Jharkhand High Court
Rahul Singh @ Rahul Kumar vs The State Of Jharkhand on 3 April, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Gautam Kumar Choudhary
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 76 of 2025
-----
Rahul Singh @ Rahul Kumar, aged about 22 years, son of Shiv Murti @
Shibu Murti @ Shivmurti, R/o Kargali Bazar, Near Gurudwara, PO & PS-
Bermo, District-Bokaro ....... ... Appellant
Versus
The State of Jharkhand ... ... Respondent
-------
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GAUTAM KUMAR CHOUDHARY
-------
For the Appellant : Mr. Ravi Prakash, Advocate
Mr. Ganesh Ram, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mrs. Shweta Singh, APP
------
rd
Order No.07/Dated: 3 April 2025
I.A. No. 2949 of 2025
1. The instant interlocutory application has been filed under Section 430(1)
of the BNSS, 2023 for keeping the sentence in abeyance in connection
with the judgment of conviction dated 13.12.2024 and order of sentence
dated 16.12.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II,
F.T.C. (C.A.W), Bermo at Tenughat (Bokaro) in connection with Sessions
Trial No.292 of 2023 arising out of Bermo (Mahila) PS Case No.01 of
2023, whereby and whereunder, the appellant has been convicted under
sections 376 (2) (n) of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for twelve
years for the offence under sections 376 (2) (n) of the IPC and a fine of
Rs.10,000/- for the said offence and in default of payment of fine, further
directed to undergo RI for six months.
Factual Matrix:
2. The prosecution story, in brief, as per written report of prosecutrix dated
02.01.2023 is that she developed friendship with the appellant through
social media, i.e, Facebook and Instagram. Thereafter, the accused started
establishing physical relation with her. On 26.11.2022, the accused took
the prosecutrix in the house of his friend Ali Khan where, he forcibly
established physical relation with her and when the prosecutrix told that
since, he established physical relation with her, so he had to marry her.
The accused solemnized his false marriage with the prosecutrix on
21.12.2022 in a temple.
3. Further, it has been alleged that thereafter, when the accused took the
prosecutrix to his house, his parents did not allow her to enter in their
house. When the parents of the prosecutrix came to know about the entire
occurrence, her parents called the accused and his parents at their house
on 26.12.2022 where the accused told that he is ready to take the
prosecutrix with him, but when the parents of the prosecutrix asked the
accused to give his consent in writing, he refused to take the prosecutrix
with him.
4. Thereafter the prosecutrix submitted her written application to the police
and on the basis of the same, Bermo (Mahila) PS Case No.01 of 2023 has
been instituted for the offence under section 376(2) (n)/493/417 of the
IPC.
5. On the basis of written report of prosecutrix dated 02.01.2023, former FIR
was registered bearing Bermo (Mahila) PS Case No.01 of 2023 has been
instituted for the offence under section 376(2) (n)/493/417 of the IPC
against the appellant.
6. After investigation, charge sheet was submitted and cognizance was taken
for the offence under section 376(2) (n)/493/417 of the IPC and the case
was committed to the Court of Sessions.
7. On receipt of the case record by the Office of Ld. Sessions Judge, Bermo
at Tenughat, the same was registered as Sessions Trial being Sessions
Trial No.292 of 2023 and accordingly the trial proceeded in which the
appellant has been convicted under sections 376 (2) (n) of the IPC and
sentenced to undergo RI for twelve years with fine of Rs.10,000/- for the
offence under sections 376 (2) (n) of the IPC and in default of payment of
fine, further directed to undergo RI for six months.
8. The instant interlocutory application has been preferred by the
applicant/appellant with the prayer for the suspension of sentence during
pendency of the instant appeal.
Argument by the learned counsel for the applicant/appellant:
9. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the applicant/appellant
that the learned trial court has also failed to take into consideration that in
2
the FIR, the Prosecutrix/victim has stated that she was subjected to rape
for the first time on 26.11.2022 but the FIR has been lodged on 02.01.2023
i.e. after delay of about one and half month.
