Telangana High Court
Ragam Venkata Santosh Amitav vs State Of Telangana on 30 April, 2025
Author: Juvvadi Sridevi
Bench: Juvvadi Sridevi
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
CRIMINAL PETITION No.3321 OF 2022
O R D E R:
This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner-accused
No.2 seeking to quash the proceedings against him in
C.C.No.5945 of 2021 pending on the file of learned II
Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-X Additional Metropolitan
Magistrate, Kukatpally, Cyberabad, registered for the
offences under Sections 304 Part II read with 109 of the
Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC‘), 184 read with 188 of the
Motor Vehicles Act (for short ‘the Act’).
02. Heard Sri Avinash Desai, learned Senior
Counsel representing Sri V. Aneesh, learned counsel for the
petitioner-accused No.2 and Smt.S.Madhavi, learned
Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State-respondent No.1.
No representation on behalf of the unofficial respondent
No.2. Perused the record.
03. Brief facts of the case are that Sri A.Mahipal
Reddy, ASI (for short ‘the deceased’) has been working at
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KPHB PS. On 27.03.2021 he was performing duty of Night
Round Officer in the limits of KPHB PS. At about 22:00
hours the deceased along with mobile driver, left the Police
Station in Government Bolero Vehicle bearing No
TS09PA3377 and while performing night patrolling duty at
SBI Bank near Pragathinagar road, at about 00:00 hours the
deceased received a call from cyber control regarding an
incident took place at Kolari Raghava Reddy Garden,
Nizampet, which pertains to Crime No.250 of 2021.
03.1. The deceased along with Home-guard visited the
scene of offence on 28.03.2021 at about 00:10 hours and
observing the scene, in the meanwhile the accused No.1-taxi
driver running Uber Cab bearing No.TS08UD2984 (for short
‘the crime vehicle’), who received a booking online call on
27.03.2021 at about 2300 hours from a passenger and he
picked up the said passenger and left RGI Airport towards
Hill County, Nizampet.
03.2. On the way, the accused No.1 reached at Kolan
Raghava Reddy Garden function hall at about 00:15 hours
and dashed the deceased causing severe injuries his head,
3
legs and other parts of his body. After the said incident, the
accused left the vehicle at the spot and fled away. On
30.03.2021 at 23:30 hours the deceased was declared as
‘dead’.
03.3. The petitioner-accused No.2 i.e. management of
Uber Private TAXI have abetted the offence, by encouraging
their drivers to drive at high speed to meet targets. Hence,
the petitioner-accused No.2 has abetted the crime by way of
instigating their driver to work over time without ample rest
for earning more money by announcing perks for driving in
Odd hours and extra hours. Thereby, the petitioner-accused
No.2 has committed the alleged offences.
04. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner submitted that the petitioner is nothing to do with
the alleged offences. The petitioner-accused No.2 i.e. Uber
India, enables customers to avail ride-hailing services by
connecting them with drivers. The petitioner-accused No.2
neither employs the driver nor owns the vehicle. The
petitioner-accused No.2 has no role in the present criminal
case. The petitioner-accused No.2 was merely a platform to
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connect the customers. There is no employee and employer
relationship between the accused No.1 and the petitioner-
accused No.2. The contents of the FIR or charge sheet do
not disclose the essential ingredients required for
constituting the offences under Sections 304 Part II read with
109 of IPC, 184 read with 188 of the Act.
05. With the above submissions, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the petitioner-accused No.2 while
praying for the quashment of criminal proceedings relied
upon a decision in Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther and another v.
State of Maharasthtra1, wherein the Honourable Supreme
Court of India at Paragraph Nos.12.4, 13, 14, 15 and 16 held
that:
“12.4. Coming back to Section 304 Part II IPC,
we find that the said section would be attracted
if anyone commits culpable homicide not
amounting to murder if the act is done with the
knowledge that it is likely to cause death but
without any intention to cause death or to cause
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
Therefore, the requirement of Section 304 Part1
(2025) 3 S.C.R. 502: 2025 INSC 338
5II IPC is that the doer must have the knowledge
that the act performed is likely to cause death or
to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death but without any intention to cause death.
Thus, the basic ingredient of Section 304 Part II
IPC is presence of knowledge and absence of
intention. The doer must have the knowledge
that the act performed by him would likely
cause death etc but there should not be any
intention to cause death.
