Madhya Pradesh High Court
Radhesharan Shah vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 2 July, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
WRIT PETITION NO. 19458 of 2021
RADHESHARAN SHAH
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
.........................................................................................................
Appearance:
Shri Sanjay K Agrawal - Sr. Advocate with Ms. Guncha Rasool - Advocate
and Shri Jaideep Kaurav - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Agnivesh Dubey - Advocate for respondent No.3.
..........................................................................................................
ORDER
(Reserved on 26.06.2025)
(Pronounced on 02.07.2025)
The present petition has been filed challenging the order (Annexure
P-1) whereby petitioner who is working on the post of Gram Panchayat
Secretary has been terminated from service.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the services of
the petitioner are governed with statutory rules known as M.P. Panchayat
Service (Gram Panchayat Secretary Recruitment and Conditions of
Service) Rules, 2011 (for short ‘Rules of 2011’). It is argued that the
petitioner was working on the post of Panchayat Secretary and on
allegations of misconduct which were factual in nature, the services of the
petitioner have been terminated by order Annexure P-1. It is argued that the
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allegations against the petitioner being in the realm of facts and denied by
the petitioner, therefore it was not open for the respondents to have
proceeded to inflict major penalty of dismissal from service.
3. It is argued that as per the Rules of 2011 as amended by notification
dated 09.08.2017 the procedure for discipline and control has been laid
down and though as per Rule 7 there is no specific provision for conducting
regular departmental enquiry as Rule 7(2) lays down provision of giving 7
days show cause notice and obtaining reply, but once the charges are
factual in nature then conducting regular departmental enquiry is
mandatory as it would satisfy the fundamental objectives of principles of
natural justice.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the
allegation was that one Smt. Brahaspatiya wife of Lalman Shah had
expired in the village where petitioner was posted as Secretary of
Panchayat and application was made to get funeral assistance for the death
of said lady. The said lady had expired on 05.11.2019 but application was
submitted stating her death to be on 04.08.2020 which would entitle a
funeral assistance of Rs.2.00 lakhs. However, the said application had been
filed annexing a forged death certificate mentioning date of death to be
04.08.2020 whereas the said lady had not expired on that date but had
expired much earlier and as per that date her death would not have entitled
the family to receive funeral assistance of Rs.2.00 lakhs.
5. It is contended that show cause notice Annexures P-8 and P-10 were
issued to the petitioner which were replied vide Annexures P-9 and P-11. It
is contended that the petitioner denied the allegations despite which no
further enquiry was conducted and therefore, though the rules do not
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specifically mandate regular enquiry but imply so as per Rule 7 (5) (a) and
even otherwise, if an stigmatic order has been passed even after denial of
charges by the delinquent, then enquiry ought to have been carried out.
6. It was argued that the allegation that petitioner had forwarded the
application form for funeral assistance was denied by the petitioner despite
which without conducting any enquiry the petitioner has been punished
with penalty of dismissal.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently
opposed the petition by contending that the misconduct of the petitioner
was duly established from the material available on record. The petitioner
was given a show cause notice and his reply was taken wherein he admitted
to the allegations, therefore, that is sufficient for compliance of principles
of natural justice and therefore, no indulgence is required to be caused in
the matter.
8. It is further argued that the punishment of dismissal is not
commensurate with the misconduct because the petitioner was posted as
Secretary and he forwarded the application for funeral assistance which
was supported by forged documents and erroneous date of death. The
exchequer was put to loss by an ineligible person getting benefit of
assistance of Rs.2.00 Lakhs. It is immaterial that if the said beneficiary
later refunded the amount which will not wipe out the misconduct.
9. Heard.
10. The State Government has framed Rules of 2011 governing the
service conditions of Panchayat Secretary which were amended vide
notification dated 09.08.2017. As per said notification Rule 7 has been
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substituted containing following procedure for discipline and control. The
said rule reads as under:-
“7. Discipline and Control.-Disciplinary action against Gram
Panchayat Secretary shall be taken under the following
circumstances:-
(1) The Gram Panchayat Secretary shall be deemed to have been
automatically terminated from services if he has been convicted by
the court for any offence of moral turpitude.
(2) The Gram Panchayat Secretary, after giving seven days Show
Cause notice and after giving him opportunity of being heard, shall
be punished under the following conditions:-
(a) doing financial irregularity, embezzlement or causing
financial loss to the Panchayat Raj institution or government;
(b) he has been punished or any order has been passed against
him for recovery of any amount under the provisions of the
Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam,
1993 (No. 1 of 1994);
(c) In case he is continuous unauthorized absent from duty;
(d) in case he misbehaves;
(e) in case the resolution has been passed by the Gram Sabha to
the effect that the Secretary negligently performs his duties or he
does not discharge the duties properly;
(f) in case he behaves seriously undisciplined manner.
