[ad_1]
Uttarakhand High Court
Raghuveer Singh Bhatia vs State Of Uttarakhand on 11 June, 2025
Author: Ravindra Maithani
Bench: Ravindra Maithani
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
IA No.3 of 2025 For Miscellaneous Application
In
Criminal Appeal No. 493 of 2024
Raghuveer Singh Bhatia ...... Appellant
Vs.
State of Uttarakhand ..... Respondent
Present:
Mr. Piyush Sammal, Advocate for the appellant.
Ms. Manisha Rana Singh, D.A.G. for the State of Uttarakhand.
Hon'ble Ravindra Maithani, J. (Oral)
The instant appeal has been preferred against the
conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 304B,
498A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961,
recorded on 27.08.2024/28.08.2024, in Sessions Trial No.27 of
2021, State Vs. Raghuveer Singh Bhatia, by the court of
Additional Sessions Judge, Khatima, District Udham Singh Nagar.
The appellant has already been granted bail in this matter on
26.09.2024. It is, thereafter, the Miscellaneous Application IA
No.3 of 2025 has been filed by the appellant for suspension of the
order of conviction and sentence.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
3. According to the prosecution case, the appellant
and the deceased were married on 09.12.2018. At the time of
marriage, gifts were given, but after marriage, the deceased was
harassed and tortured for and in connection with the demand of
dowry. Subsequently, on 08.05.2019, at the instance of the
appellant, his family members made the deceased to consume
poison, due to which she died.
2
4. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit
that the appellant has a strong case of acquittal; all co-convicts
have already been acquitted; after marriage on 09.12.2018, the
appellant had joined his services in Army in the month of
January, 2019. At the relevant point of time, he was posted in
Jammu and Kashmir. He received the information of the death of
his wife, telephonically. Thereafter, he came back to his home;
there have been no phone calls to connect the appellant with the
offence. It is also submitted that in case the order of conviction
and execution of sentence is not suspended, the appellant would
face irreparable loss, because he has already been discharged
from Army; he cannot approach the Army authorities for his
reinstatement; he may not get any retiral dues. Therefore, it is
argued that the order of conviction and execution of sentence both
should be suspended.
5. Learned State Counsel would submit that the
prosecution has proved its case and the appellant has been rightly
convicted. She would also submit that this application is not
maintainable because the application under Section 389 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“the Code”) has already been
considered by the Court on 26.09.2024, and the appellant has
already been granted bail. Therefore, the matter may not be
further agitated.
6. Suspension of sentence in pending appeal is a
recognized phenomenon under Section 389 of the Code. It reads
as follows:-
389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release
of appellant on bail.–(1) Pending any appeal by a convicted
person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded
by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or
order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in
confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond:
Provided that the Appellate Court shall, before releasing on
3bail or on his own bond a convicted person who is convicted of
an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, shall give
opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in
writing against such release:
Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is
released on bail it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to file
an application for the cancellation of the bail.
(2) …………………………………………………………………………
(3) …………………………………………………………………………
(4) …………………………………………………………………………”
7. A bare perusal of the above provision makes it
abundantly clear that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in
writing, order that the execution of sentence or order appealed
against, be suspended. It is also true that earlier, the bail
application was filed by the appellant, which has been decided by
this Court on 26.09.2024, and the Court observed as follows:-
“8. Having considered the submissions of learned
counsel for the parties and without expressing any opinion on
the final merits of the case, the appellant/applicant is
admitted to bail.
9. Let the appellant/applicant be released on bail
during the pendency of present criminal revision, on
furnishing bail bond with two sureties in the amount of
₹40,000/- and personal bond of the like amount to the
satisfaction of the learned court concerned.
