Pramod Sah vs State Of H.P. & Others on 30 June, 2025

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Pramod Sah vs State Of H.P. & Others on 30 June, 2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MMO No. 528 of 2025

.

Reserved on : 19.06.2025

Date of Decision: 30.06.2025.

Pramod Sah

….Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & others

….Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

For the petitioners : Mr. Jeet Singh Advocate.
For respondent/State : Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate
General.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition, seeking

quashing of the FIR No.03/22, dated 05.01.2022, registered at Police

Station Theog, District Shimla for the commission of an offence

punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and the

consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR.

_______________

Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? yes

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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are

that the informant, Pawan Chauhan, made a complaint to the police

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stating that he was running a fruit shop at Parala Fruit Mandi in the

name and style of Pawan Fruit Company. Pramod Saah, the petitioner,

used to purchase the apple crop from the informant. He purchased the

apples worth ₹ 30,16,022/- and absconded without making the payment

of the apple crop. He cheated the informant and other persons by not

making the payment. The police have registered the FIR and conducted

the investigation.

3. Aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the petitioner has

filed the present petition, asserting that the matter has been

compromised. A full and final payment of ₹ 85 lacs has been made. The

police filed the charge sheet, and the matter is pending before the

learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Theog, District Shimla. The

continuation of the proceedings after the compromise amounts to an

abuse of the process of the Court. The allegations in the FIR, even if

accepted to be correct, do not make out any case for the commission of

an offence punishable under Section 420 of the I.P.C. Hence the present

petition.

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4. I have heard Mr. Jeet Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner

and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for

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respondent No.1-State.

5. Mr. Jeet Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted

that the matter has been compromised with the informant and other

persons, except one. The allegations in the FIR do not constitute the

commission of any cognizable offence, and continuation of the

proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court; therefore,

he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed.

6. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for

respondent No.1-State, submitted that the offence punishable under

Section 420 of the IPC is compoundable under Section 320 of the Indian

Penal Code. This Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to

quash the FIR when an alternative remedy is available to the petitioner.

Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

7. Section 320(2) of the Cr.P.C mentions the offence punishable

under Section 420 IPC in table-1 as a compoundable offence with the

permission of the Court, therefore, the petitioner has an alternative

remedy to seek the composition of the offence before the learned Trial

Court under Section 320(2) of the Cr.P.C. It was held in Madhu Limaye v.

State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 that inherent

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power should not be exercised when an alternative remedy exists. It

was observed:

.

At the outset, the following principles may be noticed in
relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court,
which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost

invariably, barring a few exceptions:

“(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a
specific provision in the Code for the redress of the
grievance of the aggrieved party;

(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent
abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice;

(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express

bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.”

8. It was laid down by the Full Bench of Delhi High Court in

Gopal Dass vs State AIR 1978 Del 138, that the power under Section 482

of Cr.P.C. is vested in the Court to make such orders as may be

necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, prevent abuse of

the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

This power cannot be exercised when a specific remedy is available

under the other provisions of the Code. It was observed:-

“8. In order to determine the question under consideration, as
to consider what is the scope of the inherent powers of the
High Court becomes relevant. The inherent powers of the High
Court inhere in it because of its being at the apex of the judicial
set-up in a State. The inherent powers of the High Court,
preserved by section 482 of the Code, are to be exercised in
making orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order

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under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court
or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 482
envisages that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or

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affect the inherent powers of the High Court exercised by it

with the object of achieving the above said three results. It is
for this reason that section 482 does not prescribe the
contours of the inherent powers of the High Court, which are

wide enough to be exercised in suitable cases to afford relief to
an aggrieved party. While exercising inherent powers, it has to
be borne in mind that this power cannot be exercised in regard
to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the

Code. (See R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C. 866) (1).
This principle of law had been reiterated succinctly by the
Supreme Court recently in Palanippa Gounder v. The State of

Tamil Nadu, (1977) 2 SCC 634: AIR 1977 S.C. 1323 (2) therein

examining the scope of section 482 it was observed that a
provision which saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot
override any express provision in the statute which saves that
power. Putting it in another form, the Court observed that if there

is an express provision in a statute governing a particular subject
there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of
the Court because the Court ought to apply the provisions of the

statute which are made advisedly to govern the particular subject
matter.” (Emphasis supplied)

9. It was held in Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., (1999) 6

SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 647 that power under

Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is extraordinary and should not be exercised

when a specific remedy has been provided under the Code. It was

observed:

