Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Pulak Kumar Mallick vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 7 January, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
CRR 3904 of 2023
Pulak Kumar Mallick
Vs
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the petitioner : Ms. Madhushri Dutta.
For the State : Mr. Saryati Datta,
Mr. Debarshi Brahma.
For the Opposite Party : Mr. Kamalesh Ch. Saha,
No. 2 Mr. Samannya Saha.
Hearing concluded on : 06.12.2024
Judgment on : 07.01.2025
2
Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:
1. The present revisional application has been preferred praying for
quashing of the proceeding being S.T. No. 13(12)17 (S.C. No. 4(4)16
corresponding to G.R. No. 2421 of 2014 pending before the learned
Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Ranaghat,
Nadia, arising out of Hanskhali P.S. Case No. 652 of 2014 dated
28.10.2014 under Sections 306/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. The petitioner’s case is that initially the present case was initiated under
Sections 302/201/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
3. On completion of investigation the police submitted charge-sheet under
Section 306/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Magistrate taking
cognizance framed charge under Section 306/34 IPC against the
accused persons.
4. The allegations against the petitioner herein is that:-
“On 28.10.2014 one Samir Biswas S/o Lt. Niranjan
Biswas of vill-Harnahi, P.O. Morao, P.S. Bansgau,
Dist.-Gorakhpur, Uttar Pradesh submitted a written
complaint to the effect that his daughter Mita Biswas
(aged 22 years) came to the house of his brother in law
Harish Chowdhury S/o Lt. Falaram Chowdhury of
Benali Natungram, P.S. Hanskhali about one month
ago. There Mita went to the house of one Panchanan
Mallick (Maternal father in-law of Samir Biswas) at
Bagula Purbapara, and on 26.10.2014 at 10.30 hrs.
He was informed by Panchanan Mallick that Mita
Biswas expired. Then Harish went to the house of
Panchanan and then Bagula PHC where he found the
dead body of Mita. He strongly believes that (1)
Panchanan Mallick (2) Shyamali Mallick W/o
Panchanan and (3) Pulak Mallick S/o Panchanan in
nexus with one Prasanjit Das (who is known to
Panchanan) murdered his daughter and to disappear
the evidence, arranged for post-mortem over the dead
body.”
3
5. It appears that the victim in this case on the date of incident had gone to
the petitioner’s father’s house. The victim herein was aged about 22
years at the time of her death.
6. It appears from the materials on record including the case dairy
that the victim died in the house of the petitioner.
7. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the State that
trial has commenced and three witnesses have already been
examined by the trial Court.
8. The Supreme Court in CBI Vs. Aryan Singh, Criminal Appeal Nos.
1025-1026 of 2023, (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 12794-12795 of
2022), it was held:-
“4. Having gone through the impugned common
judgment and order passed by the High Court
quashing the criminal proceedings and
discharging the accused, we are of the opinion
that the High Court has exceeded in its
jurisdiction in quashing the entire criminal
proceedings in exercise of the limited powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or in exercise of
the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India.
4.1 From the impugned common judgment and
order passed by the High Court, it appears that
the High Court has dealt with the proceedings
before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a
mini trial and/or the High Court was considering
the applications against the judgment and order
passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion
of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at
the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the
criminal proceedings, while exercising the
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court is
not required to conduct the mini trial. The High
Court in the common impugned judgment and
order has observed that the charges against the
accused are not proved. This is not the stage
4where the prosecution / investigating agency
is/are required to prove the charges. The
charges are required to be proved during the trial
on the basis of the evidence led by the
prosecution / investigating agency. Therefore,
the High Court has materially erred in going in
detail in the allegations and the material
collected during the course of the investigation
against the accused, at this stage. At the stage
of discharge and/or while exercising the powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court has a very
limited jurisdiction and is required to consider
“whether any sufficient material is available to
proceed further against the accused for which
the accused is required to be tried or not”.
