Telangana High Court
Puppala Suchitra And 3 Others vs K. Preamchander Reddy And 2 Others on 23 January, 2025
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE K. SUJANA CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023 COMMON ORDER:
Since the parties and lis involved in both the revision
petitions are same, they were heard together and are being
disposed of by this common order.
2. CRP.No.2527 of 2022 is filed challenging the order
dated 20.07.2022 passed in IA.No.546 of 2021 in OS.No.162
of 2019 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Ranga
Reddy District, at LB.Nagar ; and CRP.No.429 of 2023 is
filed challenging the order dated 10.01.2022 passed in
IA.No.4 of 2021 in CMA.SR.No.8 of 2021 on the file of the
Principal District Judge, at LB.Nagar, Ranga Reddy District.
CRP.No.2527 OF 2022
3. The brief facts of the case are that the respondents
herein filed IA.No.546 of 2021 in OS.No.162 of 2019 under
Order I Rule 10 of CPC praying to implead them as plaintiff
Nos.2 to 3 in the suit, stating that they purchased the suit
schedule property from Plaintiff No.1 through a registered
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CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023
sale deed dated 09.09.2019. However, Defendants 1 to 4
claimed ownership of the property, alleging that they had
purchased it from Ayesha Tabassum, who had acquired it
from Syed Sami Ahmed. It was contended that Syed Sami
Ahmed was an imposter who had created forged documents,
including the sale deed and that defendant Nos.1 to 4 were
aware of the pending suit and had purchased the property
with knowledge of the dispute. On the other hand, the
defendant Nos.1 to 4 claimed that they were the absolute
owners and possessors of the plot, having purchased it from
Ayesha Tabassum, and that they had constructed a
compound wall and erected a gate on the property, and had
obtained an electricity connection as well.
4. After hearing both sides, the trial Court considered
the provisions of Order I Rule 10 of the CPC and the
principles laid down in various judgments, such as,
Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation
of Greater Bombay 1, Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal 2, Amit
Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon 3, Kunna Ramulu v.
1
(1992) 2 SCC 524
2
2004) 2 SCC 601
3
(2005) 11 SCC 403
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CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023
Kunna Annapurnamma 4, Pannala Renuka v. Kavali
(Rajumouni) Venkataiah 5 and held that the respondents
herein were necessary parties to the suit and that their
impleadment would avoid multiplicity of proceedings and
allowed the petition, directing them to pay costs of
Rs.2,000/- to the petitioners herein and to carry out
amendments and file a neat copy of the plaint within 14
days.
CRP.No.429 OF 2023
5. The brief facts of this case are that the respondents
herein who are third parties to IA.No.257 of 2019 in
OS.No.162 of 2019 filed IA.No.4 of 2021 in CMA.SR.No.8 of
2021 under Section 151 of CPC seeking leave to file CMA
against the order dated 30.01.2020 passed in the said IA.,
stating that they are the purchasers of the suit schedule
property from the Plaintiff, and contended that they are the
bona fide purchasers of the suit schedule property and have
a strong case. On the other hand, the said plea was strongly
opposed contending that the respondents herein are third
4
2002 (2) ALT 491
5
2006 (6) ALD 761
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CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023
parties to the suit and have no locus standi to file the
appeal, and that they have no cause of action. The trial
Court considered the provisions of CPC and the judgments
rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in V.N. Krishna
Murthy v. Ravikumar 6 and Raj Kumar v. Sardar Lal 7 and
held that a stranger can appeal against a decree, only if he
is aggrieved person whose rights are affected, and observed
that the respondents herein are lis pendente transferees,
having purchased the suit schedule property during the
pendency of the suit, and that they are bound by the decree
passed in the suit and have the right to challenge it, and
accordingly, allowed the petition, granting the respondents
herein leave to appeal against the impugned order.
Aggrieved thereby, these revision petitions are filed.
6. Heard Sri D.Jagan Mohan Reddy, learned counsel for
petitioners, and Sri Koppula Gopal, learned counsel for
respondents.
6
2020 5 ALD 153 SC
7
2004 2 ALD 95 SC
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CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023
7. Learned counsel for petitioners submitted that the
trial Court erred in allowing I.A.No.546 of 2021 in
O.S.No.162 of 2019 which was filed by respondents herein
who contend that they have purchased the suit schedule
property from the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit.
