Himachal Pradesh High Court
Prem Singh vs State Of H.P. & Another on 19 June, 2025
2025:HHC:18851
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO Nos. 475, 476,and 477
of 2025
Reserved on: 02.06.2025
Date of Decision: 19.06.2025
1. Cr. MMO Nos. 475 of2025
Prem Singh ….Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & another …Respondents
2. Cr.MMO No. 476 of 2025
Vikram Singh ….Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & another …Respondents
3. Cr.MMO No. 477 of 2025
Raghuveer ….Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & another …Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner : Mr. Varun Thakur, Advocate.
For Respondent/State : Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, Additional
Advocate General, for respondent
No.1/State.
____________________
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petitions for
quashing of F.I.R. No. 78 of 2022, dated 05.04.2022, registered for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354-A, 323,
504, 451, 201 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and
consequential proceedings pending before learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the informant (name being withheld to protect her
identity) was strolling in her Courtyard on 04.04.2022 at about
8:15-830 p.m. Petitioner Prem Singh came to her courtyard and
asked her to show her face; however, she refused to do so. He
touched her breasts. She tried to save herself, and the petitioner
tore her T-shirt. She shouted for help, and her father reached the
spot. He enquired from the petitioner, Prem Singh, as to what he
was doing with the informant. Prem Singh slapped him and
inflicted blows on the stomach and the chest of the victim’s father.
The victim’s mother also reached the spot and tried to rescue her
husband. The petitioner inflicted a knife blow on the left side of
the chest of the victim’s mother. The petitioner ran away from the
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spot. Subsequently, petitioners Vikram Singh and Raghuveer Singh
also came to the spot and abused the victim’s parents. The police
registered the F.I.R. and conducted an investigation. The police
filed a charge sheet against the petitioner before the Court after the
conclusion of the investigation.
3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the F.I.R. and
filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioners have approached this
Court, asserting that the petitioner, Prem Singh, was going to his
bathroom to fetch water. He noticed the victim’s brother and father
walking in the backyard of the petitioner’s house. Prem Singh
enquired as to what they were doing in the backyard of his house.
The victim’s father stabbed Prem Singh with a knife in his left arm.
The victim’s brother punched Prem Singh. The victim’s mother
also reached the spot and started abusing the petitioners. Prem
Singh was rescued by Vikram Singh and Raghuveer Singh. The
matter was reported to the police. However, the police did not
register the F.I.R. and instead registered the F.I.R. of the victim.
When Petitioner, Prem Singh, made an inquiry, he found that his
case was forwarded to the Gram Panchayat Kallar on 30.05.2022.
The victim’s brother had called the police on 04.04.2022 at about
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9:00 P.ms. and told them about the altercation with his parents.
The police team visited the spot to verify the information. The
police lodged a false F.I.R. in connivance with the victim and her
family members. The victim’s father was under the influence of
alcohol at the time of the incident. The information was received in
the Police Station on 04.04.2022 at 9:00 p.m., and the distance
from the police Station to the place of occurrence is about 22 KMs.
The medical examination was conducted at 9:25 p.m. It was highly
improbable for the police to receive the complaint, travel to the
spot, investigate the incident and take the injured to the hospital
within 25 minutes. This discrepancy casts a serious doubt
regarding the prosecution’s case. The police prepared two
separate site plans, one in F.I.R. No. 77 of 2022 and another in F.I.R.
No. 78 of 2022; however, these site plans do not match each other.
This shows the fabrication of the evidence. All these circumstances
cast a doubt regarding the genesis of the prosecution’s case.
Therefore, it was prayed that F.I.R. and the proceedings arising
from the F.I.R. pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed.
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4. I have heard Mr. Varun Thakur, learned counsel for the
petitioners and Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State.
5. Mr. Varun Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely
implicated. The matter was reported to the police at 9:00 p.m. No
complaint of indecent assault was made in the telephonic
information. The police went to the spot to verify the correctness of
the information. The place of incident is stated to be 22 km from
the police Station. The medical examination was conducted at 9:25
p.m., which is highly improbable. The investigation was not
conducted fairly. The site plans in F.I.R. No. 77 of 2022 and 78 of
2022 do not match each other. Therefore, he prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and the proceedings
arising from the F.I.R. pending before the learned Trial Court be
quashed.
6. Mr. Jitender K.Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that this Court cannot
conduct a mini-trial to determine the correctness or otherwise of
the allegations made in the F.I.R. The allegations in the F.I.R. are to
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be taken as correct while exercising the inherent jurisdiction. The
allegation in the F.I.R. constitutes the commission of a cognisable
offence. The matter is pending before the learned Trial Court, and
this Court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction in the
present case. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P.,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: –
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is
now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be
applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan
Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has
summarised some of the principles under which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
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2025:HHC:18851exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of
a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
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(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would
be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR
or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such
a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express
legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the
concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are
instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”
9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may
issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to
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2025:HHC:18851secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither
controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision.
