Jharkhand High Court
Raj Kumar Aged About 37 Years Son Of Late … vs Archana Devi @ Chunni W/O Raj Kumar … on 16 June, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
First Appeal No.144 of 2022
------
Raj Kumar aged about 37 years son of Late Balmiki Prasad, resident
of Kharkhari Maheshpur, P.O. Maheshpur, P.S. Madhuban, District-
Dhanbad .... .... Petitioner/Appellant
Versus
Archana Devi @ Chunni W/o Raj Kumar resident of Salempur, P.O.
Salempur, P.S. Rahui, District-Nalanda (Bihar).
…. …. Respondent/ Respondent
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
——
For the Appellant : Mr. Arun Kumar, Advocate
For the Resp. No.1 : Mr. Lukesh Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Belal Ashraf Khan, Advocate
------
18/Dated: 16.06.2025
I.A. No.7059 of 2025
1. Learned counsel for the appellant has filed the instant interlocutory
application for deletion of name of respondent no.2 from the array of
respondents.
2. There is no opposition by the learned counsel appearing for respondent
no.1.
3. This Court, taking into consideration the reason assigned at paragraph
no.3, 4 and 5 of the instant interlocutory application, is of the view that
the present application needs to be allowed.
4. Accordingly, I.A. No.7059 of 2025 stands allowed.
5. Office is directed to delete the name of respondent no.2 from the array
of respondents.
I.A. No.4638 of 2025
6. In consequent to disposal of I.A. No.7059 of 2025, learned counsel for
1
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
the appellant has submitted that he is not pressing the instant
interlocutory application.
7. Accordingly, interlocutory application being I.A. No.4638 of 2025 is
dismissed as rendered to be infructuous.
First Appeal No.144 of 2022
8. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act, is
directed against the order dated 27.08.2022 and decree (decree
sealed and signed on 05.09.2022) passed by the learned Addl.
Principal Judge, Addl. Family Court-I, Dhanbad in Original Suit No.
160 of 2021, whereby and whereunder, the petition filed under
Section 13(1)-(i) & (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for
dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and adultery, has
been dismissed.
9. The brief facts of the case, as per plaint need to be referred, as
under:
10. It is the case of the appellant/plaintiff that the marriage between
plaintiff-husband (hereinafter referred to as the ‘appellant’) and
Defendant No.1-wife (hereinafter referred to as the ‘respondent’)
was solemnized on 22.07.2013 at Maheshpur as per Hindu rites and
customs and after marriage, they lived together as husband and wife
at Maheshpur. Out of the said wedlock, the couple are blessed with
a child namely Aarabh, aged about 4 years.
2
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
11. It has been averred that respondent-wife is a highly sentimental and
quarrelsome lady who used to torture, abuse and insult the appellant
and she is living separately from the appellant since 10.02.2020. It
has been averred that respondent-wife has illicit and love
relationship with her Jija.
12. According to plaint of plaintiff, cause of action for the present suit
arose on 22.07.2013 when the marriage of parties was performed
and it also arose on several occasions including on 15.02.2021
when respondent-wife behaved and committed cruelty upon the
appellant.
13. Defendants did not appear before the court in spite of proper service
of Summons and hence, the proceeding of the suit was taken up ex-
parte against them. Since, defendants did not appear before the
Court, therefore, no reconciliation could take place between the
parties.
14. Hence, the appellant/plaintiff had no option but to file this divorce
case for the dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and
adultery.
15. It is evident from the factual aspect that the appellant/petitioner had
a motion by filing a petition under Section 13(1)-(i) & (i-a) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, for decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty
and adultery.
3
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
16. Since the defendants did not appear before the court in spite of proper
service of Summons and hence, the proceeding of the suit was taken up
ex-parte against them. Since, defendants did not appear before the Court,
therefore, no reconciliation taken place between the parties.
17. The issue has been framed by the learned Family Court for consideration
of the main point, i.e.;
(i) Whether the respondent-wife (defendant no.1) is guilty of adultery?
(ii) Whether the respondent-wife (defendant no.1) has been treated the
appellant (plaintiff) with cruelty?
(iii) Whether the marriage between them is liable to be dissolved on
these grounds?
18. The evidences have been produced on behalf of the appellant (plaintiff)
and produced the witnesses as also they have been examined.
19. Thereafter, the judgment has been passed dismissing the suit by holding
that none of the grounds either of cruelty or adultery has been established
by the appellant, which is the subject matter of the present appeal.
Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner:
20. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant/petitioner that the factual
aspect which was available before the learned Family Judge supported by
the evidences adduced on behalf of the appellant has not properly been
4
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
considered and as such, the judgment impugned is perverse, hence, not
sustainable in the eyes of law.
21. It has been submitted that the respondent-wife is a highly sentimental
and quarrelsome lady who used to torture, abuse and insult the appellant
(plaintiff) and she is living separately from the plaintiff since 10.02.2020.
22. It has further been submitted that the respondent-wife has illicit
relationship with her Jija.
23. It has further been submitted that the issue of cruelty and adultery has not
been taken into consideration in right perspective.
24. Learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner, based upon the aforesaid
grounds, has submitted that the judgment impugned suffers from
perversity, as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent:
25. Per contra, Mr. Lukesh Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent-wife,
while defending the impugned judgment, has submitted that there is no
error in the impugned judgement. The learned Family Judge has
considered the issue of cruelty and adultery and come to the conclusion
that no evidence has been adduced to establish the issue either of cruelty
or adultery and hence, dismissed the petition.
5
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
26. It has been contended that the mere allegation of cruelty is not suffice to
grant decree of divorce on the ground cruelty unless and until, it is
established by the cogent and reliable piece of evidence.
27. It has also been submitted that the evidence of appellant (plaintiff)
regarding illicit/extra matrimonial relationship of respondent-wife with her
Jija has not been corroborated by any of the witnesses.
28. It has been submitted that there is no evidence on record which could
prove the allegation of adultery against the respondent-wife (defendant
no.1).
29. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that if
on that pretext, the factum of cruelty and adultery has not been found to
be established, hence, the impugned judgment cannot be said to suffer
from error.
Analysis:
30. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned
judgment.
31. The case has been heard at length. The admitted fact herein is that the
suit for divorce has been filed on the ground of cruelty and adultery, i.e.,
by filing an application under Section 13(1)-(i) & (i-a) of the Hindu
6
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
Marriage Act, 1955 and accordingly, issues have been framed which
pertain to cruelty and adultery.
32. The evidence has been led on behalf of the appellant (plaintiff). For ready
reference, the evidences led on behalf of the appellant are being referred
as under:
(i) PW-1, Raj Kumar (plaintiff himself) has stated in his examination-
in-chief that his marriage was solemnized with respondent (Defendant
No.1) on 22.07.2013 at Maheshpur, Dhanbad and out of the said wedlock,
they are blessed with a male child namely Aarabh, aged about 5 years.
He has stated that respondent (Defendant No.1) is a highly sentimental
and quarrelsome lady who always quarrel with him without any rhyme and
reason, abused him and his family member and tortured them in various
manner. He has stated that when he scolded her, his wife left her
matrimonial home and went anywhere without informing them and
anyhow they find her.
(ii) He has further deposed that his wife not bears a good character,
she always attracted with other male persons and talked with them
through phone for a long time and when he objected the same, she
started quarrel with him. He has stated that on 08.02.2022 in the morning,
brother-in-law (Jija) of his wife Prabin Ranjan Prince came to his house
from Patna. He has further stated that on 08.02.2020 at about 10:00 A.M
he went out from his house in connection with his work and when he
7
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
returned to his house at about 01:00 P.M, he found his wife with her Jija
Prabin Ranjan Prince in an objectionable condition. He has stated that
when he objected the same, his wife started quarrel with him and also
stopped to talk. He has stated that on 10.02.2020 she left her matrimonial
home along with her belongings and their son and since then, she is living
separately and since then, they are having no relation with each other. He
has stated that except the present suit, he has not filed any case against
his wife on the other hand, his wife has also not filed any case against
him.
(iii) PW-2, Balbir Singh (friend of the plaintiff) has deposed in his
examination-in-chief that the marriage of plaintiff was solemnized with
Defendant No.1 in the year 2013 at Maheshpur, Dhanbad according to
Hindu rites and customs. He has stated that the couple are blessed with a
male child, aged about 5 years and he is living with his mother/Defendant
No.1. He has stated that Defendant No.1 is a very quarrelsome lady who
always quarrel with the plaintiff and on many occasions, she also
assaulted and tortured the plaintiff and his mother. He has stated that on
many occasions, Defendant No.1 fled away from her matrimonial home
without any information to the plaintiff and she was traced after few days.
He has stated that he also accompanied the plaintiff to search Defendant
No.1. He has stated that when he went to the house of plaintiff in the year
2020, plaintiff told him that defendant left his house. He has further stated
that after quarrel, defendant is living separately from the plaintiff.