10. Further, neither the explanation of delay has been explained nor the victim
has disclosed the occurrence to her parents as also the medical report does
not support the case of rape.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently and fervently urged that the
entire case as set out in the FIR and the chargesheet is false and cooked
up. The complainant is a major educated girl, who was fully conscious of
the consequences of the intimate relationship which flourished between
her and the applicant/appellant. The acts of repeated intimacy and sexual
relations were totally consensual in nature and were not established under
any false promise, threat, duress or coercion. The appellant all along
intended to marry the complainant. He thus, urged that the case of a
prolonged voluntary relationship/love affair between two consenting
adults has been given a colour of forcible sexual intercourse with oblique
purposes and motive.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant based upon the aforesaid ground has
submitted that it is a fit case for suspension of sentence.
Argument by the learned APP for the respondent-State:
13. Per contra, Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-
State has vehemently opposed the submissions advanced by the counsel
for the appellant. He urged that the appellant won over the confidence of
the prosecutrix/victim by giving her false assurances of marriage and
based on such promise he sexually exploited her, when in fact, he had no
intentions to marry her and after subjecting the complainant to forcible
sexual intercourse repeatedly, the appellant refused to solemnize marriage
with the victim.
14. It has been contended by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor
appearing for the respondent-State that the P.W.-1, the victim, her uncle
and aunt P.W.-2 & P.W.-3 respectively and her father P.W.-4 have
supported the case in all material particular relating to the occurrence.
3
15. It has also been contended that there is evidence that the said act was
committed by the appellant against the will of the prosecutrix and pretext
of marriage. Hence, Section 376 (2) (n) of the IPC is applicable in the
given facts of the case.
16. It has also been contended that the accused, from the very inception, did
not want to marry the prosecutrix rather he used to sexually assault the
victim for enjoying fun.
17. Learned counsel for the respondent state, therefore, has submitted that it
is not a fit case for suspension of sentence.
Analysis
18. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have given our
anxious consideration to the submissions advanced at the bar and have
carefully gone through the finding recorded by the learned trial court in
the impugned judgment as also the testimony of the witnesses and the
material placed on record.
19. It has been alleged in the written report that the victim developed
friendship with the appellant through Facebook and Instagram and on
26.11.2022 the appellant took her to the house of his friend where he
forcibly established physical relation with her on promise of marriage.
20. It is further alleged that the accused on the false promise of marriage with
the victim made physical relation with her and when the
informant/prosecutrix told him for solemnizing marriage, then he
solemnized marriage with her in a temple. Thereafter. The accused took
the prosecutrix to his house, his parents did not allow her to enter in their
house. When the parents of the prosecutrix came to know about the entire
occurrence, her parents called the accused and his parents at their house
on 26.12.2022 where the accused told that he is ready to take the
prosecutrix with him, but when the parents of the prosecutrix asked the
accused to give his consent in writing, he refused to take the prosecutrix
with him.
21. Therefore, in the aforesaid circumstances, we have to consider whether in
the facts and circumstances of the present case, the appellant who has been
4
prosecuted for committing rape upon the prosecutrix/victim by giving her
a false promise of marriage is able to make out a case for suspension of
his sentence during pendency of the instant appeal.
22. There is no dispute that the prosecutrix/victim, a qualified female, was
major at the time when her relationship with the appellant sprouted. The
first act of sexual intercourse between the appellant and the
prosecutrix/victim is alleged to have taken place on 26.11.2022. However,
at that time, the prosecutrix/victim did not make any complaint to anyone,
including her own family members, that the appellant had established
sexual relations with her based on an express promise to marry her in
future.
23. At this juncture and in the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspects it
needs to refer herein the core of Section 375 IPC which deals with rape,
punishable under Section 376 IPC. While the said Section 375 deals with
various aspects of rape, in the present case, the allegation against the
appellant is that the appellant had forced himself on victim/prosecutrix
without her consent and engaged in sexual intercourse. For ready
reference Section 375 is being quoted as under:
“375. Rape.–A man is said to commit “rape” if he–
(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra
or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person;
or
(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the
penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to
do so with him or any other person; or
(c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause
penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such
woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
(d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes
her to do so with him or any other person,
under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven
descriptions–
First.–Against her will.
Secondly.–Without her consent.
5
Thirdly.–With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by
putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or
of hurt.