4.2 One another reason pointed by the High
Court is that the initiation of the criminal
proceedings / proceedings is malicious. At this
stage, it is required to be noted that the
investigation was handed over to the CBI
pursuant to the directions issued by the High
Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the
investigation, the accused persons have been
chargesheeted. Therefore, the High Court has
erred in observing at this stage that the initiation
of the criminal proceedings / proceedings is
malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings
was/were malicious or not, is not required to be
considered at this stage. The same is required to
be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In
any case, at this stage, what is required to be
considered is a prima facie case and the material
collected during the course of the investigation,
which warranted the accused to be tried.”
9. The Supreme Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 2012 SC
(Cri) 1796, it was held:-
“57. The position that emerges from the above
discussion can be summarised thus: the power
of the High Court in quashing a criminal
proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from
the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section 320 of
the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude
with no statutory limitation but it has to be
5exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted
in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice
or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any
Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal
proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be
exercised where the offender and victim have
settled their dispute would depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case and no category
can be prescribed. However, before exercise of
such power, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the crime.
Heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the
victim or victim’s family and the offender have
settled the dispute. Such offences are not private
in nature and have serious impact on society.
Similarly, any compromise between the victim
and offender in relation to the offences under
special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity etc; cannot
provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But the
criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-
dominatingly civil flavour stand on different
footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly
the offences arising from commercial, financial,
mercantile, civil, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family
disputes where the wrong is basically private or
personal in nature and the parties have resolved
their entire dispute. In this category of cases,
High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in
its view, because of the compromise between the
offender and victim, the possibility of conviction
is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal
case would put accused to great oppression and
prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused
to him by not quashing the criminal case despite
full and complete settlement and compromise
with the victim. In other words, the High Court
must consider whether it would be unfair or
contrary to the interest of justice to continue with
the criminal proceeding or continuation of the
criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse
of process of law despite settlement and
compromise between the victim and wrongdoer
6and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is
appropriate that criminal case is put to an end
and if the answer to the above question(s) is in
affirmative, the High Court shall be well within
its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”
10. The present case is for quashing of the proceedings under Section
306/34 of Indian Penal Code.
11. The Supreme Court in Daxaben Vs The State of Gujarat & Ors.,
Criminal Appeal No……of 2022, on July 29, 2022, held that:-
“14. The proposition of law enunciated and/or
re-enunciated in the judgments cited above are
well settled. Whether the acts alleged would
constitute an offence, would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of the case. Each case
has to be judged on its own merits.
16. It is not necessary for this Court to go into
the question of whether there was any direct or
indirect act of incitement to the offence of
abetment of suicide, since the High Court has not
gone into that question. Suffice it to mention that
even an indirect act of incitement to the
commission of suicide would constitute the
offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306
of the IPC.
20. In the aforesaid judgment, the High Court
referred to an order dated 6 th December 2019
passed by a three Judge Bench of this Court in
Crl. Appeal No.1852 of 2019 (New India
Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Krishna Kumar
Pandey) where this Court held that in a revision
arising out of conviction, the High Court could not
have sealed the right of the employer to take
disciplinary action against the accused for
misconduct in accordance with the Service Rules.
21. In Krishna Kumar Pandey (supra) this
Court referred with approval, to the judgment of
this Court in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal
Singh Bhullar and Ors. where this Court held
that the High Court was not denuded of inherent
power to recall a judgment and/or order which
was without jurisdiction, or in violation of
principles of natural justice, or passed without
giving an opportunity of hearing to a party
7affected by the order or where an order was
obtained by abusing the process of Court which
would really amount to its being without
jurisdiction. Inherent powers can be exercised to
recall such orders.
24. Be that as it may, since the initial order
dated 20th October 2020 is also under challenge
in these appeals, it is really not necessary for
this Court to delve deeper into the question of
whether a final order passed under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. quashing an FIR could have, at all,
been recalled by the High Court, in the absence
of any specific provision in the Cr.P.C. for recall
and/or review of such order. The High Court
has, in effect, held that in exceptional
circumstances, such orders can be recalled, in
exercise of the inherent power of the High Court,
to prevent injustice.
