consideration at the threshold of the process of selection
by prescribing higher eligibility qualification so that the
field of selection can be narrowed down with the ultimate
objective of promoting candidates with higher
qualifications to enter the zone of consideration. The
procedure, therefore, adopted in the present case by the
Commission was legitimate.”
58. Similarly, in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B.22 it was held
that shortlisting is permissible on the basis of administrative
instructions provided the action is bona fide and reasonable. The
relevant observations in the judgment are extracted below:
“38. … The contention on behalf of the State Government
that written examination was for shortlisting the
candidates and was in the nature of “elimination test” has
no doubt substance in it in view of the fact that the records
disclose that there were about 80 posts of Medical
Technologists and a huge number of candidates,
approximately 4000 applied for appointment. The State
authorities had, therefore, no other option but to “screen”
candidates by holding written examination. It was
observed that no recruitment rules were framed in
exercise of the power under the proviso to Article 309 of
the Constitution and hence no such action could be taken.
In our opinion, however, even in absence of statutory
provision, such an action can always be taken on the basis
of administrative instructions–for the purpose of
“elimination” and “shortlisting” of huge number of
candidates provided the action is otherwise bona fide and
reasonable.”
59. Another example is in respect of fixing different cut-offs for
different subjects having regard to the relative importance of the
subjects and their degree of relevance. These instances make it clear
that this Court has been lenient in letting recruiting bodies devise an
appropriate procedure for successfully concluding the recruitment
process provided the procedure adopted has been transparent, non-
discriminatory/non-arbitrary and having a rational nexus to the object
sought to be achieved.”23
32. On the basis of the above discussion, the Constitution Bench came
to the following conclusions:
22
(2009) 1 SCC 768.
23
Emphasis supplied.
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“Conclusions
65. We, therefore, answer the reference in the following terms:
65.1. Recruitment process commences from the issuance of the
advertisement calling for applications and ends with filling up of
vacancies;
65.2. Eligibility criteria for being placed in the select list, notified at the
commencement of the recruitment process, cannot be changed midway
through the recruitment process unless the extant Rules so permit, or the
advertisement, which is not contrary to the extant Rules, so permit. Even
if such change is permissible under the extant Rules or the advertisement,
the change would have to meet the requirement of Article 14 of the
Constitution and satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness;
65.3. The decision in K. Manjusree v. State of A.P. lays down good law
and is not in conflict with the decision in State of Haryana v. Subash
Chander Marwaha. Subash Chander Marwaha deals with the right to be
appointed from the select list whereas K. Manjusree deals with the right
to be placed in the select list. The two cases therefore deal with
altogether different issues;
65.4. Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules, may devise
appropriate procedure for bringing the recruitment process to its
logical end provided the procedure so adopted is transparent, non-
discriminatory/non-arbitrary and has a rational nexus to the object
sought to be achieved;
65.5. Extant Rules having statutory force are binding on the recruiting
body both in terms of procedure and eligibility. However, where the
rules are non-existent, or silent, administrative instructions may fill in
the gaps;
65.6. Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible right to appointment. The
State or its instrumentality for bona fide reasons may choose not to fill up the
vacancies. However, if vacancies exist, the State or its instrumentality cannot
arbitrarily deny appointment to a person within the zone of consideration in the
select list.”24
ii. Applying the principles to the present case
33. Applying the judgment of the Constitution Bench, I am of the view
that the key to this case lies in a cohesive interpretation of both, Clause
18 of the advertisement, and of the “Scheme of Examination” provided
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therein. The “Scheme of Examination” provides for four stages of
examination, prior to an interview. Clause 18 expressly reserves a right of
shortlisting in the employer, and no statutory rule to the contrary has been
cited. Such a provision would therefore fall within the permissible
discretion to the employer, as provided in paragraph 52 of Tej Prakash
Pathak, subject to the test of Article 14 of the Constitution.
34. Dr. George, however, urged that such a procedure cannot be
adopted as far as the Descriptive Test stage of the examination is
concerned, as the advertisement expressly provides for the criteria
required for the preceding stage of Typing Test. While this argument is
attractive at first blush, it does not withstand deeper scrutiny. A
distinction must be made between qualifying or eligibility criteria
provided in the advertisement, and a shortlisting benchmark, which can
be supplied later, if the rules and/or the advertisement so permit. A
limited reading of Clause 18, which mandates application of the same
criteria as stated in the advertisement, for the purposes of shortlisting,
denudes the Registry of the power expressly reserved by Clause 18. Such
an analysis, which conflates qualification or eligibility criteria, with
shortlisting or selection benchmarks, is in my view not consistent with
Tej Prakash Pathak.
35. Dr. George raised an ancillary textual argument, that the “Scheme
of Examination” required the Typing Test and Descriptive Test to be
considered as a single stage, without any shortlisting permissible between
the two sub-stages. He clarified that the advertised criteria for the Typing
Test could be used to weed out candidates at that stage, but submitted that
24
Emphasis supplied.
