Madhya Pradesh High Court
Prem Nath Kapur vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 15 July, 2025
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 15TH OF JULY, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 36615 of 2018
PREM NATH KAPUR AND ANOTHER
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Amit Singh Sisodiya, advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Santosh Singh Thakur, public prosecutor for respondent/State.
.....................................................................................................................
ORDER
This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
is filed for quashing the proceedings of criminal complaint case No.
18467/2011 pending before the Special Magistrate (Municipal
Corporation, Indore).
2 The exposition of facts, giving rise to present petition, are as under:
The Food Inspector, Food and Drugs Administration, District
Indore submitted a written complaint for offence punishable under
Section 7(ii) read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act, 1954, alleging store and sale of misbranded
Pasta Moccagatta Dal 1908 against Mahendra Desai, Milind
Hathwalne, Premnath Kapur, Nirumapa Kapur, Monu Jain and M/s
Laasya Exim. It was alleged that Ms.Jyoti Baghel working as Food
Inspector Food and Drugs Administration Indore, inspected the
Lemon Tree hotel (KRIZM Hotel Pvt Ltd), 3 RNT Road, Indore on
16.8.2010. During inspection, the Food Inspector collected sample
of Pasta Moccagatta Dal. The sample was sent to the State Food
Testing Laboratory, Bhopal. The State Laboratory reported the
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sample to be mis-branded. The Memorandum of Article of
Association of Lemon Tree Hotels (Pvt) Ltd. was requisitioned.
Thereafter, the complaint for offence punishable under Section 7(ii)
read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954 was filed against Mahendra Desai, Milind
Hathwalne, Premnath Kapur, Nirumapa Kapur, Monu Jain and M/s
Laasya Exim.
Learned Special Magistrate (Municipal Corporation) took
cognisance against the petitioners and co-accused for offence
punishable under Section 7(ii) read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and criminal case No.
18467/2011 was registered. The trial is underway.
3 Learned counsel for the petitioners, in addition to the facts and
grounds mentioned in the petition, submitted that the trial Court
committed an error in taking cognisance against the petitioners. There
was no prima facie evidence against the petitioners as they were not
directors of said Hotel on the date of incident or even in the recent past.
The petitioners had resigned as directors of M/s. PMG Hotels on 5.8.2022
vide Form No. 32 (Annexure A-2), thereafter, hotel Lemon Tree at Indore
was purchased by M/s Lemon Tree Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. The annual return
submitted by M/s Lemon Tree Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. for the year 2009 to
2017 (Annexure A-3) makes it clear that petitioners were not the directors
of Hotel Lemon Tree, Indore. The complainant had not filed any
document showing involvement of the Petitioners in the alleged offence
except the memorandum of Article of Association of year 1992. Learned
counsel further referring to resolution dated 12.8.2010 and
acknowledgment No. 555 dated 3.3.2011 contended that Milind
Hathwalne, General Manager of Hotel Lemon Tree, Indore was
nominated under Section 17(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration
Act, 1954 by M/s Lemon Tree Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. and the nomination was
duly communicated to the local Health Authority, therefore, the
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Petitioners cannot be prosecuted for alleged offence. The criminal
complaint and the subsequent proceedings deserve to be quashed qua the
petitioners.
4 Learned counsel for the Respondent referred to the private
complaint submitted by Food Inspector, Food and Drugs Administration,
Indore before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore, to contend that
the Annexure No. 19 mentioned in the private complaint shows that the
information with regard to M/s Lemon Tree (Krizm Hotel Pvt. Ltd.), 3
R.N.T. Road, Indore was received vide acknowledgment No. 555 dated
3.3.2011. The memorandum enclosed with the information shows that
Premnath Kapur and Nirupama Kapur as directors of the firm. Since, no
nomination under Section 17(2) of the Act was made on 16.8.2010 (date
of inspection), both the directors are responsible for day to day
functioning of the firm. The resolution dated 12.8.2010 was presented in
the office of Food and Drug Administration Indore on 3.3.2011. The
nomination on Form No. ‘VIII’ is admissible only after signature of the
competent food authority. The nomination cannot be considered for the
reason that it was presented after the inspection dated 16.8.2010.