25. The only question in this appeal is whether
the Criminal Miscellaneous Applications filed by
the accused under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
could have been allowed and an FIR under
Section 306 of the IPC for abetment to commit
suicide, entailing punishment of imprisonment of
ten years, could have been quashed on the basis
of a settlement between the complainant and the
accused named in the FIR. The answer to the
aforesaid question cannot, but be in the negative.
28. In Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P.,
this Court held that inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C has to be exercised
sparingly, carefully and with caution and only
when such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the section itself.
29. In exceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the
process of the Court, the High Court might in
exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482
quash criminal proceedings. However,
interference would only be justified when the
complaint did not disclose any offence, or was
patently frivolous, vexatious or oppressive, as
held by this Court in Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R.
Prasanna Kumar.
30. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.
Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others., a three-
Judge Bench of this Court held:-
“6. It may be noticed that Section 482 of the
present Code is the ad verbatim copy of Section
561- A of the old Code. This provision confers a
8separate and independent power on the High
Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in
cases where grave and substantial injustice has
been done or where the process of the court has
been seriously abused. It is not merely a
revisional power meant to be exercised against
the orders passed by subordinate courts. It was
under this section that in the old Code, the High
Courts used to quash the proceedings or
expunge uncalled for remarks against witnesses
or other persons or subordinate courts. Thus, the
scope, ambit and range of Section 561-A (which
is now Section 482) is quite different from the
powers conferred by the present Code under the
provisions of Section 397. It may be that in some
cases there may be overlapping but such cases
would be few and far between. It is well settled
that the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the present Code can be exercised only when no
other remedy is available to the litigant and not
where a specific remedy is provided by the
statute. Further, the power being an
extraordinary one, it has to be exercised
sparingly. If these considerations are kept in
mind, there will be no inconsistency between
Sections 482 and 397(2) of the present Code.
7. The limits of the power under Section 482
were clearly definedby this Court in Raj Kapoor
v. State [(1980) 1 SCC 43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72]
where Krishna Iyer, J. observed as follows :
[SCC para 10, p. 47 : SCC (Cri) p. 76]
“Even so, a general principle pervades this
branch of law when a specific provision is made
: easy resort to inherent power is not right except
under compelling circumstances. Not that there is
absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power
should not invade areas set apart for specific
power under the same Code.”
8. Another important consideration which is to be
kept in mind is as to when the High Court acting
under the provisions of Section 482 should
exercise the inherent power insofar as quashing
of criminal proceedings are concerned. This
matter was gone into in greater detail in Smt.
Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi
[(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507 : 1976
Supp SCR 123 : 1976 Cri LJ 1533] where the
scope of Sections 202 and 204 of the present
Code was considered and while laying down the
9
guidelines and the grounds on which
proceedings could be quashed this Court
observed as follows : [SCC para 5, p. 741 : SCC
(Cri) pp. 511-12]
“Thus it may be safely held that in the following
cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process
against the accused can be quashed or set
aside:
(1) where the allegations made in the complaint
or thestatements of the witnesses recorded in
support of the same taken at their face value
make out absolutely no case against the accused
or the complaint does not disclose the essential
ingredients of an offence which is alleged
against the accused;
(2) where the allegations made in the complaint
are patentlyabsurd and inherently improbable so
that no prudent person can ever reach a
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused;
(3) where the discretion exercised by the
Magistrate inissuing process is capricious and
arbitrary having been based either on no
evidence or on materials which are wholly
irrelevant or inadmissible; and
(4) where the complaint suffers from
fundamental legaldefects, such as, want of
sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally
competent authority and the like.
The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative
and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate
contingencies where the High Court can quash
proceedings.”
