Rabi Murmu vs The State Of West Bengal on 29 August, 2025

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Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Rabi Murmu vs The State Of West Bengal on 29 August, 2025

Author: Rajarshi Bharadwaj

Bench: Rajarshi Bharadwaj

                                                                           2025:CHC-AS:1678-DB


                 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                            APPELLATE SIDE


                           CRA 453 of 2013
                             Rabi Murmu
                                  Vs.
                       The State of West Bengal.


Before: The Hon'ble Justice Rajarshi Bharadwaj
                      &
        The Hon'ble Justice Apurba Sinha Ray

For the Appellant            : Mr. Moinak Bakshi, Adv.
                               Ms. Niketa Bhattacharjee, Adv.


For the State                : Mr. Madhu Sudan Sur, Adv.
                               Mr. Manoranjan Mahata, Adv.

CAV On                       : 14.07.2025

Judgment On                  : 29.08.2025


Apurba Sinha Ray, J.:-


1.

The judgment of conviction and order dated 15.05.2013 and

16.05.2013 passed by the Learned Sessions Judge, Purulia in Sessions Trial

No. 33 of 2012, Sessions Case No. 237 of 2012 was under challenge in this

appeal on the grounds, inter alia that the order of conviction of the appellant

under Section 302/201 of the Indian Penal Code sentencing the appellant to

suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default to
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suffer further rigorous imprisonment for six months etc. was passed without

considering the materials on record.

2. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that

the impugned judgment is not sustainable in law since no confessional

statement of the convict under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was recorded

by the investigation officer and further the places of recovery of weapons

were not proved since there was no eye witness who saw the appellant to kill

his parents. The seizure lists were not proved in accordance with law.

Further the record shows that the police personnel accompanied the

appellant to the places of occurrence. There was no FSL Report in respect of

the seized weapons and other articles. The learned counsel has further

pointed out that prosecution could not establish any motive behind the

murder. The Doctor being PW12 has submitted that the murder of the father

of the appellant could not be done by weapons like “kait’. The offending

weapons were neither shown to the said Doctor during post mortem nor

during trial. Moreover, the offending weapons were not produced at the time

of trial. The FSL Report was not available and as a result the human blood

stains on the weapons as well as on other objects were not proved.

3. The learned counsel has further submitted that Section 27 of the

Evidence Act is not attracted in this case because the confessional

statement was not recorded and as such no facts were discovered under

Section 27 of the said Act that would connect the chains of circumstances

leading to the crime. It is also unclear as to when the convict made such an
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unrecorded confession. The evidence shows that the convict was under

illegal detention, in as much as the arrest memo shows the time of the

arrest was at 5:00 P.M. whereas the alleged unrecorded confessional

statement leading to the discovery was in the morning. Moreover the

sequence narrated by the witnesses shows that the recovery of articles

preceded the confession which is contrary to the legal mandate of Section 27

of the Evidence Act. The recovery was not carried forward to prove the

involvement of the convict in the crime owing to absence of FSL report and

witnesses not proving the seizures. The chain of circumstances remained

unlinked and could not prove the prosecution case. Extra judicial confession

if any, was not made voluntarily and was not recorded. The unrecorded

confession preceded arrest. Weapons were never produced during trial and

no FSL report arrived. The weapons were not shown to the autopsy surgeon

during autopsy or trial to elicit his opinion.

4. The learned counsel has submitted that the chain of circumstances

remains incomplete and as such the prosecution case was not proved

beyond doubt. In support of his contention he has referred following judicial

decisions.

[2023] 5 S.C.R. 601 State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Phool Chand

Rathore

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1425 Randeep Singh @ Rana & Anr. Vs. State of

Haryana & Ors.

[2025] 2 S.C.R. 388 Ramu Appa Mahapatar vs. The State of

Maharashtra
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5. The learned counsel has also pointed out that as per deposition of the

defacto-complainant that FIR was lodged on 16.05.2012 but the scribe

deposed that he arrived at the place of occurrence at around 10:00 A.M.

