Delhi District Court
Rahul Jain vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 26 July, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. VIRENDER KUMAR KHARTA,
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE (FTC)-02, CENTRAL
DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
Crl. Appeal No. 322/2018
In the matter of:-
Rahul Jain,
S/o Late Sh. Mahesh Chand Jain,
R/o B-2/50, First Floor,
Ashok Vihar, Delhi-110052.
...Appellant
VERSUS
Central Bureau of Investigation,
(through its Director),
CBI Headquarters,
5-B, CGO Complex,
Lodhi Road, New Delhi.
....Respondent.
Date of Institution of appeal 31.08.2018
Date of Arguments 23.07.2025 & previous dates
Judgment reserved on 23.07.2025
Date of Judgment 26.07.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present Criminal Appeal has been preferred by
appellant/convict Rahul Jain under Sec. 374/382 Cr.PC against
the judgment of conviction dated 25.07.2018 (herein referred as
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‘impugned judgment’) and order on sentence dated 04.08.2018
(herein referred as ‘impugned sentence order’) in case bearing
RC No. 6(S)/8/DLI, passed by Ld. Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Central District, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as ‘Ld.
Trial Court’), whereby appellant Rahul Jain was convicted for
the offences punishable under Sec. 420 IPC as well as 120B/420
IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,00,000/- for the
offence punishable under Sec. 420 IPC and in default to undergo
simple imprisonment for a period of three months.
Appellant/convict was further sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.
10,00,000/- for the offence punishable under Sec. 120B IPC read
with Sec. 420 IPC and in default to undergo simple
imprisonment for three months.
2. The brief facts leading to the present Criminal Appeal are
that on 02.07.1988, a company in the name and style of M/s H.
Choudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘accused
company’) was registered with the Registrar of Companies which
was incorporated by H.S. Choudhary and his wife Smt.
Sakuntala. As per record, appellant/convict Rahul Jain, Sh. O. P.
Goyal and Sh. Rishi Goyal became directors of the accused
company on 31.10.1988 and co-convict Ravi Kant became its
director on 02.11.1988. As per the record, that the accused
company appointed a number of agents for booking/selling of
plots to interested persons in Pink City-I colony/township sought
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to be developed by the accused company. As per the case of the
prosecution, the appointments of the agents were made by H. S.
Chaudhary with a promise of payment of commission @ 5% of
booking amount. The agents were supplied with application
forms and brochures by the accused company and advertisements
in the leading newspapers were also got published between
07.04.1989 to 20.04.1989 stating that Pink City-I, Noida Kasana
Road was approved and freehold residential colony. Thereafter, a
large number of interested buyers made booking of plots and
deposited more that Rs. 5,00,00,000/- with the accused company.
As per the case of prosecution, the land in question was not an
approved colony and the accused company did not own any land
in its name prior to 17.04.1989 as sale deeds of various pockets
of lands were executed by farmers in favour of the aforesaid
accused company on 17.04.1989. As per the case of prosecution,
vide said sale deeds of lands, company acquired lands in villages
of Tugalpor, Namoli and Rohilapur within Bulandshehar District,
Uttar Pradesh, which was found to be agricultural land according
to Section 143 of UP Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act,
1950 and could not have been used for residential purposes
except with prior permission of the government but the accused
company sold the plots to the buyers for residential purpose
without obtaining such permission from the government and
hence Pink City-I Colony/township was not an approved colony.
As per the case of prosecution, the prospective buyers were
misled by the representation made by the accused company to the
public at large through the newspaper advertisements and
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brochures supplied by the company as Pink City-I,
Colony/Township was not approved and freehold residential
colony.
3. On the basis of aforesaid allegations, case bearing RC No.
6/S/89 was registered by the CBI, Delhi and after completion of
the investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused
company, its Managing Director H. S. Chaudhary, appellant
Rahul Jain (Director), Ravi Kant (Director) and Harish Bajaj
(Chief Executive Officer of Citizen Advertising & Marketing).
Thereafter on 08.03.1999, charges under Sec. 120B & Sec. 420
IPC were framed against accused persons namely H. S.
Chaudhary, appellant Rahul Jain, Ravi Kant and Harish Bajaj to
which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. In order to prove
its case, prosecution had examined 45 prosecution witnesses.
Accused Harish Bajaj expired during the trial and proceedings
against him were abated. On completion of trial, accused persons
i.e. M/s H. Choudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd., H. S. Chaudhary,
appellant/convict Rahul Jain and co-convict Ravi Kant were
convicted for the offences punishable under Sec. 420 IPC as well
as under Sec. 120B/420 IPC, by Ld. Trial Court, vide judgment
dated 25.07.2018 and appellant Rahul Jain was sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to
pay a fine of Rs. 10,00,000/- for the offence punishable under
Sec. 420 IPC and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for
a period of three months. Appellant Rahul Jain was further
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one
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year and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,00,000/- for the offence
punishable under Sec. 120B IPC read with Sec. 420 IPC and in
default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months, by Ld.
Trial Court vide order dated 04.08.2018.
4. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment of conviction
and order on sentence, appellant has preferred the present appeal.
Arguments were heard at length on behalf of appellant/convict as
well as on behalf of Ld. Senior PP for CBI.
5. Ld. Counsel for appellant/convict argued that the judgment
and the sentence order passed by the Ld. Trial Court are perverse,
illegal, bad in law and against the facts proved by the
prosecution. He also argued that none of the prosecution
witnesses has deposed that the appellant/convict had played any
active role in the commission of offence and it has been
specifically mentioned by the Ld. Trial Court in Para No. 90 of
the judgment that there was no apparent material in evidence of
the prosecution witnesses to show that appellant/convict was
Incharge of or responsible to accused no. 1 company for conduct
of its day to day affairs. He also argued that no charge was
framed against the company i.e. M/s H. Choudhary Estate Pvt.