13. This being the legal framework, let us now
deal with the charge against the appellants
taking the same as correct. According to the
prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court
and the High Court, the two accused persons
had not taken proper care and caution by
providing safety shoes, safety belt etc to the two
employees though they were asked to perform
the job of working on the sign board as part of
decorating the front side of the shop which was
approximately at a height of 12 feet from the
ground level. The accused persons had
provided only an iron ladder to the two
employees but while working they were struck
by electricity as a result of which they suffered
electrocution and fell down. They suffered
multiple injuries which led to their death.
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Therefore, both the accused persons were
declared to be responsible for the unnatural
death of the two deceased employees.
14. Even if we take the allegation against the
appellants as correct, we are afraid no prima
facie case can be said to have been made out
against the appellants for committing an offence
under Section 304 Part II IPC. From the record
of the case, it is evident that there was no
intention on the part of the two appellants to
cause the death or cause such bodily injury as
was likely to cause the death of the two
deceased employees. It cannot also be said
that the appellants had knowledge that by
asking the two deceased employees to work on
the sign board as part of the work of decoration
of the frontage of the shop, they had the
knowledge that such an act was likely to cause
the death of the two deceased employees. As
such, no prima facie case of culpable homicide
can be said to have been made out against the
appellants. If that be so, the subsequent
requirement of having knowledge that the act
was likely to cause the death but not having any
intention to cause death would become
irrelevant though we may hasten to add that
nothing is discernible from the record of the
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case that the appellants had the knowledge that
by asking the two employees to work on the
sign board would likely cause their death or
cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause
their death.
15. Therefore, the basic ingredients for
commission of offence under Section 304 Part II
IPC are absent in the present case.
16. Section 227 CrPC deals with discharge.
What Section 227 CrPC contemplates is that if
upon consideration of the record of the case
and the documents submitted therewith and
after hearing the submissions of the accused
and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge
considers that there is no sufficient grounds for
proceeding against the accused, he shall
discharge the accused and record his reasons
for doing so. At the stage of consideration of
discharge, the court is not required to undertake
a threadbare analysis of the materials gathered
by the prosecution. All that is required to be
seen at this stage is that there are sufficient
grounds to proceed against the accused. In
other words, the materials should be sufficient
to enable the court to initiate a criminal trial
against the accused. It may be so that at the
end of the trial, the accused may still be
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acquitted. At the stage of discharge, court is
only required to consider as to whether there
are sufficient materials which can justify launch
of a criminal trial against the accused. By its
very nature, a discharge is at a higher pedestal
than an acquittal. Acquittal is at the end of the
trial process, may be for a technicality or on
benefit of doubt or the prosecution could not
prove the charge against the accused; but when
an accused is discharged, it means that there
are no materials to justify launch of a criminal
trial against the accused. Once he is
discharged, he is no longer an accused.”
06. Further, he relied upon a decision of the High
Court of Delhi in Baldev Raj Kapur v. State2 wherein it was
held at Paragraph Nos.17 and 18 that:
“17. In Vijay Mafatlal Solanki and Anr. v. The
State of Gujarat – MANU/GJ/0775/2005 wherein
a building in Ahmedabad city was seriously
damaged and major portion of the said building
collapsed on 26.1.2001 and the prosecution
had chargesheeted the petitioners as persons
responsible for offences under Section 304 Part
II besides other sections, for the collapse of the2
MANU/DE/0141/2009
9building on the plea that super structure had
collapsed because of irresponsible pattern of
construction and certain omissions and
commissions in constructing the building which
ultimately collapsed resulting into the loss of
lives and properties of the individuals who were
occupying the flats in the said apartment, it was
observed:
“9. Having considered the totality emerging from
record and in view of the discussion made
above, the Court is of the view that, prima facie,
the accused persons could not have been
chargesheeted for the offence punishable under
Section 304 Part : II of the IPC along with other
sections which the accused is charged, as there
is no element of knowledge or intention on the
part of the petitioner. As there is also no
element of any criminal conspiracy, the
petitioners could not have been chargesheeted
for the offence punishable under Section 120-B
of IPC. This section has a direct nexus with an
intention and mitigation of mind. When a major
change is found to be related to the element of
negligence, may be by overt act or by omission,
there cannot be even assumption of conspiracy.