5 In reply, learned counsel for petitioners contended that the
documents enclosed at acknowledgment No. 555 dated 3.3.2011 are true
copy of the resolution passed at the meeting of the Board of Directors of
M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. on 12 th August, 2010, wherein it was
resolved that name of the company would be changed to M/s Lemon Tree
Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. from Krizm Hotels Pvt Ltd. The resolution was signed
by Patanjali Govind Keswani, Chairman and Managing Director for M/s
Lemon Tree Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. This resolution does not reveal that the
petitioners Premnath Kapur or Nirupama Kapur were directors much less
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Managing Directors of M/s Lemon Tree Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. Learned
counsel further submitted that the Chairman and Managing Director
Patanjali Govind Keswani vide nomination Form No. ‘VIII’ under Rule 12
(B) of the Act dated 12.8.2010 nominated M/s Milind Hathwalne,
General Manager of the Lemon Tree Hotel, Indore to be incharge and
responsible to M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Indore for conduct of business of
said unit of company and authorised to exercise all powers as may be
necessary to prevent the commission by the said company of any offence
under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. This nomination was
accepted by Milinid Hathwalne and was enclosed with the resolution
dated 12.8.2010. Both the documents were received by the office of
Deputy Director, Food and Drug Administration vide acknowledgment
No. 555 dated 3.3.2011, before filing of complaint on 22.9.2011. The
complainant Food Inspector was aware of the nomination received by
office of Deputy Director Food and Drug Administration on 3.3.201.
These documents are enclosed alongwith the private complaint, therefore,
the prosecution cannot deny the veracity of these documents.
6 Heard both the parties. Perused the record.
7 Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954
provides as under-
Offences by companies.–(1) Where an offence under this Act has been
committed by a company–
(a) (i) the person, if any, who has been nominated under sub-section
(2) to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the
conduct of the business of the company (hereinafter in this section
referred to as the person responsible), or
(ii) where no person has been so nominated, every person who at the
time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was
responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the
company; and
(b) the company,
shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded
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against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any
such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the
offence was committed without his knowledge and that he exercised all due
diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.
(2) Any company may, by order in writing, authorise any of its directors or
managers (such manager being employed mainly in a managerial or
supervisory capacity) to exercise all such powers and take all such steps as
may be necessary or expedient to prevent the commission by the company of
any offence under this Act and may give notice to the Local (Health)
Authority, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, that it
has nominated such director or manager as the person responsible, along
with the written consent of such director or manager for being so
nominated.
Explanation.–Where a company has different establishments or
branches or different units in any establishment or branch, different
persons may be nominated under this sub-section in relation to
different establishments or branches or units and the person nominated
in relation to any establishment, branch or unit shall be deemed to be
the person responsible in respect of such establishment, branch or unit.
(3) The person nominated under sub-section (2) shall, until–
(i) further notice cancelling such nomination is received from the
company by the Local (Health) Authority; or
(ii) he ceases to be a director or, as the case may be; manager of the
company; or
(iii) he makes a request in writing to the Local (Health) Authority,
under intimation to the company, to cancel the nomination [which
request shall be complied with by the Local (Health) Authority],
whichever is the earliest, continue to be the person responsible:
Provided that where such person ceases to be a director or, as the case
may be, manager of the company, he shall intimate the fact of such cesser to
the Local (Health) Authority:
Provided further that where such person makes a request under clause
(iii), the Local (Health) Authority shall not cancel such nomination with effect
from a date earlier than the date on which the request is made.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-sections, where
an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved
that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is
attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary
or other officer of the company, [not being a person nominated under sub-
section (2)] such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be
deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded
against and punished accordingly.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section–
(a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other
association of individuals;
(b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm; and
(c) “manager”, in relation to a company engaged in hotel industry,
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includes the person in charge of the catering department of any hotel managed
or run by it.]
8 Thus, where an offence under the Act has been committed by a
company, the person who has been nominated under subsection 2, to be in
charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business
of the company or where no such person has been nominated, every
person who at the time of the offence was committed, was in charge of
and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the
company and the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence.
9 It is duty of the prosecutor to establish that the Director in question
was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its
business at the time the offence was committed. Section 17 is a deeming
provision which provides that where an offence under the Act is
committed by a company, the person in charge and responsible to it, is
also to be proceeded against. Where no person has been nominated, the
liability is extended to every person who was in charge of and responsible
to the company in the conduct of business. The prosecution has the duty
to find out whether any person has been nominated in terms of section 17
(2). There has to be a prosecution against the company, whereafter the
question of liability of other person of any of the categories indicated in
clause (a) of subsection 1 arises. The expression “and (b) the company”
in above Section 17(1) makes it imperative to implead the company with
the person responsible or the person in charge of, and was responsible
to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company.
10 On a plain reading, it is apparent that the words “was in charge of”
and “was responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of
the Company” cannot be read disjunctively and the same ought be read
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conjunctively.