Ltd. and hence the appellant/convict Rahul Jain who was one of
the director of the company could not have been convicted as per
the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. He
also argued that no charge was framed against the
appellant/convict as a director of the company but he has been
convicted as a director of company which is not permissible in
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law. He also argued that the officials of company cannot be held
vicariously liable unless there are specific allegations and
averments against them with respect to their individual role and
accused cannot be convicted only on the ground that he was the
director of a company. He also argued that prosecution has failed
to prove the criminal conspiracy among the accused persons and
the company. He also argued that the testimonies of PW-20 Sh.
Charanjeet Singh and PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor are suffering
from material contradictions and the said witnesses cannot be
relied upon and the Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate their
testimonies. He also argued that the appellant/convict was only a
paid employee of the company and was getting a fixed salary. He
also argued that the appellant/convict was not the beneficiary of
the amount collected by the accused company as no such funds
were ever transferred to his account from the account of
company in which the amount was collected from plot buyers.
He also argued that alleged misleading advertisements were
given by the company or by its Managing Director H. S.
Chaudhary in leading newspapers and the appellant/convict was
not involved in any such decision making process of the
company and prosecution has not produced any evidence in this
regard. He has relied on judgments titled as ‘Aneeta Hada Vs.
M/s Godfather Travels & Tour Pvt. Ltd., 2012 Crl. L.J. 2525′;
‘Sharad Kumar Sanghi Vs. Sangita Rane, 2015 (2) JCC 1277′ ;
‘Ravindranatha Bajpe Vs. Manglore Special Economic Zone Ltd.
& Ors, (2022) 15 SCC 430′; ‘Varkey Joseph Vs. State of Kerela,
AIR 1993 SC 1892’ & ‘Shyam Sundar Pramanik Vs. Moni
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Mohan Sadhukhan & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 977′. He argued that
impugned judgment dated 25.07.2018 and impugned order on
sentence dated 04.08.2018 passed by the Ld. Trial Court should
be set-aside and the present appeal should be allowed.
6. Per contra, Ld. Senior PP for CBI argued that the appellant
has been rightly convicted and sentenced by the Ld. Trial Court.
To substantiate his point, he argued that name of the company
has been mentioned in the order of charge dated 08.03.1999 and
non-mentioning of the name of company in the charge and non-
signing of the same by the representative of company does not
make any difference. He also argued that under Sec. 305 Cr.PC,
it was the duty of the company to appoint its representative to
defend the company who has not been appointed by the
company and this fact shall not affect the conviction of
appellant. He also argued that vide judgment dated 25.07.2018,
the company has been convicted and hence the appellant cannot
take the plea that his conviction was bad in law. He also argued
that the appellant was the director of the company and he along
with the company and other directors entered into a criminal
conspiracy to cheat the public at large and this fact has been duly
proved by the prosecution through the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses. He also argued that the colony/township was not
approved by the Uttar Pradesh Government and the buyers were
misled by the company and its associates. He also argued that
PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh and PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor
have specifically deposed against the appellant/convict. He also
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argued that the prosecution witnesses are of sterling quality and
their testimonies have been relied by the Ld. Trial Court. He also
argued that prosecution had proved its case against the
appellant/convict beyond reasonable doubt before the Ld. Trial
Court and hence the present appeal should be dismissed and the
conviction and sentence order passed by the Ld. Trial Court
should be upheld.
7. I have thoughtfully considered the arguments advanced,
judgments relied upon, perused the material available on record
including the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, scrutinized
the judgment dated 25.07.2018 and sentence order dated
04.08.2018 passed by the Ld. Trial Court and gone through the
relevant provisions of law.
8. The main contention of appellant/convict is that though
the company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. was
charge-sheeted by CBI but it was not tried as an accused during
the trial and since his conviction was dependent upon the
trial/conviction of the company, he has been wrongly convicted
by the Ld. Trial Court. Since as per established principle of law
a director of a company cannot be prosecuted unless the
company is arraigned as an accused, it is necessary to examine
whether the company was really tried as an accused or not in the
present case.
9. The trial of any criminal case commences with the
framing of charges. The basic purpose of framing charge against
the accused is to tell him precisely of the accusation against him
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which the prosecution intends to prove against him so that he
may properly defend himself during the trial. In any criminal
trial, charge is the foundation of the case of the prosecution.
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in judgment titled as ‘Dal Chand
@ Dalia Vs. State, cited as (1982) DLT 127′ was pleased to set-
aside the conviction on the ground of defect in charge. No
person can be convicted under any section of law until and
unless charges have been framed against him. For deciding the
contention of appellant/convict, it is necessary to go through the
charges framed against the appellant/convict. The charge framed
by the Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 08.03.1999 reads as
under:-
CHARGE
I, R. K. Gauba, Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Delhi do hereby charge you H. S. Chaudhary, Rahul
Jain, Ravi Kant and Harish Bajaj as follows:-
Firstly that all of you during the year 1989 in
Delhi and other places agreed among yourselves to do
the illegal act to with cheating with dishonest intention
by inducing general public through adverstisements
made in the leading news papers projecting a freehold
and approved residential colony and the same acts were
done in pursuance of said agreement and thereby all of
you thereby committed an offence punishable under
Sec. 120B of Indian Penal Code and within the
cognizance of this court.