9. Same view was taken in a later decision of
this Court in Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of
Bihar [(1977) 1 SCC 505 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 132 :
(1977) 2 SCR 357 : 1977 Cri LJ 1146] where
Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court observed as
follows : [SCC para 2, p. 506 : SCC (Cri) p. 133]
“It is now settled law that where the allegations
set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet do
not constitute any offence, it is competent to the
High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure to quash the order passed by the
Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence.
10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that
proceedings against an accused in the initial
stages can be quashed only if on the face of the
10
complaint or the papers accompanying the same,
no offence is constituted. In other words, the test
is that taking the allegations and the complaint
as they are, without adding or subtracting
anything, if no offence is made out then the High
Court will be justified in quashing the
proceedings in exercise of its powers under
Section 482 of the present Code.”
31. As held by this Court in State of Andhra
Pradesh v. Gourieshetty Mahesh, the High
Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C, would not ordinarily embark
upon an enquiry into whether the evidence is
reliable or not or whether there is reasonable
possibility that the accusation would not be
sustained.
32. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of
Uttrakhand, this Court held:–
“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be
cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and
only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure ends
of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a
criminal offence or not depends upon the nature
of facts alleged therein. Whether essential
ingredients of criminal offence are present or not
has to be judged by the High Court. …”
33. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, a three
Judge Bench of this Court summarized the law
with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. This Court
held:–
“7. The legal position is well settled that when a
prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be
quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as
to whether the uncontroverted allegations as
made prima facie establish the offence. It is also
for the court to take into consideration any
special features which appear in a particular
case to consider whether it is expedient and in
the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to
continue. This is so on the basis that the court
cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and
where in the opinion of the court chances of an
ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no
useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing
a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may
11while taking into consideration the special facts
of a case also quash the proceeding even though
it may be at a preliminary stage.”
34. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal, this Court observed:–
“46. The court must ensure that criminal
prosecution is not used as an instrument of
harassment or for seeking private vendetta or
with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused.
On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are
of the opinion that it is neither possible nor
desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that
would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High
Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has
to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with
caution and only when it is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the statute itself and in
the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled
legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained.”
35. It is a well settled proposition of law that
criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified, is not
vitiated on account of malafides or vendetta. As
said by Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Punjab v.
Gurdial Singh “if the use of the power for the
fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or
catalysation by malice is not legicidal.”
36. In Kapil Agarwal & Ors. v. Sanjay
Sharma & Others, this Court observed that
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is designed to achieve
the purpose of ensuring that criminal
proceedings are not permitted to degenerate into
weapons of harassment.
37. Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of
abetment to commit suicide is a grave, non-
compoundable offence. Of course, the inherent
power of the High Court under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. is wide and can even be exercised to
quash criminal proceedings relating to non-
compoundable offences, to secure the ends of
justice or to prevent abuse of the process of
Court. Where the victim and offender have
compromised disputes essentially civil and
personal in nature, the High Court can exercise
its power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash
the criminal proceedings. In what cases power to
quash an FIR or a criminal complaint or criminal
proceedings upon compromise can be exercised,
12
would depend on the facts and circumstances of
the case.
38. However, before exercising its power under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR,
criminal complaint and/or criminal proceedings,
the High Court, as observed above, has to be
circumspect and have due regard to the nature
and gravity of the offence. Heinous or serious
crimes, which are not private in nature and have
a serious impact on society cannot be quashed
on the basis of a compromise between the
offender and the complainant and/or the victim.
Crimes like murder, rape, burglary, dacoity and
even abetment to commit suicide are neither
private nor civil in nature. Such crimes are
against the society. In no circumstances can
prosecution be quashed on compromise, when
the offence is serious and grave and falls within
the ambit of crime against society.
39. Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints
relating to grave and serious offences only on
basis of an agreement with the complainant,
would set a dangerous precedent, where
complaints would be lodged for oblique reasons,
with a view to extract money from the accused.