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no other benchmark could have been employed. I am unable to accept
this submission. The Typing Test and Descriptive Test were clearly
enumerated as the third and fourth stage of the recruitment process. The
very fact that separate criteria have been laid down for the Typing Test,
implies that they were separate and distinct stages. That they have been
dealt with conjointly in the narrative below the tabular “Scheme of
Examination” cannot, by itself, be determinative. The petitioners accept
that every candidate, who was permitted to participate in the Typing Test,
need not also be called for the Descriptive Test, but suggest that the
disqualification should be limited to those who did not fulfil the
minimum criteria laid down in the advertisement itself [speed of 35
words per minute and maximum 3% mistakes]. I am of the view that, to
the contrary, permitting such an exercise implies that the two are different
stages, in which case, both qualification and shortlisting benchmarks
could have been applied.
36. Dr. George next pointed out that, in Tej Prakash Pathak25, the
Constitution Bench has held that a shortlisting benchmark must be set
before the relevant stage is reached, so that neither the candidate, nor the
evaluator/examiner/interviewer is taken by surprise. The procedure
adopted in the present case does not, in my view, violate the intention of
the observation of the Supreme Court. Shortlisting was being conducted,
in the present case, at an intermediate stage of the recruitment, on the
basis of a multiple of the number of vacancies. The marking scheme for
Typing Test was known to candidates all along; they were well aware that
they would be assessed on the basis of speed and accuracy. There was no
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change in these parameters of assessment. Consequently, the case does
not raise any question of being taken by surprise, because the very same
marking scheme was adopted.
37. Dr. George’s submission, that such an interpretation of Tej Prakash
Pathak permits the exception to govern, rather than the rule, does not
commend to me. The Constitution Bench has itself characterised the
exercise as one of balancing legitimate expectations with public interest.26
The objectives of a selection process have been identified as selection of
the most suitable person, based on impartial and objective merit-based
selection, avoiding patronage and favouritism. There is no allegation in
the present case, that these fundamental attributes have been breached.
The balance struck by the Constitution Bench must, therefore, be
observed, to the fullest extent possible. Application of the doctrine
against change of rules midway, even in a case where such a “change” is
permitted by the judgment, would disturb the balance.
38. This approach is also, in my view, supported by the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Yogesh Yadav, cited by the learned ASG. In that
case, the employer had fixed a minimum benchmark for selection of
candidates after the written test and interview process. The number of
available vacancies was not filled, only on the ground that sufficient
number of candidates did not meet the benchmark imposed later. The
Supreme Court referred to the judgments in Subhash Chander Marwaha
and Hemani Malhotra, both of which have been considered in Tej
Prakash Pathak, and held as follows:
25
Paragraph 52.
26
Paragraph 27, Tej Prakash Pathak.
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“13. The instant case is not a case where no minimum marks are
prescribed for viva voce and this is sought to be done after the written
test. As noted above, the instructions to the examinees provided that
written test will carry 80% marks and 20% marks were assigned for
the interview. It was also provided that candidates who secured
minimum 50% marks in the general category and minimum 40%
marks in the reserved categories in the written test would qualify for
the interview. The entire selection was undertaken in accordance
with the aforesaid criterion which was laid down at the time of
recruitment process. After conducting the interview, marks of the
written test and viva voce were to be added. However, since a
benchmark was not stipulated for giving the appointment. What is
done in the instant case is that a decision is taken to give
appointments only to those persons who have secured 70% marks or
above marks in the unreserved category and 65% or above marks in
the reserved category. In the absence of any rule on this aspect in
the first instance, this does not amount to changing the “rules of the
game”. The High Court has rightly held that it is not a situation where
securing of minimum marks was introduced which was not stipulated
in the advertisement, standard was fixed for the purpose of selection.
Therefore, it is not a case of changing the rules of the game. On the
contrary in the instant case a decision is taken to give appointment
to only those who fulfilled the benchmark prescribed. The fixation
of such a benchmark is permissible in law. This is an altogether
different situation not covered by Hemani Malhotra case.
14. The decision taken in the instant case amounts to shortlisting of
candidates for the purpose of selection/appointment which is always
permissible. For this course of action of CCI, justification is found
by the High Court noticing the judgment of this Court in State of
Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha . In that case, Rule 8 of the
Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Service Rules was the subject-
matter of interpretation. This Rule stipulated consideration of
candidates who secured 45% marks in aggregate. Notwithstanding the
same, the High Court recommended the names of candidates who had
secured 55% marks and the Government accepted the same. However,
later on it changed its mind and the High Court issued mandamus
directing appointment to be given to those who had secured 45% and
above marks instead of 55% marks. In appeal, the judgment of the
High Court was set aside holding as under:
“12. … It is contended that the State Government have
acted arbitrarily in fixing 55% as the minimum for
selection and this is contrary to the rule referred to above.