There are several material and glaring contradictions in the FIR as to the

place and time of occurrence. Though the FIR indicated the convict’s

presence at the place of occurrence, his subsequent alleged extra judicial

confession of crime to the defacto-complainant has further diluted the

prosecution case since the evidence of the other witnesses show that the

appellant allegedly reported the crime at the police station in the morning

and came to the place of occurrence accompanied by the police. According

to the learned counsel, the appellant was arrested at 5:00 P.M. on the date

of lodging the FIR and further he has been arrested from his in-laws house

and, therefore, such materials on record show that the appellant was not

present at the place of occurrence when the incident took place.

6. The learned counsel for the State has submitted that the prosecution

has examined as many as 14 witnesses in support of the prosecution case

and as per the appellant’s information, which was recorded in GDE No. 571

and marked as Exhibit No. 11, the offending weapons were recovered from

the places of occurrence. All the local witnesses supported the prosecution

case. The appellant not only helped the police to recover the offending

weapons but also identified the dead bodies of his parents. It is the

appellant who informed the police about the commission of offence and

police accompanied him to the place of occurrence on the basis of such

information. This was the appellant who opened the door of his room and
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showed the dead body of his mother and he also brought out the axe from

the room. He made extra judicial confessions before the local people and

also the police officer and such facts were corroborated by the said

witnesses during their examination-in-chief. It is also found from the

materials on record that the appellant led the police officer and others to a

jungle which was 3 km away from his home and identified the dead body of

his father and further he brought out a ‘kait’ from the said jungle. His blood

stained tee-shirt was also handed over to the concerned police officer by the

appellant. The medical evidence has also supported the prosecution case. In

fact there is no denial about the findings of the post mortem doctor during

his cross-examination. According to learned State counsel, the chains of all

the events have been inter-linked and there is no breaking up of any single

chain facilitating the defence case to succeed. The minor discrepancies have

been rightly ignored by the Learned Trial Court. Accordingly, the learned

counsel has submitted that the relevant judgment and order has been

correctly passed.

7. We have considered the rival contentions of the parties. It appears to

us that the instant case is based purely on circumstantial evidence, and

further the prosecution has relied upon some extra judicial confession to

establish the guilt of the appellant. Needless to mention, the extra judicial

confession is considered as a weak piece of evidence. However, that does not

mean that conviction cannot be based on such extra judicial confession.
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8. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon several judicial

decisions; such as (2024) 14 SCR 1425 Randeep Singh @ Rana & Anr. Vs.

State of Haryana & Ors., (2025) 2 SCR 388 Ramu Appa Mahapatar Vs.

the State of Maharashtra, (2023) 5 SCR 601 State of Madhya Pradesh

Vs. Phoolchand Rathore in support of his contention.

9. In Ramu Appa Mahapatar (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt

with the cases when extra judicial confession cannot be relied upon. In the

said decision the Hon’ble Court has considered the observations of the

Hon’ble Apex Court, made in State of Rajasthan Vs. Raja Ram reported in

(2003) 8 SCC 180 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with the theory

of extra judicial confession. Paragraph 17 is quoted herein below:-

“17. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Raja Ram, this

Court explained the concept of extra-judicial

confession. Confession may be divided into two

classes i.e. judicial and extra-judicial. Judicial

confessions are those which are made before a

magistrate or a court in the course of judicial

proceedings. Extra-judicial confessions are those

which are made by the party elsewhere than

before a magistrate or a court. Extra-judicial

confessions are generally those that are made

by a party before a private individual who may
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be a judicial officer also in his private capacity.

