Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Raj. State Road Tran. Corp.,Jpr. Andor vs Rampal (2025:Rj-Jd:24472-Db) on 19 May, 2025
[2025:RJ-JD:24472-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No. 466/2015
1. The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation,
Parivahan Marg, Rajasthan Jaipur.
2. The Hon'ble Transport Minister, Government of Rajasthan,
Jaipur.
3. The Managing Director, Rajasthan State Road Transport
Corporation, Parivahan Marg, Jaipur.
4. The Chief Manager, Rajasthan State Road Transport
Corporation, Bikaner.
----Appellants
Versus
Rampal son of Shri Shanker Lal, aged about 54 years, by caste
- Vishnoi, resident of Village-Alay, District Nagaur (Rajasthan).
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Dr. Harish Purohit, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Avinash Acharya, Advocate
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHAH
Order
19/05/2025
Per Hon’ble Mr. Sandeep Shah, J:
The instant Intra-Court Special Appeal has been filed by the
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred
to as R.S.R.T.C. for brevity) being aggrieved by the judgment
dated 05th February 2015 passed by the learned Single Judge,
whereby the writ petition being S.B. Civil Writ Petition
No.6643/2009 title (Rampal v. Rajasthan State Road Transport
Corporation & Ors.) filed by the respondent has been allowed with
a directions to the appellants to make complete payment of salary
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[2025:RJ-JD:24472-DB] (2 of 8) [SAW-466/2015]as per Clause 35(d) of the Standing Orders of R.S.R.T.C., along
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum to the respondent.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent, while
working as a Conductor under the respondent Corporation, was
served with an order dated 07th December 1993, whereby he was
placed under suspension pending a contemplated disciplinary
proceeding. The headquarters of the respondent, Rampal, was
fixed at Bikaner. It is the case of the respondent that since
07th December 1993, no charge sheet whatsoever was served
upon him. He claims to have approached various authorities, but
he was neither paid any subsistence allowance, nor was his
suspension order revoked.
3. The respondent further stated that he was falsely implicated
in a case under TADA; however, vide order dated 11 th May 2001,
the proceedings under the T.A.D.A. Act were dropped against him,
and thereafter, he was tried under the Arms Act. Being aggrieved
by the non-grant of subsistence allowance and continued
suspension for several years without any justification, the
respondent approached this Court by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition
No.2799/2001, which came to be disposed of vide order dated
27th February 2002. The petition was disposed of upon the
statements made by the learned counsel for the respondent that
the petitioner would appear before the Chief Manager, R.S.R.T.C
Bikaner in person on 01st March 2002 and will abide by the
instructions given by him in respect of marking his presence in
register and if he does so, he shall be paid the subsistence
allowance as per the Standing Orders/statutory rules. It was
further observed by the Hon’ble Court that, as far as the arrears
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are concerned, the respondent would submit a representation to
the respondents, who shall decide the same strictly in accordance
with law by passing a reasoned, speaking order.
3.1 Thereafter, the petitioner continuously submitted
representations, which also included notices for demand for
justice. Subsequently, vide order dated 09 th May 2002, the
respondent’s representation was dismissed by the Chief Manager,
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Bikaner. It was
observed that the respondent did not mark his attendance in the
office of the R.S.R.T.C. during the suspension period, had
remained in Police custody from 04 th February 1997 till
12th March 1997, and also failed to inform the appellants regarding
his being behind the bars. Therefore, it was held that the
respondent was not entitled for grant of subsistence allowance
from 07th December 1993 till 28th February 2002.
3.2 The respondent also placed on record before the learned
Single Judge a copy of the judgment dated 08 th December 2005,
pertaining to the criminal case lodged against him under Sections
3/25, 7/25, and 29 of the Arms Act, read with Section 205 I.P.C.
whereby he was acquitted of the offences alleged against him. The
respondent thus submitted that, since he has been acquitted,
nothing survives against him, and as per Clause 35(d) of the
Rajasthan State Road Transport Workshops Employees Standing
Orders, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Standing Orders of
1965’), he was entitled to the full salary for the period he
remained under suspension.
4. The appellants filed a reply to the writ petition and raised
preliminary objections with regards to the conduct of the
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respondent is not informing the employer with regard to the
criminal case lodged against him as also the fact that he was
behind the bars. Further a ground of delay was raised by the
appellants that the writ petition was filed belatedly. The appellants
emphasized that the respondent did not mark his attendance
during the period he remained under suspension, and therefore,
he was not entitled for subsistence allowance. An objection was
also taken that the writ petitioner had taken no liberty from the
learned Single Judge while his earlier writ petition was disposed of,
to challenge the subsequent order passed, and therefore, the writ
petition was hit by the provisions of Order 2 Rule II C.P.C. and
thus, the writ petition was not maintainable.
5. The learned Single Judge, after considering the arguments
of both sides, allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent.
It was observed that, as far as the non-marking of attendance by
the respondent before the Chief Manager, R.S.R.T.C., Bikaner is
concerned, admittedly no notice in this regard was ever issued to
him for his absence from duty during the said period, nor was any
inquiry initiated against him. It was further observed that, since
the respondent was acquitted in the criminal case, he was
therefore entitled to the benefit of full subsistence allowance
during the period of suspension, as per Clause 35(d) of the
Standing Orders of 1965.