11 In case of Charanjit Pal Jindal v. L.N. Metalics, (2015) 15 SCC
768, the Supreme Court, while considering pari-materia provision
contained in Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 held as
under-
10.In Aneeta Hada v.Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661
the question that arose for determination by this Court was whether an
authorised signatory of a company would be liable for prosecution under
Section 138 of the Act without the company being arraigned as an accused. As
there was a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges regarding
the interpretation of Sections 138 and 141 of the Act reference was made to the
larger Bench of three Judges. In the said case, this Court noticed the ratio laid
down in State of Madras v. C.V. Parekh, (1970) 3 SCC 491 and the view
expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal v. State of M.P., (1984) 4 SCC 352 while
interpreting Sections 138 and 141 of the Act, this Court observed as follows:
“53. It is to be borne in mind that Section 141 of the Act is concerned
with the offences by the company. It makes the other persons
vicariously liable for commission of an offence on the part of the
company. As has been stated by us earlier, the vicarious liability gets
attracted when the condition precedent laid down in Section 141 of the
Act stands satisfied. There can be no dispute that as the liability is
penal in nature, a strict construction of the provision would be
necessitous and, in a way, the warrant.
***
58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the
considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an
express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others.
Thus, the words ‘as well as the company’ appearing in the section
make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be
prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories
could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in
the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that
the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a
finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its
reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is
affected when a Director is indicted.
59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible
conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of
the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other
categories of offenders can only be brought in the dragnet on the
touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the
provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V.
State of Madras v. C.V. Parekh, (1970) 3 SCC 491 which is a three-
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Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal
v. State of M.P., (1984) 4 SCC 352 does not correctly lay down the law
and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision inAnil
Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd., (2000) 1 SCC 1 is overruled with the
qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in U.P. Pollution Control
Board v. Modi Distillery, (1987) 3 SCC 684 has to be treated to be
restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.”
11. From the aforesaid finding, we find that after analysing all the provisions
and having noticed the different decisions rendered by this Court, the three-
Judge Bench arrived at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the
prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning a company as an accused
is imperative. Hence in this case, we find no reason to refer the matter to the
larger Bench.
(Also relied- Bijoy Kumar Moni v. Paresh Manna, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 3833).
12 The Supreme Court, in case of R. Banerjee v. H.D. Dubey,
reported in (1992) 2 SCC 552, dealing with Section 17 of the Prevention
of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, held as under-
3.Section 23 of the Act empowers the Central Government to make rules. In
exercise of the said power the Central Government has framed rules known as
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (hereinafter called ‘the
Rules’). Rule 12-B with which we are concerned reads as under:
“12-B. Form of nomination of Director or Manager and his consent,
under Section 17.– (1) A company may inform the Local (Health)
Authority of the concerned local area, by notice in duplicate, in Form
VIII containing the name and address of the Director or Manager, who
has been nominated by it under sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act
to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of
the business of the company or any establishment, branch or unit
thereof:
Provided that no such nomination shall be valid unless the
Director or Manager who has been so nominated, gives his consent in
writing and has affixed his signature, in Form VIII in duplicate in token
of such consent.
(2) The Local (Health) Authority shall sign and return one copy of the
notice in Form VIII to the company to signify the receipt of the
nomination and retain the second copy in his office for record.”
Form VIII is in three parts. The first part is in the nature of a notice that the
company has by a resolution passed at its meeting nominated its named
Director/Manager to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the
conduct of the business of the said company or establishment/branch/unit
thereof. A certified copy of the resolution has to be sent along with the form.
This part must be signed by the Managing Director/Secretary of the Company.
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The second part relates to the acceptance of the nomination and must be
signed by the nominated Director/Manager. The third part has to be signed by
the Local (Health) Authority acknowledging the receipt of the nomination.
4.It is clear from the plain reading of Section 17 that where an offence under
the Act is alleged to have been committed by a company, where the company
has nominated any person to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company
for the conduct of its business that person will be liable to be proceeded
against and punished for the commission of the offence. Where, however, no
person has been so nominated, every person who at the time of the
commission of the offence was in charge of, and responsible to, the company
for the conduct of its business shall be proceeded against and punished for the
said crime. Even in such cases the proviso offers a defence, in that, the accused
can prove his innocence by showing that the offence was committed without
his knowledge and notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence to prevent it.
The scheme of sub-section (1) of Section 17 is, therefore, clear that the cases
where a person has been nominated under sub-section (2) of Section 17, he
alone can be proceeded against and punished for the crime in question. It is
only where no such person has been nominated that every person who at the
time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to, the
company for the conduct of its business can be proceeded against and
punished. The proviso, however, lays down an exception that any such person
proceeded against shall not be liable to be punished if he proves that the
offence was committed without his knowledge and that he had exercised all
due diligence to prevent the commission thereof. Sub-section (2) of Section 17
empowers the company to authorise any of its Directors or Managers to
exercise all such powers and take all such steps as may be necessary or
expedient to prevent the commission by the company of any offence under the
Act. It further empowers the company to give notice to the Local (Health)
Authority in the prescribed form that it has nominated a Director or Manager
as the person responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. This
has to be done with the written consent of the nominated Director or Manager.