10. Bail application stands disposed of accordingly.”
8. Reading of the Court’s order dated 26.09.2024
makes it further clear that, in fact, on that date, the Court had
not passed any specific order for suspending the execution of
sentence appealed against. The law on this point has been
discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rama
Narang Vs. Ramesh Narang and Others, (1995) 2 SCC 513. In
Para 19 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as
follows:-
“19. That takes us to the question whether the
scope of Section 389(1) of the Code extends to conferring
power on the Appellate Court to stay the operation of the
order of conviction. As stated earlier, if the order of conviction
is to result in some disqualification of the type mentioned in
Section 267 of the Companies Act, we see no reason why we
should give a narrow meaning to Section 389(1) of the Code to
4debar the court from granting an order to that effect in a fit
case. The appeal under Section 374 is essentially against the
order of conviction because the order of sentence is merely
consequential thereto; albeit even the order of sentence can be
independently challenged if it is harsh and disproportionate to
the established guilt. Therefore, when an appeal is preferred
under Section 374 of the Code the appeal is against both the
conviction and sentence and therefore, we see no reason to
place a narrow interpretation on Section 389(1) of the Code
not to extend it to an order of conviction, although that issue
in the instant case recedes to the background because High
Courts can exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Code if the power was not to be found in Section 389(1) of
the Code. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Division
Bench of the High Court of Bombay was not right in holding
that the Delhi High Court could not have exercised
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code if it was confronted
with a situation of there being no other provision in the Code
for staying the operation of the order of conviction. In a fit
case if the High Court feels satisfied that the order of
conviction needs to be suspended or stayed so that the
convicted person does not suffer from a certain
disqualification provided for in any other statute, it may
exercise the power because otherwise the damage done
cannot be undone; the disqualification incurred by Section
267 of the Companies Act and given effect to cannot be
undone at a subsequent date if the conviction is set aside by
the Appellate Court. But while granting a stay of (sic or)
suspension of the order of conviction the Court must examine
the pros and cons and if it feels satisfied that a case is made
out for grant of such an order, it may do so and in so doing it
may, if it considers it appropriate, impose such conditions as
are considered appropriate to protect the interest of the
shareholders and the business of the company.”
(emphasis supplied)
9. This concept has further been discussed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Navjot Singh Sidhu Vs.
State of Punjab and Another, (2007) 2 SCC 574. In Para 6 of the
judgment, the legal principle has been laid down, which is as
follows:-
“6. The legal position is, therefore, clear that an
appellate court can suspend or grant stay of order of
conviction. But the person seeking stay of conviction should
specifically draw the attention of the appellate court to the
consequences that may arise if the conviction is not stayed.
Unless the attention of the court is drawn to the specific
consequences that would follow on account of the conviction,
the person convicted cannot obtain an order of stay of
conviction. Further, grant of stay of conviction can be resorted
to in rare cases depending upon the special facts of the case.”
10. In the instant case, in fact, when the earlier bail
was granted to the appellant, specific order for suspension of
5
execution of sentence was not passed. Bail has already been
granted. This Court is of the view that mere grant of bail does not
debar the appellant to approach this Court further for suspension
of order of conviction.
11. In its bail order dated 26.09.2024, this Court has
noted an argument made on behalf of the appellant that, “in the
cross examination of PW1/mother of the deceased she stated
that infact the deceased was not happy with the marriage as
she did not want to marry with the appellant/convict but
under family pressure, she married with the present
appellant/convict”.”
12. It is admitted by learned State Counsel that the
appellant had left his home after marriage in the month of
January, 2019, and returned only after the death of his wife, but
she would submit that there is call detail record, which reveals
that the appellant was speaking to his family members. Though,
she admits that there is no transcript of any such conversation.
13. The loss, which is narrated, is that the appellant
has been discharged from Army service and he may not approach
for his reinstatement until the order of conviction and execution of
sentence is suspended.
14. Having considered the entirety of facts, this Court
is of the view that this is a fit case in which the order of conviction
as well as execution of sentence, appealed against, should be
suspended. Accordingly, the Miscellaneous Application deserves to
be allowed.
6
15. The order of conviction as well as execution of
sentence, appealed against, shall remain suspended during the
pendency of this appeal.
16. The Miscellaneous Application, IA No.3 of 2025,
stands disposed of, accordingly.
(Ravindra Maithani, J.)
11.06.2025
Ravi Bisht
[ad_2]
Source link