6. Being aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been
filed. The counsel for the appellant reiterated the grounds taken in
the reply to the writ petition while arguing the present appeal, and
asserted that, since the respondent was behind the bars from
04th February 1997 till 12th March 1997, and then failed to mark
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his attendance during the suspension period, he is not entitled to
any benefit whatsoever. Therefore, there was no question of
payment of any subsistence allowance. Dr. Harish Purohit, learned
counsel for the appellants contends that the respondent was
involved in a serious crime under the T.A.D.A. Act, and therefore,
there was no justification for the learned Single Judge to direct the
grant of salary to the respondent for the period from 07 th
December 1993 till 28th February 2002. An objection regarding the
delay in approaching the writ Court was also raised by the learned
counsel for the appellant and it is contended that the order dated
09th May 2002 was challenged after almost seven years without
showing any justification. It has further been submitted that the
learned Single Judge did not consider all these aspects while
granting relief to the respondent, and therefore, it was prayed that
the appeal be allowed and the impugned judgment passed by the
learned Single Judge be quashed.
7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent
supported the judgment and asserted that the respondent
attempted to mark his presence but he was not permitted to do so
at Bikaner during the suspension period. A specific averment to
this effect was made in the earlier writ petition also. It is argued
that, irrespective of this, it is an admitted fact that the appellants
did not send any notice or correspondence requiring the
respondent to mark his presence at Bikaner. Therefore, the ground
sought to be taken by the appellants regarding non-marking of
attendance during the suspension period is a faulty and untenable
ground. Furthermore, it was argued that the respondent was
initially charged under the T.A.D.A. Act but the charges under
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T.A.D.A. were dropped on 11th May 2001 and vide judgment dated
08th December 2005 he was acquitted of the charges under the
Arms Act also. Thereafter, the respondent submitted a
representation, and when no action was taken, he approached this
Court by filing the writ petition. It is submitted that there was no
delay whatsoever, and even assuming that there was a minor
delay, it constituted a continuing cause of action insofar as the
non-grant of salary is concerned. Furthermore, no third-party
rights were created in the meantime. It was therefore submitted
that the learned Single Judge had considered all aspects of the
matter, and accordingly, the present appeal deserves to be
dismissed.
8. Having carefully perused the record of the case and after
considering the arguments of counsel for both sides, we are of the
firm opinion that, as far as the non-marking of attendance during
the suspension period is concerned, it is an admitted position that
no notice whatsoever was issued by the appellant Corporation for
the alleged non-appearance of the respondent at the headquarters
during the suspension period, nor were any disciplinary
proceedings initiated. Had it been the case of the appellants that
some notice was issued or that disciplinary proceedings were
initiated in relation to the non-appearance, the matter would
certainly have stood on a different footing. However, in the
present case, there is nothing on record to suggest that any such
notice was issued or disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against the respondent.
9. With regard of the respondent’s non-appearance, no benefit
can be derived by the appellants in connection with the same as
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held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Anwarun Nisha Khatoon v.
State of Bihar & Ors., (2002) 6 SCC 703″. Furthermore, in
“State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Bhan Tale, (1983) 3 SCC 387,
& Captain M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr.,
(1999) 3 SCC 679″, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, as
far as subsistence allowance is concerned, its payment during the
suspension period is mandatory. It is only when it is proven that,
during the period of suspension, the employee was gainfully
employed elsewhere, that the subsistence allowance can be
withheld and not otherwise. The Hon’ble Apex Court has gone
further to hold that, if a final order is passed by the disciplinary
authority without the payment of subsistence allowance, such
proceedings stand vitiated, as subsistence allowance has been
recognized as an integral part of the right to life under Article 21
of the Constitution.
9.1 As per the averments made by the respondents, the
subsistence allowance was not paid to the respondent for the
entire period and no notice regarding the non-attendance of the
respondent was ever served upon him. Therefore, the ground
taken by the appellants that the respondent did not attend the
office has no legal basis to stand on and is, therefore, rejected.
10. As far as the payment of subsistence allowance and the
procedure post-acquittal in a criminal case or post-conclusion of
inquiry is concerned, a specific provision has been made in the
Standing Orders of 1965, wherein Clause 35(d) provides as
follows:-
“(d) If, on conclusion of the inquiry or as the case may be, of
the criminal proceedings, the workman has been found not guilty
of the charge, he shall be deemed to have been on duty during(Downloaded on 30/05/2025 at 10:14:15 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:24472-DB] (8 of 8) [SAW-466/2015]the period of such suspension and shall be entitled to the same
wages as he would have received if he had not been suspended,
after deducting subsistence allowance paid to him for such
period.”
11. In the present case, it is admitted that the respondent was
suspended pending a contemplated disciplinary proceeding against
him. However, the admitted fact is that no charge sheet was ever
issued to the respondent. The ground taken by the appellants was
that since the respondent was undergoing trial for offences
punishable under sections 3/25, 7/25, and 29 of the Arms Act, he
was therefore kept under suspension. Needless to emphasize that
the respondent was acquitted by the Trial Court vide judgment
dated 08th December 2005. The necessary corollary post-acquittal
is that the employee concerned is entitled to treat the entire
period of suspension as duty period and is also entitled to receive
the same wages as he would have received had he not been
placed under suspension, subject to deduction of any subsistence
allowance already paid for such period.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal filed by the R.S.R.T.C.
is not having any merits and fails.
13. D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 466 of 2015 is dismissed.
(SANDEEP SHAH),J (SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR),J
22-devrajP/-
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