As to extra-judicial confessions, two questions

arise: firstly, whether they are made voluntarily

and secondly, are they true? If the court is of the

opinion that the confession was not made

voluntarily but was a result of an inducement,

threat or promise, it would not be acted upon. It

follows that a confession would be voluntary if it

is made by the accused in a fit state of mind

and if it is not caused by any inducement, threat

or promise having reference to the charge

against him proceeding from a person in

authority. Whether or not the confession was

voluntary would depend upon the facts and

circumstances of each case judged in the light of

Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

(briefly „the Evidence Act‘ hereinafter). The law is

clear that a confession cannot be used against

an accused person unless the court is satisfied

that it was voluntary. At that stage, the question

whether it is true or false does not arise. If the

facts and circumstances surrounding the making

of a confession appear to cast a doubt on the

veracity and voluntariness of the confession, the
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court may refuse to act upon the confession even

if it is admissible in evidence. The question

whether a confession is voluntary or not is

always a question of fact. A free and voluntary

confession is deserving of the highest credit

because it is presumed to flow from the highest

sense of guilt.

17.1. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary

and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be

relied upon by the court. The confession will

have to be proved like any other fact. The value

of the evidence as to confession like any other

evidence depends upon the reliability of the

witness to whom it is made and who gives the

evidence. Extra-judicial confession can be relied

upon and conviction can be based thereon if the

evidence about the confession comes from a

witness who appears to be unbiased, not even

remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect

of whom nothing is brought out which may tend

to indicate that he may have a motive of

attributing an untruthful statement to the

accused. The words spoken by the witness
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should be clear, unambiguous and unmistakenly

convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the

crime and that nothing is omitted by the witness

which may militate against it. After subjecting

the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on

the touchstone of credibility, the extra-judicial

confession can be accepted and can be the basis

of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility.

17.2. If the evidence relating to extra-judicial

confession is found credible after being tested on

the touchstone of credibility and acceptability, it

can solely form the basis of conviction. The

requirement of corroboration is a matter of

prudence and not an invariable rule of law.”

10. In the above decision the Hon’ble Apex Court has also referred to

another case, that is Sansar Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in

(2010) 10 SCC 604, wherein the court accepted the admissibility of extra

judicial confession and held that there is no absolute rule that an extra

judicial confession can never be the basis of a conviction although ordinarily

an extra judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material.

It is also held in the case of Ramu Appa Mahapatar (supra) that in a case of

circumstantial evidence the onus lies upon the prosecution to prove the

complete chain of events which shall undoubtedly point towards the guilt of
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the accused. That apart in a case of circumstantial evidence while the

prosecution relies upon an extra judicial confession, the court has to

examine the same with a greater degree of care and caution. An extra

judicial confession if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind can

be relied upon by the court. The value of evidence as to extra judicial

confession like any other evidence depends upon the veracity of the witness

to whom it has been made.

11. In paragraph 19.2 the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above case of Ramu

Appa Mahapatar (supra) has referred to the decision of Sahadevan Vs.

State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2012) 6 SCC 403 to point out the

principles and which would make an extra judicial confession an admissible

piece of evidence which can formulate the basis of conviction of an accused.

The said principles are quoted herein below:-

“i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak
evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the
court with greater care and caution.

(ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be
truthful.

(iii) It should inspire confidence.

(iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater
credibility and evidentiary value if it is
supported by a chain of cogent circumstances
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and is further corroborated by other prosecution
evidence.

(v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the
basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any
material discrepancies and inherent
improbabilities.

(vi) Such a statement essentially has to be
proved like any other fact and in accordance
with law.”

12. In Randeep Singh @ Rana & Anr. (supra) the observations of the

Apex Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra

reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 have been quoted to point out the five

principles of circumstantial evidence.

“153. A close analysis of this decision would
show that the following conditions must be
fulfilled before a case against an accused can be
said to be fully established:

(1) The circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established. It may be noted here that this Court
indicated that the circumstances concerning
“must or should” and not “may be” established.

There is not only a grammatical but a legal
distinction between “may be proved” and “must
be or should be proved” as was held by this
Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of
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Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793: 1973 SCC (Cri)
1033: 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations
were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p.

1047] “Certainly, it is a primary principle that
the accused must be and not merely may be
guilty before a court can convict and the mental
distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long
and divides vague conjectures from sure
conclusions.”