Furthermore, financially strong offenders would
go scot free, even in cases of grave and serious
offences such as murder, rape, brideburning, etc.
by buying off informants/complainants and
settling with them. This would render otiose
provisions such as Sections 306, 498A, 304-B
etc. incorporated in the IPC as a deterrent, with a
specific social purpose.
40. In Criminal Jurisprudence, the position of
the complainant isonly that of the informant.
Once an FIR and/or criminal complaint is lodged
and a criminal case is started by the State, it
becomes a matter between the State and the
accused. The State has a duty to ensure that law
and order is maintained in society. It is for the
state to prosecute offenders. In case of grave and
serious noncompoundable offences which impact
society, the informant and/or complainant only
has the right of hearing, to the extent of ensuring
that justice is done by conviction and
punishment of the offender. An informant has no
right in law to withdraw the complaint of a
noncompoundable offence of a grave, serious
and/or heinous nature, which impacts society.
13
41. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, this
Court discussed the circumstances in which the
High Court quashes criminal proceedings in case
of a non-compoundable offence, when there is a
settlement between the parties and enunciated
the following principles:-
“58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal
proceeding having regard to the fact that the
dispute between the offender and the victim has
been settled although the offences are not
compoundable, it does so as in its opinion,
continuation of criminal proceedings will be an
exercise in futility and justice in the case
demands that the dispute between the parties is
put to an end and peace is restored; securing the
ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor.
No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful
effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing
that seriously endangers and threatens the well-
being of the society and it is not safe to leave the
crime-doer only because he and the victim have
settled the dispute amicably or that the victim
has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes
have been made compoundable in law, with or
without the permission of the court. In respect of
serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.,
or other offences of mental depravity under IPC
or offences of moral turpitude under special
statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or
the offences committed by public servants while
working in that capacity, the settlement between
the offender and the victim can have no legal
sanction at all. However, certain offences which
overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil
flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile,
commercial, financial, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or
the family dispute, where the wrong is basically
to the victim and the offender and the victim
have settled all disputes between them
amicably, irrespective of the fact that such
offences have not been made compoundable, the
High Court may within the framework of its
inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or
criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on
the face of such settlement, there is hardly any
likelihood of the offender being convicted and by
not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice
14shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be
defeated. The above list is illustrative and not
exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own
facts and no hard-and-fast category can be
prescribed”.
42. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, this
Court held that in case of heinous and serious
offences, which are generally to be treated as
crime against society, it is the duty of the State
to punish the offender. Hence, even when there
is a settlement, the view of the offender and
victim will not prevail since it is in the interest of
society that the offender should be punished to
deter others from committing a similar crime.
43. In State of Maharashtra v. Vikram
Anantrai Doshi, this Court held:-
“26. … availing of money from a nationalised
bank in the manner, as alleged by the
investigating agency, vividly exposits fiscal
impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The
modus operandi as narrated in the charge-sheet
cannot be put in the compartment of an
individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong
and it has immense societal impact. It is an
accepted principle of handling of finance that
whenever there is manipulation and cleverly
conceived contrivance to avail of these kinds of
benefits it cannot be regarded as a case having
overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil
character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It
creates a hazard in the financial interest of the
society. The gravity of the offence creates a dent
in the economic spine of the nation. …”
44. In CBI v. Maninder Singh, this Court held:-
“17. … In economic offences the Court must not
only keep in view that money has been paid to
the bank which has been defrauded but also the
society at large. It is not a case of simple assault
or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with
which we are concerned was well planned and
was committed with a deliberate design with an
eye on personal profit regardless of consequence
to the society at large. To quash the proceeding
merely on the ground that the accused has
settled the amount with the bank would be a
misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against
the economic offenders are not allowed to
continue, the entire community is aggrieved.”
15
45. In State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Vasanthi
Stanley, this Court held:-
“14. … Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent
is neither to be considered nor accepted in
economic offences. The submission assiduously
presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An
offence under the criminal law is an offence and
it does not depend upon the gender of an
accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in
CrPC relating to exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether
pertains to a different sphere. A person
committing a murder or getting involved in a
financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot
claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of her
gender as that is neither constitutionally nor
statutorily a valid argument. The offence is
gender neutral in this case. We say no more on
this score.
