Supreme Court – Daily Orders
Pyla Demudamma vs Cheepurupalli Chandramma And Ors on 24 July, 2025
Bench: Sanjay Karol, Prashant Kumar Mishra
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6667 OF 2013
PYLA DEMUDAMMA … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
CHEEPURUPALLI CHANDRAMMA (D)
THROUGH LRS. & ORS. ... RESPONDENT(S)
ORDER
1. Appellant lays challenge to the judgment and order dated 20.08.2010
passed by the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Appeal
Suit No.322 of 2003 titled “Pyla Demudamma v. Cheepurupalli Moogulu (died)
per Lrs. & Ors.” whereby the High Court has affirmed the findings returned by
the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Anakapalle in Original Suit No.64 of 1998.
2. For the sake of convenience, the apellant-herein shall be referred to as the
plaintiff and the respondent-herein shall be referred to as the defendant.
3. The plaintiff, admittedly being the daughter of the defendant, instituted
the present suit seeking a declaration of title and possession in respect of the ‘A’
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RAJNI MUKHI
Date: 2025.08.12
and ‘C’ schedule properties and a permanent injunction in respect of the ‘B’
18:17:20 IST
Reason:
schedule properties. Her claim is premised upon a legal notice dated 26.09.1998
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(Ex.A1/Ex.B15) and the defendant’s reply dated 08.10.1998 (Ex.B17). Theplaintiff asserted that her mother, Chinna, was the sole daughter and legal heir
of one Pyla Chinna Musalayya @ Krishnamma (hereinafter referred to as
‘Musalayya’), who died intestate, and that Musalayya’s estate devolved
exclusively upon her mother. It was further alleged that the plaintiff’s mother,
during her lifetime, executed a Will dated 06.10.1963 (Ex.A5) bequeathing all
the properties inherited from Musalayya to the plaintiff.
4. The defendant, in his written statement, admitted only the paternity of the
plaintiff while denying all other averments. Though it was admitted that the suit
properties originally belonged to Musalayya, however, it was contended that
Musalayya and his wife had no children and had fostered the defendant, who
was their nephew (sister’s son). It was further contended that the defendant had
succeeded to the suit properties after the death of Musalayya and was in
possession and enjoyment thereof. He further alleged that the Will dated
06.10.1963 (Ex.A5) was forged and fabricated, asserting that the plaintiff’s
mother had died prior to 1963 and as such, the question of her executing a Will
does not arise. The defendant also set up a plea of adverse possession, asserting
long-standing, continuous, and exclusive enjoyment of the suit properties. The
plaintiff’s contention that the defendant held the ‘C’ schedule properties as a
licensee was also categorically denied.
5. Based on the aforesaid pleadings, the Trial Court framed following issues
for adjudication:
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“1. Whether the Will dated 6.10.1963 alleged to be
executed by the mother of the plaintiff is true, valid and
binding on the defendant and if so, whether the plaintiff is
entitled for declaration of title over the plaint ‘A’ schedule
property?
2. Whether the plaintiff got title to and possession over
plaint ‘B’ schedule property?
3. Whether the defendant is in possession of plaint ‘C’
schedule property as licensee and if so, whether the plaintiff
is entitled to recover possession of ‘C’ schedule property?
4. to what relief?”
6. Upon full trial, the Trial Court dismissed the plaintiff’s suit holding that
she is not entitled for declaration of possession or for the consequential relief of
injunction. On issue No.1, the Court rejected the Will propounded by the
plaintiff on the ground that it contains suspicious circumstances and found it to
be not genuine or valid. The Trial Court also held that the plaintiff had failed to
prove that her mother is a natural daughter of the deceased Musalayya. On issue
No.2, it was held that the plaintiff had failed to adduce any evidence to establish
possession over the ‘B’ schedule properties. On issue No.3, the Court found that
there was no evidence to prove that the defendant was in possession of the ‘C’
schedule property as a licensee subject to a condition of redelivering the same
upon demand.
7. Aggrieved by this, the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the High Court,
wherein the plaintiff primarily relied upon the defendant’s reply notice dated
08.10.1998 (Ex.B17), contending that the same contained an admission
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regarding the relationship between the plaintiff, her mother Chinna, and
Musalayya, viz., plaintiff is the granddaughter of Musalayya and her mother
‘Chinna’ was the only daughter of Musalayya. The relevant portion of the
plaintiff’s notice and the defendant’s reply are as follows:
“Ex.A1:
“You are the father, “Chinna” is the mother Pyla
Chinna Musalayya is the maternal grandfather of my client.