Fourthly.–With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her
husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is
another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.
Fifthly.–With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by
reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by
him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome
substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of
that to which she gives consent.
Sixthly.–With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years
of age.
Seventhly.–When she is unable to communicate consent.”
24. In this regard it would also be profitable to refer to Section 90 of
the IPC which deals with consent given either under fear or
misconception. Section 90 provides that a consent is not a consent under
the IPC if such a consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under
a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has
reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequences of such fear
or misconception. For ready reference the same is being quoted as under:
“90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.–
A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this
Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under
a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has
reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such
fear or misconception; or…”
25. Thus, Section 375 of the IPC clearly stipulates that a person is said to have
committed rape if he performs any of the sexual acts mentioned under sub-
clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) without the consent of the woman. As referred
hereinabove, in terms of Section 90 of the IPC, if the consent is given
6
under a misconception of fact, such a consent is no consent in the eyes of
law and cannot be considered to be willful and voluntary consent.
26. Taking in to consideration the aforesaid aspect the Hon’ble Apex Court
has observed in the case of Shambhu Kharwar v. State of Uttar Pradesh
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1032 as follows:
“11. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC
608, a two Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part
(D.Y. Chandrachud J.), held in Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of
Uttar Pradesh (2021) 18 SCC 517, observed that:
“12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to
Section 375 of the IPC involves an active understanding of the
circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An
individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating
various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various
possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction,
consents to such action…
14. […] Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court
has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given
on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the
breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently
not fulfilled…
16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the
maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it
but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual
relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the
woman’s “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise
cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise,
the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding
his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under
Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact”
where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage
in the said act…
18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above
cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must
involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed
act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a
7
“misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two
propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must
have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention
of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself
must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the
woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.
27. Thus, it is evident that where the promise to marry is false and the intention
of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by
it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations,
there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman’s “consent”. On
the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise.
To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no
intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it.
28. In the case of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 3471 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that to make a
man, accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of
marriage, criminally liable, the physical relationship must be traceable
directly to the false promise made and it must not be qualified by other
circumstances or consideration.
29. It has further been observed that in a situation where the woman
knowingly maintains the physical relationship for a prolonged period, it
cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely
because of alleged promise made by the accused to marry her.
30. In conclusion, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that unless it can be shown
that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of
marriage and without being influenced by any other consideration, it
cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of
fact. It was further held that even if it is assumed that a false promise of
8
marriage was made to the complainant initially by the accused, the fact
that the relationship continued for a period of nine long years would render
the plea of the complainant that her consent for all these years was under
misconception of the fact that the accused would marry her implausible,
for ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is
being quoted as under:
” 22. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by
making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally
liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the
false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or
consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical
relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such
as personal liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal
marital ties. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is
maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot
be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely
because of the alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her.
Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely
because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with
the physical relationship without being influenced by any other
consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under
misconception of fact.
27…… In our opinion, the longer the duration of the physical
relationship between the partners without protest and insistence by the
female partner for marriage would be indicative of a consensual
relationship rather than a relationship based on false promise of
marriage by the male partner and thus, based on misconception of
fact.”
28. Moreover, even if it is assumed that a false promise of marriage was
made to the complainant initially by the appellant, even though no such
cogent evidence has been brought on record before us to that effect, the
fact that the relationship continued for nine long years, would render
the plea of the complainant that her consent for all these years was
under misconception of fact that the Appellant would marry her
implausible. Consequently, the criminal liability attached to such false
promise would be diluted after such a long passage of time and in light
of the fact that no protest was registered by the complainant during all
those years. Such a prolonged continuation of physical relationship
without demurral or remonstration by the female partner, in effect takes
out the sting of criminal culpability and neutralises it.