However, given the broad and profound nature of this
authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The
conditions for invoking such powers are embedded
within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where
intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the
course of several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting
the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court.
The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the
following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been
filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the
legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the
dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague
and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to
settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana
v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).
10. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977)
2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High Court can quash the
criminal proceedings if they amount to an abuse of the process of
the Court. It was observed on page 703:
“7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High
Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the
conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would
be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of
justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The
saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and
criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public
purpose, which is that a court proceeding ought not to be
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2025:HHC:18851permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or
persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a
lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which
the structure of the prosecution rests, and the like would
justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the
interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the
ends of mere law, though justice has got to be administered
according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling
necessity for making these observations is that without a
proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision
which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to
do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be
impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that
salient jurisdiction.”
11. The term abuse of the process was explained in
Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740: (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450at page 761:
33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy
of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well-established
and recognised doctrine both by the English courts and
courts in India. There are some established principles of law
which bar the trial when there appears to be an abuse of the
process of the court.
34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public
Prosecutions[1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER
401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02)
“There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed
with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are
necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
jurisdiction. … A court must enjoy such powers in order to
enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of
its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its
process.
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***
The power (which is inherent in a court’s jurisdiction) to
prevent abuses of its process and to control its procedure
must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an
accused person from oppression or prejudice.”
In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case
observed that where particular criminal proceedings
constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to
refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.
35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 :
(1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the word
“abuse of process” as something so unfair and wrong with
the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor
to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly
supportable case.
36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’
Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 : (1993) 3
All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of process,
the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the
stay of prosecution could arise in the following
circumstances:
(i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair
trial; or
(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of the
process because it offends the court’s sense of justice and
propriety to be asked to try the accused in the
circumstances of the particular case.
37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App R
164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:
“It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the
prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of
the court to deprive the defendant of a protection
provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a
technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the
defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the
12
2025:HHC:18851preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part
of the prosecution which is unjustifiable.”
38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94:
1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that:
“The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many
different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main strands
can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the
court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair
trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be
unfair for the defendant to be tried.”
What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine
on the individual facts of each case.
12. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC
488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are
frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them.
However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. It was
observed at page 498:
13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a
duty to look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and above the
averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection,
try to read in between the lines. The Court, while exercising
its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the
Constitution, need not restrict itself only to the stage of a
case but is empowered to take into account the overall
circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the
case as well as the materials collected in the course of
investigation. Take, for instance, the case at hand. Multiple
FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the
background of such circumstances that the registration of
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multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the
issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal
grudge, as alleged.
14.State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of
A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on
the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an
FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration
of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation
of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to
prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for
quashing an FIR. The Court held : (Golconda Linga Swamy
case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522:
2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC p. 527, paras 5-7)
“5. … Authority of the court exists for the advancement of
justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority
so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent
such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the
court to allow any action which would result in injustice
and prevent the promotion of justice. In the exercise of its
powers court would be justified in quashing any
proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it
amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing
of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint,
the court may examine the question of fact. When a
complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look
into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged
and whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations
are accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of
Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this Court
summarised some categories of cases where inherent
power can and should be exercised to quash the
proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)
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(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of
sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information
report or complaint taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence
alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there
is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced
clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal
evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where
there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may
not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not
ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in
question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable
appreciation of it,the accusation would not be sustained. That
is the function of the trial Judge. The judicial process, no
doubt, should not be an instrument of oppression or
needless harassment. The court should be circumspect
and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all
relevant facts and circumstances into consideration
before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument
in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta
to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the
section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to
short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden
death.” (emphasis supplied)
13. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
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14. It was submitted that the incident had taken place on
04.04.2022 between 8:15 to 8:40 p.m. The matter was reported to
the police at 9:00 p.m. The entry in the daily diary shows that the
victim’s brother made a complaint regarding the altercation
between Prem Singh and the victim’s parents. Police sent ASI
Pawan Kumar, Constable Parveen Kumar, HHG Suresh Kumar and
HHG Vijay Kumar to verify the correctness of the information. The
place of occurrence is stated to be 22 KMs, and it was not possible
to travel 22 KMs and get the victim’s father medically examined at
9:25 p.m. This submission overlooks many crucial facts. The F.I.R.
specifically mentions that ASI Parveen Kumar, HH G Suresh Kumar
had gone to verify the correctness of the information, where they
found that the victim’s parents had been taken by her to the
Hospital. Hence, ASI Pawan Kumar went to the Regional Hospital,
where the statement was made by the victim. Thus, as per the
endorsement made on the statement, the victim had already taken
her parents to the hospital, and there was nothing suspicious in the
medical examination of the victim’s father on the same day at 9:25
p.m. Further, the F.I.R. shows that entry No. 7 dated 05.04.2022
was made at 4:31 a.m. regarding the registration of the F.I.R.
