Raj Kumar Das And Ors vs The State Of West Bengal And Another on 7 January, 2025

0
122

Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Raj Kumar Das And Ors vs The State Of West Bengal And Another on 7 January, 2025

                     IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

                      Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction

                             APPELLATE SIDE

Present:

The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)



                              CRR 1519 of 2020


                            Raj Kumar Das and Ors.


                                     -Vs-


                      The State of West Bengal and another



For the Petitioners           :    Mr. Sourav Chatterjee,
                                   Mr. Soumya Nag.


For the State                 :    Mr. Rana Mukherjee,
                                   Mr. Bitasok Banerjee.


For the O.P. No. 2            :    Mr. Arnab Sinha,
                                   Mr. A. Basu.


Hearing concluded on          :    16.12.2024



Judgment on                   :     07.01.2025
                                       2


Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:

1. The present revisional application has been preferred praying for

quashing of the proceedings being Special Case No. 12 of 2018 pending

before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, First Court, Alipore,

South 24-Parganas arising out of Rabindra Sarobar Police Station Case

No. 65 of 2018 dated 2.5.2018 under Sections 448/323/504/506/34 of

the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 3/4 of the Scheduled Castes

and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and all orders

passed therein including the order dated 2.3.2019 passed by the

Learned Additional Sessions Judge, First Court, Alipore, South 24-

Parganas thereby issuing a non-bailable warrant of arrest against the

present petitioners.

2. The petitioners’ case is that he as well as the opposite party no. 2 are

employees of the Central Public Works Department (hereinafter referred

to as CPWD). The petitioner no. 2 is an employee of the Office of the

Assistant Estate Manager (under the Ministry of Housing and Urban

Affairs, Directorate of Estates) and the petitioner no. 3 was an employee

under the Ministry of Home Affairs. As such the petitioner nos. 2 and 3

were not employees of Central Public Works Department as falsely

alleged by the opposite party no. 2 in the application under Section

156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

3. That the petitioner no. 3 earlier used to reside at P-19, Southern

Avenue, Kolkata-700 029 but after attaining superannuation is living

elsewhere.

3

4. It is further stated that earlier, the opposite party no. 2 instituted a

criminal case being Lake Police Station Case No. 409 of 2015 dated

2.11.2015 under Sections 3(1)(viii)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act against the present

petitioners. The said case was duly investigated and upon investigation,

the Investigating agency arrived at an opinion of closing the

investigation declaring the said case as a mistake of fact vide Final

Report No. 220 of 2015 dated 26.12.2015.

5. The proceedings in the present case has been initiated on 02.05.2018

on the basis of an application under Section 156(3) of Cr. P.C.

6. The complainant’s case therein is that he is an employee of CPWD

under Central Government as “Safaiwala” and has been living at the

abovenoted quarter with his other family members since the year 2006.

7. The accused persons are also residing by the side of the petitioner’s

quarter in the same premises as they are the employees of CPWD.

8. It has been alleged that all the accused persons are continuously

creating torture upon the complainant and his family members both

physically and mentally with their motive to drive out the complainant

from the said premises.

9. That on 16.2.2016, 19.2.2016 and 9.9.2017 the said accused persons

forcibly and illegally criminally trespassed in the quarter of the

complainant and started to abuse the complainant and his family in

filthy languages calling them “Sala, Suorer baccha” etc. and on protest

they mercilessly assaulted the complainant by fist and blows and also

by iron rod.

4

10. The accused persons also allegedly openly declared that the

complainant and his family members have no right to occupy the said

quarter because the complainant is lower class man as “Safaiwala”.

11. In the meantime, accused Dulal Chakraborty petitioner no. 3 herein

retired from service and hence he left the said quarter but the other two

accused persons did not stop their cruelty and torture upon the

complainant and his family members.

12. Last on 25.11.2017 at about 11.00 A.M., the accused persons allegedly

criminally trespassed into the house of the complainant and assaulted

him and his family members and committed theft of some valuables

and cash of Rs. 10,000/- from the house, which was kept in the

almirah.

13. In Hitesh Verma vs The State of Uttarakhand & Anr., Criminal

Appeal No. 707 of 2020, on 05.11.2020, held:-

“14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or
intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is
to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up
for consideration before this Court in the judgment
reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through
Standing Counsel & Ors.,(2008) 8 SCC 435. The
Court had drawn distinction between the expression
“public place” and “in any place within public view”. It
was held that if an offence is committed outside the
building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn
can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside
the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a
place within the public view. On the contrary, if the
remark is made inside a building, but some members
of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends)
then it would not be an offence since it is not in the
public view. The Court held as under:

“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar,
the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3
(by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car
which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our
5

opinion, this was certainly a place within public view,
since the gate of a house is certainly a place within
public view. It could have been a different matter had
the alleged offence been committed inside a building,
and also was not in the public view. However, if the
offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn
outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by
someone from the road or lane outside the boundary
wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the
public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a
building, but some members of the public are there (not
merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an
offence since it is in the public view. We must,
therefore, not confuse the expression “place within
public view” with the expression “public place”. A
place can be a private place but yet within the public
view. On the other hand, a public place would
ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by
the Government or the municipality (or other local
body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State,
and not by private persons or private bodies.”