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preparation of a list of eligible candidates with minimum
qualifications who may be considered for appointment.
The list is prepared in order of merit. The one higher in
rank is deemed to be more meritorious than the one who is
lower in rank. It could never be said that one who tops the
list is equal in merit to the one who is at the bottom of the
list. Except that they are all mentioned in one list, each
one of them stands on a separate level of competence as
compared with another. That is why Rule 10(ii), Part C
speaks of ‘selection for appointment’. Even as there is no
constraint on the State Government in respect of the
number of appointment to be made, there is no constraint
on the State Government in respect of the number of
appointments to be made, there is no constraint on the
Government fixing a higher score of marks for the purpose
of selection. In a case where appointments are made by
selection from a number of eligible candidates it is open to
the Government with a view to maintain high standards of
competence to fix a score which is much higher than the
one required for mere eligibility.”
15. Another weighty reason given by the High Court in the instant
case, while approving the aforesaid action of CCI is that the
intention of CCI was to get more meritorious candidates. There was
no change of norm or procedure and no mandate was fixed that a
candidate should secure minimum marks in the interview. In order
to have meritorious persons for those posts, fixation of minimum 65%
marks for selecting a person from the OBC category and minimum
70% for general category, was legitimate giving a demarcating choice
to the employer. In the words of the High Court:
“In the case at hand, as we perceive, the intention of the
Commission was to get more meritorious candidates.
There has been no change of norm or procedure. No
mandate was fixed that a candidate should secure
minimum marks in the interview. Obtaining of 65% marks
was thought as a guideline for selecting the candidate
from the OBC category. The objective is to have the best
hands in the field of law. According to us, fixation of such
marks is legitimate and gives a demarcating choice to the
employer. It has to be borne in mind that the requirement
of the job in a Competition Commission demands a well-
structured selection process. Such a selection would
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the Commission which has been uniformly applied. The
said action of the Commission cannot be treated to be
illegal, irrational or illegitimate.”
16. It is stated at the cost of repetition that there is no change in the
criteria of selection which remained of 80 marks for written test and
20 marks for interview without any subsequent introduction of
minimum cut-off marks in the interview. It is the shortlisting which
is done by fixing the benchmark, to recruit best candidates on
rational and reasonable basis. That is clearly permissible under the
law.”27
39. Thus, in Yogesh Yadav, the minimum benchmark for selection was
not provided at all, but was permitted to be fixed later. This is also in line
with the decision of the Constitution Bench in Tej Prakash Pathak. In the
present case also, there is a difference between the qualification criteria
laid down in the advertisement, and the shortlisting criteria applied while
issuing the impugned notification date 14.07.2025. This is also thus a
case of shortlisting, similar to that in Yogesh Yadav, although applied at
an intermediate stage of the recruitment process, rather than at the final
stage of selection.
40. I am, therefore, of the view that the impugned action of shortlisting
was permissible under Clause 18 of the advertisement.
41. It may be noted that learned ASG raised an alternative submission,
that the respondent’s action in the present case would be justified in terms
of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Tej Prakash Pathak, even in
the absence of Clause 18. I do not consider it necessary to enter into this
contention at all as, in my view, Clause 18 expressly provides the answer.
For the same reason, it is not necessary to examine whether the
respondent’s actions were also be justified by Clause 47 of the Rules.
27
Emphasis supplied.
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iii. Judgments cited by the petitioner
42. The judgments in Manoj Kumar and Hemani Malhotra, cited to
support the petitioners’ contentions on permissibility of setting such a
shortlisting benchmark, do not persuade me to a contrary conclusion.
43. Manoj Kumar predates the judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak. The
employer had reserved the right to shortlist candidates at different stages
of recruitment. The vacancy circular provided the basic qualification
criteria and selection was to be made after conducting interview of
qualified candidates. The employer, however, later issued a notification
dispensing with the interview, and instead allocating additional marks for
essential qualifications, essential experience, and a written test. One of
the candidates challenged the selection, on the ground that he possessed
an additional post-graduate qualification, but it was ignored on the
ground that it was not in the relevant subject. The variation in the
selection procedure was not challenged.
44. Dr. George, however, relied upon the following observations of the
Supreme Court:
“12. The standard argument made consistently and successfully
before the Single Judge and the Division Bench must fail before us.
Clauses 14 and 19 of the vacancy circular do nothing more than
reserving flexibility in the selection process. They cannot be read to
invest the Institute with unbridled discretion to pick and choose
candidates by supplying new criteria to the prescribed qualification.
This is a classic case of arbitrary action. The submission based on
Clauses 14 and 19 must fail here and now.