Secondly, that all of you during the abovesaid
period and at the same places cheated the prospective
buyers of the plots by dishonestly inducing them to
deliver to you amounts over Rs. Five Crores on the
pretext of booking of the plots in Pink City-I, Noida,
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falsely projecting the same as residential colony
freehold, approved/sanctioned by the government of
U.P. and which was the money/property of the said
prospective buyers and that you thereby committed an
offence punishable under Sec. 420 IPC and within the
cognizance of this court.
I hereby direct you to trial for the said charges.
C.M.M.
Charge has been read over and explained to the accused
persons who are questioned as under:-
Q. Do you plead guilty?
A. I H. S. Chaudhary plead not guilty.
A. I Rahul Jain plead not guilty.
A. I Ravi Kant plead not guilty.
A. I Harish Bajaj plead not guilty.
RO & AC
C.M.M/8.3.99
10. On the careful perusal of charges framed on 08.03.1999, it
is revealed that charges had been framed against H. S.
Chaudhary, Rahul Jain (appellant/convict), Ravi Kant & Harish
Bajaj only and no charge was framed against the accused
company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. It is pertinent
to mention that the name of the company has been mentioned in
the order on charge dated 08.03.1999 but the name of the
company was not mentioned in the charges actually framed nor it
has been signed by any representative on behalf of the company.
It is also pertinent to mention that the charges dated 08.03.1999,
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nowhere metions that the appellant/accused was the director of
the company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. or that he
entered into any criminal conspiracy with the accused company
and it only mentioned that appellant/accused entered into
criminal conspiracy with accused persons namely H. S.
Chaudhary, Ravi Kant and Harish Bajaj. However,
appellant/accused has been convicted in capacity of director of
the accused company and in the judgment dated 25.07.2018, the
Ld. Trial Court has recorded the finding that accused/appellant
along with other accused persons and the company entered into a
criminal conpiracy which is contrary to the charges framed on
08.03.1999. From the language of charges framed against the
appellant/accused, it may be inferred that the abovesaid accused
persons entered into criminal conspiracy with each other in their
private capacity and they did not enter into criminal conspiracy
with the company in capacity of its directors. Thus, it has come
on record that no charges were framed against accused company
i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. Since no charge was
framed against accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate
Pvt. Ltd., it could not have been tried as an accused.
11. As per the contents of FIR i.e. RC No. 6/89/SPL/DLI dated
31.08.1989 and charge-sheet filed on behalf of CBI, the accused
company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. was principal
accused which entered into criminal conspiracy with H. S.
Chaudhary, Smt. Shakuntala Chaudhary, Rahul Jain
(appellant/convict) and Om Prakash to cheat the public at large.
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The Ld. Trial Court while deciding the contention of not framing
the charge against the accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary
Estate Pvt. Ltd., observed that accused no. 2 i.e. H. S. Chaudhary
was Managing Director of accused no. 1 company at relevant
time and summons were served upon accused no. 2 upon which
he had appeared before the court and therefore, once accused no.
2 H. S. Chaudhary had been served with a summon, such service
on the principal officer of the company can be said to be a valid
service on accused no. 1 company as well. The observation of
Ld. Trial Court does not seem to be correct as a company
incorporated under The Companies Act,1956 is a separate legal
entity from its directors including the Managing Director and it
was mandatory to serve summons independently upon the
company and the Ld. Trial Court must have ensured the
appearance of its representative in pursuance of summoning
order.
12. The Ld. Trial Court has also observed that it was the
responsibility of the company to have appeared in the court or
otherwise to face consequences for non-appearance. The
observation of the Ld. Trial Court does not seem to be correct as
per the established principles of law of criminal jurisprudence. A
person cannot be tried or convicted until and unless he has been
given an opportunity to defend himself. The Ld. Trial Court has
also discussed Sec. 305 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
and has observed that it was the prerogative of company itself as
to who it wants to appoint its authorized representative and if at
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all such representative is to be appointed or not and the court can
neither compel nor direct a company to appoint any such
representative or to appoint any particular person as its
representative. In any criminal trial, if any of the accused is not
represented by any counsel, it is the duty of the court and the
Public Prosecutor that such accused is provided legal aid so that
such accused may defend himself. Not providing the opportunity
of defence to any accused is against the principle of natural
justice. No such efforts were made during the trial of present
case. Sec. 305 of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 reads as
under:-
Section 305 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
305. Procedure when corporation or registered society is an
accused:-
1. In this section, “corporation” means an incorporated
company or other body corporate, and includes a society
registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21
of 1860).
2. Where a corporation is the accused person or one of the
accused persons in an inquiry or trial, it may appoint a
representative for the purpose of the inquiry or trial and
such appointment need not be under the seal of the
corporation.
3. Where a representative of a corporation appears, any
requirement of this Code that anything shall be done in
the presence of the accused or shall be read or stated or
explained to the accused, shall be construed as a
requirement that that thing shall be done in the presence
of the representative or read or stated or explained to the
representative, and any requirement that the accused shallCrl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
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be examined shall be construed as a requirement that the
representative shall be examined.
4. Where a representative of a corporation does not appear,
any such requirement as is referred to in sub-section (3)
shall not apply.
5. Where a statement in writing purporting to be signed by
the managing director of the corporation or by any person
(by whatever name called) having, or being one of the
persons having the management of the affairs of the
corporation to the effect that the person named in the
statement has been appointed as the representative of the
corporation for the purposes of this section, is filed, the
Court shall, unless the contrary is proved, presume that
such person has been so appointed.
6. If a question arises as to whether any person, appearing as
the representative of a corporation in an inquiry or trial
before a Court is or is not such representative, the
question shall be determined by the Court.