“2. It appears that, unfortunately, the High Court, by exercising
its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code (for short “the Code”), has prevented the flow
of justice on the alleged contention of the convicted accused

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that it was polluted by the so-called misconduct of the judicial
officer. It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High
Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be

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necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to

prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of
law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited

jurisdiction on the High Court, and the alleged abuse of the process
of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance
with law, including procedural law and not otherwise. Further,
inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be

used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of
the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering
the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that
inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered

by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any

specific provision of the Code. In the present case, the High Court
overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted
accused to prefer a statutory appeal against conviction of the
offence. The High Court has intervened at an uncalled-for stage

and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of
the trial.

xxxxx

9. In our view, the order passed by the High Court entertaining

the petition of the convicted accused under Section 482 of the
Code is, on the face of it, illegal, erroneous, and to say the least,
unfortunate. It was known to the High Court that the trial court

passed proceedings to the effect that a final judgment and order
convicting the accused were pronounced by the trial court. It
was also recorded by the trial court that, as the accused were
absent, the Court had issued non-bailable warrants. In such a
situation, instead of directing the accused to remain present
before the Court for resorting to the steps contemplated by the
law for passing the sentence, the High Court has stayed further
proceedings, including the operation of the non-bailable
warrants issued by the trial court. It is disquieting that the High
Court has overlooked the important legal aspect that the accused
has a right of appeal against the order of conviction purported to

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have been passed by the trial court. In such circumstances, the High
Court ought not to have entertained a petition under Section 482 of
the Code and stonewalled the very efficacious alternative remedy of

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appeal as provided in the Code. Merely because the accused made

certain allegations against the trial judge, the substantive law
cannot be bypassed.

10. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hamida v.

Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474, that the inherent power under Section 482 of

Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and should not be exercised when

an alternative remedy is available. It was observed:

“7. It is a well-established principle that inherent power

conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC has to be

exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases, and
that too to correct patent illegalities or when some miscarriage
of justice is done. The content and scope of power under Section
482 CrPC were examined in considerable detail in Madhu

Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri)
10: AIR 1978 SC 47], and it was held as under : (SCC p. 555, para

8)

The following principles may be stated in relation to the

exercise of the inherent power of the High Court:

(1) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a
specific provision in the Code for the redress of the

grievance of the aggrieved party;

(2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice;

(3) that it should not be exercised as against the express
bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.

8. In State v. Navjot Sandhu [(2003) 6 SCC 641: 2003 SCC (Cri)
1545], after a review of a large number of earlier decisions, it
was held as under : (SCC p. 657, para 29)

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“29. … The inherent power is to be used only in cases where
there is an abuse of the process of the court or where
interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of

.

justice. The inherent power must be exercised very

sparingly, as cases which require interference would be few
and far between. The most common case where inherent
jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal

proceedings are required to be quashed because they are
initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most
of the cases set out hereinabove fall in this category. It must
be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted

to if there is a specific provision in the Code or any other
enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved
party. This power should not be exercised against an express
bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal

Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against

an express bar in some other enactment.”

9. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999
SCC (Cri) 1076] the High Court had entertained a petition under
Section 482 CrPC after an order of conviction had been passed

by the Sessions Judge and before the sentence had been
awarded and further proceedings in the case had been stayed. In
appeal, this Court set aside the order of the High Court after

reiterating the principle that it is well settled that inherent
power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by

specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe
any specific provision of the Code. It was further observed that

the High Court overlooked the procedural law which
empowered the convicted accused to prefer a statutory appeal
against conviction of the offence and intervened at an uncalled
for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial
stage of the trial. The order of the High Court was accordingly
set aside on the ground that a petition under Section 482 CrPC
could not have been entertained as the accused had an
alternative remedy of an appeal as provided in the Code. It is not
necessary to burden this judgment with other decisions of this
Court, as the consistent view throughout has been that a petition
under Section 482 CrPC cannot be entertained if there is any other

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specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for redress of
the grievance of the aggrieved party.