(2) the facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused, that is to say, they should not be
explainable on any other hypothesis except that
the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete
as not to leave any reasonable ground for the
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the
accused.” (emphasis added)

13. In the said decision of Randeep Singh @ Rana & Anr. (supra) it has

also been held that even a confessional statement before the police which

distinctly relates to the discovery of a fact may be proved under Section 27.
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By quoting K. Chinaswamy Reddy Vs. State of A.P. reported in (1963) 3

SCR 412, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Randeep Singh @ Rana & Anr. (supra)

has explained section 27 of Indian Evidence Act, 1972 in the following

manner:-

“….Thus even a confessional statement before
the police which distinctly relates to the
discovery of a fact may be proved under Section

27. The Judicial Committee had in that case to
consider how much of the information given by
the accused to the police would be admissible
under Section 27 and laid stress on the words
“so much of such information…as relates
distinctly to the fact thereby discovered” in that
connection. It held that the extent of the
information admissible must depend on the
exact nature of the fact discovered to which such
information is required to relate. It was further
pointed out that “the fact discovered embraces
the place from which the object is produced and
the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the
information given must relate distinctly to this
fact”. It was further observed that-

“Information as to past users, or the past history
of the object produced is not related to its
discovery in the setting in which it is
discovered.”

This was exemplified further by the Judicial
Committee by observing-

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“Information supplied by a person in custody
that ‘I will produce a knife concealed in the roof
of my house’ leads to the discovery of the fact
that a knife is concealed in the house of the
informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is
proved to have been used in the commission of
the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant.
If however to the statement the words be added
‘with which I stabbed A’, these words are
inadmissible since they do not relate to the
discovery of the knife in the house of the
informant.”

14. By quoting the observation in Subhas Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan

reported in 2002 1 SCC 702, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Randeep Singh @

Rana & Anr. (supra) has reminded us that:-

” …..Though the offence is gruesome and revolts

the human conscience but an accused can be

convicted only on legal evidence and if only a

chain of circumstantial evidence has been so

forged as to rule out the possibility of any other

reasonable hypothesis excepting the guilt of the

accused. In Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit case

[(1981) 2 SCC 35: 1981 SCC (Cri) 315: AIR 1981

SC 765] this Court cautioned -“human nature is

too willing, when faced with brutal crimes, to

spin stories out of strong suspicions” (SCC p. 44,

para 33). This Court has held time and again
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that between may be true and must be true

there is a long distance to travel which must be

covered by clear, cogent and unimpeachable

evidence by the prosecution before an accused is

condemned as a convict.”

15. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Phoolchand Rathore (Supra) the

Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to mention in page 621 that the

circumstances of extra judicial confession are also required to be proved

beyond doubt.

16. In our case, it has been time and again contended from the part of the

appellant that there is no recovery statement of the appellant under Section

27 of the Indian Evidence Act nor there is any material to show that the

appellant had committed the alleged gruesome offences. It is also alleged

that there was no direct evidence to implicate the present appellant and the

prosecution has heavily relied upon the statements of the witnesses who

were not at all eye witnesses to the alleged incident of murder.

17. Needless to mention, some offences are committed intentionally by the

offender beyond the glare of any witness. The law does not encourage the

real culprit to escape due to non-availability of such eye witnesses; rather

the law has formulated the theory of circumstantial evidence to nab the

actual culprit and to release the innocent people who are not the real

culprits from the clutches of law. In this type of cases where there is no eye
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witness, the law of the land prescribes that if the chains of

circumstances/events are so complete and are so entangled in a manner

pointing to the guilt of the accused only and there cannot be any other

opinion apart from the complicity of the accused in commission of the

offence, in that case the offender or the accused can be convicted only on

the basis of such piece of reliable circumstantial evidence.

18. In this case nobody saw the appellant to commit the murder of his

parents. But the depositions of the witnesses from the locality divulge that

the appellant had confessed before them that he murdered his parents with

some weapons and he has also brought out those weapons from the hide

out. They have also narrated that it was the appellant who opened the door

and led the police personnel and others to the place of murder of his

mother, and thereafter to the second place of occurrence where his father’s

dead body was found. The witnesses have also deposed that the appellant

brought out the offending weapons and seizure lists were prepared by the

concerned police officer.