(3) Any proper punishment out of the following punishments, may be
imposed by passing the speaking order in writing:-
(a) termination of Service; or
(b) withholding of increment; or
(c) recovering the amount of loss caused to Panchayat/State
Government; or
(d) the period of unauthorized absence to be declared dies-non
or without pay.
(4) The Chief Executive Officer of Zila Panchayat shall be the
competent authority for taking disciplinary action. The appeal may be
filed before the Commissioner, Panchayat Raj Sanchalnalay within 15
days from the date of order of imposing punishment.
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(5) For the purpose of taking disciplinary action, the following
conditions shall be following by the Competent Authority,–
(a) Principles of Natural Justice for hearing shall be applicable;
(b) The certified proof shall be shown to the concerned Secretary
of Gram Panchayat;
(c) All proceedings shall have to be completed within two months
from the date of issuing the notice under sub-rule (2) above.
11. As per said notification Rule 7(2) provides for issuing of show cause
notice and after giving opportunity of being heard issuing order of
punishment. No provision of issuing charge sheet and regular departmental
enquiry is laid down. However, as per Rule 5(a) it is provided that the
competent authority shall observe the principles of natural justice for
hearing. Therefore, this Court would proceed to examine whether the facts
of the case contain such a denial which would require the authority to
conduct regular departmental enquiry.
12. The allegation in the case was that a lady who was resident of the
village had died around 2013-2014 and fraudulent death certificate was
issued on 04.08.2020 showing death of 04.08.2020. Upon issuing show
cause to the petitioner the fact came on record that infact there was no
death certificate dated 04.08.2020 and the certificate of 04.08.2020 which
was submitted along with application for funeral assistance was forged
certificate and actual date of death of that lady was 05.11.2019.
13. It is not in dispute between the parties that the family would not have
been entitled to get funeral assistance of Rs.2.00 lakhs if the date of death
had been 05.11.2019 because apparently from the documents available on
record it appears that funeral assistance was given under some scheme
which would become applicable only if the date of death would be
04.08.2020. Learned counsel for the respondents expressed possibility that
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assistance might be under some assistance scheme under Covid-19
pandemic. Be that as it may be, it is not disputed that the family was not
entitled to get financial assistance for funeral as per actual date of death i.e.
05.11.2019.
14. The defence of the petitioner in his reply Annexure P-9 was that the
lady died on 05.11.2019 and certificate as per actual date of death was
already issued by the Gram Panchayat which was also uploaded on the
portal. However, some application was filed with the Janpad Panchayat
seeking funeral assistance projecting date of death to be 04.08.2020 and the
petitioner had no say in the matter being Panchayat Secretary because he
never issued death certificate showing date of death to be 04.08.2020.
15. However, upon perusal of reply Annexure P-9 it is evident that the
petitioner has admitted that said application of the beneficiary was
recommended by the petitioner and the application contains signature of
the petitioner as recommendatory authority being Secretary of Gram
Panchayat.
16. In the subsequent reply (Annexure P-11) the petitioner made even
clearer averments by stating that he was asked to sign the application as
recommended by some employee of Janpad Panchayat and under mental
tension he recommended the case on the application without scrutiny. He
further submitted that the payment has been erroneously made to the
beneficiary who was not entitled to the payment and he pursued with the
beneficiary to deposit the amount. Para 3 of the reply (Annexure P-11)
contains following averments:-
**3- e`rd dk yM+dk jes’k ‘kkg tuin iapk;r ds lacaf/kr ‘kk[kk
izHkkjh ds feyhHkxr ls vUR;s”Vh jkf’k dk Hkqxrku gsrq vkosnu i=Signature Not Verified
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ljiap o vU; yksxksa ds gLrk{kj lfgr rS;kj dj tuin dk;kZy; esa
esjs ikl Hkqxrku vuq’kalk gsrq fn;k x;k vkSj dgk x;k fd vki viuk
gLrk{kj cuk nsaA mDr vkosnu ds lkFk layXu eqR;q izek.k i= esa
eqrd dk yM+dk jes’k ‘kkg tuin iapk;r ds fefyHkxr ls LdSu
djkdj eqR;q fnukad 05-11-2019 ds LFkku ij 04-08-2020 djk fn;k
x;k FkkA rRdkyhu nSfod vkink ds dkj.k ekufld ruko dh fLFkfr
esa esjs }kjk iksVZy ls fcuk psd fd;s gh Hkqxrku gsrq vuq’kalkk dj
fn;k x;k] ;g esjs lcls cM+h xyrh gSA**
17. Evidently as per aforesaid para-3 the petitioner admitted to all the
allegations against him. He admitted that an application containing wrong
date of death supported by forged death certificate was recommended by
him under his signature and he submitted that he did it under mental
tension. Once the petitioner admitted to have recommended a fraudulent
application supported by forged documents and even payment was released
on that application then nothing remains to be enquired into the matter
further. The date of death of persons within Gram Panchayat had to be
scrutinized by the petitioner and therefore, without recommendation of the
petitioner the payment could not have been made to the beneficiary by the
Janpad Panchayat. The petitioner admitted to having signed his