13. As per Sec. 305(2) Cr.PC, where a corporation is an
accused person or one of the accused persons in an inquiry or
trial, it may appoint a representative for the purpose of inquiry or
trial or such appointment need not to be under the seal of
corporation. Under Sec. 305 (3) Cr.PC, where a representative of
a corporation appears, any requirement of this Code that anything
shall be done in the presence of the accused or shall be read or
stated or explained to the accused, shall be construed as a
requirement that that thing shall be done in the presence of the
representative or read or stated or explained to the representative,
and any requirement that the accused shall be examined shall be
construed as a requirement that the representative shall be
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examined. Under Sec. 305(6) Cr.PC, if a question arises as to
whether any person appearing as the representative of a
corporation in an inquiry or trial before a court is or is not such
representative, the question shall be determined by the court.
14. On the perusal of complete record of the case, it is
revealed that the accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary
Estate Pvt. Ltd. never appointed any representative to defend the
accused company. There is no order from the court in which any
of the director who were facing the trial including accused H. S.
Chaudhary, who was Managing Director of the company was
ever appointed as representative of the company or that any of
the director or the Managing Director voluntarily came forward
to represent the company in the trial. In the absence of any
document of representation filed on behalf of accused company
and in absence of any order of court or the written consent by
Managing Director H. S. Chaudhary, it cannot be presumed that
the company was being represented by accused H. S. Chaudhary.
No charges were framed against the accused company nor the
document of charge was signed on behalf of company by anyone.
On the perusal of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, it is
revealed that 44 prosecution witnesses i.e. from PW-1 to PW-44
have not been cross-examined on behalf of the company or its
representative nor any opportunity was granted to the accused
company for such cross-examination as the heading ‘cross by
accused M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd.’ is missing in the
cross-examination of PW-1 to PW-44. It is pertinent to mention
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that PW-45 IO/Inspector Harikesh has been cross-examined on
behalf of accused company. This court has carefully examined
the orders of the Ld. Trial Court of the dates on which PW-45
IO/Inspector Harikesh was examined as PW but there is nothing
in the said orders stating that the company had appointed its
representative for cross-examination of PW-45 or the court its
own had appointed such representative. PW-45/IO Inspector
Harikesh has been cross-examined by Sh. Rajeev Kumar
(Advocate) on behalf of accused H. S. Chaudhary and M/s H. S.
Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. However, on the perusal of
Vakalatnama of Sh. Rajeev Kumar (Advocate), it is revealed that
he was given the authority by accused H. S. Chaudhary to
represent himself only and not the company.
15. In the present case, no opportunity was granted to accused
company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. to cross-
examine 44 prosecution witnesses and only one witness was
examined on behalf of accused company and that too without any
authorization from the company or its representative. The right of
cross-examination is a fundamental right deeply rooted in the
principles of natural justice to ensure fair trial to the accused.
Article 21 of The Constitution of India guarantees the right to life
and personal liberty and the right of fair trial is covered under
Article 21 of The Constitution of India. Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India in judgment titled as ‘Natasha Singh Vs. CBI, (2013) 5
SCC 741′ has held that the denial of right of cross-examine to the
accused is a serious violation of the principle of natural justice
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and the right to a fair trial. It is pertinent to mention that the
statement of accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate
Pvt. Ltd. was not recorded under Sec. 313 Cr.PC through its
representative and the company was convicted by not following
the mandatory procedure of trial laid down in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. On the basis of aforesaid discussion,
this court is of considered opinion that no representative was ever
appointed on behalf of the accused company to defend the
company as per mandate of Sec. 305 Cr.PC, no charges were
framed against accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate
Pvt. Ltd., out of 45 prosecution witnesses, 44 witnesses were not
cross-examined on behalf of accused company, statement of
company/its representative was not recorded under Sec. 313
Cr.PC and hence it cannot be said that the company was arrayed
as an accused in the present case. Filing of charge-sheet against
the accused company was not sufficient and arraigning of the
accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd was
necessary during the trial and hence the impugned judgment
dated 25.07.2018 and impugned sentence order dated 04.08.2018
qua appellant/convict are bad in law.
16. On the basis of foregoing discussions, it has come on
record that accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate
Pvt. Ltd was not arraigned as an accused during the trial of co-
accused persons. Now the question before this court is whether
co-accused/convict/appellant who was director of the company
can be convicted without arraigning the company as an accused.
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Hon’ble Supreme Court of India as well as Hon’ble High Court
of Delhi have laid down the principles regarding the liability of
directors when the company is not an accused. Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in judgment titled as Aneeta Hada Vs. M/s
Godfather Travels & Tour Pvt. Ltd., 2012 Crl. L.J. 2525′ while
deciding the vicarious liability of a director of a company has
observed as under:-
“39. It is to be borne in mind that Section 141 of the
Act is concerned with the offences by the company. It
makes the other persons vicariously liable for
commission of an offence on the part of the company.
As has been stated by us earlier, the vicarious
liability gets attracted when the condition precedent
laid down in Section 141 of the Act stands satisfied.
There can be no dispute that as the liability is penal
in nature, a strict construction of the provision would
be necessitous and, in a way, the warrant.”
41. It will be seemly to quote a passage from
Maxwell’s The Interpretation of Statutes (12th
Edition) : –
“The strict construction of penal statutes seems to
manifest itself in four ways: in the requirement of
express language for the creation of an offence; in
interpreting strictly words setting out the elements of
an offence; in requiring the fulfilment to the letter ofCrl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 18 of 39
statutory conditions precedent to the infliction of
punishment; and in insisting on the strict observance
of technical provisions concerning criminal
procedure and jurisdiction.”