19. Now the question is whether the series of extra judicial confessions of

the appellant as revealed have been proved beyond the shadow of

reasonable doubt or not.

20. Let us see the materials brought on record by the prosecution to prove

the extra judicial confession beyond shadow of doubt.
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21. The instant case was started with extra judicial confession. On

16.05.2012 the appellant allegedly went to the Bandwan PS and lodged one

GD stating that he killed his mother Nilmoni Murmu with an axe by cutting

her throat and also killed his father by cutting his throat with a small knife

by the side of the road approximately 3 KM away from Burijhor to

Mrigichami behind a bush. He also stated before the concerned police that

he has kept the offending weapons, tee-shirt in his secret hideout. He

wished that police would recover the dead bodies of his parents, the

offending weapons and tee-shirt. He also stated before the police that he

believed that the bad souls in his parents’ bodies were responsible for illness

and death of his wife and for that reason he killed his parents. The said GD

extract has been marked as exhibit – 11.

22. Thereafter, to verify such statements or information, as the case may

be, the Officer-in-charge of Bandwan Police Sation Dipankar Sarkar along

with force went to the places of occurrence accompanied by Rabi Murmu.

The P.W. 1 Amin Tudu being a local villager in his deposition has indicated

that the appellant had also made extra judicial confession before them

admitting that he murdered his parents. The relevant portion of his

deposition is being quoted herein below:-

“In the morning I found that cows and buffaloes
which were tying in ropes in the house of
Sukram were crying. On hearing the same, I
reached there. After some time police came
there. Rabi was there with police. After getting
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down from the Police Van Rabi opened Shickle of
the door from outside. Rabi accompanied by
police entered inside the room and we also
followed them. On entering the room we found
that the mother of Rabi i.e. Nilmani was lying
down on the room having serious cut injury on
her throat. On seeing it we came outside. I
noticed Rabi to come out with an axe. Rabi told
that by that weapon he committed murder of his
mother. Police seized that axe on the strength of
seizure list in which I put my signature on it in
Bengali. It is my signature there on (The
signature of witness in the seizure list dated 16-
05-12 be marked as Ext. 1/1 on proof).

Police examined the dead body of mother. It is
my signature in the copy of the inquest report
(The signature of witness Amin Tudu appears in
the inquest report in respect of victim Nilmani
Murmu be marked as Ext.2/1 on proof).

Rabi also disclosed that he also committed
murder of his father. Then Rabi, police and
ourselves visited in Birjhore Mouja and found
that Sukram i.e. father of Rabi was lying dead.
Rabi identified his father. Police examined the
dead body and prepared a document.”

23. The P.W. 5 Sri Ajit Murmu has also indicated that the appellant had

made extra judicial confession before him. The relevant portion of his

deposition is quoted herein below:-

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“On the 2nd Day of Jaistha of this Bengali year,
the incident had taken place. On the relevant
date while we were going outside for nature’s
call, I noticed that 2/3 police vans came to our
village with the accused. Robi came down from
the police vehicle. Police also came down from
the vehicle. Thereafter being led by Robi they
entered inside the house of Robi, We also
followed the police personnel and entered inside
the room. On reaching there we found that the
mother of the accused was lying on the floor of
the room having cut marks on the throat. Robi
brought out one Axe and handed over the same
to the police. Robi told that by that Axe he killed
his mother.

Robi also disclosed that he had committed
murder to his father in a jungle.

Police inspected the dead body of the deceased
and prepared a report. Police also seized the
said Axe. This is the carbon copy of the Inquest
Report which bears my signature. I was present
at the time of conducting the inquest over the
dead body of Nilmoni Mumu. (The signature of
the witness in the “Inquest” report of Nilmoni
Murmu is marked as Exhibit2/2).