10. In the case in hand, the respondents-accused could apply for

.

bail afresh after the offence had been converted into one under

Section 304 IPC. They deliberately did not do so and filed a
petition under Section 482 CrPC in order to circumvent the
procedure whereunder they would have been required to

surrender, as the bail application could be entertained and
heard only if the accused were in custody. It is important to note
that no order adverse to the respondents-accused had been
passed by any court, nor was there any miscarriage of justice or

any illegality. In such circumstances, the High Court committed
a manifest error of law in entertaining a petition under Section
482 CrPC and issuing a direction to the subordinate court to
accept the sureties and bail bonds for the offence under Section

304 IPC. The effect of the order passed by the High Court is that

the accused after getting bail in an offence under Sections 324,
352 and 506 IPC on the very day on which they were taken into
custody, got an order of bail in their favour even after the
injured had succumbed to his injuries and the case had been

converted into one under Section 304 IPC without any court
examining the case on merits, as it stood after conversion of the
offence. The procedure laid down for the grant of bail under

Section 439 CrPC, though available to the respondents-accused,
having not been availed of, the exercise of power by the High

Court under Section 482 CrPC is clearly illegal and the
impugned order passed by it has to be set aside.” (Emphasis

supplied)

11. Similarly, it was held in B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana 2003

(4) SCC 675, that the High Court can quash the F.I.R. in non-

compoundable offences based on compromise suggesting that the

power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not to be exercised in respect

offences, which are compoundable under Section 320 of Cr.P.C. except

in exceptional cases.

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12. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR in exercise of

inherent jurisdiction when an alternative remedy is available.

.

13. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute the commission of any cognizable offence and the

continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of

the Court; hence, the FIR be quashed. The law relating to quashing of

FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of

U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: –

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned,

it is now more or less well settled as regards the
principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one
may refer to the decision of this Court in State of
Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein

this Court has summarised some of the principles under
which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in
the following words:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the

various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of

the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or

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rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.

.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first

information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence

or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,

accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate
r within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a

case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is

permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the

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proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the

.

aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)

would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as

contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in

such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of

the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”

14. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes
or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are

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neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound
nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it

.

sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are

embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing
the High Court to act only in cases of clear
abuse of process or where intervention is essential to

uphold the ends of justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the
course of several decades, has laid down the principles
and guidelines that High Courts must follow before

quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby
pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case
before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter
alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the

criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the

FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima
facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature;
(v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus
allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and

compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).

15. It was held in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.

Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692: 1988 SCC (Cri)

234: 1988 SCC OnLine SC 80 that the Court has to determine

whether the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint

constitute a cognizable offence when the prosecution is at the

initial stage. It was observed at page 695

7. The legal position is well settled that when a
prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the
test to be applied by the court is as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish

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the offence. It is also for the court to take into
consideration any special features which appear in a
particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in

.

the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue.

This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for
any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court
chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and,

therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by
allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court
may while taking into consideration the special facts of a
case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a

preliminary stage.

16. The parameters for exercising jurisdiction to

interfere with the investigations being carried out by the police

were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeharika

Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401:

2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, and it was observed at page 444:

13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from

the decision of the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir
Ahmad [King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, 1944 SCC

OnLine PC 29: (1943-44) 71 IA 203: AIR 1945 PC 18], the
following principles of law emerge:

13.1. The police have the statutory right and duty under
the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure
contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into
cognizable offences.

13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
cognizable offences.

13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or
offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information
report, the Court will not permit an investigation to go on.

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13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly
with circumspection, in the “rarest of rare cases”. (The
rarest of rare cases standard in its application for

.

quashing under Section 482CrPC is not to be confused

with the norm which has been formulated in the context
of the death penalty, as explained previously by this
Court.)

13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of
which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an
enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of
the allegations made in the FIR/complaint.

13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the
initial stage.

13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception

and a rarity rather than an ordinary rule.

13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the
jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State
operate in two specific spheres of activity. The inherent
power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the

ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by
Section 482CrPC.

13.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary, not overlapping.

13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference
would result in the miscarriage of justice, the Court and
the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of

investigation of offences.

13.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do
not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act
according to its whims or caprice.

13.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia
which must disclose all facts and details relating to the
offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by
the police is in progress, the court should not go into the
merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be
permitted to complete the investigation. It would be

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premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy
facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be
investigated or that it amounts to an abuse of process of

.

law. During or after the investigation, if the investigating

officer finds that there is no substance in the application
made by the complainant, the investigating officer may
file an appropriate report/summary before the learned

Magistrate, which may be considered by the learned
Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.
13.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but
the conferment of wide power requires the Court to be

cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on
the Court.

13.14. However, at the same time, the Court, if it thinks fit,

regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the
self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the

parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P.
Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC
866] and Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992

Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], has the jurisdiction
to quash the FIR/complaint.

13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the

alleged accused, the Court when it exercises the power
under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether or

not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence and is not required to consider on
merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable

offence or not and the court has to permit the
investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations
in the FIR.

17. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L.

Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High

Court can quash the criminal proceedings if they amount to an

abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed at page 703:

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“7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High
Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the
conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue

.

would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the

ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be
quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers,
both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a

salutary public purpose, which is that a court proceeding
ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of
harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled
object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the

material on which the structure of the prosecution rests,
and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the
proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice
are higher than the ends of mere law, though justice has

got to be administered according to laws made by the

legislature. The compelling necessity for making these
observations is that without a proper realisation of the
object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save
the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice,

between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible
to appreciate the width and contours of that salient
jurisdiction.”

18. The term abuse of the process was explained in

Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740:

(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761:

33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the
remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well-

established and recognised doctrine both by the English
courts and courts in India. There are some established
principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to
be an abuse of the process of the court.

34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public
Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All
ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02)

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“There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed
with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are
necessary to enable it to act effectively within such

.

jurisdiction. … A court must enjoy such powers in order

to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any
abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted
thwarting of its process.

***
The power (which is inherent in a court’s jurisdiction)
to prevent abuses of its process and to control its own
procedure must in a criminal court include a power to

safeguard an accused person from oppression or
prejudice.”

In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same

case observed that where particular criminal proceedings

constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to
refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.

35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR
495 : (1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined

the word “abuse of process” as something so unfair and
wrong with the prosecution that the court should not
allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other

respects, a perfectly supportable case.

36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’
Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 : (1993)
3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of

process, the court confirms that an abuse of process
justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the
following circumstances:

(i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a
fair trial; or

(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of
the process because it offends the court’s sense of
justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in
the circumstances of the particular case.

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37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App
R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:

“It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the

.

prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of

the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection
provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a
technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the

defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the
preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the
part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable.”

38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R

94: 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that:

“The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many
different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main

strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases

where the court concludes that the defendant cannot
receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes
that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.”

What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to

determine on the individual facts of each case.

19. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15

SCC 488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are

frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them.

However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while

exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. It was

observed at page 498:

13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a
duty to look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and above the
averments and, if need be, with due care and
circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court

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while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or
Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only
to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into

.

account the overall circumstances leading to the

initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials
collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance
the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over

a period of time. It is in the background of such
circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes
importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking
vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.

14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of
A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on
the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash

an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between

consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence
and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that
manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be
considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held :

(Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga
Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC p. 527,
paras 5-7)

“5. … Authority of the court exists for the advancement

of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that
authority so as to produce injustice, the court has
power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of

the process of the court to allow any action which
would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of
justice. In the exercise of the powers court would be
justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings
would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no
offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may
examine the question of fact. When a complaint is
sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the
materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and

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whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are
accepted in toto.

6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of

.

Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this

Court summarised some categories of cases where
inherent power can and should be exercised to quash
the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal
bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want
of sanction;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information
report or complaint taken at its face value and
accepted in their entirety do not constitute the
offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but

there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear

in mind the distinction between a case where there is no
legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where

there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may
not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction

under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not
ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence
in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable

appreciation of it, accusation would not be sustained. That
is the function of the trial Judge. The judicial process, no
doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or,
needless harassment. The court should be circumspect
and judicious in exercising discretion and should take
all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration
before issuing the process, lest it would be an
instrument in the hands of a private complainant to
unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At
the same time, the section is not an instrument handed

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over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and
bring about its sudden death.”(emphasis supplied)

20. In the present case, a perusal of the FIR shows that the

.

petitioner had taken the apple crop from the informant and other

persons with a promise to pay the money. The fact that he absconded

after taking the apple crop shows that he never intended to honour the

promise. It is not a case where a person is unable to pay the amount due

to financial difficulties or other reasons, but a case where the petitioner

absconded after receiving the apple crop from the informant and other

persons. These allegations prima facie show a dishonest intention which

led the growers to hand over their apple crop to the petitioner and

constitute the commission of a cognizable offence.

21. It was submitted that the dispute between the parties was

civil, and the registration of the FIR was impermissible. There can be

no dispute with the proposition of law that the civil dispute cannot be

turned into criminal proceedings1, however, it does not mean that no

civil action can give rise to a criminal action. Professor Glanville

Williams explained in his celebrated book Learning the Law (Tenth

Edition, Stevens and Sons) that the facts by themselves cannot

determine civil or criminal liability. The same set of facts may give

1
G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, A.M. Mohan v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339, Sachin
Garg v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 82, and Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 268.

