Delhi High Court
Priya Chauhan And Ors vs Union Of India And Ors on 9 July, 2025
Author: Prateek Jalan
Bench: Prateek Jalan
$~57
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on: 09th July 2025
+ W.P.(C) 9410/2025
PRIYA CHAUHAN AND ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Ms. Aishwarya Dobhal, Mr. Albar
Qureshi, & Ms. Mansi Bidhuri,
Advocates.
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Ripu Daman Bhardwaj, CGSC
& & Mr. Kautilya Birat, GP with
Mr. Kushagra Kumar, Mr. Kumar
Rana, Advocates for R-1.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN
PRATEEK JALAN, J. (ORAL)
CM APPL. 39730/2025 (exemption)
Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
The application stands disposed of.
W.P.(C) 9410/2025 and CM APPL. 39729/2025 (ad-interim directions)
1. The petitioners have filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution assailing the “Recruitment Rules for Teaching and Non-
Teaching posts in KVS-revised” notified on 20.03.2025 [“Recruitment
Rules”] by the respondent No. 2- Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan
[“KVS”].
2. The uncontested position is that KVS is a notified entity for the
purposes of jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal
[“Tribunal”] under Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
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[“the Act”]. I have, therefore, put it to Ms. Aishwarya Dobhal, learned
counsel for the petitioners, that the challenge must first be instituted
before the Tribunal, in accordance with the judgment of the Constitution
Bench in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Others1, and several
judgments which follow the same view.
3. Ms. Dobhal’s first argument is that the Tribunal does not have
jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the Recruitment Rules,
particularly as no recruitment process is in progress.
4. I am not persuaded by this argument. It may first be noted that the
Tribunal is vested with jurisdiction, even to hear challenges to statutory
provisions. Paragraph 93 of L. Chandra Kumar makes this position clear,
as follows:
“93. Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions
on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are
competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are
questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as
substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under
our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an
obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such
decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division
Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also
have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules.
However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important
exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the
vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal
which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be
unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be
approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in
cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of
their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench
of their respective High Courts. We may add that the By this, we mean that
it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even
in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as
mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is1
(1997) 3 SCC 261, [hereinafter, “L. Chandra Kumar”].
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challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.”2
5. L. Chandra Kumar has been explained in the judgment of the
Division Bench of this Court in Parikshit Grewal & Ors. v. Union of
India3, decided on 27.09.2024, in the following terms:
“12. Thus, the Supreme Court clarified, in terms as unequivocal as could be,
that it would not be open to a litigant to approach the High Court in matters
relating to the areas of law in which the Tribunal concerned is constituted,
and that the Tribunal would continue to act as the court of first instance in all
such matters, the only exception being where the very legislation under which
the Tribunal is constituted is challenged. In other words, save and except for
cases in which the litigant challenges one or the other provision of the AT
Act, it is not open to the litigant to approach the High Court in the first
instance, in respect of matters which the Central Administrative Tribunal is
competent to adjudicate; in other words, in respect of matters which fall
within the purview of Article 14 of the Constitution. In all such matters, the
Central Administrative Tribunal would be the only court of first instance,
available to the litigant.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
14. Thus, the position in law is clear as crystal. All matters, which fall
within the purview of Section 14 of the AT Act have first to be agitated
before the Tribunal. It is the Tribunal alone which can entertain these
matters, as a court of first instance. The litigant is completely proscribed
from approaching the High Court in such matters, without first
approaching the Tribunal. The only circumstance in which the litigant can
approach the High Court, without first approaching the Tribunal, is where
the litigation challenges the vires of the AT Act itself, or of one or the other of
its provisions.
15. It is completely befuddling, therefore, to see petitions, which clearly fall
within the scope and ambit of Section 14 of the AT Act, being directly filed in
the High Court. Going by the number of such petitions which are still coming
up before this Court itself, the malaise is reaching endemic proportions.
Without meaning any disrespect to High Courts which may choose to
entertain such petitions, these stray examples, if any, cannot derogate from
the position in law so unequivocally stated by seven Hon’ble Judges of the
Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar.”4
6. The same view has been followed in a recent judgment of the
2
Emphasis supplied.
3
2024 SCC OnLine 6939, [hereinafter, “Parikshit Grewal”].
4
Emphasis supplied.
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Division Bench of this Court in Manish Kumar v. Union of India & Ors.5.