15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the
informant were within the four walls of her building. It
is not the case of the informant that there was any
member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at
the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the
basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any
place within public view” is not made out. In the list of
witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain
witnesses are named but it could not be said that
those were the persons present within the four walls of
the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place
within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view
of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh, it
cannot be said to be a place within public view as
none was said to be present within the four walls of
the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.”

14. The Supreme Court in Ramawatar vs State of Madhya Pradesh

reported in AIR 2021 SC 5228, wherein the Court categorically held:-

“16. On the other hand, where it appears to the
Court that the offence in question, although
covered under the SC/ST Act, primarily private
or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence
has not been committed on account of the caste
of the victim, or where the continuation of the
6

legal proceedings would be an abuse of the
process of law, the Court can exercise its power
to quash the proceedings. On similar lines,
when considering a prayer of quashing on the
basis of compromise/settlement, if the Court is
satisfied that the underlying objection of the Act
would not be contravened or diminished even if
the felony in question goes unpunished, the
mere fact that the offence is covered under a
„special statue’ would not refrain this Court or
the High Court, from exercising their respective
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or
Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure.”

15. The Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya

vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. in Criminal Appeal

No…../2023 (arising out of SLP(CRL) No. 1249 of 2023) in which

Paragraph 18 reads as follows:-

“18. That apart, assuming arguendo that the
appellant had hurled caste related abuses at the
complainant with a view to insult or humiliate him,
the same does not advance the case of the
complainant any further to bring it within the ambit
of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We have noted
from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge-sheet that
the same makes no reference to the utterances of
the appellant during the course of verbal altercation
or to the caste to which the complainant belonged,
except for the allegation/observation that caste-
related abuses were hurled. The legislative intent
seems to be clear that every insult or intimidation
for humiliation to a person would not amount to an
offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act
unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is
targeted at the victim because of he being a member
of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If on calls
another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a
thief (chor) in any place within public view, this
would obviously constitute an act intended to insult
or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive
language. Even if the same be directed generally to
a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or
Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract
7

section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with
casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/ST Act
bars invocation of the court‟s jurisdiction under
Section 438, Cr.P.C. and having regard to the
overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other laws, it
is desirable that before an accused is subjected to a
trial for alleged commission of offence under section
3(1)(x)
, the utterances made by him in any place
within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R.
(which is not required to be an encyclopaedia of all
facts and events), but at least in the charge-
sheet(which is prepared based either on statements
of witnesses recorded in course of investigation or
otherwise) so as to enable the court to ascertain
whether the charge sheet makes out a case of an
offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed
for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the
situation before it, prior to taking cognizance of the
offence. Even for the limited test that has to be
applied in a case of the present nature, the charge-
sheet dated 21st January, 2016 does not make out
any case of an offence having been committed by
the appellant under section 3(1)(x) warranting him
to stand a trial.”

16. In Randheer Singh vs The State of U.P. & Ors., Criminal Appeal

No. 932 of 2021, on September 02, 2021, the Supreme Court held:-

“23. Even though an FIR need not contain every detail,
an offence has to be made out in the FIR itself. It is the
case of the Private Respondents that Bela Rani has no
title. Bela Rani executed a false Power of Attorney in
favour of Rajan Kumar (since deceased). Alternatively,
the Power of Attorney, in itself, was a forged
document.

33. In this case, it appears that criminal proceedings
are being taken recourse to as a weapon of
harassment against a purchaser. It is reiterated at the
cost of repetition that the FIR does not disclose any
offence so far as the Appellant is concerned. There is
no whisper of how and in what manner, this Appellant
is involved in any criminal offence and the charge
sheet, the relevant part whereof has been extracted
above, is absolutely vague. There can be no doubt that
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should be
used sparingly for the purpose of preventing abuse of
the process of any court or otherwise to secure the
8

ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses criminal
offence or not depends on the nature of the allegation
and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal
offence are present or not has to be judged by the High
Court. There can be no doubt that a complaint
disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal
texture. The High Court has, however, to see whether
the dispute of a civil nature has been given colour of
criminal offence. In such a situation, the High Court
should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings
as held by this Court in Paramjeet Batra (supra)
extracted above.”

17. It is seen from the report submitted by the police through the

State, that the de facto complainant expired one year back and his

family members are not co-operating along with the police as to

whether they went to proceed in this case or not.

18. Case diary has been placed by the State.

19. It appears that there are no materials in the case diary to support

allegations herein, and the de facto complainant having expired and with

his family members not cooperating, continuing the present criminal

proceeding shall be an abuse of the process of law.

20. CRR 1519 of 2020 is thus allowed.

21. The proceedings being Special Case No. 12 of 2018 pending before the

learned Additional Sessions Judge, First Court, Alipore, South 24-

Parganas arising out of Rabindra Sarobar Police Station Case No. 65 of

2018 dated 2.5.2018 under Sections 448/323/504/506/34 of the Indian

Penal Code and under Sections 3/4 of the Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, is hereby quashed in

respect of the petitioners namely Raj Kumar Das, Manoj Kumar Jha

and Dulal Chakraborty.

9

22. All connected Applications, if any, stand disposed of.

23. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

24. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary

compliance.

25. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied

expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities.

(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)

[ad_1]

Source link

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here