13. The other submission of the respondent about restricting a “PG
Degree” to a “PG Degree in relevant subject” must also be rejected.
The illegality in adopting and applying such an interpretation is
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provided under Clauses ‘a’ to ‘d’ are under two categories. While ‘a’,
‘b’ and ‘d’ relating to PG Diploma, PG Degree, and PhD are general
qualifications providing for 5, 6 and 10 marks, respectively, the
category under ‘c’ relates to professional qualification in the field.
This is where specialisation is prescribed. If we add the requirement
of specialisation to category ‘b’ i.e. PG Degree, then that category
becomes redundant. The whole purpose of providing PG Degree
independently and allocating a lesser quantum of 6 marks will be
completely lost if such an interpretation is adopted. This can never be
the purpose of prescribing distinct categories. No further analysis is
necessary. We reject this submission also.
14. The Single Judge as well as the Division Bench did not really
analyse the prescription of additional qualifications and the distinct
marks allocated to each of them, but confined their decision
to restraint in judicial review and dismissed the appellant’s prayer.
When a citizen alleges arbitrariness in executive action, the High
Court must examine the issue, of course, within the context of judicial
restraint in academic matters. While respecting flexibility in executive
functioning, courts must not let arbitrary action pass through. For the
reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the decisions of the
Single Judge and the Division Bench are not sustainable, and we
hereby set aside their judgments.” 28
45. This judgment is of little assistance to the petitioner in the present
case. The right reserved to the employer was of shortlisting, but the
entirety of the process was amended, both in the procedure itself, and by
qualifying the grant of additional marks based on subject of study.
Paragraph 12 of Manoj Kumar proscribes “supplying new criteria to the
prescribed qualification”. In the present case, however, no new criteria
were supplied. Candidates were assessed against the original criteria of
typing speed and number of mistakes, and candidates were shortlisted in
proportion to the number of vacancies.
46. Hemani Malhotra has been dealt with in the Constitution Bench
judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak. The Court held that imposition of a
28
Emphasis supplied.
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minimum qualifying mark in a viva voce test, which was not provided for
in the recruitment advertisement, by a subsequent notification, was
invalid.
47. It may further be noted that, in Hemani Malhotra, there was no rule
akin to Clause 18 of the advertisement, which specifically reserved the
right to shortlist. The judgment is, therefore, distinguishable. In any
event, the Constitution Bench in Tej Prakash Pathak, laid down the
principles referred to above – including paragraph 52 – after considering
the judgment in Hemani Malhotra.
iv. Argument of arbitrariness
48. This takes us to the petitioners’ argument that the decision in the
present case, does not pass the test of arbitrariness. To establish
arbitrariness to a degree calling for the interference of the writ Court, the
petitioners would have to demonstrate unreasonableness, in the sense that
no reasonable decision-maker could have arrived at the same conclusion,
based on the material.
49. As far as this aspect is concerned, it is evident from the Note of the
Registry that the appropriateness of the ratio of 1:10 was proposed in the
context of the number of posts to be filled, and it was also mentioned that
the next stage of examination is the Descriptive Test. The Note later
recorded the modalities for conduct of the Descriptive Test, either
through University academicians or officers of the Registry. It also
proposed checking of answer sheets by outside academics and detailed
the consequent financial outlay. This also alludes to the task becoming
more burdensome with a larger number of candidates. Read as a whole,
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although the considerations have not been articulated in detail, the
context of the number of posts, and the reference to a Descriptive Test as
the next stage, provide sufficient foundation for the term “appropriate
ratio”. Relying upon the record produced before the Court, I find the
material adequate, to resist a finding of manifest arbitrariness or
unreasonableness.
50. The affidavits filed by the respondent, extracted above, provide
further information in support of the aforesaid decision. In the context of
Dr. George’s reliance upon Mohinder Singh Gill and Ramjit Singh
Kardam, suffice it to state that I do not read the respondent’s affidavits as
supplying new reasons for the decision taken, but as adding some data
and detail to the analysis. However, as noted above, I have concluded that
the decision can be defended on the basis of the record alone. The
Registry’s Note also contains sufficient detail as to the “administrative
reasons” which prevailed with the respondent.
51. Dr. George’s reference to the illuminating commentary in
Professor Powell’s article also does not call for further discussion, as the
respondent has not claimed any immunity or relaxed standard of judicial
scrutiny, in respect of its administrative decision-making. I am guided by
the general principle that all administrative decision-makers are entitled
to exercise discretion in matters within their remit, in accordance with
law. The writ Court examines the decision-making process alone, and
restrains itself from imposing its preferred outcome on an otherwise
lawful decision.29
29
West Bengal Central School Service Commission.
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F. CONCLUSION
52. For the reasons stated above, the writ petitions are dismissed, but
without any order as to costs.
PRATEEK JALAN, J
AUGUST 29, 2025
‘pv’/Ainesh/
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