7. The position, therefore, is that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear
even a challenge to statutory provisions. A fortiori, it would be competent
to hear a challenge to Recruitment Rules, as in the present case. The
judgments are clear: the Tribunal will act as the court of first instance in
respect of matters falling within its jurisdiction, and it is not open to an
aggrieved person to approach the High Court directly, circumventing the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In the event the petitioners are unsuccessful
before the Tribunal, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution
may be exercised at that stage. It may be noted that, with regard to KVS
itself, the Supreme Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Subhas
Sharma6, held that the High Court ought not to have entertained a writ
petition at first instance, as the matter fell within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal.
8. Ms. Dobhal’s submission that this Court ought to entertain the writ
petition as a Court of first instance, as no recruitment process has yet
commenced, inasmuch as no advertisement has been issued for any post,
is unmerited. Section 14 of the Act confers jurisdiction upon the Tribunal
in the following terms:
“14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central
Administrative Tribunal.–(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided
in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and
from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority
exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the
Supreme Court 2***) in relation to–
(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All-
India Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under
the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence
5
2025 SCC OnLine Del 1519.
6
(2002) 4 SCC 145.
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services, being, in either case, a post filled by a civilian;
xxxx xxxx xxxx
(2) The Central Government may, by notification, apply with
effect from such date as may be specified in the notification the
provisions of sub-section (3) to local or other authorities within the
territory of India or under the control of the Government of India and
to corporations [or societies] owned or controlled by Government,
not being a local or other authority or corporation [or society]
controlled or owned by a State Government:
Provided that if the Central Government considers it
expedient so to do for the purpose of facilitating transition to the
scheme as envisaged by this Act, different dates may be so specified
under this sub-section in respect of different classes of, or different
categories under any class of, local or other authorities or
corporations [or societies].
(3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central
Administrative Tribunal shall also exercise, on and from the date
with effect from which the provisions of this sub-section apply to
any local or other authority or corporation [or society], all the
jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before
that date by all courts (except the Supreme Court2) in relation to–
(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any
service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other
authority or corporation 1[or society]; and
(b) all service matters concerning a person [other than a
person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1)]
appointed to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such
local or other authority or corporation 1 [or society] and pertaining
to the service of such person in connection with such affairs.”7
9. Challenge to the Recruitment Rules would, in my view, fall within
the scope of the aforesaid jurisdiction. The words “in relation to”, used in
Section 14, have been consistently interpreted by the Courts as words of
wide and comprehensive import. In Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd
Project v. Mahesh8, the Supreme Court referred to its earlier judgments
and held as follows:
“20. We begin by examining the phrasing of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of
the 2013 Act. We would prefer to read the words “all the provisions relating7
Emphasis supplied.
8
(2022) 2 SCC 772.
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to determination of compensation” in Section 24(1)(a) as including the
period of limitation specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act. To elaborate,
the word “all” and the expression “relating to” used in Section 25 are
required to be given a wide meaning to ensnare the legislative intent. The
expressions “relating to” or “in relation to” are words of
comprehensiveness which may have a direct as well as indirect
significance depending on the context.9
21. Similarly, interpreting Section 129-C of the Customs Act, 1962, this
Court while giving the phrase “in relation to” a narrower meaning of direct
and proximate relationship to the rate of duty and to the value of goods for
purpose of assessment, did observe that ordinarily the phrase “in relation
to” is of a wider import.10 Several cases assigning a wider import to the
expression “relating to”, in view of the contextual background, find
reference in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta11. In Renusagar
Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.12, this Court held that the term “in
relation to”, when used in the context of arbitration clause, is of widest
amplitude and content.
22. In Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain v. Eknath Vithal Ogale13 the expression
“relating to” in the context of the Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 has been
held to be comprehensive in nature that would take in its sweep all types of
suits and proceedings which are concerned with recovery of possession.
Broad and wider interpretation was again preferred in Doypack Systems
(P) Ltd. v. Union of India14, observing that the expression “in relation to” is
a very broad expression which presupposes another subject-matter. In
Doypack Systems (P) Ltd., in the context of Section 3 of the Swadeshi Cotton
Mills Company Ltd. (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1986,
the expression “relating to” was held to mean “bring into association or
connection with”. [Doypack Systems (P) Ltd., para 50] The words are
comprehensive and might have both direct as well as indirect significance.
The decision in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. refers to Corpus Juris
Secundum, wherein the expression “relating to” has been held to be
equivalent to or synonymous with as to “concerning with” and
“pertaining to”. It has been observed that the expression “pertaining to”
is an expression of expansion and not of contraction.