Where a company has different establishments or branches or units, different
persons may be nominated in relation to the different establishments/
branches/ units and the person so nominated shall be deemed to be the person
responsible in respect of such establishment, branch or unit. Sub-section (4) of
Section 17 overrides the preceding sub-sections and posits that where an
offence has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence
was committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any
neglect on the part of any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the
company, other than the one nominated, such Director, Manager, Secretary or
other officer shall also be deemed guilty and be liable to be proceeded against
and punished for the same. This sub-section, therefore, makes it clear that
notwithstanding the nomination under sub-section (2) of Section 17 and
notwithstanding clause (a)(i) of sub-section (1) of Section 17, any Director,
Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company, other than the nominated
person, can be proceeded against and punished if it is shown that the offence
was committed with his consent or connivance or negligence. It is crystal clear
from the scheme of Section 17 that where a company has committed an
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offence under the Act, the person nominated under sub-section (2) to be in
charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business shall
be proceeded against unless it is shown that the offence was committed with
the consent/ connivance/ negligence of any other Director, Manager, Secretary
or Officer of the company in which case the said person can also be proceeded
against and punished for the commission of the said offence. It is only where
no person has been nominated under sub-section (2) of Section 17 that every
person, who at the time of the commission of the offence was in charge of and
was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business can be
proceeded against and punished under the law.
7.The appellants, however, contend that since the company had made a
nomination as required by sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act, only the
person nominated could be proceeded against and punished for the alleged
offence along with the company. So far as Lipton India Limited is concerned,
it is said that it had nominated one H. Dayani by company resolution dated
December 15, 1988 as the person to be in charge of, and responsible to, the
company for the conduct of its business at its Nagpur branch and intimation
thereof was sent as required by Rule 12-B with the consent of the said H.
Dayani to the concerned Local (Health) Authority and hence the said H.
Dayani alone could be proceeded against and punished, besides the company,
for the commission of the offence in question. A copy of the resolution passed
by the Board of Directors of the company at its meeting held on December 15,
1988 was annexed to the intimation sent in the prescribed form under Rule 12-
B of the Rules. M/s Hindustan Lever Limited contends that it too had
nominated one Dr Nirmal Sen as the person in charge of, and responsible to,
the said company for the conduct of its business at the Shamnagar factory and
hence besides the company the said Dr Nirmal Sen alone could be proceeded
against and punished. That company also had intimated the Local (Health)
Authority about the nomination of Dr Nirmal Sen as the person in charge of,
and responsible to, the said company for the conduct of its business at its
Shamnagar factory and this was duly verified by the Local (Health) Authority
of Bhatpara Municipality exercising administrative control over the area in
which the said factory was situate. As pointed out earlier if the two companies
succeed in showing that they had made valid nominations of H. Dayani and Dr
Nirmal Sen, respectively, and had duly intimated the concerned Local (Health)
Authority about the same before the commission of the alleged offences, there
can be no doubt that the case would fall within the ambit of sub-clause (i) of
clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act and not under sub-clause
(ii) thereof. It would then be necessary for the prosecuting agency to show
from the averments made in the complaint that the case falls within sub-
section (4) of Section 17 of the Act. If the prosecuting agency fails to show
that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of any
particular Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company or on
account of the negligence of any one or more of them, the case set up against
the appellants cannot be allowed to proceed.
9. On a careful perusal of the complaints lodged by the Food Inspector under
the Act it is evident that intimation regarding the nomination in favour of H.
Dayani and Dr Nirmal Sen had been communicated to the Food Inspector
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before the complaints came to be lodged. This is evident from the averments
made in the respective complaints. The nomination was, however, not acted
upon by the complainant on the ground that it was incomplete. It was,
therefore, said that in the absence of a valid nomination from the concerned
company the Directors of the company were liable to be proceeded against and
punished on proof of the charge levelled against them in the complaint. It will
thus be seen that there is no allegation in the complaint which would bring the
case within the mischief of Section 17(4) of the Act. There is no allegation in
the complaint that the offence was committed with the consent/ connivance/
negligence of the Directors, other than the nominated person, who were
impleaded as co-accused. We are, therefore, satisfied that the allegations in the
complaint do not make out a case under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the
Act. That being so, the inclusion of the co-accused other than the company and
the nominated person as the persons liable to be proceeded against and
punished cannot be justified. As held by this Court in Municipal Corporation
of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi [(1983) 1 SCC 1 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 :
(1983) 1 SCR 884] where the allegations set out in the complaint do not
constitute any offence, no process can be issued against the co-accused other
than the company and the nominated person and the High Court would be
justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to quash the order passed by the Magistrate
taking cognizance of the offence against such co-accused.