42. We have referred to the aforesaid passages only
to highlight that there has to be strict observance of
the provisions regard being had to the legislative
intendment because it deals with penal provisions
and a penalty is not to be imposed affecting the
rights of persons whether juristic entities or
individuals, unless they are arrayed as accused. It is
to be kept in mind that the power of punishment is
vested in the legislature and that is absolute in
Section 141 of the Act which clearly speaks of
commission of offence by the company……..Applying
the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the
considered opinion that commission of offence by the
company is an express condition precedent to attract
the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words “as
well as the company” appearing in the Section make
it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the
company can be prosecuted, then only the persons
mentioned in the other categories could be
vicariously liable for the offence subject to the
averments in the petition and proof thereof. One
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Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 19 of 39
cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a
juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a
finding is recorded against it, it would create a
concavity in its reputation. There can be situations
when the corporate reputation is affected when a
director is indicted.
43. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the
irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the
prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning
of a company as an accused is imperative. The other
categories of offenders can only be brought in the
dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the
same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We
say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V.
Parekh (supra) which is a three-Judge Bench
decision.
17. Similarly Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in judgment
titled as ‘Sharad Kumar Sanghi Vs. Sangita Rane, 2015 (2) JCC
1277′ reiterated the law laid down in ‘Aneeta Hada (supra) and
observed as under:-
“In the case at hand as the complainant’s initial
statement would reflect, the allegations are against the
company, but the company has not been made arrayed
as a party. Therefore, the allegations have to be
restricted to the Managing Director. As we have noted
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 20 of 39
earlier, allegations are vague and in fact, principally
the allegations are against the company. There is no
specific allegation against the Managing Director.
When a company has not been arrayed as a party, no
proceeding can be initiated against it even where
vicarious liability is fastened on certain statutes. It has
been so held by a three-Judge Bench in Aneeta Hada v.
Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited in the
context of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.”
18. In the present case, appellant/convict has been convicted
under Sec. 420/120B of Indian Penal Code. As per the cardinal
principle of interpretation of statue, the provisions of criminal
law are to be interpreted strictly. The court should not broaden
the scope of criminal statues beyond their clear and unambiguous
language, especially when doing so may result in finding of guilt.
The principle of strict construction ensure that no one is punished
for the actions not clearly defined by the criminal law. In the
present case, Ld. Trial Court had presumed that charges were
framed against the accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary
Estate Pvt. Ltd. and the accused company faced the trial. The
presumption taken by the Ld. Trial Court is against the facts and
the principles of strict construction. Applying the law laid down
by the Hon’ble Suprme Court of India in ‘Aneeta Hada (supra)’
and Sharad Kumar Sanghi (supra)’, the arraigning of accused
company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. during the
trial was mandatory for securing the conviction of
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 21 of 39
accused/appellant. The appellant/convict could have been
prosecuted only when the company was prosecuted. In the
present case, the accused company was charge-sheeted but was
not prosecuted. The conviction of company without arraigning it
during the trial cannot be considered legally right and hence the
conviction of accused/appellant is also bad in law.
19. To secure the conviction of an accused, the prosecution
must prove that the accused actively participated in the
commission of offence. A person cannot be convicted only on the
ground that he was the director of the company. There were other
directors of the company namely Smt. Shakuntala Chaudhary,
Om Prakash Goyal and Rishi Kumar who were not charge-
sheeted by the Investigating Agency on the ground that there was
no sufficient evidence against them. In the present case, the main
contention of the prosecution is that the public at large was
cheated through the misleading advertisements by the accused
company and its directors. Thus, the active role played the
appellant/convict in the present case is to be seen in light of
evidence adduced by the prosecution and the law laid down by
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in this regard.
20. PW-7 Sh. K. L. Kalra, Retd. Bank Manager, proved the
documents pertaining to the current account of accused company
i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. exhibited as Ex.
PW-7/A, extracts of board meeting and copy of memorandum of
accused company as Ex. PW-7/A-1 to Ex. PW-7/A-6, letter, Ex.
PW-7/B and pay-slips, Ex. PW-7/B-1 to Ex. PW-7/B-9. As per
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 22 of 39
document, Ex. PW-7/A-5 i.e. minutes of board meeting dated
01.11.1988 of accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate
Pvt. Ltd., the authority to operate the account of company was
given only to Managing Director H. S. Chaudhary, Rishi Kumar
(director) & Om Prakash (director). Thus, the appellant/convict
was not having any authority to deal with the financial matters of
accused company and he had not issued any cheque for the
payment of misleading advertisements and he had not received
any payments from the plot buyers on behalf of the company.
21. The prosecution is not clear as to on which date, time and
place the decision regarding the misleading advertisements was
taken and by whom the said decision was taken. The prosecution
has not placed any document of minutes of the board meetings of
the directors showing the presence of appellant/convict in the
said meeting, showing his signatures in which the agenda and
draft of misleading advertisements was passed. Even during the
the examination of prosecution witnesses, prosecution has not
brought on record as to who had passed the agenda and draft of
misleading advertisements. Prosecution has examined three
witnesses i.e. PW-2, PW-4 & PW-14 relating to the misleading
advertisements. PW-2 Sh. Vinod Goyal who was proprietor of
Ikon Advertising Services, deposed that an order was placed for
display of hoarding by Harish Bajaj (co-accused since expired) of
Citizen Advertising & Marketing to promote Pink City-I
township. He has proved letter in this regard as Ex. PW-2/A and
the record showing the hoardings, Ex. PW-2/B-1 to Ex.