He contended that the respondents being purchasers
pendente lite cannot be permitted to be brought on record in
a suit for injunction and relied on the principle that a
purchaser pendente lite is not entitled to be impleaded in a
suit for injunction, as the suit is primarily between the
plaintiff and the defendant. He asserted that the trial court
failed to appreciate that in a suit for injunction, the plaintiff
is required to prove possession over the suit schedule
property as on the date of filing the suit, and that
subsequent purchasers, such as Respondent Nos. 1 and 2,
would not be in a better position to prove the possession of
plaintiffs. He lamented that the plaintiffs possession is a
crucial factor in determining the reliefs in a suit for
injunction, and that the application to implead respondents
was filed only to delay the proceedings in the suit.
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8. Learned counsel for petitioners incessantly contended
that respondents purchased the suit schedule property after
the order of injunction was vacated, and subsequently filed
C.M.A.SR.No.08 of 2021 with a leave to challenge the order,
and lamented that the same would show the clear attempt
to re-agitate the issue that had already been decided by the
trial Court. Therefore, while praying this Court to allow the
revision petitions, setting aside the order dated 20.07.2022
passed in IA.No.546 of 2021 in OS.No.162 of 2019 as well as
order dated 10.01.2022 passed in IA.No.4 of 2021 in
CMA.SR.No.8 of 2021, in support of the said contentions, he
relied on the judgments rendered in the case of
S.Kumudham Vs. R.Rajendiran and Another 8,
whereunder, it was observed that “A Court of law is not
under an obligation to make a lis pendens suit, seeking
appropriate relief in the manner known to law and in
accordance with law”. He also relied on the judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in National
Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and
Others 9. Furthermore, in the case of Mohd. Sharfuddin Vs.
8
2012 SCC OnLine Mad 3850
9
2017 16 SCC 680
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CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023
Mohd. Jamal and Others 10 and the relevant paragraph
Nos.19 to 21 read as under:
“19. A learned Single Judge of Karnataka High
Court in Shankaralingappa v. Nanje Gowda, AIR
1981 Karnataka 78, held that a judgment in a
suit for injunction is not a judgment in rem and
binds only the parties to the suit. Broadly,
‘privies’ are of three kinds viz., (i) ‘privies’ in
blood; (ii) ‘privies’ in estate and (iii) ‘privies’ in
law. The plaintiff is not a ‘privy’ in blood and a
‘privy’ in law. But, the question is whether he is
a ‘privy’ in estate. The learned Judge observed at
paras 25 and 26 as follows:
“The suit filed by Kalaiah as also the suit filed by
the plaintiff are not for declaration of title or
their ownership. Both the suits are simple suits
for permanent injunctions. A decree for
permanent injunction does not prohibit the
defendant from instituting a suit for declaration
of his title and for recovery of possession from
the very decree holder that has obtained a decree
for permanent injunction. On the very first
principle stated by Sir William de Grey in
10
2003 SCC OnLine AP 184
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CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023Duchess of Kingston’s case, as also on the legal
principles that distinguish ownership and
possession, it is difficult to hold that a transferee
is a ‘privy’ in estate and the decree made against
his transferor operates as res judicata against
him. A decree for permanent injunction obtained
by one person against another person, cannot
obviously bind all other persons and ignore the
factual changes that take place with regard to
possession. If that is not the position, then it
ignores all legal and factual changes that take
place and stamps that decree as if it is a
covenant running with that land. With all the
anxiety of law to safeguard possession,
acceptance of such a proposition, would even
defeat the very safeguards provided by law and
would create innumerable problems in
safeguarding possession. In this view also, the
Court should be loath to accept the extreme
proposition that the plaintiff, the transferee is a
‘privy’ in estate and the decree obtained by
Kalaiah against Lingamma operates as res
judicata against him. From this it follows, that
the decree in O.S. No. 597 of 1942-1943 (Exhibit
D-12) cannot operate as res judicata against the
plaintiff.
9
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CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023An injunction does not run with the land. An
injunction only acts in personam or against a
person. Both these principles are firmly
established legal principles (vide Somnath
Honnappa Bennalkar v. Bhimrao Subrao Patil,
ILR (1974) Kant 1506).”
20. In Ganesh v. Narayan, AIR 1931 Bom. 484,
a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held
that “a decree for permanent injunction obtained
against a father in Hindu Joint family can be
executed against the son.”
21. The learned Senior Counsel also refers to the
passage in Text Book by Sir John George
Woodroffe on law relating to Injunctions in India
and extracted para 17.03 which reads thus:
“INJUNCTION IN RESPECT OF ACTS OF AN
INDIVIDUAL:–Insofar as an injunction is in its
nature a remedy against an individual, it will be
issued only in respect of acts done by him
against whom it is sought to be enforced. Thus,
an injunction cannot be obtained against
executors on account of acts done by their
testator. They may be sued for an injunction in
respect of a wrong done by themselves, but they
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CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023cannot be so sued in a representative character.