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Therefore, even though the information was received at 9:00 p.m.,
which was the initial information recorded in the daily diary, a
formal F.I.R. was entered on 05.04.2022. This is also apparent from
the F.I.R.,where the time of registration has been recorded as 4:50
a.m.
15. In any case, this submission means that this Court has
to conduct a mini-trial to verify the correctness of the information
recorded in the F.I.R. The Court exercising the jurisdiction under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C., (corresponding to 528 of BNNS) does not
conduct the mini-trial to determine the truthfulness or otherwise
of the allegations contained in the F.I.R. It was laid down in
Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643,t hat the
Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go
into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was
observed: –
“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of
the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the
allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face
value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make
out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the
present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint,
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2025:HHC:18851even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the
commission of an offence or make out a case against the
accused. We are of the considered view that the present case
would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by
this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in
the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of
the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once
the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of
the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this
submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court
in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj
A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri)
23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this
Court while deciding the question of whether the High
Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for
quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by
the police during the pendency of the Section 482
petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various
sections under which the appellant is being
charged and is to be prosecuted would show that
the same is not made out even prima facie from
the complainant’s FIR. Even if the charge sheet
had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph
Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj
365] could have still examined whether the
offences alleged to have been committed by the
appellant were prima facie made out from the
complainant’s FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc.
or not.”
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16. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial
while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was
observed on page 397:
“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while
exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not
supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be
made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan
Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The
relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted
hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings,
while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the
Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …
7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the
powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited
jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any
sufficient material is available to proceed further against
the accused for which the accused is required to be tried
or not’.”
17. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025
SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the FIR as
correct. It was observed: –
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“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court
must believe the averments and allegations in the
complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held
that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference
would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the
judicial process should not interfere at the stage of
investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent
powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner
according to its whims or caprice.”
18. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct
a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the F.I.R. are
correct or not.
19. It was submitted that petitioner Prem Singh had also
reported the matter to the police, and the police had not taken
proper action in the matter. The grievance of the petitioner, Prem
Singh, cannot be adjudicated in these proceedings, and the
petitioners have a remedy available to them for the redressal of
their grievances. Further, the petitioners themselves mentioned
that the F.I.R. lodged by the petitioner Prem Singh was sent to the
Gram Panchayat Kallar, which shows that the police had conducted
the investigation and filed the charge-sheet in the matter.
20. It was submitted that F.I.R. was lodged by the
petitioner, Prem Singh, on 05.04.2022 at 3:30 p.m., which was
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much before the F.I.R. lodged by the victim. There is no rule of law
that the F.I.R. lodged first is correct and the F.I.R. lodged
subsequently is not correct. It is a matter of trial to be determined
which of the F.I.R. is correct. The correctness of these F.I.R.s can be
determined only after leading the evidence and cross-examination
of the witnesses, and it is not possible for this Court to record any
finding regarding the correctness of the F.I.R. while exercising
inherent jurisdiction.
21. It was submitted that the site plans prepared in the two
F.I.Rs. are different. This submission will not help the petitioners
because it would be a case of defective investigation, and F.I.R.
cannot be quashed because of the defective investigation conducted
by the police.
22. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The
learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734:
2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed,
the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was
observed:
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“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is
ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR
do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of
any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of
the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge
application before the trial court under Section 227 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even
according to the State, the investigation is over and the
charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court.
In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to
look into the materials which the investigating officer might
have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such
discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into
the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is
made out or not.”
23. The petitioners have filed a copy of the statement made
by the victim under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. before the learned
Magistrate, in which she reiterated her allegations that the
petitioner Prem Singh asked her to show her face and when she
declined, he touched her breasts and tore her T-shirt. These
allegations, prima facie, constitute the commission of cognisable
offences; therefore, F.I.R. cannot be quashed at this stage.
24. No other point was urged.
25. In view of the above, the present petitions fail, and the
same stands dismissed.
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26 The observations made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the present petitions and will have no
bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
27. The present petitions stand disposed of, and so are the
miscellaneous applications, if any.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
19th June, 2025(ravinder)