29. It will be very difficult to assume that the complainant who is
otherwise a mature person with two grown up children, was unable to
discover the deceitful behaviour of the appellant who continued to have
sexual relationship with her for such a long period on the promise of
marriage. Any such mendacious act of the appellant would have been
exposed sooner without having to wait for nine years. The inference one
9
can draw under the circumstances is that there was no such false
promise made to the complainant by the appellant of marriage by
continuing to have physical relationship so as to bring this act within
the province of Section 376 IPC and therefore, there was no vitiation of
consent under misconception of fact.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
31. In our view if criminality is to be attached to such prolonged
physical relationship at a very belated stage, it can lead to serious
consequences. It will open the scope for imputing criminality to such
long term relationships after turning sour, as such an allegation can be
made even at a belated stage to drag a person in the juggernaut of
stringent criminal process. There is always a danger of attributing
criminal intent to an otherwise disturbed civil relationship of which the
Court must also be mindful.
31. It is trite that there is a distinction between rape and consensual
intercourse. This Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7
SCC 675 differentiated between a mere breach of promise and not
fulfilling a false promise and held that an accused will only be liable if the
Courts concludes that his intentions are mala fide and he has clandestine
motives. The relevant extract is reproduced hereinbelow:–
“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason,
accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the
good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape
and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very
carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry
the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to
this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of
cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach
of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must
examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of
marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given
after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual
indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have
sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused,
and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the
accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he
could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was
unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for
rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the
accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show
that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had10
no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the
victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having
the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various
unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with
respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear
from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception
of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception
of fact”, the fact must have an immediate
relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal
liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from
the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry
her.”
(emphasis supplied)
32. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Naim Ahmed v. State
(NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 89 while distinguishing false
promise to marry from breach of promise by the accused observed as
under:
“21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that
the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the
misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry
her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was
no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly
of Section 375 IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a
difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of
promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right
from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the
prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by
giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust,
whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility
that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to
marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain
circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his
control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a
folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to
prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier,
each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court.”
33. Thus, there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing
breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused
right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the
prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceived the prosecutrix by giving
a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas
11
in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused
might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and
subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen
by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to
fulfil his promise.
34. Thus, from the aforesaid settled position of law it is evident that the
accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has willfully
agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also recognized that a
prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love
and passion for the accused. Further it is not in doubt that a man can be
held liable if he engages into a physical relationship with any woman on
the false pretext of marriage. However, in order to hold such man
criminally accountable, it must be shown that such physical relationship
is a direct consequence of the false promise made by the accused, and is
not marred by any other consideration or circumstance on the part of the
woman.
35. For the aforesaid reason, in instances where the physical relationship
between the prosecutrix and the accused is continued for a long period, it
cannot be said with conviction that the same is only based out of the
alleged promise made by the accused. Further, there must be adequate
evidence to indicate that ab initio, the accused had no intention
whatsoever to keep his promise to marry the prosecutrix. Consequently,
unless it can be established that the physical relationship was chiefly
because of the alleged promise, and is not influenced by any other
consideration thereby being directly linked to the alleged promise made
12
by the accused, it cannot be said that the consent of the woman was based
on a misconception of fact.
36. Testing the facts of the case at hand, on the touchstone of the above
precedents, we have gone through the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses especially P.W.1(prosecutrix) wherein she has stated that on
26.11.2020, she came in contact with the accused/applicant through
Facebook and they developed love affair between them. She has further
testified that on 26.11.2022, the accused called her at the house of his
friend Ali Khan and established physical relation against her will and
when she objected him, the accused assured to marry her and thereafter,
continued establishing physical relation with her on pretext of marriage.
She has further testified that when she pressurized the accused/applicant
for their marriage, then on 21.12.2022, the accused took the prosecutrix in
a temple and put vermilion on her forehead. Thereafter, the accused has
taken the victim to his house, but his parents refused to accept her.
37. She had further testified that when her parents came to know about the
same, they went there and brought her and kept her mobile phone. After
some days, when her parents have given the mobile phone to her, she saw
the message of accused in which he asked her as to whether, she talked
with her parents about their marriage or not. Thereafter, she narrated to
her parents that she and the accused were in physical relation, then, her
parents called the accused and his parents in a meeting on 26.12.2022 and
in the meeting, her parents told to her that if she wanted to go with the
accused, she has to give in writing to which, she agreed, but the accused
refused to keep her. Thereafter, she has filed this case.