This is the seizure list prepared by the police in
my presence. It bears my signature. (The
signature of the witness in the seizure list dated
16.05.12 be marked as Ext. 1/2).

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This is another seizure list on the strength of
which the police seized the blood-stained Axe
etc. It is my signature thereon. After recovery of
the Axe I followed the police personnel and Robi
to the jungle and in the jungle Robi identified the
dead body of his father Sukram Murmu. He also
brought out one Kait blood stained genji etc.
which were seized by the police on the strength
of the seizure list.”

24. The P.W. 6 Some Murmu is as follows:-

“I have been living at Burijhore village under
Bandwan P.S. One day in the month of Jaistha
of this Bengali year, the incident had happened.
In one day on seeing the police van I came. I
found Robi Mumu coming down from the police
van. Then Robi being accompanied by police
entered inside his room. We followed them.
There I found the dead body of Nilmoni Murmu,
the mother of the accused. Robi brought out one
Axe and has stated that by it he killed his
mother.

I did not visit the jungle.”

25. The P.W. 7 Baburam Murmu has also deposed that the appellant

confessed before them that he killed his parents. The relevant deposition is

quoted herein below:-

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“On the 2nd day of Jaistha of this Bengali year,
in the morning at about 7/8 a.m. while myself
along with others was sitting in a village path-
way (Kuli). At that time, I noticed 2/3 Police
vans accompanied by a person and Police
personnel came to our village. Rabi came down
from the Police-van and entered the room. We
followed Rabi and the Police personnel. On
reaching inside the house, we found the dead-
body of mother of Rabi. Rabi told that he
lynched his mother by an axe. Rabi also
confessed that he killed his father.

I was interrogated by the police.”

26. The P.W. 8 Baren Tudu, PW 9 Bangal Tudu and PW 10 Suklal Tudu

have deposed that Rabi Murmu confessed before them that he killed his

mother by an axe and he also killed his father. Now the question is whether

the extra judicial confession made before the police station and the extra

judicial confession made before the above local witnesses can be accepted as

confession in holding that the accused had committed his parents.

27. Needless to mention, any confession before the police authority is not

acceptable and it is an inadmissible piece of evidence. As the GD allegedly

contained some extra judicial confessions, the same cannot be accepted in

view of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the information

given by the appellant that he intended that police should recover dead

bodies of his parents and also the offending weapons including his wearing
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apparels is significant in view of the fact that Section 27 of Indian Evidence

Act has been regarded as an exception to Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian

Evidence Act. In other words, by virtue of Section 27 the statement of the

accused by which recovery of offending weapons was done appears to be an

admissible piece of evidence. However, all other confessions as made out in

the said GD cannot be treated as admissible evidence under the Indian

Evidence Act.

28. However, we have found that several witnesses such as PW. 1, PW5,

PW6, PW7, PW8, PW9 and PW10 have categorically deposed that the

appellant confessed before them that he committed the murder of his

parents by an axe and a kait. Now the question is whether such alleged

extra judicial confession of the appellant before those witnesses can be

accepted or not? It appears from the record that those witnesses withstood

the cross-examination and they stuck to their deposition on this point. In

other words the said witnesses remained unshaken during their cross-

examination.

29. In spite of such unshaken testimony of the above PWs, it appears that

when such alleged extra-judicial confession was made by the appellant

before the above witnesses, the police was very much present at the spot. It

is also deposed by the said witnesses that they saw Rabi Murmu come down

from a police vehicle and thereafter led the police to the place of the

occurrence. The fact that extra-judicial confessions made allegedly by Rabi

Murmu in presence of the police personnel at the spot was admitted by the
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said witnesses namely P.W. 1 Amin Tudu, P.W. 5 Sri Ajit Murmu, P.W. 6

Some Murmu, P.W. 7 Baburam Murmu, P.W. 8 Baren Tudu, P.W. 9 Bangal

Tudu and P.W. 10 Suklal Tudu.