recommendation on the application which in itself was nothing but fraud
and supported with forged document. Even in order Annexure P-1 para-4
(IV) it has been held that the petitioner has admitted to the allegation and
this was one of the reasons behind the punishment order being passed. In
para-4(IV) the findings are contained as under:-
**vkids }kjk fnukad 19-11-2020 dks izLrqr tokc esa Lohdkj fd;k
x;k gS fd vkosnu ds lkFk layXu eqR;q izek.k i= dks esjs }kjk tUe
e`R;q izek.k i= dks esjs }kjk tUe e`R;q iksVZy ij fcuk tkap fd,Signature Not Verified
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Hkqxrku gsrq vuq’kalk dj fn;k x;k] ;g esjs lcls cM+h xyrh
gSA**””
18. Once the petitioner admitted to having recommended such
application which was nothing but fraud and forgery and amount of Rs.2.00
Lakhs was withdrawn from State exchequer on the basis of such fraud, then
in the considered opinion of this Court nothing required to be enquired into
the matter and no further facts remained to be established by way of any
enquiry. It is settled in law that opportunity of hearing is not an unruly
horse and this Court would not mechanically set aside every order on the
question of denial of opportunity of hearing. In Natwar Singh Vs.
Director of Enforcement, reported in 2010 (13) SCC 255, it has been
held as under :-
26 [Ed.: Para 26 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No.
F.3/Ed.B.J./3/2011 dated 10-1-2011.] . Even in the application of the
doctrine of fair play there must be real flexibility. There must also have
been caused some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such
thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The
requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the
case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is
acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with and so forth. Can the courts
supplement the statutory procedures with requirements over and above
those specified? In order to ensure a fair hearing, courts can insist and
require additional steps as long as such steps would not frustrate the
apparent purpose of the legislation.
27. In Lloyd v. McMahon [1987 AC 625 : (1987) 2 WLR 821 :
(1987) 1 All ER 1118 (HL)] , Lord Bridge observed: (AC pp. 702 H-703
B)
“My Lords, the so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved
on tablets of stone. To use the phrase which better expresses the
underlying concept, what the requirements of fairness demand when
any body, domestic, administrative or judicial, has to make a
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character of the decision-making body, the kind of decision it has to
make and the statutory or other framework in which it operates. In
particular, it is well established that when a statute has conferred on
any body the power to make decisions affecting individuals, the
courts will not only require the procedure prescribed by the statute
to be followed, but will readily imply so much and no more to be
introduced by way of additional procedural safeguards as will
ensure the attainment of fairness.”
28. As Lord Reid said in Wiseman v. Borneman [1971 AC 297 : (1969)
3 WLR 706 : (1969) 3 All ER 275 (HL)] : (AC p. 308 C)
“… For a long time the courts have, without objection from
Parliament, supplemented procedure laid down in legislation where
they have found that to be necessary for this purpose.”
29. It is thus clear that the extent of applicability of the principles of
natural justice depends upon the nature of inquiry, the consequences
that may visit a person after such inquiry from out of the decision
pursuant to such inquiry.
19. In Mohd. Sartaj Vs. State of U.P., reported in 2006 (2) SCC 315, it
was held as under :-
14. However, in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379] this
Court has also observed as under: (SCC p. 395, para 24)
“In our view the principles of natural justice know of no
exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any
difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance
of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of
prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is
unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that
the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said
earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one
conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is
permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the
observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to
observe natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs.”
18. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan [(2000) 7 SCC
529 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 965 : AIR 2000 SC 2783] this Court considered
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the principle of natural justice and whether it is a case where, even if
notice has been given, result would not have been different and whether
it could be said that no prejudice was caused to him, if on the admitted
or proved facts grant of an opportunity would not have made any
difference. The Court referred to the decisions rendered in M.C.
Mehta v. Union of India [(1999) 6 SCC 237] , the exceptions laid down
in S.L. Kapoor case [(1980) 4 SCC 379] and K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank
of India [(1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62 : AIR 1984 SC 273]
where it has been laid down that not mere violation of natural justice
but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) has to be proved.