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 23 of 39
PW-2/B-10. He has not deposed that he had received the said
order from the accused company or its directors including the
appellant/convict. Similarly, PW-4 Sh. H. K. Bhatia has also
deposed that he had printed leaflets for Pink City-I on order
placed by Citizen Advertising. PW-14 Sh. K. S. Rawat, who was
working as Senior Clerk at Advertising Department, National
Herald Newspaper also deposed that the said advertisement was
given by the Citizen Advertising & Marketing. The prosecution
has not proved as to on what basis the Citizen Advertising &
Marketing was giving the misleading advertisement in the
leading newspapers on behalf of accused company. No official
from Citizen Advertising & Marketing has been examined as PW
to prove the documents through which the said firm had received
the order through which prosecution could have proved as to who
was actively involved in draft and publication of misleading
advertisements in the leading newspapers through Citizen
Advertising & Marketing. Moreover, none of the prosecution
witness has deposed that appellant/convict was having any role in
the decision qua the draft and publication of misleading
advertisements. Without any direct evidence, it cannot be
presumed that appellant/convict was actively involved in the said
decision making process or in preparing the draft of misleading
advertisement and its publication.
22. As per the case of prosecution, the accused company i.e.
M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. had appointed booking
agents for booking plots for prospective buyers. As per order of
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 24 of 39
charge dated 08.03.1999 also the appointment of booking agents
were made by accused no. 2 i.e. H. S. Chaudhary with a promise
of payment of commission @ 5% on the booking amount.
Prosecution has examined several booking agents i.e. PW-1 Sh.
Nanak A. Bhatia, PW-6 Sh. Rishi Gupta, PW-9 Sh. S. K. Bajaj,
PW-16 Sh. Mohan Arora, PW-17 Sh. Mahinder Gupta, PW-25
Sh. S. K. Dua, PW-26 Sh. S. P. Kapoor, PW-39 Sh. Sudhir
Kumar and PW-44 Sh. Suresh Talwar. All the abovesaid
prosecution witnesses (booking agents) deposed that they were
booking agents for M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. and they
had been promised a commission of 5% on the booking amount
of the plots and they were given brouchers pamphlets by M/s H.
S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. or H. S. Chaudhary (since
expired). All the abovesaid PWs have either deposed that they
were approached by M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. or by
co-accused H. S. Chaudhary, (since expired), who was Managing
Director of accused company. None of the abovesaid prosecution
witnesses (booking agents) have deposed that they were ever
approached by the appellant/convict. Thus, prosecution has also
failed to prove the active role of appellant/convict with respect to
appointment of booking agents and distribution of pamphlets/
brouchers to them in which misleading information regarding the
proposed township was printed.
23. Appellant/convict has taken the defence that he was only
the employee of company and was working as a director on a
monthly salary and he had not contributed any share capital in
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 25 of 39
the company and he was not entitled to any profit from the
company. The prosecution has not alleged that the
appellant/accused was beneficiary of the alleged cheated amount
collected by accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate
Pvt. Ltd.
24. While deciding the scope of liability of a director on basis
of his active role in the management and affairs of company,
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in ‘Ravindranatha Bajpe Vs.
Manglore Special Economic Zone Ltd. & Ors, (2022) 15 SCC
430′ has observed as under:-
8. In the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal (supra), it is
observed by this Court in paragraphs 42 to 44 as
under:
“(iii) Circumstances when Director/person in charge
of the affairs of the company can also be prosecuted,
when the company is an accused person
42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person
which acts through its officers, Directors, Managing
Director, Chairman, etc. If such a company commits
an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be
the intent and action of that individual who would act
on behalf of the company. It would be more so, when
the criminal act is that of conspiracy.
However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle
of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious
liability unless the statute specifically provides so.
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 26 of 39
43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the
commission of an offence on behalf of a company can
be made an accused, along with the company, if there
is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with
criminal intent. Second situation in which he can be
implicated is in those cases where the statutory regime
itself attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by
specifically incorporating such a provision.
44. When the company is the offender, vicarious
liability of the Directors cannot be imputed
automatically, in the absence of any statutory
provision to this effect. One such example is Section
141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta
Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5
SCC 661, the Court noted that if a group of persons
that guide the business of the company have the
criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body
corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act has to be understood. Such
a position is, therefore, because of statutory
intendment making it a deeming fiction. Here also, the
principle of “alter ego”, was applied only in one
direction, namely, where a group of persons that guide
the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed
to the body corporate and not the vice versa.
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 27 of 39
Otherwise, there has to be a specific act attributed to
the Director or any other person allegedly in control
and management of the company, to the effect that
such a person was responsible for the acts committed
by or on behalf of the company.”
8.3 As held by this Court in the case of India Infoline
Limited (supra), in the order issuing summons, the
learned Magistrate has to record his satisfaction
about a prima facie case against the accused who are
Managing Director, the Company Secretary and the
Directors of the Company and the role played by them
in their respective capacities which is sine qua non for
initiating criminal proceedings against them.
Looking to the averments and the allegations in
the complaint, there are no specific allegations and/or
averments with respect to role played by them in their
capacity as Chairman, Managing Director, Executive
Director, Deputy General Manager and Planner &
Executor. Merely because they are Chairman,
Managing Director/Executive Director and/or Deputy
General Manager and/or Planner/Supervisor of A1 &
A6, without any specific role attributed and the role
played by them in their capacity, they cannot be
arrayed as an accused, more particularly they cannot
be held vicariously liable for the offences committed
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 28 of 39
by A1 & A6.
25. The Ld. Trial Court in para no. 90 of the impugned
judgment has specifically recorded the finding that there was not
apparent material in the evidence of prosecution witnesses to
show that they were in-charge of or responsible to accused no. 1
company (M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd.) for the conduct
of its day to day affairs and there was no clear evidence that these
accused had signed any material document on behalf of the
company. Thus, the Ld. Trial Court was also of the view that the
appellant/convict was not actively involved in the conduct of day
to day affairs of the company.
26. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and the finding
recorded by the Ld. Trial Court, this court is of considered
opinion that the appellant/convict was not actively involved in
the conduct of day to day affairs of the company and he had not
signed any document through which the public at large was
cheated by M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. Applying the
law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
‘Ravindranatha Bajpe (supra)’, this court is of considered opinion
that without proving the active role played by the
appellant/convict with criminal intent and in absence of specific
provision of vicarious liability in IPC, he could not have been
convicted only on the ground that he was the director of the
company at the relevant time.
27. The Ld. Trial Court has discussed the role of
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 29 of 39
appellant/accused in para no. 90 of the impugned judgment. The
Ld. Trial Court observed that there was no clear evidence that
these witnesses (accused, the word witnesses seems to be a
clerical mistake) had signed any material document on behalf of
company but still the court cannot ignore the fact that PW-40 has
specifically identified these accused persons as well though
during cross-examination by Ld. APP for CBI. The Ld. Trial
Court also observed that even PW-20 deposed about involvement
of appellant/convict, though, he could identify him. Thus, with
respect to the active role of appellant/convict, the Ld. Trial Court
while convicting the appellant/convict has relied upon the
testimonies of PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh and PW-40 Smt.
Kanta Kapoor. The testimonies of these witnesses need to be
appreciated as per the established principles of criminal
jurisprudence and nothing can be presumed.
28. To prove the prosecution case, the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses must be reliable. It is not the quantity but
the quality of the testimony of the witness that helps a court in
arriving at a conclusion in any case. The test in this regard is that
the evidence adduced by the parties must have a ring of truth. In
a criminal trial, the prosecution has to prove the case beyond
reasonable doubt and it is possible only when the testimony of
prosecution witnesses is cogent, trustworthy and credible. To
secure a conviction of accused, the testimony of the prosecution
witness must be of sterling quality.
29. In case titled as Rai Sandeep @ Deepu Vs. State (NCT of
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 30 of 39
Delhi) cited as (2012) 8 SCC 21, it is held that :
“22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling
witness” should be of a very high quality and
caliber whose version should, therefore, be
unassailable. The court considering the
version of such witness should be in a position
to accept it for its face value without any
hesitation. To test the quality of such a
witness, the status of the witness would be
immaterial and what would be relevant is the
truthfulness of the statement made by such a
witness. What would be more relevant would
be the consistency of the statement right from
the starting point till the end, namely, at the
time when the witness makes the initial
statement and ultimately before the court. It
should be natural and consistent with the case
of the prosecution qua the accused. There
should not be any prevarication in the version
of such a witness. The witness should be in a
position to withstand the Cross examination
of any length and howsoever strenuous it may
be and under no circumstances should given
room for any doubt as to the factum of the
occurrence, the persons involved, as well as
the sequence of it. Such a version should haveCrl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 31 of 39
corelation with each and every one of other
supporting material such as the recoveries
made, the weapons used, the manner of
offence committed, the scientific evidence and
the expert opinion. The said version should
consistently match with the version of very
other witness. It can even be stated that it
should be akin to the test applied in the case
of circumstantial evidence where there should
not be any missing link in the chain of
circumstances to hold the accused guilty of
the offence alleged against him. Only, if the
version of such a witness qualifies the above
test as well as all other such similar tests to
be applied, can it be held that such a witness
can be called as a “sterling witness’ whose
version can be accepted by the court without
any corroboration and based on which the
guilty can be punished. To be more precise,
the version of the said witness on the core
spectrum of the crime should remain intact
while all other attendant materials, namely,
oral, documentary and material objects
should match the said version in material
particulars in order to enable the court trying
the offence to rely on the core version to sieveCrl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 32 of 39
the other supporting materials for holding the
offender guilty of the charge alleged.”
30. In case of Ramdas Vs. State of Maharashtra cited as (2007)
SCC 170, it is held that :
“23. It is no doubt true that the conviction in
a case of rape can be based solely on the
testimony of the prosecutrix, but that can be
done in a case where the court is convinced
about the truthfulness of the prosecutrix and
there exist no circumstances with cast of
shadow of doubt over her veracity. It the
evidence of the prosecutrix is of such quality
that may be sufficient to sustain an order of
conviction solely on the basis of her
testimony. In the instant case we do not fine
her evidence to be of such quality.”
31. Thus, from the above said judgments, it is clear that the
version of the witness should be natural one and it must
corroborate the prosecution case. Such version must match with
the testimony of other prosecution witnesses. It should be of such
a quality that there should not be any shadow of doubt upon it.
32. PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh deposed that in April, 1989
he had seen advertisement regarding booking of plots in the
name of Pink City Colony at Noida which was sponsored by H.
S. Chaudhary Estate. He further deposed that he visited the office
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 33 of 39
of H. S. Chaudhary Estate situted at Ashok Vihar where he met
with Mr. Rahul Jain (appellant/convict) and Ravi Kant. He
further deposed that he cannot identify Rahul Jain
(appellant/convict) and Ravi Kant). In his cross-examination by
the Ld. Senior PP for CBI, PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh deposed
that he did not remember that Sh. Rahul Jain and Sh. Ravi Kant
abovenamed had told him in the office that Pink City-I was an
approved colony by UP government. He also deposed that he did
not remember that Ravi Kant had also given the broucher or that
he had stated before CBI Inspector that Ravi Kant had given him
the broucher. He also deposed that he did not remember that he
had told the CBI and got recorded in his statement that Ravi Kant
and Rahul Jain were director of the company. Thus, PW-20 Sh.