30. Needless to mention, when confession of a crime by an accused is to

be relied upon, it is the duty of the court to see that such confession is made

voluntarily and without being influenced by police authority or any other

person. It is the usual practice of the Judicial Magistrates recording

confession of the accused under section 164 Cr.P.C. (183 of BNSS) to send

him to the correctional home with a direction to keep the accused in

segregation for reflection of his mind and also for alleviating any persisting

influence on his mind caused at the instance of police authority or any other

person and after being satisfied that the accused is free from influence etc.,

his confessional statement, if any is recorded in chamber of the Judicial

Magistrate. This usual practice is followed by the Judicial Magistrates to

make the confessional statement of the accused more believable and trust-

worthy, but in our case it is found that when the appellant had made such

alleged extra judicial confession before those local witnesses, he was with

the police personnel. In other words when such extra judicial confessions

were made the police were very much present at the spot. Therefore, it

cannot be said that such extra judicial confessions were made by the

appellant in the absence of the police authority. In other words, the vital

question whether or not such extra judicial confession was made by the

appellant free from influence, threat or intimidation cannot be ascertained

since immediately before making such confession he came down from the
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police van and further when he made such alleged confessions the police

was very much present in the vicinity. The basic ingredients for recording

such extra judicial confession were not followed in the course of the

proceedings. As the prosecution has failed to show that the appellant has

made voluntary extra judicial confession before the said witnesses in the

absence of the police personnel and also in the absence of their influence, it

is not prudent or reasonable to rely upon such extra judicial confessions

made by the appellant to the above witnesses in presence of the police

personnel. The Learned Trial Judge did not consider this vital issue properly

in delivering the impugned judgment.

31. In view of the above discussion we find that such extra judicial

confessions which were allegedly made by the appellant to the local

witnesses in presence of the police personnel are unreliable and cannot be a

part of legal evidence.

32. In the facts and circumstances, as discussed above, the investigating

officer could have produced the accused before the Judicial Magistrate for

recording his confessional statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. but that

was not done by the I.O. for the reasons best known to him. It is also found

that recovery of weapons was done on the basis of information given by the

appellant without recording any discovery statement of the appellant. It is

further found that the weapons were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory

for chemical examination but no reports of the Forensic Science Laboratory

were received to that effect that the weapons contained human blood. It is a
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fact that the offence was committed in a place which was infested with

Maoist personnel at the relevant point of time. There was a defence taken on

behalf of the appellant that he has been falsely implicated as the police had

failed to get any breakthrough in several cases involving Maoist and for

which the appellant has been made scapegoat. In view of such allegations it

is the duty of the court to see that appellant was not falsely implicated. In

this case, the deposition of a post mortem doctor (P.W.12) is very much

significant who opines that the death of Sukram Murmu, father of the

appellant, could not be caused by using a small knife (kait). This has also

created a serious doubt. Therefore, in this case, there are several lacunae

since neither the recovery statement was recorded nor the weapons, wearing

apparels were sent for FSL Report. Furthermore, the extra judicial

confession on which the prosecution has heavily relied upon was made by

the appellant in presence of the police personnel. In other words, the

prosecution is unable to show that chains of circumstances or the events

are complete which only point to the guilt of the accused.

33. Therefore, considering all materials on record, we are inclined to give

benefit of doubt to the appellant Rabi Murmu. In view of the above

discussion the appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order dated

15.05.2013 and 16.05.2013 passed by the Learned Sessions Judge, Purulia

in Sessions Trial No. 33 of 2012, Sessions Case No. 237 of 2012 of

conviction is set aside. The appellant Rabi Murmu is acquitted from the

charges of the case and be set at liberty at once. The accused be released
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from the custody if he is not wanted in any other case. The criminal appeal

being CRA 453 of 2013 is allowed on contest. No order as to costs. The trial

court record be sent to the concerned court immediately.

34. Accordingly, CRA 453 of 2013 is disposed of.

35. Urgent photostat certified copies of this Judgment, if applied for, be

supplied to the parties on compliance of all necessary formalities.

I Agree

(RAJARSHI BHARADWAJ, J.)

(APURBA SINHA RAY, J.)

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