The said Chinna Musalayya died Intestate 30 years back,
after his death, is only daughter “Chinna” because absolute
owner of all his properties, under the Hindu Succession Act.
Subsequent to the death of “Chinna” my client, Chinna’s
daughter, because. The absolute owner of the schedule
properties under the Hindu Succession Act as well as will
executed by Smt. Chinna.”
Ex.B17:
“Except the relationship, rest of the allegations in
your notice are not true. They all not binding on my client.
The allegations that are not denied In this notice cannot be
treated as accepted from my client.
My client’s father-In-law Pyla Chlnna
Musalayya during his life time settled all his properties in
favour of my client. Subsequent to· the death of Chinna
Musalayya my client is In absolute possession and has been
enjoying the same. Neither your client nor anybody else has
any right to question my client regarding the above said
properties.”
8. The High Court framed the following points for consideration:
“1. Whether the learned counsel for the appellant is justified
in seeking a decree based on admissions of the defendant in
Ex.B17, in terms of Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908?
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2. If for any reason the said question is held against the
appellant, whether the judgment of the Court below is
sustainable?”While answering the above, the High Court held that – (a) no decree under
Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 1, could be granted on the
basis of the alleged admission in Ex.B17, as the plea had neither been raised
before the Trial Court nor was such a foundation laid in the suit. The suit was
tried as a regular civil suit, with both parties leading evidence and marking
documents; and (b) On merits it was found that Chinna, the plaintiff’s mother,
predeceased Musalayya and hence could not have executed the Will dated
06.10.1963 (Ex.A5). Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the appeal, finding
no infirmity in the judgment of the Trial Court which had dealt with all issues
on merits.
9. It is in this background that the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal
before us. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material on record, the sole issue that arises for our consideration is whether the
concurrent findings returned by the Courts below are sustainable.
10. The law relating to judgment based on admissions, under Order XII Rule
6 CPC is well settled. This provision enables the Court to pass a judgment at
any stage of the suit based on admissions of facts made by any party, either in
the pleadings or otherwise. Such judgment may be rendered on the basis of an
application filed by a party or even on the Court’s own motion, without waiting
1 ‘CPC’ for short.
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for the determination of any other issue between the parties. We may refer to a
few judicial pronouncements of this Court in this regard:
10.1 In Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India 2, this Court
had dealt with admissions in pleadings or otherwise and held as follows:
“12. As to the object of Order 12 Rule 6, we need not say
anything more than what the legislature itself has said when
the said provision came to be amended. In the Objects and
Reasons set out while amending the said Rule, it is stated
that “where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to
enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on
admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party
to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the
relief to which according to the admission of the defendant,
the plaintiff is entitled”. We should not unduly narrow down
the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to
obtain speedy judgment. Where the other party has made a
plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should
apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts
in the face of which it is impossible for the party making
such admission to succeed.”10.2 In Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd.3 it was observed as under:
“11. It is true that a judgment can be given on an
“admission” contained in the minutes of a meeting. But the
admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious
and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an
intention to be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an
enabling provision, it is neither mandatory nor peremptory
but discretionary. The court, on examination of the facts and
circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion,
keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment
2 (2000) 7 SCC 120
3 (2011) 15 SCC 273
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without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the
defendant, by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore unless
the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, the
discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the
valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. In short
the discretion should be used only when there is a clear
“admission” which can be acted upon.”
[See Also: Bhim Rao Baswanth Rao Patil v. Madan Mohan Rao 4
and Vikrant Kapila v. Pankaja Panda5]
10.3 A three-Judge Bench of this Court in S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar
Bajaj6, while holding that the power under Order XII Rule 6 is a discretionary
one which should be exercised with caution, observed as under:
“8. The words in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC “may” and “make
such order …” show that the power under Order 12 Rule 6
CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of
right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of right and
rather is a matter of discretion of the court. Where the
defendants have raised objections which go to the root of
the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the
discretion under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The said rule is an
enabling provision which confers discretion on the court in
delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent
of the claim admitted by one of the parties of his opponent’s
claim.”10.4 Recently, a coordinate Bench of this Court in Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya
Naryan Jaiswal7, laid down the following principles relating to Order XII Rule
6:
4 (2023) 18 SCC 231
5 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1298
6 (2015) 9 SCC 287
7 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7517
“26. The primary object underlying Rule 6 is to enable a
party to obtain speedy judgment at least to the extent of
admission. Where a plaintiff claims a particular relief or
reliefs against a defendant and the defendant makes a plain
admission, the former is entitled to the relief or reliefs
admitted by the latter.