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rise to criminal or civil liability. The distinction between the two is not

the nature of the act but the nature of the proceedings that are taken

.

to seek redressal. It was observed:

“The distinction between a crime and a civil wrong, though

capable of giving rise to some difficult legal problems, is in
essence quite simple. The first thing to understand is that the
distinction does not reside in the nature of the wrongful act
itself. This can quite simply be proved by pointing out that the

same act may be both a crime and a civil wrong. Occasionally, at
a bus station, there is someone who makes a living by looking
after people’s impedimenta while they are shopping. If I entrust
my bag to such a person, and he runs off with it, he commits the

crime of theft and also two civil wrongs–the tort of conversion

and a breach of his contract with me to keep the bag safe. The
result is that two sorts of legal proceedings can be taken against
him: a prosecution for the crime, and a civil action for the tort
and the breach of contract. (Of course, the plaintiff in the latter

action will not get damages twice over merely because he has
two causes of action; he will get only one set of damages.)
To take another illustration, if a railway signalman, to dumb

forgetfulness a prey, fails to pull the lever at the right moment,
and a fatal accident occurs on the line, his carelessness may be

regarded as sufficiently gross to amount to the crime of
manslaughter, and it is also the tort of negligence towards the

victims of the accident and their dependents and a breach of his
contract with the Railway Executive to take due care in his work.
It will be noticed that this time, the right of action in tort and
the right of action in a contract are vested in different persons.
These examples show that the distinction between a crime and
civil wrong cannot be stated as depending upon what is done,
because what is done may be the same in each case. The true
distinction resides, therefore, not in the nature of the wrongful
act but in the legal consequences that may follow. If the
wrongful act is capable of being followed by what are called
criminal proceedings, that means that it is regarded as a crime

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(otherwise called an offence). If it is capable of being followed
by civil proceedings, that means that it is regarded as a civil
wrong. If it is capable of being followed by both, it is both a

.

crime and a civil wrong. Criminal and civil proceedings are (in

the normal case) easily distinguishable: the procedure is
different, the outcome is different, and the terminology is
different.”

22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held in Randheer Singh v.

State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 626: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 942, that a given

set of facts may make out a civil wrong as well as the criminal offence

and mere availability of civil remedies is no ground to quash the

criminal proceedings. It was observed:

“34. The given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as well as
a criminal offence. Only because a civil remedy is available may
not be a ground to quash criminal proceedings. But as observed

above, in this case, no criminal offence has been made out in
the FIR read with the chargesheet so far as this appellant is
concerned. The other accused, Rajan Kumar, has died.”

23. A similar view was taken in V.R. Dalal v. Yougendra Naranji

Thakkar, (2008) 15 SCC 625, wherein it was observed: –

“13. It may be true that in the event the court finds that the
dispute between the parties is civil in nature, it may not allow
the criminal proceedings to go on. But, no law, in our opinion,
as such can be laid down as in a given case both civil suit and
criminal complaint would be maintainable although the cause
of action for both the proceedings is the same.”

24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Puneet

Beriwala Vs. State 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983 that simply because a

remedy is provided under the civil law cannot lead to an inference that

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resort cannot be had to the criminal law or that the civil law remedy is

the only remedy available to the parties. It was observed:

.

28. It is trite law that the mere institution of civil proceedings is
not a ground for quashing the FIR or to hold that the dispute is
merely a civil dispute. This Court in various judgments, has held

that simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of
contract, that does not by itself clothe the Court to conclude
that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of
criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the

process of the court. This Court is of the view that because the
offence was committed during a commercial transaction, it
would not be sufficient to hold that the complaint did not
warrant a further investigation and, if necessary, a trial.

[See: Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi

Admin.), (2009) 5 SCC 528, Lee Kun Hee v. State of UP, (2012) 3
SCC 132 and Trisuns Chemicals v. Rajesh Aggarwal, (1999) 8 SCC
686]

25. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed because civil remedy is

available to the informant for the recovery of the money.

26. It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge-sheet

before the learned Trial Court, hence, the learned Trial Court is seized

of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal

v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the

charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to

appreciate the same. It was observed:

“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready
to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not
inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any

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specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the
view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application
before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal

.

Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the

State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to
be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the
trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which

the investigating officer might have collected forming part of
the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the
trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether
any discharge case is made out or not.”

27. No other point was urged.

28. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is

dismissed and so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.

29. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to

the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the

merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge
30th June, 2025

(veena)

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