The Court has also placed reliance in the matter of State Bank of
Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717]
and Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460] where the
principle has been laid down that there must have been some real
prejudice to the complainant. There is no such thing as merely technical
infringement of natural justice. The Court has approved this principle
and examined the case of the employee in that light. In Viveka Nand
Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd. [(2005) 5 SCC 337 : 2005 SCC
(L&S) 689] this Court has held that the principles of natural justice are
required to be complied with having regard to the fact situation
obtaining therein. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It cannot be
applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and
circumstances of the case. The principle of natural justice, it is trite, is
no unruly horse. When facts are admitted, an enquiry would be an
empty formality. Even the principle of estoppel will apply. In another
recent judgment in State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi [(2006) 1 SCC 667 :
JT (2006) 1 SC 19] while considering the argument that the principle of
natural justice had been ignored before terminating the service of the
employees and, therefore, the order terminating the service of the
employees was bad in law, this Court has considered the principles of
natural justice and the extent and the circumstances in which they are
attracted. This Court has found in Neeraj Awasthi case [(2006) 1 SCC
667 : JT (2006) 1 SC 19] that if the services of the workmen are
governed by the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, they are protected under
that law. Rules 42 and 43 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules lay
down that before effecting any retrenchment the employees concerned
would be entitled to notice of one month or in lieu thereof pay for one
month and 15 days’ wages for each completed year of service by way of
compensation. If retrenchment is to be effected under the Industrial
Disputes Act, the question of complying with the principles of natural
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attracted only when the services of some persons are terminated by way
of a punitive measure or thereby a stigma is attached. Applying this
principle, it could very well be seen that discontinuation of the service
of the appellants in the present case was not as a punitive measure but
they were discontinued for the reason that they were not qualified and
did not possess the requisite qualifications for appointment.
20. In SBI Vs. M.J. James, reported in 2022 (2) SCC 301, it was held
as under :-
28. Traditional English law recognised and valued the rule against
bias that no man shall be a judge in his own cause i.e. nemo debet esse
judex in propria causa; and the obligation to hear the other or both
sides as no person should be condemned unheard i.e. audi alteram
partem. To these, new facets sometimes described as subsidiary rules
have developed, including a duty to give reasons in support of the
decision. Nevertheless, time and again the courts have emphasised that
the rules of natural justice are flexible and their application depends on
facts of each case as well as the statutory provision, if applicable,
nature of right affected and the consequences. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union
of India [A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262] the
Constitution Bench, dwelling on the role of the principles of natural
justice under our Constitution, observed that as every organ of the State
is controlled and regulated by the rule of law, there is a requirement to
act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures
which are considered inherent in the exercise of a quasi-judicial or
administrative power are those which facilitate if not ensure a just and
fair decision. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a
given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances
of that case, the framework of law under which the enquiry is held and
the constitution of the body of persons or tribunal appointed for that
purpose. When a complaint is made that a principle of natural justice
has been contravened, the court must decide whether the observance of
that rule was necessary for a just decision in the facts of the case.
29. Legal position on the importance to show prejudice to get relief is
also required to be stated. In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K.
Sharma [State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364] a
Division Bench of this Court distinguished between “adequate
opportunity” and “no opportunity at all” and held that the prejudice
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also speaks of procedural and substantive provisions of law embodying
the principles of natural justice which, when infracted, must lead to
prejudice being caused to the litigant in order to afford him relief. The
principle was expressed in the following words : (SCC p. 389, para 32)
“32. Now, coming back to the illustration given by us in the
preceding paragraph, would setting aside the punishment and the
entire enquiry on the ground of aforesaid violation of sub-clause (iii)
be in the interests of justice or would it be its negation? In our
respectful opinion, it would be the latter. Justice means justice
between both the parties. The interests of justice equally demand that
the guilty should be punished and that technicalities and
irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice are not
allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice are
but the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be
perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a
counterproductive exercise.”
30. Earlier decision in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [M.C.
Mehta v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237] examined the expression
“admitted and undisputable facts”, as also divergence of legal opinion
on whether it is necessary to show “slight proof” or “real likelihood of
prejudice”; or legal effect of “an open and shut case”, with reference to
the observations in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [S.L.
Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] and elucidates in the
following words : (M.C. Mehta case [M.C. Mehta v. Union of India,
(1999) 6 SCC 237] , SCC pp. 245-47, paras 22-23)
“22. Before we go into the final aspects of this contention, we
would like to state that cases relating to breach of natural justice do
also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond
dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case law
and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court
thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of “real substance” or
that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result
will not be different, even if natural justice is followed.