Charanjeet Singh had turned hostile qua the role as well as on the
identity of appellant/convict and in these circumstances, he had
failed to bring any incriminating evidence on record against
appellant/convict. This court is of considered opinion that PW-20
Sh. Charanjeet Singh was not a witness of sterling quality and his
testimony cannot be relied upon to secure the conviction of
appellant/convict.
33. PW-40 Smt. Kant Kapoor deposed that she had booked
plot in Pink City-I, Noida which was being developed by M/s H.
S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. She further deposed that her
brother-in-law (behnoi) had gone to the office of M/s H. S.
Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. for booking the aforementioned plot
and he met Rahul Jain (appellant/convict) and Ravi Kant there
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 34 of 39
and on their asking booked the plot. She also deposed that M/s H.
S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. had shown the paper showing the
aforesaid project approved by the government and on this belief
the plot was booked and she had given cash to her brother-in-law
who in turn made payment to M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt.
Ltd. She specifically deposed that she personally had not gone to
the office of M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. and she failed
to identify the accused persons. Thus, as per the examination-in-
chief of PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor, she did not meet the
appellant/convict nor she had visited the office of M/s H. S.
Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. for booking the plot. The brother-in-
law (behnoi) of PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor was not examined as
PW. PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor had not produced any receipt
allegedly signed by appellant/convict. PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor
was declared hostile and was cross-examined by Ld. Spl. APP
for CBI in which she changed her stand and gave the answers to
the questions put to her by Ld. Spl. APP for CBI in affirmative
and deposed that she had personally visited to the office of M/s
H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. and she had met Rahul Jain
(appellant/convict) and Ravi Kant. She also identified the
appellant on the pointing out by the Ld. Spl. APP for CBI. The
incident pertains to year 1989 and PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor
was examined on 01.11.2013 i.e. after about 24 years of the
incident. PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor had taken two different
contradictory stands in her examination-in-chief and cross-
examination which cannot co-exist and this raises serious doubts
on her veracity as well as the prosecution story. Identification of
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 35 of 39
appellant/convict on the pointing out by the Ld. Spl. APP for CBI
that too after changing her stand, after lapse of 24 years without
production of any document in this regard, does not inspire
confidence. Thus, the testimony of PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor
cannot be relied upon.
34. Applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Rai Sandeep (supra) and Ramdas (Supra), this court is of the
considered opinion that PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh and PW-40
Smt. Kanta Kapoor are not witnesses of sterling quality as their
versions are not natural and they have failed to withstood the test
of cross examination. This court is of the considered opinion that
the testimonies of PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh and PW-40 Smt.
Kanta Kapoor are not clear, cogent, credible, trustworthy and
consistent and have not been corroborated by the other
prosecution witnesses and documentary evidence on record and
the circumstances.
35. It is established principle of law that if two views are
possible, the view favourable to the accused must be accepted.
The benefit of doubt must always go to the accused as the
prosecution has to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
36. The Hon’ble Apex court in Rang Bahadur Singh Vs. State
of U.P. reported in AIR 2000 SC 1209 has held as follows:-
“The timetested rule in that acquittal of a guilty
person should be preferred to conviction of an
innocent person. Unless the prosecutionCrl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 36 of 39
establishes the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt a conviction cannot be passed
on the accused. A criminal court cannot afford to
deprive liberty of the appellants, lifelong liberty,
without having at least a reasonable level of
certainty that the appellants were the real
culprits.”
37. In yet another decision in State of U.P. Vs. Ram Veer
Singh and Another reported in 2007(6) Supreme 164 the Hon’ble
Apex Court has held as follows:-
“The golden thread which runs through the
web of administration of justice in criminal cases
is that if two view are possible on the evidence
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of
the accused and the other to his innocence, the
view which is favourable to the accused should be
adopted. The paramount consideration of the
Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is
prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may
arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than
from the conviction of an innocent. In a case
where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is
cast upon the appellate Court to reappreciate the
evidence where the accused has been acquitted,
for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 37 of 39
of the accused really committed any offence or
not.”
38. In the present case due to not arraigning the company i.e.
M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. as an accused during the
trial, non-proving of active/specific role of appellant/convict with
criminal intent, no specific provision of vicarious liability in IPC,
contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of star
witnesses of prosecution i.e. PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh and
PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor and the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in ‘Aneeta Hada (supra), Sharad Kumar
Sanghi (supra) & ‘Ravindranatha Bajpe (supra), serious doubts
have been created on the prosecution story and the evidence led
by the prosecution before the Ld. Trial Court and two views are
possible in the present case and hence the benefit of the same
must go to the appellant/convict.
39. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this court is of
considered opinion that the conviction and sentence of the
appellant for the substantive offence of 420 IPC as well as
120B/420 IPC cannot be sustained. Accordingly the present
appeal is hereby allowed and the impugned judgment of
conviction of appellant dated 25.07.2018 and the impugned
sentence order dated 04.08.2018 are hereby set-aside. Appellant
is hereby acquitted of the offence punishable under Sec. 420 IPC
as well as Sec. 120B/420 IPC.
Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018,
Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 38 of 39
40. File be consigned to Record Room after due compliance.
Trial Court Record be returned back to Ld. Trial Court alongwith
copy of this judgment.
Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR Announced in the open court KUMAR KHARTA KHARTA Date: on 26th day of July, 2025 2025.07.26 13:16:06 +0530 (Virender Kumar Kharta) ASJ/FTC-02(CENTRAL) TIS HAZARI COURTS:DELHI:26.07.2025 Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 39 of 39