8
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
(iv) No documentary evidence has been adduced on behalf of the
appellant (plaintiff). The evidence of these witnesses was never subjected
to cross-examination by the respondent-wife and Jija (defendant no.1 &
defendant no.2 respectively) as they never appeared for cross-
examination.
33. The learned Family Judge has gone into the interpretation of the word
“cruelty” and assessing the same from the evidences led on behalf of the
appellant as also the submission made in the pleadings, i.e., plaint, has
found that the element of cruelty and adultery could not have been
established.
34. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the evidence of
cruelty and adultery has not properly been considered and as such, the
judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of
law.
35. While on the other hand, argument has been advanced on behalf of the
respondent-wife has submitted that the judgment has well been
considered and merely by committing fraud, the suit for divorce has been
filed.
36. This Court, while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the
parties on the issue of perversity, needs to refer herein the interpretation
of the word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court
which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the
9
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
evidence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State
[Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206
while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no
doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding
relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the
finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is
rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27
of the said judgment reads as under:
“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of
cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this
Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the
findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the
evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer
from the vice of procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry’s (Calcutta) Employees’ Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR
1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a
finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber &
Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the
Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the
findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they
are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at
those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the
Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of
pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1
LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may
probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of
evidence but is altogether against the evidence.
In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse”
as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned
away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn.
“Perverse.–Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most
people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn.
Perverse.–Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.
10
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.–Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction
of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe
Encyclopedic Edn.)
Perverse.–Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or
opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
“Perverse.–A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only
against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.””
37. One of the grounds for divorce has been taken of cruelty. The “cruelty”
has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. N.G.
Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326 wherein it has been laid
down that the Court has to enquire, as to whether, the conduct charge as
cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in the mind of the petitioner, a
reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to live
with the respondent.
38. This Court, deems it fit and proper to take into consideration the meaning
of ‘cruelty’ as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shobha Rani
v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988)1 SCC 105 wherein the wife alleged that the
husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon’ble Apex Court
emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition.
39. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the “conduct in relation
to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial
obligations”. It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such
cruelty can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or unintentional.
For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the middle of the
11
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an essential element of
cruelty but it may be present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more
“a question of fact and degree.”
40. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed therein that while dealing
with such complaints of cruelty it is important for the court to not search
for a standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in
another case. What must be considered include the kind of life the parties
are used to, “their economic and social conditions”, and the “culture and
human values to which they attach importance.”
41. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal conduct such as asking
for dowry. Making allegations against the spouse in the written statement
filed before the court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute
cruelty.
42. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337, the wife alleged in
her written statement that her husba was suffering from “mental problems
and paranoid disorder”. The wife‟s lawyer also levelled allegations of
“lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family while he was
conducting a cross-examination. The Hon‟ble Apex Court held these
allegations against the husband to constitute “cruelty”.
43. In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)
6 SCC 334 the Hon‟ble Apex Court has observed by taking into
consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written
12
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
statement that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity with a
person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital
affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman,
were held to constitute “cruelty” itself.
44. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal
Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, has been pleased to observe that while
judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is
whether that conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders
the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make
one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or
humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the
spouse, etc. The conduct complained of must be “grave” and “weighty”
and trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not
constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.
45. This Court, on the premise of the interpretation of the word “cruelty” has
considered the evidences of the witnesses as has been incorporated by
the learned Court in the impugned judgment.
46. Herein, the main ground of cruelty has been taken by the
appellant/plaintiff that the respondent-wife is a quarrelsome lady who
used to torture, abuse and insult the plaintiff. She always quarreled with
him without any rhyme and reason, abused him and his family member
and tortured them in various manner.
13
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
47. The said ground, therefore, cannot be said to be sufficient to prove the
ground of cruelty, as such, the said ground has been disbelieved by the
learned Family Judge.
48. So far as the ground of adultery is concerned, the argument has been
advanced that the respondent wife is having bad character. She always
attracted with other male person and talked with them through phone for a
long time and when objected the same, she started quarrel with him. The
further argument is that when he went out from his house in connection
with his work and when he returned to his house at about 1:00 p.m., he
found his wife with her Jija-Prabin Ranjan Prince in an objectionable
condition.
49. As per the statutory provision as provided under Section 13(1)(i) of the
Hindu Marriage Act where the ground for adultery has also been provided
to be taken as a ground for dissolution of marriage but it is incumbent
upon the party to take the ground of adultery for dissolution of marriage to
substantiate the same on the basis of cogent evidence. It is not available
for a party concerned that by merely making submission of adultery, the
adultery will be said to be proved, rather, the issue of adultery since
belongs to the character assassination of a party, is to substantiate with
the cogent and valid evidence.