x x x
28. The provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary and
permissive. They are not mandatory, obligatory or
peremptory. This is also clear from the use of the word
“may” in the rule.
29. The powers conferred on the court by this rule are
untrammeled and cannot be crystallized into any rigid rule
of universal application. They can be exercised keeping in
view and having regard to the facts and varying
circumstances of each case.
30. If the court is of the opinion that it is not safe to pass a
judgment on admissions, or that a case involves questions
which cannot be appropriately dealt with and decided on the
basis of admission, it may, in exercise of its discretion,
refuse to pass a judgment and may insist upon clear proof of
even admitted facts.
31. To make order or to pronounce judgment on admission
is at the discretion of the court. First, the word “may” is
used in Rule 6 and not the word “shall” which prima facie
shows that the provision is an enabling one. Rule 6 of Order
12 must be read with Rule 5 of Order 8 which is identical to
the Proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act. Reading all
the relevant provisions together, it is manifest that the court
is not bound to grant relief to the plaintiff only on the basis
of admission of the defendant.”
11. Applying the above proposition of law, we are of the considered view that
the High Court was justified in holding that a judgment could not have been
passed based on the alleged admissions made by the defendant in Ex.B17. To
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constitute a valid admission in pleading, the said admission should be
unequivocal, unconditional, and unambiguous, and it must be made with the
intention to be bound by it. In the present case, however, it is to be noted that
the plaintiff never sought a decree on the basis of Ex.B17 before the Trial Court.
More importantly, the plaintiff in her own plaint described the contents of
Ex.B17 as false and untenable. Therefore, in such circumstances, reliance upon
the same document to invoke Order XII Rule 6 CPC would be wholly
misplaced.
12. Further more, having considered the material in its entirety, we now also
proceed to examine the correctness of the findings of fact returned by the High
Court, being the First Appellate Court. Before us, it is not in dispute that the
plaintiff’s mother, undisputably and unrefutably, predeceased Musulayya and
his wife, a fact which is recorded in Ex.B1, being the death extract which
records her date of death as 12.05.1953. If that is so, then obviously there is no
question of plaintiff’s mother having executed the Will dated 06.10.1963
(Ex.A5). The schedule properties admittedly belonged to Musulayya, and as
such, there was no question of the plaintiff succeeding to the same through her
mother. It is also the matter of record that the plaintiff’s mother was not the only
daughter of Musulayya. Therefore, even on facts, we do not find any sufficient
reason to interfere with the findings returned by the Courts below. No question
of law, other that the one discussed supra, arises for consideration.
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13. In view of the above, the present civil appeal is dismissed. Pending
application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
……………………………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
…………………………………….J.
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 24, 2025 10 ITEM NO.107 COURT NO.13 SECTION XII-A S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No. 6667/2013 PYLA DEMUDAMMA Appellant(s) VERSUS CHEEPURUPALLI CHANDRAMMA (D) THROUGH LRS AND ORS. Respondent(s)
Date : 24-07-2025 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KAROL
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRAFor Appellant(s) : Mr. K. Shivraj Choudhuri, AOR
Mr. G.V.R Choudary, Adv.
Mr. Sanjay Jha, Adv.
Ms. Kirti Goyel, Adv.
Mr. K. Shivraj Choudhuri, Adv.
For Respondent(s) :Mr. VVS Rao, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Ch. Leela Sarveswar, Adv.
Mr. Saurabh Gupta, Adv.
Mr. Sridhar Kakani, Adv.
Mr. Nandi Kiran Kumar, Adv.
Mr. M. A. Chinnasamy, AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. The appeal is dismissed in terms of signed order.
2. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(RAJNI MUKHI) (ANU BHALLA)
ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)
(Signed order is placed on the file)
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