Lack of reasons, to earn some more profit or to
get illegal gratification may result in to
10negligence and also criminal negligence. The
same is an independent offence punishable
under IPC. The court is prima facie satisfied
that the element of intention to commit a
criminal wrong is lacking and, therefore, the
accused could not have been chargesheeted
for the said offence. So, the petitioners at least
should have been discharged from the offence
punishable under section 304 & 120 -B of the
IPC and ld. Addl. Sessions Judge ought to have
said that the accused should be asked to face
charge of the offence punishable under Section
304-A of IPC along with other offences charges
referred to above.”
18. Reading of Section 304 Part II makes it
clear that an accused can be charged under the
said provision for an offence of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder only when
being so charged, it is alleged that the accused
has done the act with the knowledge that it is
likely to cause death or to cause such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death; under such
circumstances the charged offences would fall
under Section 304 Part II. But, before any
charge is framed under Section 304 Part II, the
material on record must at least prima facie
show that the accused is guilty of homicide and
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the act committed must amount to culpable
homicide. Where the material relied upon for
framing such a charge against the accused
concerned falls short of even prima facie
indicating that the accused appeared to be
guilty of an offence of culpable homicide under
Section 304 Part II IPC not amounting to
murder, it is in the interest of justice that
provisions of Section 304 Part II IPC are
eliminated.”
07. On the other hand, learned Assistant Public
Prosecutor appearing for the State contended that there are
triable issues and factual aspects to be examined by the
learned trial Court and it is not a fit case to quash the
proceedings against the petitioner at this juncture and the
matter has to be decided after conducting trial by the learned
trial Court and prayed to dismiss this Criminal Petition.
08. Having regard to the submissions made on
either side and on perusal of the record, it is apparent on the
face of the record that the petitioner-accused No.2 operates
solely as a technology intermediary, connecting riders with
drivers via mobile application ‘Uber’. It is an admitted fact
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that the accused No.1 was not employed with the petitioner-
accused No.2. So also, the petitioner-accused No.2 was not
the owner of the crime vehicle. The crime vehicle belongs to
one Mohammed Akbar. Hence, the employer and employee
relationship cannot be attributed to the accused No.1 and the
petitioner-accused No.2. Therefore, there is no direct nexus
between the accused No.1-driver and the petitioner-accused
No.2.
09. Section 304 Part II of IPC would be attracted if
anyone commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder,
if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause
death but without any intention to cause death or to cause
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Therefore, the
requirement of Section 304 Part II IPC is that the petitioner-
accused No.2 must have the knowledge that the act
performed is likely to cause death or to cause such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death but without any intention to
cause death. Thus, the basic ingredient of Section 304 Part
II IPC is presence of knowledge and absence of intention.
The accused must have the knowledge that the act
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performed by him would likely to cause death etc but there
should not be any intention to cause death.
10. This being the settled principle of law, the
petitioner-accused No.2 being a platform to connect the
customers and cab drivers, there was no intention or
knowledge on the part of the petitioner-accused No.2 to
cause the death or cause such bodily injury as was likely to
cause the death of the deceased. Generally, when an online
booking ride arrives on the mobile application, it is for the
driver to opt whether to accept the said ride or not. However,
it is for the driver to follow the rules and regulations of the
traffic. Therefore, the petitioner-accused No.2 is no way
connected to the death of the deceased. The essential
ingredients required for constituting the alleged offences are
not made out against the petitioner-accused No.2.
11. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances
of the case including the settled principle of law laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, this Court is of the firm
opinion that the allegations levelled against the petitioner-
accused No.2 do not attract the alleged offences. Therefore,
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the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the
petitioner-accused No.2 amounts to abuse of process of law
and the same are liable to be quashed.
12. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is allowed and
the criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused No.2
in C.C.No.5945 of 2021 pending on the file of learned II
Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-X Additional Metropolitan
Magistrate, Kukatpally, Cyberabad, are hereby quashed.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if
any, shall stand closed.
__________________
JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J
Dated: 30-APR-2025
KHRM
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THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
PD
JUDGMENT
IN
CRIMINAL PETITION No.3321 OF 2022
Dated: 30-APR-2025
KHRM