And for the same reason, namely, that an
injunction is an order directed to a person, it
does not run with the land. By reason of this
same operation in personam the Court may
exercise jurisdiction quite independently of the
act to be done, provided the defendant be within
the reach and amenable to the process of the
Court.”
9. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents opposed
the submissions made by learned counsel for petitioners
and asserted that there are no illegalities or irregularities in
the orders under challenge, as the respondents herein are
purchasers of the property from plaintiffs and if any order is
granted against the plaintiffs, the same shall bound on them
as well. Therefore, while praying this Court to dismiss the
Revision Petitions, as the same lacks merits, he relied on the
judgments rendered in the case of Amit Kumar Shaw and
Another Vs. Farida Khatoon and Another 11 whereunder, it
was observed that “Under Order XXII Rule 10, no detailed
inquiry at the stage of granting leave is contemplated. The
court has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its
11
2005 11 SCC 403
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discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit by or
against the person on whom the interest has devolved by
assignment or devolution. The question about the existence
and validity of the assignment or devolution can be
considered at the final hearing of the proceedings. The court
has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its
discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit”. Further,
in the case of V.Narayana Reddy Vs. Ani Narayanam and
Another 12 in paragraph No.16 it was observed as under:
“16. In Kesari Goutham Reddy v. Velpula John
Victor Macaulay, 2007 (5) ALD 656 the question
that arose for consideration before this Court
was whether a purchaser pendente lite the
proceedings can come on record to safeguard his
interests in the pending litigation, and whether it
would not be just and proper to dismiss such an
application. This Court followed the judgments
of the apex Court in Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal,
(2004) 2 SCC 601 and Amit Kumar Shaw v.
Farida Khatoon, (AIR 2005 SC 2209) and held
that a person sought to be impleaded is a proper
and necessary party to the proceedings because
12
2009 4 ALD 13
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CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023
his interests are going to be affected it he was
not added as party to the proceedings.”
10. Having regard to the rival submissions made and on
going through the material placed on record, it is noted that
admittedly, the respondents are subsequent purchasers of
the suit schedule property. The trial Court while considering
the judgments passed in the cases of V.N. Krishna Murthy
(supra 6) and Raj Kumar (supra 7) allowed the orders under
challenge, specifically observing that leave to appeal should
be granted to the respondents herein, them being the lis
pendent transferees, having been bound by the decree
passed and that they have got equally right to question the
validity of the order, and are entitled to seek leave to prefer
the appeal against the order.
11. In the context of civil proceedings, the issue of
impleading a purchaser pendente lite often arises, to which
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principle that
under Order XXII Rule 10 of CPC, the Court need only be
prima facie satisfied to grant leave for continuing the suit,
without conducting a detailed inquiry into the assignment or
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devolution of interest. The said principle was reaffirmed in
the case of Amit Kumar Shaw (supra 11) whereunder, it
was held that the validity and existence of such assignment
or devolution can be examined at the final hearing, and that
the said approach ensures that the proceedings are not
unduly delayed or complicated by unnecessary inquiries at
the interlocutory stage. Furthermore, in the case of
V.Narayana Reddy (supra 12) the Hon’ble Supreme Court
relied on the judgment rendered in Kesari Goutham Reddy
v. Velpula John Victor Macaulay 13, in Raj Kumar
(supra 7) and Amit Kumar Shaw (supra 11) to hold that a
purchaser pendente lite can be impleaded as a necessary
party to safeguard their interests. In essence, it was
recognized that a purchaser pendente lite has a legitimate
stake in the outcome of the proceedings and should be
permitted to participate in the suit to protect their rights
and the said approach promotes justice and ensures that all
parties with a legitimate interest in the dispute, are heard.
12. Reverting to the facts of the case on hand, it is
imperative to note that the respondents are subsequent
13
2007 5 ALD 656
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purchasers of the suit schedule property from plaintiffs and
having regard to the legal position as discussed above, it is
needless to mention that any order passed against the
plaintiffs, shall have binding on the respondents herein as
well. In other words, it is a matter of their right to seek
proper adjudication. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion
that there are absolutely no illegalities or irregularities
committed by the trial Court in impleading the respondents
herein as party to the suit and in granting leave to them to
prefer appeal against the injunction order, warranting
interference of this Court. There are no merits in these
revision petitions and the same are liable to be dismissed.
13. Accordingly, these Civil Revision Petitions are
dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall also
stand closed.
_______________
K. SUJANA, J
Date: 23.01.2025
PT