13
38. Thus, from the testimony of victim/informant it is evident that there was
friendship and love affair between the prosecutrix and the
applicant/appellant since 2020 and when the said sexual relationship
established between them, the prosecutrix was major at that time. Further
she herself testified that she pressurized the accused/applicant for their
marriage, then on 21.12.2022, the accused took the prosecutrix in a temple
and put vermilion on her forehead and thereafter, the accused has taken
the victim to his house, but his parents refused to accept her. From the
aforesaid conduct it appears that he was in serious relationship with the
victim/prosecutrix otherwise he would not take the prosecutrix to his
parental house.
39. Admittedly the FIR was instituted after the delay of more than one and
half month and this regard no satisfactory explanation has been put
forward by the prosecution, rather it appears from record that when
panchayati between the parents of victim and applicant/appellant has not
produced the desired result then the FIR in the instant case has been
lodged.
40. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid discussion primafacie it cannot be
stated that the applicant/appellant has established sexual relationship with
the prosecutrix on the pretext of false promise of marriage.
41. Therefore, in our opinion, even if the allegations made by the complainant
are accepted on their face value, it is evident that the appellant and the
victim were in relationship. Further it is evident from the impugned order
that the medical examination of the prosecutrix did not point towards any
external injury mark on the person of the prosecutrix. It was also noted
that there is no medical evidence to support the version of the prosecutrix.
14
42. Upon a reading of the statement of the prosecutrix and the materials on
record, it is evident that the victim and applicant/appellant were
acquainted with each other and the prosecutrix was mature enough to fully
understand what was happening between them. For this reason, primafacie
it cannot be said that the consent of the prosecutrix was vitiated by virtue
of Section 90 of the IPC.
43. Moreover, even if it is assumed that a false promise of marriage was made
to the victim initially by the applicant/appellant, even though no such
cogent evidence has been brought on record before us to that effect, and
further as per the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case
of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra(supra), the criminal
liability attached to such false promise would be diluted in light of the fact
that no protest was registered by the victim during existence of the said
relationship.
44. In the instant case also, admittedly the prosecutrix/victim is an educated
woman and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her which could have
prevented her from filing a police complaint forthwith against the accused
if she felt that the sexual relations were under duress or were being
established under a false assurance of marriage. Thus, the version that the
victim allowed the accused/appellant to establish sexual relations with her
under the misconception of marriage is not fully reliable. Therefore,
primafacie it is apparent that the relationship between the
prosecutrix/victim and appellant was consensual without the existence of
any element of deceit or misconception.
45. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law and admitted
factual aspect which has been referred in the preceding paragraphs of this
15
order, it is hard to believe that the prosecutrix/victim, being a qualified
and major woman, kept on bending to the demands of the appellant
without raising any protest to any quarter that the appellant was exploiting
her sexually under the pretext of a false promise of marriage. Further, the
sexual relations continued unabatedly between the parties, is primafacie
sufficient to indicate that there was absence of an element of
misconception in the relationship of the victim and the appellant.
46. We, however, make it clear that our decision in this case and observations
made are to be understood in the factual matrix before this Court reason
being that every case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances,
for we are dealing with human relationships and psychology which are
dynamic and permeated with an array of unpredictable human emotions
and sensitivities and hence, every decision relating to human relationships
must be based on the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in the
particular case.
47. Thus, on the basis of discussion made hereinabove, this Court of the
considered view that the it is fit case where prayer for suspension of
sentence during pendency of the instant appeal may be allowed.
48. Accordingly, the instant Interlocutory Application stands allowed.
49. In view thereof, the appellant, named above, is directed to be released on
bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only)
with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned
Additional Sessions Judge-II, F.T.C. (C.A.W), Bermo at Tenughat
(Bokaro) in connection with Sessions Trial No.292 of 2023 arising out of
Bermo (Mahila) PS Case No.01 of 2023.
16
50. It is made clear that any observation made hereinabove will not prejudice
the case of the parties on merit since the appeal is lying pending for its
consideration.
51. In view thereof, I.A. No.2949 of 2025 stands disposed of with the
aforesaid observation.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Gautam Kumar Choudhary, J.)
Sudhir/
NAFR
17
[ad_1]
Source link