See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn. [Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn.,
(1971) 1 WLR 1578 (HL)] . (per Lord Reid and Lord
Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University [Glynn v. Keele University,
(1971) 1 WLR 487] , Cinnamond v. British Airports
Authority [Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority, (1980) 1 WLR
582 (CA)] where such a view has been held. The latest addition to
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this view is R. v. Ealing Magistrates’ Court, ex p
Fannaran [R. v. Ealing Magistrates’ court, ex p Fannaran, (1996) 8
Admn LR 351] (Admn LR at p. 358) (see de Smith, Suppl. p. 89)
(1998) where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be “demonstrable
beyond doubt” that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf
in Lloyd v. McMahon [Lloyd v. McMahon, 1987 AC 625 : (1987) 2
WLR 821 (HL)] (WLR at p. 862) has also not disfavoured refusal of
discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New
Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant [McCarthy v. Grant, 1959
NZLR 1014] however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case
of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is “real
likelihood — not certainty — of prejudice”. On the other
hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn., 1996, pp. 271-72) says
that slight proof that the result would have been different is
sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart
from Ridge v. Baldwin [Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 : (1963) 2
WLR 935 (HL)] , Megarry, J. in John v. Rees [John v. Rees, 1970 Ch
345 : (1969) 2 WLR 1294] stating that there are always “open and
shut cases” and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid
down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider.
Ackner, J. has said that the “useless formality theory” is a
dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be
followed. His Lordship observed that “convenience and justice are
often not on speaking terms”. More recently Lord Bingham has
deprecated the “useless formality” theory in R. v. Chief Constable of
the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton [R. v. Chief Constable
of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton, 1990 IRLR 344] by
giving six reasons. (See also his article “Should Public Law
Remedies be Discretionary?” 1991 PL, p. 64.) A detailed and
emphatic criticism of the “useless formality theory” has been made
much earlier in “Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow” by Prof.
D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63) contending
that Malloch [Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn., (1971) 1 WLR 1578
(HL)] and Glynn [Glynn v. Keele University, (1971) 1 WLR 487]
were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 1996,
p. 323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p. 596) and others say
that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-
making authority. de Smith (5th Edn., 1994, Paras 10.031 to 10.036)
says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view
though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative
Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. 526-30) says that while futile writs may not
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be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the
decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to
admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of
opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the
outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance
or if he can prove a “real likelihood” of success or if he is entitled to
relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may,
however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all
admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that
the courts can, in exercise of their “discretion”, refuse certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is
not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases
as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [State Bank of
Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364] , Rajendra Singh v. State
of M.P. [Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P., (1996) 5 SCC 460] that
even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction
is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for
individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public
interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the
latter, it cannot be waived.
23. We do not propose to express any opinion on the
correctness or otherwise of the “useless formality” theory and leave
the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as, in the
case before us, “admitted and indisputable” facts show that grant of
a writ will be in vain as pointed [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4
SCC 379] out by Chinnappa Reddy, J.”
31. In State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh [State of U.P. v. Sudhir
Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 847]
referring to the aforesaid cases and several other decisions of this
Court, the law was crystallised as under : (SCC para 42)
“42. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus reveals:
42.1. Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary
to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the
audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to
the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.
42.2. Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law
embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se
does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again,Signature Not Verified
Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR
SARATHE
Signing time: 03-07-2025
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prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a
mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in
individual interest, but also in public interest.
42.3. No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the
breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the
case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel,
acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial
or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts
that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused
to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice.
42.4. In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or
indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does
not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in
fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the
Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the
authority who denies natural justice to a person.
42.5. The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere
apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It
should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite
inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-
observance of natural justice.”
21. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, no prejudice has
been caused by not conducting a regular enquiry, when the charges were
duly admitted by the petitioner in his reply, and tried to create excuse of
having issued recommendation of a forged and fraudulent application under
some mental tension.
22. So far as the question of punishment being shocking disproportionate
is concerned, the same does not appear to be so. It is a case of fraud and
forgery committed and amount of Rs.2.00 Lakhs withdrawn from the State
exchequer and remitted to account of beneficiary. The petitioner had
recommended the said fraudulent application supported with forged
documents being Panchayat Secretary. Therefore, the punishment of
dismissal is fully commensurate with the misconduct.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR
SARATHE
Signing time: 03-07-2025
10:31:05
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23. Consequently, finding no reason to interfere in the order Annexure
P-1 dated 14.02.2020, the petition stands dismissed.
(VIVEK JAIN)
nks JUDGE
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR
SARATHE
Signing time: 03-07-2025
10:31:05