13 The material on record and case on hand is examined in the light of
the aforestated prepositions of law.
14 The impugned written complaint was filed against (i) Mahendra
Desai, Assistant Manager of M/s Lemon Tree (Krizm Hotels Pvt. Ltd.)
Indore; (ii) Milind Hatwalne Licensee, M/s Lemon Tree (Krizm Hotels
Pvt. Ltd.) Indore; (iii) Premnath Kapur, Director, M/s Lemon Tree
(Krizm Hotels Pvt. Ltd.) Indore; (iv) Nirumapa Kapur, Director M/s
Lemon Tree (Krizm Hotels Pvt. Ltd.) Indore; (v) Monu Jain, Proprietor,
M/s Arihant Sales and (vi) M/s Laasyya Exim, for offence punishable
under Section 7(ii) read with section 16(1)(a)(i) of Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act 1954 with regard to sale of misbranded food article
Pasta Moccagatta Dal from Hotel Lemon Tree, Indore. The petitioners
Prem Nath Kapur and Nirupama Kapur are impleaded as Directors of M/s
Lemon Tree (Krizm) Hotels Pvt. Ltd. without impleading the company
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M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. or M/s Krizm Hotels Pvt Ltd. Thus, the
complaint against the directors alleging that they are the person incharge
of and responsible to the company (M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd.) for
conduct of its business without impleading the company was not
maintainable in view of the provisions contained under Section 17(1) of
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. There is no averment in the
complaint that the petitioners were present at Indore at the time of
inspection i.e. the commission of offence and they were incharge of and
were responsible to M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. For conduct of
business of hotel Lemon Tree, Indore. There is no allegation in the
complaint that the offence was committed with the consent/ connivance/
negligence of the Directors, the Petitioners.
15 It was duty of the complainant, after receiving the intimation dated
3.3.2011, to verify whether the person responsible Mr. Milin Hatvalne is
duly nominated by the company M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. The
information received by the office of Deputy Director Food and Drug
Administration vide acknowledgment No. 555 dated 3.3.2011 (enclosed
with the complaint) shows that there was the resolution with regard to
change of name of the company from Krizm Hotels Pvt Ltd. to M/s
Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and this resolution was signed by Patanjali
Govind Keswani in the capacity of Chairman and Managing Director of
the M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. Despite receiving this information
and enclosing it with the private complaint, the complainant Food
Inspector did not verify that whether petitioners Premnath Kapur and
Nirupama Kapur, who were directors in erstwhile Krizm Hotels Pvt Ltd.
as per its memorandum of Article of Association continued as directors of
M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. Further, despite receiving information
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of resolution dated 12/8/2010 and nomination under Rule 12(B) dated
12.8.2010 signed by Chairman and Managing Director of M/s Lemon
Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd., namely, Patanjali Govind Keswani, the
complainant did not proceed against such Managing Director. No reason
is given for impleading the petitioners, instead of Managing Director of
M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. who was in-charge of the Lemon Tree
Hotel at Indore. Therefore, the complaint against the present petitioners
is, apparently, an abuse of process of Court.
16 In the considered opinion of this Court, inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure needs to be invoked to
prevent the abuse of process of the Court.
17 Consequently, the petition (MCRC No. 36615 of 2018) is allowed
and proceedings of criminal case No. 18467/2011 pending before Special
Magistrate Municipal Corporation Indore are quashed with reference to
the petitioners Prem Nath Kapur and Nirupama Kapur. The petitioners
stand discharged.
18 Let a copy of this order be sent to the trial Court for information
and compliance.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
Digitally signed by BHUNESHWAR DATT
BHUNESH
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENTCH AT INDORE, ou=HIGH COURT OF
MADHYA PRADESH BENTCH AT INDORE,
2.5.4.20=3fb5bcda9fd75d95d6c7cdcbd092ee5a74
a94a5534aed3a66d9385cfcfc201e0,
WAR DATT
postalCode=452001, st=MADHYA PRADESH,
serialNumber=89FD75A8D0C99E05779A327974E
46BC85102826CE0604B211E4C91102B4D1269,
cn=BHUNESHWAR DATT
Date: 2025.07.15 19:59:29 +05’30’
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