50. This Court, taking into consideration the statutory provision as provided
under Section 13(1)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act where the ground for
14
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
adultery has been provided to be taken as a ground for dissolution of
marriage but it is incumbent upon the party while taking the ground of
adultery for dissolution of marriage to substantiate the same on the basis
of cogent evidence. It is not available for a party concerned that by merely
making submission of adultery, the adultery will be said to be proved,
rather, the issue of adultery since belongs to the character assassination
of a party, is to substantiate with the cogent and valid evidence.
51. It needs to refer herein that according to (Encyc. 156) Cp. FORNICATION
adultery is “the offence of incontinence by married persons”. Adultery has
been defined in the following manner in Standard Treatises, such as
Rydon on Divorce, 10th Edition: —
“Consensual sexual intercourse between a
married person and a person of the Opposite
sex, not the other spouse during the subsistence
of the marriage.”
52. The fact that adultery has taken place can be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances, such as undue familiarities, admissions,
suspicious circumstances, improper behaviour, inclination of the spouses
and the opportunities available. Adultery can rarely be proved by direct
evidence which is looked upon only with disfavour.
53. Further, the onus to prove this charge of adultery is upon the person
making allegation of adultery. He or she has to satisfy the court by leading
sufficient and proper evidence. The evidence must be clear, cogent and
convincing. It should admit only one inference before it can be accepted
15
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
to infer adultery. Circumstantial and presumptive evidence assumes
importance in the case of adultery because direct evidence is normally not
possible. The uncorroborated evidence supported by circumstantial
evidence at times can be considered sufficient, cogent and reliable.
54. It requires to refer herein that Court is required to be satisfied that the
offence is proved and this requires proof by a preponderance of
probability, but the degree of probability depends on the subject-matter,
so that, in proportion as the offence is grave, so should the proof be clear.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required and it is a misdirection for
the court to require itself to be satisfied with the same certainty as in a
criminal case. This is precisely the law prevailing in England after the
decision in Blyth v. Blyth, (1966) 1 All ER 524).
55. The Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court was dealing with the
standard of proof required in case of a matrimonial offence in a petition for
divorce in the case of Prem Masih v. Mst. Kumudani Bai & Anr. (AIR
1974 Madhya Pradesh 88), which reads as under: —
“The case of Blyth v. Blyth (1966) 1 All ER 524 will,
therefore, show’ that the view expressed in Preston-
Jones’ case (1951 AC 391) that the standard of proof
in case of a matrimonial offence in a petition for
divorce is proof beyond reasonable doubt, does not
now hold the field and that the correct test in that
matter-is that expressed by Dixon, J. in (1948) 77
CLR 191 (Supra). In view of the mandate in Section 716
2025:JHHC:15773-DBof the Act that the principles and rules on which the
Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England
for the time being acts and gives relief should be
applied by the Indian Courts, we feel that now the
standard of proof recommended in (1966) 1 All ER
524) (Supra) will have to be applied by the Indian
Courts also But the change in principle as to the
standard of proof will most often not make any
difference in the result, for even applying the civil,
standard of proof to a divorce proceeding based
on adultery, a high standard of proof will be needed
to satisfy the Court that adultery has been
committed.”
56. This Court, on consideration of the impugned judgment as also the
material available on record, has found that no such cogent evidence has
been produced by the husband to prove the ground of adultery except his
own narration.
57. The learned Family Judge has taken into consideration the aforesaid
aspects of the matter and the settled proposition of law as referred
hereinabove had observed that no evidence in the regard of adultery has
been brought on record by the appellant and accordingly negated the
claim of appellant.
58. This Court, on consideration of the impugned judgment as also the
material available on record, has found that no such cogent evidence has
been produced by the husband to prove the ground of adultery.
17
2025:JHHC:15773-DB
59. The learned Family Judge has taken into consideration the aforesaid
aspects of the matter, as such, the said ground has been held to be not
applicable as a ground for divorce.
60. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that the learned Family Judge has
considered the fact that the appellant-husband has miserably failed to
establish the allegation of illicit relationship of the respondent-wife with
other person which also amounts to “cruelty’ upon the respondent-wife at
the hands of the appellant.
61. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the
appellant/petitioner has failed to establish the element of perversity in the
impugned judgment as per the discussion made hereinabove, as such,
the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed.
62. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is, dismissed.
63. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Rohit/-A.F.R.
18