23. The expression “relating to” when used in legislation normally refers
9
State Wakf Board v. Abdul Azeez Sahib, 1966 SCC OnLine Mad 80 : AIR 1968 Mad 79.
10
Navin Chemicals Mfg. & Trading Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, (1993) 4 SCC 320.
11
Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta, (2021) 7 SCC 209 : (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 1
[hereinafter, “Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd.”].
12
Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., (1984) 4 SCC 679.
13
Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain v. Eknath Vithal Ogale, (1995) 2 SCC 665.
14
Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 299 [hereinafter, “Doypack Systems (P)
Ltd.”].
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to “stand in some relation, to have bearing or concern, to pertain, to refer,
to bring into association with or connection with”. [See judgment of
Mitter, J. (para 308) in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India15.]
Therefore, the expression “relating to” when used in legislation has to be
construed to give effect to the legislative intent when required and
necessary by giving an expansive and wider meaning. Given this trend in
interpretation, the words “all the provisions of this Act relating to the
determination of compensation” must not be imputed a restricted
understanding of the word “relating” only to the substantial provisions on
calculation of compensation, that is, Sections 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act.
Rather, the expression should be given an expansive meaning so as to
include the provision on limitation period for calculation of compensation,
that is, Section 25 of the 2013 Act.”16
10. Applying these principles to Section 14 of the Act, I am of the
view that a challenge to Recruitment Rules requires adjudication “in
relation to” recruitment, which would bring the matter squarely within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The fact that the petitioners herein have
chosen to institute a challenge at this stage, when there is no recruitment
process in progress, cannot alter this position. The consequence of the
petitioners’ submission would be that the question of vires of the Rules,
in the abstract, would fall within the jurisdiction of this Court, whereas a
similar challenge, instituted after an advertisement is issued, would fall
within the jurisdiction of Tribunal. This would not be a tenable situation.
11. Ms. Dobhal, however, relies upon the following observation in
Parikshit Grewal to support this submission:
“18. The learned Single Judge has first held that the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal is not restricted only to employees or persons who are in
Government service, as it also covers disputes relating to recruitment
and matters concerning recruitment for entry into Government service.
The submissions of the appellants – as the petitioners before the
learned Single Judge – that as they were not employees holding any
civil post as yet, they could approach this Court was, therefore,15
(1971) 1 SCC 85.
16
Emphasis supplied.
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rejected. In this context, the learned Single Judge has gone into the
definition of the expressions “selection” and “recruitment” and has
relied in that context on the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.P.
Public Service Commission, Hyderabad v. B. Sarat Chandra. The
learned Single Judge has held that “any challenge relating to any
stage of the recruitment process, post the issuance of the
advertisement would fall under ‘recruitment and matters concerning
recruitment’ under Section 14 of the AT Act and the remedy of the
petitioners would lie before the Tribunal as the only Court of first
instance………………”.
I do not read these observations to mean that a challenge to the
Recruitment Rules can be entertained by this Court, if an advertisement
has not been issued. This was not the question which arose in that case, as
the observations of the Court were in the context of a recruitment which
was already in process.
12. The final ground urged by Ms. Dobhal, is that the petitioners have
approached this Court pursuant to liberty granted by the Supreme Court.
She states that the petitioners had first filed a petition under Article 32 of
the Constitution before the Supreme Court for the same reliefs. The
petitioners were permitted to withdraw the writ petition [W.P.(C) Diary
No. 18899/2025], by order of the Supreme Court dated 23.05.2025, with
the following observations:
“Delay condoned.
After arguing the matter for some time, learned counsel for the
petitioners seeks leave to withdraw this writ petition with liberty to
move the jurisdictional High Court with appropriate petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
The Writ Petition is, accordingly, dismissed with liberty as above.”
13. I do not accept Ms. Dobhal’s submission that the order in any way
entitles the petitioners to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, if
such relief is otherwise barred or inappropriate. The Supreme Court
accepted the request of the petitioners for permission to withdraw the writ
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petition. The petitioners sought liberty to move the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution, which was granted to them. The
consequence of such liberty is that the present writ petition can be
entertained, despite the petitioners having earlier moved the Supreme
Court, and withdrawn their writ petition. It does not imply that the writ
petition must be entertained by this Court, despite falling within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Such a course would be contrary to the
judgments cited above.
14. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is dismissed, with
liberty to the petitioners to approach the Tribunal. The pending
application also stands disposed of.
15. It is made clear that this Court has not made any comment on the
merits of the petitioners’ claim.
PRATEEK JALAN, J
JULY 9, 2025
‘pv/Jishnu’/
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