15. … A grave criminal offence or serious
economic offence or for that matter the offence
that has the potentiality to create a dent in the
financial health of the institutions, is not to be
quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial
or the principle that when the matter has been
settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on
the system. …”
46. In Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbathbhai
Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others v. State
of Gujrat and Another, a threeJudge Bench of
this Court quoted Narinder Singh (supra),
Vikram Anantrai Doshi (supra), CBI v.
Maninder Singh (supra), R. Vasanthi Stanley
(supra) and held:-
“16. The broad principles which emerge from the
precedents on the subject, may be summarised
in the following propositions:
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers
of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the
process of any court or to secure the ends of
justice. The provision does not confer new
powers. It only recognises and preserves powers
which inhere in the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the
High Court to quash a first information report or
a criminal proceeding on the ground that a
settlement has been arrived at between the
offender and the victim is not the same as the
invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of
16compounding an offence. While compounding an
offence, the power of the court is governed by the
provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under
Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is
non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal
proceeding or complaint should be quashed in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the
High Court must evaluate whether the ends of
justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court
has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be
exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or
first information report should be quashed on the
ground that the offender and victim have settled
the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no exhaustive
elaboration of principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section
482 and while dealing with a plea that the
dispute has been settled, the High Court must
have due regard to the nature and gravity of the
offence. Heinous and serious offences involving
mental depravity or offences such as murder,
rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be
quashed though the victim or the family of the
victim have settled the dispute. Such offences
are, truly speaking, not private in nature but
have a serious impact upon society. The decision
to continue with the trial in such cases is
founded on the overriding element of public
interest in punishing persons for serious
offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences,
there may be criminal cases which have an
overwhelming or predominant element of a civil
dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar
as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is
concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which
arise from commercial, financial, mercantile,
partnership or similar transactions with an
essentially civil flavour may in appropriate
situations fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute.
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16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash
the criminal proceeding if in view of the
compromise between the disputants, the
possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding would
cause oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle
set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above.
Economic offences involving the financial and
economic well-being of the State have
implications which lie beyond the domain of a
mere dispute between private disputants. The
High Court would be justified in declining to
quash where the offender is involved in an
activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act
complained of upon the financial or economic
system will weigh in the balance.”
47. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi
Narayan & Ors., a three-Judge Bench
discussed the earlier judgments of this Court
and laid down the following principles:-
“15. Considering the law on the point and the
other decisions of this Court on the point,
referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held
as under:
15.1. That the power conferred under Section
482 of the Code to quash the criminal
proceedings for the non-compoundable offences
under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised
having overwhelmingly and predominantly the
civil character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes and
when the parties have resolved the entire
dispute amongst themselves;
15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involved heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on
society;
15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised
for the offences under the special statutes like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in
that capacity are not to be quashed merely on
the basis of compromise between the victim and
the offender;
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15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the
Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of
heinous and serious offences and therefore are
to be treated as crime against the society and
not against the individual alone, and therefore,
the criminal proceedings for the offence under
Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which
have a serious impact on the society cannot be
quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482
of the Code, on the ground that the parties have
resolved their entire dispute amongst
themselves. However, the High Court would not
rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
charge is framed under this provision. It would
be open to the High Court to examine as to
whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there
for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected
sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead
to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For
this purpose, it would be open to the High Court
to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether
such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts
of the body, nature of weapons used, etc.
However, such an exercise by the High Court
would be permissible only after the evidence is
collected after investigation and the charge-sheet
is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial.
Such exercise is not permissible when the matter
is still under investigation. Therefore, the
ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the
decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [(2014) 6
SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read
harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in
the circumstances stated hereinabove;
15.5. While exercising the power under Section
482 of the Code to quash the criminal
proceedings in respect of noncompoundable
offences, which are private in nature and do not
have a serious impact on society, on the ground
that there is a settlement/compromise between
the victim and the offender, the High Court is
required to consider the antecedents of the
accused; the conduct of the accused, namely,
whether the accused was absconding and why
he was absconding, how he had managed with
the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.”
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48. In Arun Singh and Others v. State of
Uttar Pradesh Through its Secretary and
Another, this Court held:-
“14. In another decision in Narinder Singh v.
State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC
(Cri) 54] it has been observed that in respect of
offence against the society it is the duty to
punish the offender. Hence, even where there is
a settlement between the offender and victim the
same shall not prevail since it is in interests of
the society that offender should be punished
which acts as deterrent for others from
committing similar crime. On the other hand,
there may be offences falling in the category
where the correctional objective of criminal law
would have to be given more weightage than the
theory of deterrent punishment. In such cases,
the court may be of the opinion that a settlement
between the parties would lead to better
relations between them and would resolve a
festering private dispute and thus may exercise
power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the
proceedings or the complaint or the FIR as the
case may be.
15. Bearing in mind the above principles which
have been laiddown, we are of the view that
offences for which the appellants have been
charged are in fact offences against society and
not private in nature. Such offences have serious
impact upon society and continuance of trial of
such cases is founded on the overriding effect of
public interests in punishing persons for such
serious offences. It is neither an offence arising
out of commercial, financial, mercantile,
partnership or such similar transactions or has
any element of civil dispute thus it stands on a
distinct footing. In such cases, settlement even if
arrived at between the complainant and the
accused, the same cannot constitute a valid
ground to quash the FIR or the charge-sheet.
16. Thus the High Court cannot be said to be
unjustified inrefusing to quash the charge-sheet
on the ground of compromise between the
parties.”
49. In exercise of power under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the
correctness of the allegation in the complaint
except in exceptionally rare cases where it is
20
patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or
do not disclose any offence.
50. In our considered opinion, the Criminal
Proceeding cannot be nipped in the bud by
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Cr. P.C. only because there is a settlement, in
this case a monetary settlement, between the
accused and the complainant and other relatives
of the deceased to the exclusion of the hapless
widow of the deceased. As held by the three-
Judge Bench of this Court in Laxmi Narayan &
Ors. (supra), Section 307 of the IPC falls in the
category of heinous and serious offences and are
to be treated as crime against society and not
against the individual alone. On a parity of
reasoning, offence under section 306 of the IPC
would fall in the same category. An FIR under
Section 306 of the IPC cannot even be quashed
on the basis of any financial settlement with the
informant, surviving spouse, parents, children,
guardians, care-givers or anyone else. It is
clarified that it was not necessary for this Court
to examine the question whether the FIR in this
case discloses any offence under Section 306 of
the IPC, since the High Court, in exercise of its
power under Section 482 CrPC, quashed the
proceedings on the sole ground that the disputes
between the accused and the informant had
been compromised.”
In the said case (Daxaben Vs The State of Gujarat & Ors.
(Supra)) the Court set aside the order of the High Court quashing
proceedings under Section 306 IPC in view of settlement between
the parties.
12. In the present case, the petitioners are named in the suicide note
and the signature on the note has been proved to be that of the
deceased.
13. The case has to thus proceed towards trial there being prima facie
material in this case against the petitioners to be decided in
21
accordance with law, in the interest of Justice. Interference at this
stage shall amount to abuse of the process of law.
14. Quashing a case of such a nature will cause miscarriage of justice.
(Daxaben Vs The State of Gujarat & Ors. (Supra)).
15. CRR 3904 of 2023 is thus dismissed.
16. Trial court to proceed in the case expeditiously.
17. There will be no order as to costs.
18. All connected applications, if any, stand disposed of.
19. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
20. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary
compliance.
21. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties expeditiously after due compliance.
(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)
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